The British Agency House in Malaysia and Nigeria: evolving strategy in commodity trade by Purdie, Gavin Ernest
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Purdie, Gavin Ernest (2018) The British Agency House in Malaysia and 
Nigeria: evolving strategy in commodity trade. PhD thesis. 
 
 
https://theses.gla.ac.uk/9021/  
 
 
 
Copyright and moral rights for this work are retained by the author  
A copy can be downloaded for personal non-commercial research or study, 
without prior permission or charge  
This work cannot be reproduced or quoted extensively from without first 
obtaining permission in writing from the author  
The content must not be changed in any way or sold commercially in any 
format or medium without the formal permission of the author  
When referring to this work, full bibliographic details including the author, 
title, awarding institution and date of the thesis must be given 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Enlighten: Theses  
https://theses.gla.ac.uk/ 
research-enlighten@glasgow.ac.uk 
 
 The British Agency House in Malaysia and Nigeria: 
Evolving Strategy in Commodity Trade 
 
By 
 
 
Gavin Ernest Purdie 
MSc Contemporary Economic History 
 
 
 
 
 
Thesis submitted in fulfilment of the requirements of the Degree of 
PhD Economic and Social History 
 
School of Social and Political Sciences, College of Social Sciences 
University of Glasgow 
 
 
 30 March 2018 
  
2 
Declaration 
I declare that, except where explicit reference is made to the contribution of 
others, that this dissertation is the result of my own work and has not been 
submitted for any other degree at the University of Glasgow or any other 
institution. 
 
 
Printed Name: Gavin Ernest Purdie 
 
 
 
Signature:  
 
  
3 
Abstract 
The thesis compares the business activities of a particular type of British overseas 
trading company, the Agency House, in two former British colonies, Malaysia and 
Nigeria.  The thesis charts the commercial and political circumstances that heralded 
the arrival of the Agency House in each colony and the companies’ rapid business 
growth thereafter while trading under the relative security offered by the British 
Empire.  The thesis then examines the firms’ development in the aftermath of empire 
as the selected companies struggled to survive in independent nations.  Here, each 
of the London-domiciled boards faced a very different set of commercial conditions 
overseas, which were largely shaped by politics both home and abroad.  Each firm 
was forced into tough decisions on trade strategy to safeguard interests overseas 
and thereafter placate an increasingly hostile host regime.  After independence, the 
Agency House, as obvious and symbolic reminders of imperialism, became targets 
for punitive legislation aimed at redressing imbalances in the private sector and 
achieving the repatriation of corporate wealth in each of the selected nations. 
  
The commodity trade was the basis for the development of the Agency House in 
each former colony.  In Malaysia, a British-financed estate industry spread rapidly in 
response to escalating demand for rubber at the start of the 20th century.  By the 
1950s, for a number of reasons, the estate industry moved from rubber to oil palm 
cultivation, which quickly became a catalyst for a huge expansion in the plantation 
industry, the evidence of which is etched across the nation’s topography today.  In 
Nigeria, the production of (although not trade in) commodities always remained the 
remit of indigenes only which was enshrined in law, both colonial and nationalist, 
despite the lobbying by resident British traders.  This was one of a number of factors 
examined in the thesis to understand why trade there could not keep pace with the 
British estate development taking place in Malaysia and despite Nigeria’s long 
history in the export of commodities like palm oil.  Examining the commodity trade of 
each nation helps to explain the growth of the British Agency House to become 
commercial powerhouses in each nation.  The thesis therefore looks at the strategy 
of each firm, the trade they were engaged in and thereafter how each attempted to 
survive when confronted by increasingly hostile nationalist legislation.  It will also 
explain why only one of the Agency Houses examined here continues to trade today. 
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Preface and Acknowledgements 
My personal motivation for this study lies with a maternal grandfather who served in 
Malaya during the Second World War alongside West African troops, and, although 
he rarely talked about his experiences, he spoke warmly about the local people he 
encountered in Malaya and the African troops he fought alongside.  In 2010, I 
submitted an essay that examined the remarkable economic growth of Malaysia after 
independence from Britain.  The returned paper bore a remark: ‘but why did 
Malaysia develop faster than peer nations after independence?’  This got me 
thinking more deeply about the nation and particularly the British overseas 
companies that Malaysia played host to both before and after independence.  What 
became of those companies?  To complete a comparative study, Nigeria was 
chosen for a number of reasons.  After all, Nigeria, like Malaysia, was a former 
colony and dominated by British overseas firms at independence with a primary 
resource export industry that provided much of the nation’s revenue.  Despite these 
similarities, Nigeria struggled in the aftermath of independence both politically and 
economically regardless of the commercial contribution of those once resident British 
companies.  What therefore became of the companies that previously controlled so 
much of that all-important commodity trade?  To answer this question, a number of 
British overseas companies were selected to examine and compare their commercial 
histories within host nations.  Of course, other non-business factors also determined 
the fate of British companies, not least the pressure exerted on foreign interests by 
nationalist regimes.  At its most general, whereas Malaysia benefitted economically 
and commercially because of that prolonged British business presence, Nigeria did 
not.  This comparative analysis of the British Agency House therefore offers a take 
on business survival in an era of unique trading conditions in two former colonies. 
 
 This study was made possible by an award from the Economic and Social 
Research Council.  Furthermore, I have been fortunate to be supported by two 
wonderful supervisors, Ray Stokes and Sumita Mukherjee, to whom I am completely 
indebted for their constant guidance and immeasurable patience.  I also offer my 
thanks to the many academics who responded to my early enquiries when first 
formulating this research proposal back in 2010, most particularly, Nick White of 
Liverpool John Moores University.  This brings me to a number of elderly gentlemen 
who agreed to be interviewed, without whose input, this thesis would be neither 
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Africa Company (UAC), several times in London and their recollections of working for 
that company in Nigeria were invaluable.  Leslie Davidson, former chairman of 
Unilever’s Plantations Group, recounted not only his time working on Unilever’s oil 
palm estates in West Africa and Malaysia but also supplied me with many useful 
papers from his own personal business archives.  He also presented me a book he 
wrote, East of Kinabalu, a humorous take on estate life in Sabah in the 1960s.  
Perhaps he will not mind me repeating a comment made about that book by a former 
colleague, ‘and you know, some of it is even true!’  My gratitude also goes to Rod 
MacKenzie, who gave so much of his time in order to get the Malaysian palm oil 
story accurate.  He corrected many of my misconceptions including a number of 
those found in archives.  Brian Gray, Douglas Gold and Richard Lindesay were 
knowledgeable and enthusiastic interviewees at a meeting of the Tropical Growers 
Association in London.  Again, their insights on the Malaysian plantation industry 
feature throughout.  David Hopkinson, previously of M&G and Harrisons, covered 
investment matters in the plantation sector.  I also had the honour of spending time 
with Marc Gent, the last British chairman of Guthries, shortly before he sadly passed 
away.  My thanks also go out to Hereward Corley who arrived late in the day to 
assist me with the science behind the emergence of the oil palm.  Raja Alias, a long 
serving chairman of FELDA, gave a sincere account from the Malaysian perspective.  
During the course of my studies I visited a number of archives and special thanks 
goes to Diane Backhouse of Unilever, who spent many hours retrieving and copying 
papers on my behalf.  Finally, I am most deeply indebted to Henry Barlow whom I 
met and interviewed in Kuala Lumpur.  He remains active in the plantation industry of 
Malaysia today and currently sits on the board of Sime Darby.  In subsequent 
months, he freely gave much of his time to rectifying storyline errors and correcting 
schoolboy grammar. 
 
 Finally, I would just like to add that any errors in the thesis are completely 
down to yours truly. 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
The Basis for Comparative Business Analysis 
The purpose of this thesis is to conduct a comparative study into some of the most 
prominent British overseas trading firms to have operated in the former colonies of 
Malaysia and Nigeria.  These companies became known as Agency Houses.  In the 
case of Nigeria, the company selected was the United Africa Company (UAC), a 
Unilever subsidiary which dominated the commodity trade there during the colonial 
period and for a considerable amount of time after independence.  For Malaysia, 
where the trade was more diversified, a number of companies were selected, 
including: Thomas Barlow & Brother (Barlows), the Guthrie Corporation (Guthries) 
and Harrisons & Crosfield (Harrisons).  Only the last of those, Harrisons, trades 
today, albeit in a new company name, Elements plc.  That said, every one of these 
firms was, for much of the 20th century, extremely successful and therefore powerful 
businesses within host nations.  Moreover, most of their profits were generated by 
the trade in commodities.  As such, all companies selected made key contributions 
within the private sector of each host nation both during and after British rule. 
 
 Existing research on the activities of the British Agency House in former 
British colonies before and after independence is rather sparse despite the historical 
commercial importance of these firms in trade development overseas.  It is therefore 
a much neglected area of study in the history of business. This thesis seeks to make 
a contribution to this area by looking at the Agency House business model, the 
evolution of this type of firm overseas and its trading strategy during imperialist times 
and, later, within independent nations.  Moreover, by undertaking a comparative 
study of the companies named above, the thesis offers insights into the development 
of a global trade in commodities in the 20th century, a trade that has been crucial to 
both Malaysia and Nigeria as well as a number of other developing countries.  
Throughout, attention will be given to evolving business strategies as these firms 
sought to survive in a demanding and ever-changing (and eventually deteriorating) 
overseas trading environment.  All in all, then, this study can therefore make an 
important contribution to the historiography of firm. 
 
 The aims of this introduction are to examine the extant literature in the main 
subject areas covered in the thesis and to identify the various research resources 
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accessed.  The time-span of the study covers the early years of British trade in 
Malaysia and Nigeria in the late 19th and early 20th centuries, moving chronologically 
through business expansion and company consolidation under direct rule and then 
to the fate of the firms after independence, when the commercial dominance of the 
Agency House overseas was eroded by the legislation introduced in host nations.   
Ultimately, the thesis also argues that the business legacy of the Agency House, and 
of imperialist modes of production more generally, that were established under 
British rule continue to have a significant impact on the economies of Malaysia and 
Nigeria to this day. 
 
The Background: British Business in a Colonial Context 
Even at its height, British rule was never homogenous across the Empire and 
differed between and within colonies.  In Nigeria, the east and west of the country 
were governed directly by the British Colonial Office, whereas the northern region 
was largely left to the traditional rule of local emirs and tribal chiefs.  For that reason, 
British companies rarely ventured north and had a minimal commercial presence 
there.  What business there was in that area was conducted through indigenous 
intermediaries.  A similar state of affairs occurred initially on the Malayan Peninsula 
where most British interests were clustered around the major ports.  However, the 
sovereignty of the Malay emirs was gradually eroded and replaced by more explicit 
British rule which was motivated and underpinned by profits from rubber production 
and other extractive industries like tin mines.  As a rule of thumb, the movement of a 
British commercial presence inland was followed by more direct rule.   
 
British investment in Nigeria, Malaya and other colonies was undertaken in 
large part by what are known as Free Standing Companies (FSCs), firms 
headquartered and with owners/stockholders based in Britain, but with all operations 
overseas. These companies have been the focus of some research, for instance by 
Mira Wilkins and Kevin Tennant.1  To carry out their trade activity overseas, FSCs 
relied crucially on the services of another set of organisations that have not been the 
                                                 
1 Mira Wilkins, ‘The Free Standing Company 1870-1914: an important type of British foreign direct 
investment’, Economic History Review, 41 (1988), pp. 259-82. Kevin Tennant, Owned, monitored, but not 
always controlled: understanding the success and failure of Scottish Free-Standing Companies, 1862-1910, 
(unpublished PhD Thesis, London School of Economics and Political Science, August 2009). 
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subject of systematic scholarly research to date, that is the Agency House, a unique 
commercial organisation that offered all manner of support services, including estate 
management, insurance and various other ancillary services, in support of a rapidly 
emerging commodity trade.  
 
Malaysia and Nigeria played host to some of the most successful British 
overseas traders and Agency Houses of the 20th century.  The firms selected for this 
study are among that group, and all became hugely influential overseas due to a 
business presence that was built under British rule.  These companies were 
particularly prominent in agriculture and the commodity trade, which at its height 
supplied the industrialised world with essential primary resources such as rubber and 
palm oil.  The export of those commodities formed one segment of a lucrative 
shipping trade route that, in turn, involved the export of British manufactured goods 
to the colonies and many other overseas markets.  Under the protection of the British 
Empire, that trade generated vast profits for company and investor alike.  
 
 Both nations, as commodity producers, were therefore destinations for British 
exports and for the investment capital required to finance the various commercial 
ventures prosecuted in-country.  As a result, Malaysia and Nigeria experienced rapid 
commercial development and increased commodity production in the early 20th 
century.  Of course, opening up these nations to international trade also rendered 
them vulnerable to market price volatility and potential financial crisis.  Some 
commodities were more vulnerable than others, none more so than the rubber 
produced on the Malayan estates.  That market volatility, in turn, paved the way for 
the Agency House.  Despite intermittent trading setbacks caused by war and other 
crises, British Agency Houses in general proved financially robust and able to resist 
external pressures.  Each of the selected companies was therefore able to expand 
holdings through steady asset accumulation in their respective colonies.  Indeed, 
such was the commercial power of the Agency House at independence that the 
economies of Malaysia and Nigeria were essentially shackled to imperialist modes of 
production.  That is, each economy depended heavily on the export of commodities 
for finance, not least in relation to paying for imports of manufactured goods.  
Breaking that dependency meant tackling the business hegemony of the British 
Agency House.  The manner in which each regime pursued that goal forms a major 
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thread to this thesis.  For the Agency House, on the other hand, the manner by 
which company directors in London responded to political pressure and overseas 
legislation and regulation ultimately determined business survival.  It was here that 
those London based directors earned their stripes.  It was obvious during the course 
of this study that one company managed that challenge better than all others.  
Before we get to that, though, it is first important to explain more fully why the thesis 
places an emphasis on the commodity trade, and in particular, trade in rubber and 
palm oil. 
 
The Agency House and the Commodity Trade 
Despite geographical distance and cultural differences between Malaysia and 
Nigeria, there have been a number of similarities between these nations, particularly 
in trade.  Of course, operating within the British Empire was an obvious parallel, as 
was the rapid commercial development that took place to facilitate the extraction of 
primary resources.  Each colony was resource rich and viewed by Westminster in 
the 19th century as a supplier of raw materials to a rapidly industrialising Britain.  
British companies seized control of that trade within the colonies, and both Malaysia 
and Nigeria played host to a huge number of FSCs.  The FSC could not operate 
independently, however, and that is where the Agency House, offering a suite of 
professional services, came to the fore.  It was a position aided and abetted at times 
by the local British colonial representatives.  That subsequent business dominance 
attained by the Agency House continued to hold sway until independence for 
Malaysia and Nigeria. 
 
 If business development is held to be a prerequisite for economic growth, then 
how each of the nationalist regimes chose to regulate the private sector after 
independence was crucially important.  It was certainly true of Malaysia and Nigeria 
as government policy there had ramifications for that all important commodity trade.  
That policy also impacted on inward investment flows and thereby any proposed 
plans for business and economic development.  Therefore the actions of government 
immediately after independence along with the subsequent treatment of established 
British business interests can help explain why Malaysia and Nigeria have occupied 
opposite ends of the economic development league table for a number of years.  
That gulf was confirmed by the World Bank’s ‘ease of doing business’ index in 2015 
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which placed Malaysia at position ‘18’ and Nigeria well down at position ‘170’.2  The 
same organisation more recently categorised Malaysia an ‘upper-middle class’ 
nation and reported elsewhere ‘Nigeria’s economic performance since Independence 
[in 1960] has been decidedly unimpressive’.3  This thesis examines the role of British 
Agency Houses and their evolving business strategies in these developments. 
 
British Company Activity Overseas 
To understand the historic performance of any nation’s economy fully, it is typically 
necessary to assess the contribution of certain companies and their role in key 
sectors.  That statement certainly holds true for both Malaysia and Nigeria, where 
several British firms steadily emerged to dominate a number of important sectors.  
As the British Empire spread wider, the number of FSCs pursuing business 
opportunity overseas increased throughout the 19th century. 4   These various 
enterprises were vehicles for the spread of British capital, culture, goods, people and 
skills.  In London, the City’s financial houses were conduits through which 
investments were funnelled overseas to finance those far-flung ventures.  In a short 
time, the British trade footprint had spread across the globe, protected and 
supported by a state bent on global power.  As such, the objectives of Westminster 
and that of the overseas trader often overlapped.  This was made evident in an 1890 
speech to parliament, when Prime Minister Lord Salisbury declared that for Africa 
‘the interests of this country are the interests of the Royal Niger Company’.5  In those 
days, the state could rightly be thought of as a sort of super-joint stock company, or, 
more simply, ‘Great Britain Ltd’.6  Among those British overseas possessions was 
                                                 
2 See World Bank’s ‘Doing Business 2015: Going beyond Efficiency’, 
<http://www.doingbusiness.org/~/media/GIAWB/Doing%20Business/Documents/Annual-
Reports/English/DB15-Chapters/DB15-Report-Overview.pdf>, p. 4, (accessed, 12 November 2015). 
3For Malaysia, Zainal Aznam and Yusof Deepak Bhattasali, ‘Economic Growth and   Development in 
Malaysia:   Policy Making and Leadership’, Commission of Growth and Development working paper, no. 27, p. 
1, see <http://siteresources.worldbank.org/EXTPREMNET/Resources/489960-
1338997241035/Growth_Commission_Working_Paper_27_Economic_Growth_Development_Malaysia_Policy
_Making_Leadership.pdf>, (accessed 25 August 2015). For Nigeria, Milton A Iyoha, ‘Leadership, Policy Making, 
and Economic Growth in African Countries: The Case of Nigeria’, Commission on Growth and Development 
working paper, no. 17. Washington, DC: World Bank, p. 1, see 
<http://siteresources.worldbank.org/EXTPREMNET/Resources/489960-
1338997241035/Growth_Commission_Vol3_Leadership_Growth_Ch6_Leadership_Policy_Making_Economic_
Growth_African_Countries_Case_Nigeria.pdf>, (accessed 25 August 2015). 
4 Mira Wilkins, ‘The Free Standing Company’, pp. 259-82. 
5Andrew Roberts, Salisbury: Victorian Titan, (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1999), p. 529. 
6 C G Wrigley, ‘Empire and Commerce in Africa’, Journal of Commonwealth Political Studies, 7 (1969), p. 248. 
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the Malayan Peninsula and, in West Africa, the lands that would eventually form 
Nigeria.  In both regions, ports were quickly established to accommodate and attract 
further British trade.  As more FSCs brought their investment to bear on the two 
regions, they soon became part of a Pax Britannica that would emerge to dominate 
global trade for many years to come. 
 
 At the end of the 19th century, that thirst for global power and trade supremacy 
was still very much alive within Westminster and the company boardroom.  It was, 
however, a partnership and shared vision that did not survive the 20th century.  
When the near bankrupt British economy staggered into a new world order in 1945, it 
was clear that this ‘old boy’ public and private alliance was a thing of the past as 
rapid withdrawal from empire ensued.  Despite this, many British companies stayed 
on in Malaysia and Nigeria and, for a time, continued to dominate trade in each 
nation.  That commercial dominance would eventually come to an end.  The question 
was when?  First though, we step back to name the companies that are selected by 
this thesis and their respective host nations. 
 
The British Overseas Company and the Host Nation 
So what became of those British Agency Houses and numerous FSCs, those agents 
of trade and Empire?  In Malaysia and Nigeria, a few firms were so prominent that 
their individual business histories serve as a template for the private-sector 
development that took place in those nations.  Certainly, rates of attrition for the 
overseas firm were always high and company structures within colonies were 
constantly being streamlined by merger and acquisition activities.  In Malaya all of 
the selected Agency Houses in this thesis began life as family-owned concerns.  
Guthries and Harrisons had, however, become publicly listed firms by the early 20th 
century, whereas Barlows stayed firmly under family control.  It was a time of 
unprecedented demand for rubber, an industry in which all Agency Houses invested 
heavily.  As market prices soared, huge profits were reaped by investors.  With time, 
many standalone estate operators came under the de facto control of their biggest 
shareholders, the Agency Houses.  Development of the estate industry in Malaysia 
was thereafter directed from the London boardrooms of those same Agency Houses.  
For Nigeria, the United Africa Company emerged as the leading commercial 
enterprise in West Africa by far while in Malaysia a number of Agency Houses came 
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to the fore.  Despite the similar areas of trade in which the companies participated, 
however, there was no single blueprint for the corporate command structure of these 
firms.  UAC, a subsidiary of Unilever, was formed in 1929 albeit with a largely 
autonomous set of directors and, in time, separate headquarters from the parent 
company in London.  That relatively autarchic status saw UAC management rapidly 
expand company interests across West Africa (and beyond). 
 
 By the outbreak of the Second World War, then, a few British overseas firms 
had risen to the top of the business pile in both Malaysia and Nigeria.  To achieve 
that level of success, access to capital was crucial which in itself explains why the 
management of Harrisons and Guthries had decided to float each company on the 
London Stock Exchange.  For any competing firm, indigenous or otherwise, such 
access to finance was a barrier to challenging what quickly became an established 
hierarchy of British companies in the colonies.  If we fast forward to independence, 
very little had changed in each nation, and the all-important trade in commodities 
was still dominated by the Agency Houses.  Therefore, the spending plans of a new 
nationalist government were heavily dependent on a trade still under the control of 
the British.  Each regime had difficult policy choices to make.  That challenge came 
to a head in the 1970s when nationalist regimes demanded the transfer of equity 
from British companies to indigenous people and public bodies.  Such was the scale 
of profits being generated year on year by an increasingly lucrative commodity trade, 
especially in Malaysia, that the host nation was keen to share in the wealth.  This 
was resisted in London, and companies thereafter sought to redeploy business out 
of host nations.  It was a struggle between host nation and the London board of 
directors that would continue until the early 1980s.  As such, that trade in 
commodities, both in Malaysia and Nigeria, can act as a prism through which to 
examine the interplay between British business development and government policy 
in each nation.  It is here that the discipline of business history can offer an insight 
into company strategy during an era of political change across a rapidly contracting 
British Empire. 
 
The Host Nation Perspective 
In her study of British business in West Africa post 1945, historian Stephanie Decker 
argued that, when decolonisation was in full swing, British firms in Nigeria and 
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Ghana sought to curry favour with a nationalist regime by aligning commercial 
strategy more closely to local development policy.  Decker claimed that a 
‘Development Consensus’ emerged between authorities and resident British firms.7  
This appraisal of the commercial landscape in West Africa has much merit and can 
be equally applied to the Malaysian private sector at that time.  As independence 
approached, the colonial body increasingly courted British overseas companies to 
invest locally as a means to placate loud demands in the colonies themselves for 
development.  What is more, as independence neared, Westminster also came to 
view economic and social development in the colonies as essential to fend off the 
more extreme aspects of nationalism.  It could also provide breathing space for 
authorities to manoeuvre pro-British politicians to power. 8   Of course, and not 
incidentally, achieving those goals would also prolong the flow of commodities on 
favourable terms to British industry.  This neo-colonialist plan was recognised by the 
historian Harry Magdoff who noted that ‘both the economic and political structures of 
the former colonies are well suited to the perpetuation of economic dependence 
along with political independence’.9   In this regard, the Agency Houses in both 
nations were able to consolidate commercial holdings and power across the private 
sector.  It lent weight to an argument that the British firm had managed to trap a host 
nation within a colonial mode of production.10  Therefore, at independence, it can be 
argued along the lines of Magdoff that, although political independence had been 
achieved, real economic freedom for Malaysia and Nigeria was still some way off. 
 
 The fact that much of the development that took place in Malaysia and Nigeria 
immediately prior to independence was funded by private capital lends added 
credence to the thesis that the British government and the nation’s business 
                                                 
7Stephanie Decker, Building up Goodwill: British Business, Development and Economic Nationalism in Ghana 
and Nigeria, 1945-1977, (unpublished PhD Thesis, University of Liverpool, 2006).  Decker states ‘International 
business defended its controversial presence in decolonizing countries by arguing its case in terms of 
promoting development’, p. 16. 
8 In Malaysia, the first Prime Minister, Tunku Abdul Rahman, was acknowledged as an anglophile who 
graduated from the University of Cambridge in 1924. In Nigeria, the nation’s first and only Prime Minister, 
Abubakar Tafawa Balewa, spent a year at the University of London in 1944.  Nigeria’s first president, Dr 
Nnamdi Azikewe, was also held to be pro-British. See John E. Flint, ‘”Managing Nationalism”: the Colonial 
Office and Nnamdi Azikewe, 1932-43, in Robert D King and Robin Kilson, The Statecraft of British Imperialism, 
Essays in honour of Wm. Roger Louis, (London: Frank Cass, 1999), pp. 143-58. 
9 Harry Magdoff, Imperialism without Colonies, (New York: Monthly Review Press, 2003), p. 112. 
10 One particularly forthright text which addresses post-colonial business in Nigeria is Toyin Falola (ed.), Britain 
and Nigeria: Exploitation or Development, (New Jersey: Zed Books, 1987), pp. 1-272. 
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interests hatched a neo-colonial conspiracy in the run-up to independence.  
Moreover, many perceived British friendly politicians did assume power at 
independence.  However, as this thesis will demonstrate, the relationship between 
the British overseas firm and the colonial regime was not as formidable as the 
‘Development Consensus’ implied.  This became particularly apparent during the 
British decolonisation programme when local business leaders were rarely, if ever, 
consulted.11  That very point was underscored by those interviewed by this thesis.12  
After independence, however, sentiment in favour of the former power began to 
deteriorate, and thereafter the stability and determination of the newly independent 
government determined the strength and type of legislation aimed at reducing those 
substantial British company holdings.  That choice of legislation was tempered by the 
fact that each new wave of indigenization put forward by government incurred costs 
and ultimately produced different outcomes.  In the end, the task of tackling British 
commercial strength was managed more effectively by the government of Malaysia, 
a point that frequently surfaces in the latter chapters of this thesis. 
 
 Despite the political disengagement that was taking place at nation-state 
level, however, the perpetuation of a British business presence in Malaysia after 
independence was, on the whole, a factor that encouraged further investment in the 
new country’s estate industry.  That was not the case in Nigeria where, despite 
similar levels of economic dependency on commodity exports and of British 
company dominance, an estate industry was never possible.  The outright ban on 
foreign-owned land tenure ultimately shaped agricultural production across the 
nation and eventually caused it to stagnate.  Therefore, the developments that took 
place within the commodity trade in each nation were, to a large extent, products of 
the relationship that existed between British firms operating in country and the host 
regime.  Before we develop this argument further, however, we need to explore 
themes identified in the existing scholarly literature on the subject, which underpins 
this area of research. 
                                                 
11 Sarah Stockwell, ‘Trade, Empire, and the Fiscal Context of Imperial Business during Decolonization’, 
Economic History Review, 57 (2004), and Nicholas J White, ‘the Business and the Politics of Decolonization: the 
British experience in the 20th century’, Economic History Review, 53 (2000).  The historians argue that there is 
little evidence to indicate an alliance between the British Government and directors of overseas companies. 
12 All of those interviewed commented on the growing gulf that emerged between local colonial figures and 
resident company representatives in Malaysia and Nigeria which extended to London. 
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Literature Review 
As the largest empire the world has witnessed, the British Empire from the late 19th 
century until the Second World War has, unsurprisingly, been the focus of extensive 
scholarly and popular inquiry.  However, the complexities of British imperialism have 
led to a situation where, in the words of imperial historian Paul Hayes, that ‘to write 
on imperial issues is immediately to enter a world of controversy’.13  Moreover, the 
historian David Fieldhouse warned that the subject is ‘beyond the competence of any 
one man: there can no longer be a complete imperial historian’.14  In large part, the 
complexities and breadth of the subject derive from disparities in rule from colony to 
colony, which in turn influenced the type and conduct of trade pursued by overseas 
companies.  In part for this reason, this thesis uses comparative analysis to assess 
the business histories of a number of British firms that operated in Malaysia and 
Nigeria prior to and following independence. 
 
But another reason for focusing on companies active in the British colonies 
and the independent states that succeeded them stems from the paucity of existing 
scholarly research in the area, in particular that which examines overseas business 
in the post-colonial era.  The imperial historian Ronald Robinson highlighted this in 
general terms when he wrote that ‘the paradox of imperialism after empire raised 
questions for the historian that are not usually asked, because they are too difficult to 
answer’.15  Sarah Stockwell has confirmed Robinson’s claim with regard to business, 
writing in 2000 that ‘there has been little detailed investigation of the activities of 
British business during the end of empire’.16 Despite this, some pioneering works 
have emerged in recent years.  In 2004, for instance, Nicholas White wrote about the 
challenges faced by the Malaysian government when attempting to secure 
ownership of foreign-owned assets like the estates.  White’s book and related papers 
predominantly look at political aspects, weighing up the question of whether the 
persistence of British commercial dominance constituted neo-colonialism, which in 
                                                 
13 Paul Hayes, ‘British Foreign Policy and the Influence of the Empire, 1870-1920, Journal of Imperial and 
Commonwealth History, 12 (1984), p. 102. 
14 David Fieldhouse, ‘Can Humpty-Dumpty be put together again? Imperial History in the 1980s’, in Holland, 
Imperialism and Decolonization, p. 22. 
15 Ronald Robinson, ‘Imperial Theory and the Question of Imperialism after Empire’, in Holland, Imperialism 
and Decolonisation, p. 43. 
16 Sarah Stockwell, the Business of Decolonisation: British Business Strategies in the Gold Coast, (Oxford: OUP, 
2000), p. 4.  
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turn provoked government to adopt a more aggressive approach to achieve 
economic nationalism.17  White does not, though, examine the trading activities of 
the Agency House and the strategy each employed to combat legislation.  This is a 
critical point as the trade and strategy of the British firms in Malaysia contrasted with 
that of UAC in Nigeria.  For this nation, recent and ground-breaking research by 
Stephanie Decker tells a very different story.  Decker claimed that resident British 
companies, UAC included, sought to ‘build up goodwill’ with local authorities by 
realigning operations to complement the development goals of an independent host 
nation. 18   In the end, that strategy did not pay off for UAC as the Nigerian 
government, weighed down by a balance of payments deficit, sought to placate a 
restless populace by targeting foreign companies.  Again, Decker does not dwell on 
the specifics of UAC trade, something that is at the centre of a considerable part of 
the analysis put forward in this thesis. 
 
 Other business historians, however, have indeed examined company strategy 
and structure in the colonial era. In 1988, for instance, Mira Wilkins, writing about the 
spread of British overseas trade during the 19th century, first coined the term ‘Free 
Standing Company’ (FSC).19  A huge number of those FSCs fanned out across the 
British Empire (and elsewhere) to exploit a multitude of commercial opportunities.  
Many ventures were in the extractive industries, and it was the FSCs that first 
established the European estate culture in Malaysia and elsewhere.  The financial 
capital provided to those ventures came from privileged elite that Koebner labelled 
‘financial parasites, [namely] investors, dealers or financiers’.  Those investors were 
encouraged to invest overseas ‘because the home market is bound to render 
diminishing returns’.20  Indeed Fieldhouse estimated between the years 1862 and 
1893, the flow of capital overseas rose from £144 million to a staggering £1698 
million.21  Both Malaysia and Nigeria were the destinations for a number of FSCs 
and the regions subsequently benefitted from that outward flow of British capital. 
                                                 
17 Nicholas J White, British Business in Post-Colonial Malaysia: Neo-colonialism or disengagement?, (Oxon: 
RoutledgeCurzon, 2004). 
18 Decker, Building up Goodwill, p.16. 
19 Mira Wilkins, ‘The Free Standing Company’, pp. 259-82. 
20 Richard Koebner, ‘The Concept of Economic Imperialism’, Economic History Review, 2 (1949), p. 28. 
21 David Fieldhouse, ‘Imperialism: An Historiographical Revision’, Economic History Review, 14 (1961), p. 190. 
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As the commercial landscape of each colony matured, the Agency House 
business model emerged prominently.  Geoffrey Jones outlined the main difference 
between the two types of overseas British companies: the FSC was ‘heavily 
specialized in trading in a single commodity... [Whereas] many merchant houses 
[Agency Houses] had taken on a “hybrid” character by 1870’.22  It was that multi-
faceted approach to business that allowed a number of Agency Houses to emerge 
and eventually to dominate trade in particular colonies.  Jones highlighted this when 
he wrote that ‘real management control from Britain was exercised over the free-
standing companies in these groups’.23  Chapman confirmed this when stating that ‘it 
was the Agency House that wielded real power and influence over foreign 
commerce’.24  One reason for this was that FSCs which operated their own estates 
were engaged in an often lucrative, but very risky, business, because of the volatility 
of markets for commodities. Agency Houses, on the other hand, managed to survive 
by consistently spreading risk through the measured purchase of shares in profitable 
local firms or FSCs while at the same time providing professional services to those 
same commercial clients.  In fact, Jones asserted that, in time, it was the Agency 
Houses that became true multinationals.25  Again, that is a notable claim particularly 
given the surprisingly few papers that have been written on this type of company.  
Therefore, this study of their emergence and development can contribute to the 
existing historiography of the firm. Moreover, this study is structured around firms 
engaged in the commodity trade, and it also draws upon this literature. 
 
Commodities and Business Development 
Sven Beckert, in his study of cotton, argued that ‘by focusing on one specific 
commodity...we are able to see connections between peoples and places that would 
remain on the margins’.26  This study focuses on two closely related commodities, 
rubber and palm oil.  Both provide an opportunity to view trade development in 
Malaysia and Nigeria from the vantage point of the British Agency House.  Rubber, 
                                                 
22 Geoffrey Jones, Merchants to Multinationals: British Trading Companies in the Nineteenth and Twentieth 
Centuries, (Oxford: OUP, 2000), p. 43. 
23 Jones, Merchants to Multinationals, p. 343. 
24 Stanley D Chapman, Merchant Enterprise in Britain: from the Industrial Revolution to World War I, 
(Cambridge: CUP, 1992), pp. 1-339. 
25 Jones, Merchants to Multinationals, pp. 1-404. 
26 Sven Beckert, Empire of Cotton: A Global History, (New York: Alfred A Knopf, 2014), p. xxii. 
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both natural and synthetic, has been extensively researched by a number of 
historians, most notably Barlow,27 and there has been a long tradition of cultivating it 
in Malaysia.  In contrast, the oil palm, with its origins in West Africa, has been the 
subject of limited scholarly inquiry, this despite the fact that palm oil was a crucial 
part of the Nigerian economy through 1945 and beyond and that British-owned 
estates in Malaysia began moving from rubber to palm oil production in a big way in 
the 1950s. 
 
Literature on palm oil in Nigeria is virtually non-existent.  On the other hand, 
there is some scholarship on palm oil in Malaysia.  Historian Pletcher is one example 
from this literature, although his paper on the Malaysian palm oil industry claims that 
‘much of the credit for this [palm oil industry] success lies with the government of 
Malaysia for its active investment in palm oil production’.28  This is certainly true 
insofar as development of any industry (especially in a developing country) cannot 
take place without the support of government.  Pletcher, though, makes no mention 
at all of the investment capital and research effort of British companies, which kick-
started palm oil production on the estates of Malaysia.  Similarly, Jaya Gopal has 
written about the emergence of a palm oil refinery industry in Malaysia,29 but also 
omitted any mention of British company involvement.  This is more than a little 
surprising given that it was Lever Brothers (Unilever) that built the nation’s very first 
refinery outside Kuala Lumpur in the early 1950’s.30  Susan Martin, on the other 
hand, does acknowledge the dominance of the British Agency House in her research 
on the Danish company, United Plantations, although her focus on a company from 
another nation naturally entails limited attention to the full story of the British role.31  
The point to take from existing literature on palm oil in Malaysia is that the 
                                                 
27 Colin Barlow, The Natural Rubber Industry: Its Development, Technology and Economy in Malaysia, (Oxford: 
OUP, 1978), p.28, Also P. T. Bauer, The Rubber Industry: a Study in Competition and Monopoly, (London: 
Longman’s Green, 1948), pp. 1-404. Also see James Hagan and Andrew Wells, ‘the British and rubber in 
Malaya, c1890-1940’, Research Online, (2005), pp. 143-150. For price related material see Frederick R. 
Hoisington, ‘Commodities: High Finance in Rubber’, Financial Analysts Journal, 16 (1960), pp. 105-16. 
28 James Pletcher, ‘Regulation with Growth: the Political Economy of Palm Oil in Malaysia’, World 
Development, 19 (1991), pp. 626-7. 
29 Jaya Gopal, ‘the Development of Malaysia’s Palm Oil Refining Industry: Obstacles, Policy and Performance’, 
unpublished thesis, University of London, January 2001. 
30 Leslie Davidson, ‘Agricultural Globalisation and the Impact on Malaysia’s Oil Palm Industry’, International 
Planters Conference: 16-18 June 2003, p. 7. 
31 Susan Martin, the UP Saga, (NIAS Press, 2004), pp. 1-356. 
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contribution of the British estate operator and the Agency Houses that exercised de 
facto control over the industry have been much neglected.  This thesis addresses 
this neglect, examining the developments that took place in Malaysia alongside the 
commodity’s relative demise in Nigeria, which can reveal much about those Agency 
Houses that dominated the trade in each nation before and after independence. 
 
The Companies 
Of the companies dealt with here, Peter Pugh wrote a company-sponsored history of 
Harrisons in 1990.32  This book did not, however, attempt to examine the firm’s 
trading strategy with prevailing Malaysian (and colonial) legislation and indeed 
largely glossed over the challenges encountered in the 1970s by British firms, 
especially those in the estate industry.  In the case of Nigeria, Fieldhouse wrote 
extensively on UAC, but, much like Pugh, mainly looked at the company from a 
London perspective.33  Furthermore, Charles Wilson, who has researched Unilever 
intensively, made frequent reference to UAC because of the subsidiary’s frequent 
financial importance to the parent company.34  Again, however, Wilson wrote little 
about the type of trade conducted by UAC in Nigeria and the impact that subsequent 
government legislation had on company strategy and profits.  Each of these 
company biographies are, at times, referred to in the thesis but the content does not 
always apply well to the comparative issues dealt with here.  Therefore, the earlier 
noted literature by Wilkins and Jones has more relevance to this study and 
particularly to the different and evolving British company structures in each colony. 
 
Decolonisation and Neo-colonialism 
In early imperialism, Burroughs contended, ‘the [British] state used its authority to 
create a framework for commercial activity and to define the terms of 
development.’35  The companies selected here certainly benefited at times from that 
state-sponsored policy in Malaysia and Nigeria.  After the Second World War though, 
                                                 
32 Peter Pugh et al, Great Enterprise: a History of Harrisons & Crosfield, (Frome: Butler & Tanner, 1990). 
33 David Fieldhouse, Merchant Capital and Economic Decolonisation: the United Africa Company, 1929-1987, 
(Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1994). 
34 Charles Wilson, the History of Unilever: A Study in Economic Growth and Social Change, (London: Cassell & 
Company Ltd., 1968). 
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Darwin concluded that ‘the influence which the British hoped to exercise over their 
former colonies faded away as their economic fortunes declined’.36   Hence the 
position of the British company overseas became more fragile, particularly when 
nationalist politicians assumed power.  Darwin went on to write that ‘the British had 
come to recognise that major changes would have to be made in their empire to 
meet local aspirations.’ 37   This fits with Decker’s point that resident British 
companies, like UAC, actively sought to align trade more closely to the development 
goals of government at independence.  That said, the political influence of distant 
Westminster was still apparent at this time.  On that subject, Holland wrote that 
‘wherever national elections were integrated into the colonial system, the British 
could make or break African politicians’.38  Gallagher and Robinson agreed that the 
British imposition of ‘responsible government, far from being a separatist device, was 
simply a change from direct to indirect methods of maintaining British interests’.39  
That indirect power was evident in Malaysia where a number of English educated 
politicians took office at independence.  They were simply more amenable to British 
interests which included the maintenance of a private sector status quo.  Of course, 
for nationalists, the meddling of a former power alongside lingering British business 
dominance smacked of neo-colonialism.  On that point, a number of Nigerian 
historians have accused Britain of what they claim was the sustained exploitation of 
their nation which was perpetrated by British firms.40  It is a controversial claim and 
one that lays blame for any subsequent economic frailties in Nigeria firmly at the 
door of the former power.  There is no hint of shared responsibility, a subject 
addressed by this thesis.  Interestingly in contrast, Malaysian historians have not 
openly accused Britain of neo-colonialism.  Therefore, it could be argued that, for 
Malaysia, that prolonged British business presence is reflected on more positively.  
In contrast, Nigeria’s consistent drive to rid itself of British influence, including in the 
form of the British firms that stayed behind, in fact, implies that Britain ultimately had 
                                                 
36 John Darwin, ‘British Decolonization since 1945: A pattern or a puzzle? Journal of Imperial and 
Commonwealth History, 12 (1984), p. 191. 
37 Darwin, ‘British Decolonization since 1945’, p. 206. 
38 R F Holland, ‘the Imperial Factor in British Strategies from Attlee to Macmillan, 1945-63’, in Holland, 
Imperialism and Decolonization, p. 174. 
39Gallagher and Robinson, ‘The Imperialism of Free Trade’, p. 4. 
40 Falola, Britain and Nigeria, pp. 1-272. 
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a negative impact on private sector development.  These arguments are explored 
more fully in this thesis. 
 
 That said, immediately at independence, in each nation British firms continued 
to flourish and encountered few challenges, commercially or politically.  However, 
they were now most certainly on their own and could no longer count on support 
from Westminster, a point made by a number of historians.  Stockwell wrote that 
during the decolonisation programme ‘few companies, even where they enjoyed 
easy access to the corridors of power, were of sufficient importance to the British 
economy to persuade policy makers to go out on a limb for them’.41  What is more, 
Holland claimed that during decolonisation ‘the only time-frame which mattered was 
that in Whitehall’.42  There is nothing in company archives to suggest that business 
leaders were ever consulted by the Whitehall mandarins during decolonisation.  
Leading on from that, White added that an alleged London metropolitan alliance was 
never as robust as the historians Cain and Hopkins claimed in their South East 
England centred ‘Gentlemanly Capitalism’ theory.43  White countered, arguing that 
‘the business and the politics of decolonisation were rarely, if ever, reconciled’.44  
Jones supported that claim when he wrote that ‘British colonial officials were 
frequently critical of the merchant firms, and certainly did not protect them against 
competitors.’45  That view pointed to the thorny topic, social class, which, it was 
claimed by those interviewed, could be more pronounced in an overseas setting.  
White picked up on this, stating that in Malaysia ‘both socially and ideologically, the 
colonial business elite remained separate from the official political elite which 
oversaw development and decolonisation overseas’.46  Therefore, it can be argued 
that far from feeling aggrieved at the departure of the colonial regime, British 
directors in London were well advanced with plans to carve out a lasting commercial 
future overseas.  This is what Napolitano et al., referred to as the ‘search for an 
                                                 
41 Stockwell, ‘Trade, Empire and the Fiscal Context’, p. 142. 
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integrated framework of business longevity’.47  Just how long that longevity would be 
tolerated by government in Malaysia and Nigeria, again, is a subject tackled here. 
 
 Napolitano et al. also wrote that the reasons behind a firm’s longevity are 
‘most often loosely defined as a company’s capability to adjust to changes in its 
operating environment’.48  Certainly, those stay-behind British companies faced a 
unique set of business conditions in host nations and most obviously after 
decolonisation.  It was perhaps inevitable that the days of the British Agency House 
were numbered, and indeed, by the 1970s, external political pressure was mounting 
and beginning to take a toll on trade.  It would, though, be a long drawn out and 
economically painful divorce for all the parties involved.  That was largely because 
British firms were deeply-rooted in both nations and within economies that had been 
constructed around them.  Therefore, the manner in which each regime tackled that 
British commercial dominance features strongly in the thesis. 
 
 In Malaysia, White asserted that ‘British banks, trading firms, shipping 
companies and enterprises engaged in primary and secondary production were 
fused together in a maze of interlocking directorships and cross-shareholdings’.49  
White here appeared to be pointing a finger at the Agency House and its complex 
approach to business.  White though also offered evidence to support the claim that 
the Malaysian government was more amenable to foreign business than peer 
nations when he related that on the eve of independence ‘the Minister of Commerce 
and Industry...publicly went out of his way to allay the fears of those foreign investors 
anxious about their stake in Malaya’.50  Of course, that position changed over time 
but it did provide security to London boardrooms demonstrated by the long-term 
investment strategies those Agency Houses embarked upon at independence.  
Moreover, it was obvious that some firms were better managed than others and 
demonstrated the corporate dexterity to resist government pressure for many years.  
This again fits with the above point made by Napolitano et al. about ‘a company’s 
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capability to adjust to changes in its operating environment’.51  That capability was 
evident at director level in Harrisons and ultimately ensured business survival when 
trading conditions deteriorated in Malaysia.  It was not so obvious at board level in 
the other companies operating in Malaysia that are dealt with here. 
 
 Finally, turning specifically to British business activity in Nigeria, historical 
literature is again thin on the ground save for the aforementioned Unilever books by 
Wilson and Fieldhouse.  However, the 2006 thesis by Stephanie Decker did open a 
chapter on a much neglected area of research.  Other papers by Decker have 
expanded on the interaction that took place between the British firm and Nigerian 
authorities in a post-colonial setting.52  Decker noted that despite the number of 
British firms operating in Nigeria, by 1940, the strength of UAC was so overwhelming 
that all others traded in its shadow.  Moreover, Obuagu argued that after 
independence ‘the common theme that ran through the debates of most Nigerian 
leaders was the freeing of the country from economic colonialism and all elements of 
neo-colonialism.’53  This was a state of affairs certainly borne out in interviews and 
the archival material accessed for this study.  Therefore, given the size and reach of 
UAC at its height, the business history of that company ultimately reflects the trading 
conditions faced by all British firms in Nigeria before and after independence. 
 
Sources 
As indicated in this introduction, most historical studies on Britain’s relationship with 
former colonies draw on material from various government archives and other official 
sources or publications.  As a result, those studies have focussed on the political 
aspects of imperialism in order to offer an explanation for the rise and fall of the 
British Empire.  Given the claim in much of this literature that the spread of British 
imperialism was driven by trade, it is surprising that so little has been written about 
those companies that prosecuted and dominated trade overseas and indeed their 
subsequent activities after British rule.  It is claimed here that a thorough 
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examination of the trade those companies engaged in can reveal much about the 
disparate economic performances of each of these former British colonies.  It can 
also indicate why few companies survived in their respective host nations all that 
long after British rule.  Therefore, undertaking the study from a business perspective 
entailed using the material found in company archives of those firms that dominated 
trade in Malaysia and Nigeria.  That is supplemented, insofar as possible, (due to 
access restrictions, or other factors including security concerns in Nigeria), with 
material from public records both in the UK and overseas.  Finally, the personal 
testimonies of a number of former company employees are included to add a very 
human context to the material found in the various archives.  Let us look in more 
detail at each of these sets of sources. 
 
Business Archives 
As the thesis takes the form of a comparative business study, the archives of the 
selected companies were visited on a number of occasions.  For Malaysia the 
records of Harrisons & Crosfield are held at the Metropolitan Archives in London.  
This company was a leading exponent of the Agency House business model that 
takes centre stage in this thesis.  Although Harrisons possessed an extremely 
diversified business portfolio, most company profits were generated by its estate 
interests, primarily in Malaysia.  Harrisons alongside Guthries were leading 
exponents of British commercial strength in Malaysia and a demonstration of 
competitive advantage of firms operating within the protection and security of an 
imperialist order.  Sadly, very little of the Guthries archives has survived, although a 
number of accounting ledgers and some correspondence produced by the Singapore 
offices are housed in the School of Oriental and African Studies in London.54  Some 
of the data contained in those papers was used to help explain the rise of the British 
Agency House in Malaysia and, from a trade perspective, to trace the adoption of oil 
palm as a major estate grown crop.  Another British Agency House that was 
extremely active in the Malaysian plantation sector was the family-owned Thomas 
Barlow and Brother.  The Barlow archives are held in the Centre of South Asian 
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Studies at the University of Cambridge and were well maintained and illuminating.55  
In Kuala Lumpur, a visit to the Malaysian Palm Oil Council was also very useful and 
some of the statistics on palm production unearthed there are included in this study. 
 
For Nigeria, the vast Unilever archives are housed at Port Sunlight on the 
Wirral.  The collection is looked after by a full-time staff and includes papers that 
detail the trading activities of UAC and the Plantations Group.  Therefore, four 
separate visits were made to this collection.  At the times of visits, the Plantations 
Group papers were being catalogued, and therefore not all were available.  This was 
not an issue as Leslie Davidson, a former chairman of the Plantations Group, 
willingly supplied a number of papers relevant to this study.  Furthermore, Tony 
Thomas, previously of UAC, also supplied some of his own corporate papers that 
revealed Unilever policy and activities in the international arms of its business.  The 
UAC archives provided a rich source of germane material and revealed a great deal 
of supplementary detail on private sector development in Nigeria particularly after 
independence.  Overall, the UAC archives (as well as those of the Plantations Group 
and parent company, Unilever) had much to offer this study. 
 
Public Records 
The public records visited included the extensive Colonial Office collection at Kew 
from which material on official British policy was gleaned on both Malaysia and 
Nigeria prior to decolonisation.  A visit to Calabar in Nigeria to examine a large public 
collection was cancelled prior to travel when it was found that viewing would be 
severely limited (4 hours a day), and that the papers themselves were not 
catalogued, but instead stored randomly in boxes from floor to ceiling.  Security 
issues were also a concern at that time, and therefore that visit was cancelled.  An 
ancillary visit to the Nigerian Embassy in London proved largely unproductive.  In 
retrospect, the Nigerian records were of minor importance as very little new British 
commercial activity and, therefore, investment took place after independence apart 
from that made by UAC to support existing trade.  A number of papers held in Kew 
involved commodity Marketing Boards that were established under British rule.  
                                                 
55 In a supplementary question Henry Barlow was asked why the Barlow archives were in such a good state.  
He explained that he himself had footed the bill to employ an archivist to put the records in order. 6 August 
2013. 
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These offered a better insight into the commodity trade as it developed in Nigeria.  A 
research trip to Malaysia was undertaken and included visits to the National Archives 
in Kuala Lumpur.  Again material on the British company was sparse although there 
were a number of papers relating to the New Economic Policy introduced by 
government in the 1970s to curtail foreign business dominance.  Of the other public 
records visited, the Bodleian Library in Rhodes House at the University of Oxford is 
home to the Fabian Colonial Bureau records.  This organisation was a political think 
tank that supplied information and analysis and counted in its membership over two 
hundred Members of Parliament to the Labour Government in 1945.  One of those 
was Arthur Creech-Jones, a former chairman of the Fabian Society who 
subsequently became the Secretary of State for the Colonies in 1946.  The Fabian 
papers were very informative on British government policy during the decolonisation 
era and also made frequent reference to Westminster’s indifference to British 
overseas firms after the Second World War.  That last observation was also evident 
in comments made on the minute sheets of Colonial Office files held at Kew. 
 
Oral Histories 
It was decided at an early stage to interview a number of expatriate employees of the 
companies selected to add a first-hand and human version of events to supplement 
the official commentary.  Thankfully ten former employees of Agency Houses 
volunteered to participate, and, interestingly, their personal testimonies often 
challenged the official version of events.  Therefore, the personal recollections of 
these elderly gentlemen were invaluable and each revealed an in-depth recollection 
of events that impacted directly on the trade of those companies they were employed 
by.  It became obvious that those who had worked in Malaysia retained an emotional 
attachment to that nation and a deep pride in the contribution made by British 
companies to the estate industry.  In contrast, those who had worked in Nigeria did 
not display that same level of attachment or sense of achievement for reasons that 
will become clear in the thesis.  A previous and long serving chairman of the 
Malaysian Federal Land Development Authority (FELDA) also kindly agreed to 
participate through oral testimony and provided an honest and indigenous take on 
the contribution of British business to the estate industry.  An approach was also 
made to interview a former Nigerian Head of State and previous chairman of UAC 
(Nigeria).  However, this was complicated by personal business interests, and, 
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heeding the advice of others, the approach was abandoned at an early stage.  A 
complete list of those interviewed and brief biographies is in Appendix A. 
 
 At interview, a set number of questions were prepared and sent to the 
interviewees in advance; however, much of the dialogue took a semi-structured 
approach which allowed respondents to digress and divulge other facts they thought 
relevant.  Decker commented that, at a particular interview she conducted, ‘the 
social age [distance?] between us, defined through age, gender and colour, was 
noticeable and on occasion humorously commented upon’.56  This was not the case 
during these interviews (possibly because the age gap was not as wide in my case), 
and indeed, the respondents always appeared at ease and happy to tell their side of 
the story.  There was the danger that, as agents of past events, respondents would 
view roles and that of the companies they worked for through rose-tinted spectacles.  
That may have been the case however, two gentlemen are still engaged as advisors 
to companies running estates in South East Asia and are therefore very much in 
tune with the current events there (MacKenzie and Barlow in Malaysia).  They were 
all admirably pragmatic about the politics and nationalism that have guided 
government policy in each nation.  There was also a question mark on age and 
memory.  On that point, the oral historian Lynn Abrams, remarked that: 
Yet, research into the relationship between ageing and memory demonstrates 
that in fact memory functions do not necessarily deteriorate with age as long as 
the subject remains healthy.57 
 
In fact all of those interviewed, some of whom now in their 80s, had a remarkable 
recollection of events.  Indeed, one gentleman who cited his failing memory 
displayed an astonishing recollection of names and facts from over 50 years ago.  
The interviews collectively highlighted that, for the Malaysian government, the 
struggle lay not with expatriate businessmen in country, but rather with the company 
directors sat in boardrooms in London.  In fact, many of those British expatriates 
were subsequently employed by Malaysian companies.  On the other hand, in 
Nigeria, a high level of animosity towards the British was experienced locally by 
company employees.  In any case, throughout the thesis, personal accounts of 
                                                 
56 Decker, Building up Goodwill, p. 55. 
57 Lynn Abrams, Oral History Theory, (Oxon: Routledge, 2010), p. 90. 
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events that took place decades ago are consistently evaluated, with critique offered 
where considered necessary. 
 
Scope of Study 
The thesis is a comparative business study that examines the activities of British 
companies in Malaysia and Nigeria.  The story begins at the height of British 
imperialism in the 19th century and thereafter takes a chronological approach to 
understand the company structures that emerged in each colony and particularly the 
role of each firm in the commodity trade. The thesis is presented in two parts: Part I 
covers the period under British rule while Part II focuses on each nation after 
independence.  Those eras act as bookends in an evolving geo-political context that 
impacted directly on business overseas as Britain’s global influence waxed and 
waned.  One constant for both countries dealt with here, from a business 
perspective, was the Agency House.  The specific conditions that gave rise to the 
emergence of these unique firms is reflective of and a consequence of British 
company activity overseas.  The thesis starts with Nigeria where vast numbers of 
British firms were whittled down to a point where in the late 1930s, only one, UAC, 
dominated trade across the wider region of West Africa.  It is therefore UAC that 
features prominently in the story about business development in Nigeria. 
 
 The next chapters look at Malaysia and the origins of British trade in that 
region.  Similar to Nigeria, a huge number of FSCs set up shop at the main ports but 
soon moved inland to establish outposts and exploit the resource wealth of the land.  
The spectacular advances made by the rubber industry were largely due to the 
adoption of a European-style estate culture.  That industry prepared the ground for 
business development thereafter in Malaysia.  The circumstances surrounding the 
emergence of the Agency House are covered here to fully account for the company 
formation that took place and what became a dominant role in the plantation 
industry.  The opening chapters therefore explore early British trade and set the 
scene for the comparative company analysis that follows. 
 
 The second half of the thesis focuses on the contrasting trading conditions 
that the selected companies encountered overseas after British rule as nationalism 
began to surface more prominently.  At independence, the political leaders of each 
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appeared to intimate an amenable approach to British companies operating locally.  
In Nigeria, UAC therefore continued with its acquisition programme, although even at 
a fairly early stage, management was considering a move out of the commodity 
trade despite the huge profits posted in previous years.  In Malaysia, the research 
reveals how the Agency House continued to make inroads into estate control as 
many standalone operators succumbed to market forces and sold up.  The thesis 
thereafter moves to the 1970s, examining a marked step up in government 
legislation designed to reduce the business stake of foreign firms.  In that decade, 
economic nationalism came to the fore mainly as a result of the spiralling profits 
posted year on year by the Agency Houses.  The legislation which that growing 
economic nationalism generated was intended to achieve a redistribution of 
commercial and corporate wealth but varied between nations by design and 
application.  The competency and indeed stability of government proved crucial in 
this regard which, in turn, determined flows of inward investment.  It is no accident 
that the commodity trade continues to thrive in Malaysia whereas, in Nigeria, it is no 
longer the force it once was under British rule.  The thesis, therefore, examines the 
interplay between the government and directors of British firms to explain what 
became of the Agency House and, thereafter, to assess their legacy.  By analysing 
and comparing company archival material, some of the business-related reasons 
explaining the disparate economic performances of Malaysia and Nigeria in the post-
independence period will emerge.  But the thesis will also examine the commercial 
and political reasons that helped bring about the demise of the British Agency House 
overseas. 
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Part I: pre-Independence  
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Chapter 2: Nigeria – the United Africa Company 
Introduction 
This chapter looks at the early British trade presence in West Africa and the creation 
of a market built around the export of commodities to Europe and slaves across the 
Atlantic.  As the West African market matured (and slavery was abolished), a 
growing number of merchant ships arrived carrying all manner of manufactured 
goods from a rapidly industrialising Britain.  It became an efficient sea route as those 
same merchant ships were loaded with commodities, like pepper and palm oil, for 
return legs.  The initial inroads by traders moved swiftly on towards the imposition of 
direct British rule, which had an even greater impact on trade across the region by 
the late 19th century.  This chapter examines an era of intense merger and 
acquisition activity that followed in the wake of direct British rule and culminated by 
the late 1920s in the domination of much of trade in Nigeria by one British company.  
That company was United Africa Company, or UAC, a firm that followed a very 
different business model from peer British firms operating in Nigeria at that time:  
UAC was a subsidiary of the soap maker, Unilever,58 formed in 1929, and itself the 
product of a merger of two of the largest British traders in the region to that point, the 
Niger Company and the African & Eastern Trade Corporation (A&E).  The 
subsidiary’s core business was purchasing commodities, mainly Nigerian palm oil, 
and shipping them back to Unilever’s soap factory at Port Sunlight on the Wirral, but 
UAC quickly expanded commercial interests in West Africa far beyond the 
commodity trade to become Unilever’s most profitable subsidiary in the 1950s.  
 
This chapter therefore begins with some background on ‘the Coast’ trade, as 
it was called, to understand the commercial and company structures that emerged 
under British rule.  The study dwells on the rise of UAC to become the ‘Business 
Octopus of Africa’.59  It is argued that this company’s trading history on ‘the Coast’ 
underscored the challenges that all foreign firms faced in Nigeria both during and 
after British rule.  Furthermore, the chapter considers the ramifications of policies 
                                                 
58 Unilever was actually formed in 1930 at the merger of Lever Brothers and the Dutch company Margarine 
Unie. The name is used here because UAC was formed only a year before and for convenience. 
59 During the early 1960s UAC was labelled a business ‘Octopus’ first quoted by Nduka Eze, ‘UAC: an Octopus 
and how it treats its African Staff’, WAP, 18 February 1949, former Secretary of the Amalgamated Union of the 
United Africa Company African Workers. 
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introduced under British rule and then by the nationalist regime.  Pulling these 
themes together can help to explain not only historical weaknesses within the 
Nigerian private sector, but also why UAC no longer trades as an overseas company 
today.  First though, we need to look at how British trade on ‘the Coast’ began? 
 
The Origins of International Trade in Nigeria 
 “Beware, beware the Bight of Benin, 
 Whence few come out, though many go in”60 
Merchant ships from Britain first arrived off the coast of Old Calabar and the other 
West African ports around 1668 to trade in slaves and teeth (Ivory Tusks).61  The 
Bight of Benin, mentioned in the nautical verse above is a bay in the Gulf of Guinea 
off the coast of Nigeria and was notorious as a major embarkation port for West 
African slaves.  That trade was always facilitated by local intermediaries who 
delivered the human cargo down the River Niger to the ships sitting offshore.  Even 
then, the inland part of the trade was left to locals as the Nigerian interior has never 
been hospitable to Europeans.  The practice of conducting trade through local 
middlemen survived well into the 20th century. 
 
 When the slave trade eventually ended, the ships continued to arrive from 
Britain off the west coast of Africa to land finished goods from home factories for the 
local market.62  On the return leg, they carried commodities, most notably palm oil, 
but also (in lesser quantities) wax, gum and red pepper.  In 1833, 13,345 tonnes of 
West African palm oil was offloaded from ships docked at British ports; of that total 
around 5,000 tonnes came from Calabar in Nigeria.63  The commodity’s importance 
to the Nigerian economy was already apparent.  The trade attracted the attention of 
                                                 
60 An old nautical rhyme from the late 18th century coined at a time when British merchants first started plying 
trade (off the Slave Coast) in West Africa. The Bight of Benin is a region stretching some 400 miles and 
covering the outlet of the River Niger. It is believed the shanty reflected the mortality rate of Europeans due to 
malaria and other ailments in the region. For further information see Philip McCutcheon, Beware, beware the 
Bight of Benin, (Worthing: Littlehampton Book Services Ltd., 1974). 
61 Elizabeth Donnan, Documents Illustrative of the History of the Slave Trade to America, (Washington: 
Carnegie Institution, 1932), p.193. 
62 Although the British government made slave trading illegal in 1808, other nations, including France, Spain, 
Portugal and the Netherlands, continued to trade in slaves until 1830.  See, A J H Latham, Old Calabar 1600-
1891: the Impact of the International Economy upon a Traditional Society, (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1973), 
pp.20-1 and 73. The main imports into Nigeria at the end of the 19th century were textiles, bar iron, copper 
rods, hardware, guns, powder, salt and spirits. 
63 Latham, Old Calabar, p. 66, and p. 73. 
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other European nations, and, as a consequence, the number of ships arriving off 
West Africa steadily increased. 64   Trade in commodities continued to lure 
merchantmen to the mouth of the River Niger, most notably those from France.65  In 
response, the British traders closed ranks in an effort to combat competition, 
supported politically and militarily by Westminster.  Throughout the 19th century, the 
British politicians vociferously promoted any trade overseas that competed directly 
with the other European powers.  Therefore, with the protection of the Royal Navy to 
fall back on, the British merchants began to dominate trade in the region.  In time, 
permanent trading posts were established which lured a number of companies to 
provide the services necessary for trading and shipping operations taking place far 
from Britain.  Those companies were Agency Houses.  Soon the Nigerian private 
sector, in which the Agency House played a key role, was well established, globally 
connected and largely run by the British.  
 
 The 1861 Treaty of Cession saw Britain annex the port of Lagos and herald a 
further stage in trade development on ‘the Coast’.  At the 1885 Treaty of Berlin, 
Britain officially took control of large parts of West Africa including much of the land 
that would later form Nigeria.66  Subsequently, the northern Nigerian lands came 
under indirect British rule as traders scrambled to exploit the wider region’s resource 
wealth.67  That said, while British rule was generally an enabling factor for overseas 
companies, in some colonies and particular areas of trade it could also be 
obstructive to business.  One such obstruction was the policy of Trusteeship 
introduced by colonial authorities in Nigeria.  This was, broadly speaking, the 
protection of indigenous rights over land from the perceived ills of foreign commercial 
exploitation.  The subject of foreign land tenure was revisited and debated at length 
in both Houses of Parliament at the start of the 20th century.  The result was the 
                                                 
64 Latham, Old Calabar, p. 18. Here the author charts the rise in ship numbers arriving in West Africa from 
British ports. Between the years 1795 and 1804, 1,099 ships left Liverpool for West Africa alone. 
65 Helen Chapin Metz (ed.), Nigeria: a Country Study, (Washington: GPO for the Library of Congress, 1991), pp. 
1-20. Palm oil exports alone were reputedly worth £1 million a year by 1840. See 
<http://countrystudies.us/nigeria/12.htm>, (accessed, 25 August 2015).  See under Commodity Trade Section. 
66 It was at this conference that European powers set guidelines to regulate trade on the African continent. See 
Kwame Anthony Appiah and Henry Louis Gates Jr., (eds.), Encyclopaedia of Africa, (Oxford: OUP, 2010), pp. 
177, 297, 316, and for Nigeria specifically p. 553. 
67 Michael Crowder, ‘Indirect Rule – French and British Style’, Africa: Journal of the International African 
Institute, 34 (1964), p. 197/8. Colonial rule in Northern Nigeria became a model of indirect rule as government 
officials adopted the policy of ‘Trusteeship’, that of protecting indigenous institutions and land. 
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Land Promulgation Act of 1907, instigated by Lord Lugard, the first Governor 
General of Nigeria, whereupon all residual land in the north was nationalised to 
prevent accumulation by European settlers.68  That policy was later bolstered by the 
Land and Native Rights Proclamation of 1910, and, in 1912, a West African Lands 
Committee was formed to uphold it.69  These government directives remained in 
force for the entirety of British rule, despite regular lobbying to change them in later 
years by resident firms like UAC.  In practice, colonial authorities allowed and indeed 
encouraged British commercial participation at every stage of the commodity trade 
except that of production which, of course, required land.  That ban on foreign land 
tenure had lasting consequences for Nigerian agriculture and, for the purposes of 
this thesis, most clearly and prominently for palm oil production. 
 
 The colonial legislation left parts of the commodity trade prone to abuse by 
Nigerian intermediaries, who operated between farmer and trader.70  In later years, 
Lord Lugard spoke disparagingly about such middlemen and accused them of 
exploiting the farmers.  Indeed, eventually, Lugard seemed to undergo a change of 
heart because he later said: 
The problem is to avoid the evils of the concessionaire, while ensuring the 
proper and adequate development of natural resources, and the example of the 
European-owned plantation will assist in its solution.71 
 
Despite Lugard’s changed views on land tenure, the principle of Trusteeship 
remained.  Moreover, the British council of indigenous rulers supported that policy 
while, in 1926, the colonial office restated its position in the West Africa magazine: 
The Colonial Office and West African governments are pledged up to the eyes 
to respect the right of the African races to the land in British West Africa, and 
the people there need not have the faintest fear that the policy will be changed 
at the bidding of anybody.72 
 
                                                 
68M J Watts and T J Bassett, ‘Crisis and Change in African Agriculture: A Comparative Study of the Ivory Coast 
and Nigeria’, African Studies Review, 28 (1985), p. 6. 
69 W J Reader, Unilever: a Short History, (London: W S Cowell Ltd, 1960), p. 23. 
70 UAC 1/9/1/4/1/5/2, UAC Corporate Planning Department: Nigeria – Visit Reports. There are various visit 
reports in the archives. Those from 1957, when UAC was reviewing its role in the commodity trade, draw 
attention to abuses in the trade carried out by the local indigenous intermediaries. 
71 Lord Frederick J D Lugard, the Dual Mandate in British Tropical Africa, (London: Routledge, 1922), p. 487. 
72 West Africa, (London, 1926), p. 199. A weekly magazine published in London from 1917-2005. 
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In spite of the veto on foreign land ownership, some British companies were able to 
tailor their trade strategies around colonial policy better than others. 
 
The Formation of UAC 
In 1879, George Goldie was appointed British colonial administrator for West Africa.  
Three years after his petition for Royal Charter status had been turned down, Goldie 
bought out the assets of an existing trading firm in the region, the United African 
Company (not to be confused with UAC, the United Africa Company, formed in 
1929), and established the National African Company.  In 1886, Westminster finally 
granted Goldie the Royal Charter he desired, and thereafter he renamed the 
company the Royal Niger Company Chartered & Ltd.  Westminster tasked Goldie to 
advance British interests in West Africa whereupon he secured 500,000 square 
miles of land for the Crown.73  In 1897, the land was amalgamated to existing British 
possessions to form Nigeria.74  Just two years later, Goldie’s coveted Royal Charter 
was revoked by a British government keen to appease the French.  On 1 January 
1900, the land holdings of the Niger Company and all administrative duties passed to 
the Crown.  Nonetheless, a significant British trade presence had been established, 
and, as such, imports to the colony valued at £1m by the end of the 19th century had 
risen to £16m in 1925.  71 per cent of those imports came from Britain.75  In return, 
Nigeria supplied British factories with raw materials, again most notably palm oil.  In 
fact, over eighty percent of Nigeria’s oil palm, some 100,000 tonnes, was shipped to 
Britain in 1913.  The importance of this commodity in terms of revenue to the colony 
was obvious, not least because it accounted for 57 per cent of all exports.76  As 
                                                 
73 See John E Flint, Sir George Goldie and the making of Nigeria (West African History), (Oxford: OUP, 1960), 
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profits in trade to and from ‘the Coast’ continued to rise, competing British firms 
invested further in their buying network infrastructure to allow greater access to palm 
oil and other commodities produced by the colony. 
 
 Of the existing British trading companies at the turn of the twentieth century, 
the most prominent in West Africa were the Niger Company, the African Association 
(forerunner to African & Eastern), Alexander Miller, Brother & Company, the Anglo-
Guinea Produce Company, GB Olivants (GBO) of Manchester and the Company of 
African Merchants.  There were also two French firms operating in the Francophone 
regions, Compagnie Française de l’Afrique Occidentale (CFAO) and Société 
Commerciale de L’Ouest Africaine (SCOA).  All were involved in the commodity 
trade.  Because of Trusteeship, all commodity purchases were conducted through 
tribal chiefs or, more commonly, local buying agents, there being no direct access to 
the farmers.  To monopolise downstream trade and price, British traders signed a 
pooling agreement to regulate the market. 77   At that time, Lever Brothers was 
expanding production at Port Sunlight and therefore needed to secure ‘unassailable 
supplies of oil seeds’. 78   Lord Leverhulme knew that his soap products were 
vulnerable to the prices demanded for palm oil in West Africa.  This troubled William 
Lever (Lord Leverhulme), and he subsequently avowed that his goal was to ‘stop the 
existing producers of raw materials from holding him to ransom’.79  In fact, Lever 
wanted to grow his own oil palm, preferably on estates in West Africa.  However, the 
Trusteeship ban on land tenure forced Lever to pursue his estate ambitions in the 
distant Solomon Islands, but production never reached sufficient levels to satisfy 
factory consumption.  Lever finally concluded that he must bypass the British trading 
firms in West Africa to avoid being ‘held to ransom’.  Therefore, in 1920, Lever paid 
what was considered to be the inflated price of £8 million for the entire shareholding 
of Goldie’s Niger Company and, in doing so, secured access to an annual supply of 
                                                                                                                                                       
Abstract for British Self-Governing Dominions, Colonies, Possessions and Protectorates in each year from 1903 
to 1923, BPP 1926, xxviii, Cmd. 2738, p. 307. 
77 Wilson, Unilever, Volume I, p. 180. 
78 Reader, Unilever, p. 23. 
79 Reader, Unilever, p. 16. 
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100,000 tonnes of oil seed.80  Tony Thomas, a former UAC employee, revealed his 
own take on Lever’s actions: 
The Niger Company was bought by Lord Leverhulme as a defensive measure 
because he feared being held over a barrel by the other merchant firms in West 
Africa when purchasing raw materials for his soap and margarine factories.  
The [accompanying] purchase of what became Palm Line was also a defensive 
measure against outside shipping firms serving West Africa.81 
 
It was a cash sale and, due to the soaring price of commodities at that time, it 
included a sizeable goodwill premium.  Soon after the purchase, it was discovered 
that Lever had unwittingly taken on debts previously incurred by the Niger Company 
and, as a result, a banker’s overdraft of around £2 million was due immediately.  To 
complicate matters further, an unforeseen fall in oil prices placed Lever and his 
business in dire straits.82  By early 1921, the debt was still unpaid and, with creditors 
threatening to serve a writ on Lever, Barclays Bank was finally persuaded to grant a 
bridging loan.  It was, however, a close-run thing about which the Unilever historian 
Charles Wilson wrote that ‘Liquidation [of Lever Brothers] would be the inevitable 
consequence’, such was Lever’s precarious financial standing at that time. 83  
Intervention by Barclays came at a price, though, as Lever was forced to offer 
debenture stock as collateral security.  It was, however, a reasonable price 
considering the alternative. 
 
 To counter this new trading giant, several of the remaining British merchants 
merged to form African & Eastern (A&E).  There were just a handful of other sizeable 
European traders left: four British companies, the Niger Company (Lever Brothers), 
A&E, GBO and the Anglo-Guinea Produce Company; the Swiss African Trading 
Company; two German companies, G Gottschalk of Hamburg and Rosenblum; and 
the two aforementioned French firms, CFAO and SCOA.  In 1921, the A&E board 
fought off a takeover bid by Lever, however the sustained volatility of commodity 
prices played into the soap-maker’s hands.  The onset of the ‘Great Depression’, 
which affected commodities before it affected other areas of the economy, brought a 
marked downturn in trade which destabilised A&E.  And, although William Lever died 
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on 7 May 1925, his ambition to secure control of Nigerian palm oil supplies lived on 
in the new chairman, Francis D’Arcy Cooper.   
 
The immediate challenge for Cooper, however, was that in the late 1920s, 
sales revenue from ‘the Coast’ was down.  Overproduction of soap in Nigeria itself 
forced down prices there and put a squeeze on Lever Brothers’ revenues in West 
Africa.  Furthermore, the £2 million in debenture stock held by the Barclays Bank 
meant that dividends and other financial obligations were decimating all company 
profits.  Fortunately for Lever Brothers, A&E was in a worse financial state due to the 
company’s bloated share register.  Cooper was aware of this and commented that 
‘[shares in A&E] were heavily overbought’.84  However, to the surprise of all, the 
board of A&E sacrificed the company’s stock, which meant that the Niger Company 
could now be undercut by its competitor.  To head that eventuality off, Cooper 
convened a meeting with the directors of A&E in January 1929 to discuss a business 
merger.  That initial meeting turned into ‘six weeks of bitterly fought bargaining’.  
Finally on 3 March 1929, agreement on a merger was reached and UAC was born.85  
The new company had a market capitalisation of £13 million and the combined 
assets of the two largest trading firms on ‘the Coast’ at its disposal.  It was clear that 
the other European firms were now reduced to minor players on ‘the Coast'.  In that 
same year, Lever Brothers began the process of merger with Margarine Unie of the 
Netherlands to form Unilever, which was established in 1930.86  UAC now was the 
subsidiary of—and had the backing of—a huge multinational.  Trade on ‘the Coast’ 
thereafter was dominated by UAC as the company embarked upon a wide ranging 
acquisition programme.  The chapter now looks at the growth and development of 
the UAC business on ‘the Coast’. 
 
The Early Years of UAC 
The formation of UAC fulfilled a long-held goal of Lever: to own a supply chain of 
palm oil almost back to source.  Moreover, bulk sea transport was also secured in 
the merger with A&E, and the shipping line was christened the Palm Line, 
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underscoring the significance of palm oil to UAC and Unilever.  There was the added 
bonus of a few estates in Nigeria and the Cameroons established before the land 
ban became law.  The fact that the authorities did not move to confiscate these 
estates probably gave UAC management some hope that the Land Act could 
possibly be overturned in the future.  First on the agenda for the UAC board, 
however, was gaining majority control of the commodity trade.  As such, in 1930, the 
Anglo-Guinea Produce Company was acquired.  Unfortunately, there are no records 
that reveal the extent of the UAC share in the commodity trade at this time, however, 
one company paper from 1932 revealed that outstations in the Gold Coast 
processed around 40 per cent of the colony’s cocoa in 1931.87   That gave an 
indication of the order of magnitude of UAC’s position in the colony’s overall 
commodity trade.  In 1931, UAC formed Nigerian Motors Ltd in Lagos and thereafter 
went into agency work which would become core business in later years.88  Nigerian 
Motors was also the first associate company to be registered in Nigeria.  However, 
all was not going smoothly at board level and in the first year most of the former A&E 
directors were culled.  The board thereafter faced a major financial headache as the 
commodity trade began to suffer from a deepening global financial crisis. 
 
 In 1932, Unilever was forced to service outstanding UAC debt.89  To reduce 
future liability, Unilever’s Special Committee authorised the UAC board to raise 
capital independently and, if absolutely necessary, issue equity for the business.  
That move in itself was indicative of Unilever philosophy on managing subsidiaries: 
that of granting autonomy wherever necessary.  Ultimately, Unilever’s interest in its 
subsidiaries was purely financial, and, indeed, one former chairman remarked that 
‘firms are often compared to ships.  Well, Unilever is not a ship, it is a fleet’.90  In the 
spirit of that analogy, when UAC profits on the ‘the Coast’ recovered, which they 
soon did, the subsidiary became akin to a flag-ship within that Unilever fleet.  In fact, 
the UAC board was steadily assembling its own fleet of associate companies on ‘the 
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Coast’.  The subsidiary’s ability to raise capital independently through the banks 
allowed the directors financial room to manoeuvre, and, by 1933, the Unilever 
emergency loan had been repaid in full.91  Suitably emboldened, UAC swooped also 
in 1933 to buy GBO, a major competitor on ‘the Coast’.  In keeping with its parent 
firm’s modus operandi, UAC afforded a large measure of autonomy to the existing 
GBO management.  Perhaps more surprisingly, GBO was allowed to compete 
directly with UAC in some areas of trade.  Thomas justified this as a means to avoid 
handing ‘ammunition to critics who already resented UAC’s dominance [in the 
region]’.92  Thereafter, the grounds for retaining the GBO setup were two-fold.  First, 
it was believed that customers loyal to GBO would be unwilling to switch their 
allegiance to UAC; and second, existing GBO employees would be happier working 
within the same management structure.  This quite unique approach to business 
management is revisited in later chapters. 
 
 As the decade wore on, UAC business turnover on ‘the Coast’ increased.  For 
the years 1935-7, the company reported profits of £1.1 million, £1.5 million and £2.3 
million, respectively.93  The board also continued to acquire other companies in the 
region.  In 1936, UAC bought the Swiss African Trading Company and the German 
companies G Gottschalk and Rosenblum two years later.  The board’s wider 
geographical ambitions were demonstrated in the purchase of two British firms 
operating in East Africa, Gailey Roberts Ltd and Bullows & Roy Ltd.94  Yet again, all 
acquisitions were conducted discreetly, particularly those of the German firms, and 
the existing management afforded a great deal of autonomy.  By the end of the 
1930s, UAC was by far the largest trading firm in the whole of Africa: the last 
remaining independent European firms on ‘the Coast’, John Holt, Paterson Zochonis, 
Marel ET Prom and, the two French companies, were all (and even taken together) 
much smaller than UAC.  That overseas business itself was facilitated by a vast 
number of UAC staff sat in offices across Western Europe.  Perhaps now the 
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directors of UAC thought their commercial strength strong enough to warrant an 
approach to colonial authorities to acquire land to develop estates in West Africa.  
 
 Still, although a major objective of the UAC board was to expand estate 
holdings in West Africa, the unwillingness of the British colonial regime to 
countenance foreign land tenure in Nigeria forced management to look elsewhere.  
In 1935, Unilever secured land in the Belgian Congo where, somewhat notoriously, 
the colonists were both more invasive and open to an estate culture.  It was here that 
Unilever established several oil palm estates and tasked UAC to manage them.  This 
again underscored parent company policy on overseas assets.  Although Unilever’s 
Special Committee was content to approve asset purchases overseas, the task of 
managing estates was well outside core competences.  Therefore, the running of the 
Congo estates passed to UAC, leaving Unilever to focus on manufacturing.  Those 
estates were later cited as demonstrations of progressive rural development by UAC 
when managers from the company were lobbying British colonial authorities for 
Nigerian land.95  The company argued that the founding of an estate culture would 
attract investment, provide employment and generate wider economic benefits to the 
colony.  Regardless of the merits in this argument, the British Governor of Nigeria 
ruled against company plans even for an oil-palm research station in 1939: 
[The proposal] may be immediately dismissed since introduction of the 
capitalist-owned plantation system is in conflict with the approved policy of 
government which is pledged in support of the peasant producer.96 
 
Despite this, UAC continued to progress other parts of the business and, in 1938, 
company accounts revealed that capital employed stood at £19 million.97  Unilever’s 
thirst for raw materials remained unabated and was driven by the rising demand for 
cleaning products.  Thus, by the end of the 1930s, the Palm Line was shipping 
900,000 tonnes of palm oil each year to the UK, a rise of 200,000 tonnes on the 
figure for 1929.98  The profit from that trade alone stood at over £1 million in 1939, of 
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which palm products accounted for more than half.99 Moreover, the estates owned 
by the company in West Africa were beginning to produce results, although UAC 
revenue from the estates was negligible in these early years and made no impact on 
company profits mainly due to the depressed global markets, as Table 2.1 shows. 
 
Table 2.1:  UAC West African Plantations Financial Results for 1930–1939100 
Financial Year 
Ending 
Pre-Tax 
Profit/Loss) 
(£) 
Financial Year 
Ending 
Pre-Tax 
Profit/Loss) 
(£) 
1930 (1,000) 1935 10,038 
1931 (1,842) 1936 37,010 
1932 (2,183) 1937 47,639 
1933 (2,035) 1938 18,614 
1934 3,112 1939 48,101 
 
The table shows that from 1934, estate profits rose year on year although the figures 
only represented a fraction of overall UAC profits.  In fact, the 1937 figure of £47,639 
was just 0.2 per cent of total UAC profits for that year as general trading continued to 
deliver the lion’s share of revenue.101  Despite that, the rising profit trend from the 
estates motivated the board to again petition authorities for land in Nigeria. 
 
 Unfortunately, war intervened and any growth strategy on ‘the Coast’ was 
effectively halted when the British government commandeered all essential industrial 
production and support facilities.  The ships of the Palm Line were requisitioned and 
familiar Unilever brands like Sunlight Soap were repackaged as standard 
government products.  It was also then that the British government made the fateful 
decision to introduce a system to oversee mandatory contracts placed for some 
commodities in West Africa.  To administer those purchases, marketing boards were 
                                                 
99 UAC 1/1/1/6/11, Summary of UAC Accounts: 1939-40. 
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set up and run from London.  Those boards would have a lasting and, ultimately, 
damaging impact on the Nigerian commodity trade. 
 
The West African Produce Marketing Boards 
In late 1939, the British Ministry of Food placed compulsory contracts to purchase 
the entire cocoa output of British West Africa.  To administer those contracts, a 
Nigerian Produce Marketing Company was set up and run by civil servants from 
offices at Buckingham Gate in London.102  Further contracts followed for palm oil, 
ground nuts and cotton.  In effect, the marketing boards were a monopsony for a 
number of commodities grown in West Africa.   At that time, UAC handled about 75 
per cent of Nigerian palm oil and over half the cocoa and ground nut exports from 
the wider region.103  That trade generated vast profit through downstream sales.  The 
implementation of government contracts cut of those profits and UAC, like all British 
traders on ‘the Coast’, became Licensed Buying Agents (LBAs) for the British 
Ministry of Food.  The issue for those companies was that the prices paid to them by 
the Marketing Boards were fixed below the market.  This was compounded by the 
fact that all onward commodity sales were also conducted by the public body.  
Consumer nations like the USA were forced to buy direct from the Marketing Boards 
in London.  As a result, the £1 million profit recorded by UAC from the trade in 1940 
fell to £600,000 in 1941, and by 1945 the figure was just £270,000.104  In the first two 
years of operation (1940-41), on the other hand, the marketing boards managed to 
generate $8.7 million (£3 million) in profit.  This was primarily achieved by buying at 
below market price from LBAs and selling at a higher price to the USA and others.105  
That figure is an indication of the scale of lost revenue to UAC during the war.  
Despite this, the UAC board perhaps reassured themselves that the war and, not 
incidentally, the marketing boards would not last forever. 
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UAC – post War 
Despite lost revenue during the war, UAC emerged in 1945 relatively intact and 
ready to resume a dominant trading position on ‘the Coast’.  The company’s main 
business in the region then was, in order of fiscal importance: 
 Produce and Merchandising Trade (Core) 
 Ocean Shipping and River Transport (Nigeria, Gambia and the Congo) 
 Timber Extraction 
 Plantations (Oil Palm and Rubber) 
UAC was very much an overseas Agency House and every bit a multinational 
despite that subsidiary status to Unilever.  The 1946 accounts revealed that produce 
and merchandise sales alone amounted to £17.8 million which generated a net profit 
of £2.7 million.106  At this time, however, it was merchandising and agency work that 
produced over 90% of those profits.  Indeed, the company’s overall trading 
infrastructure was vast and broken down geographically overseas.  Table 2.2 gives 
an idea of the company’s operations on ‘the Coast’ after the war. 
 
Table 2.2: UAC Company Structure in West Africa circa 1946107 
Colony Designated Areas 
within a Colony 
Number of Districts 
within each Colony 
Nigeria 5 48 
Sierra Leone 1 3 
Gold Coast (Ghana) 5 27 
Others 9 17 
 
Although not obvious from the figures in the second column, the Nigerian market, 
with 48 districts, was the company’s main focus in West Africa.  This was confirmed 
in the 1946 accounts that reported over 60 per cent of staff overseas were stationed 
in Nigeria and around 70 per cent of company turnover generated there.108 
 
 The overall business on ‘the Coast’ was directed from London down to 
Regional Managers in each colony, to whom General Area and District Managers 
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108 UAC 1/1/1/6/17, UAC Directors’ Reports and Accounts: 1946. 
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reported.  Each district had an accounting centre and one or more wholesale outlets 
that supplied local stores.  Each district branch forwarded monthly accounts to Area 
Managers, who collated returns and forwarded them on to head office in London 
where a staff of around 800 managed from afar.  There were sub-branches in 
Liverpool (shipping and cargo – 120 staff), Manchester (Textiles and hardware – 200 
staff) and in Western Europe, Hamburg (German Trade – 100 staff), Paris (trade in 
the French territories – 200 staff) and Brussels (Head Office of Huileries du Congo 
Belge – 80 staff). 109  Some of that staff was responsible for processing commodities.  
A much higher number were engaged in the sourcing of all manner of goods for an 
emerging West African market.  Due to the skill levels required for this line of work, 
many employees in Europe were at managerial level.  Therefore, UAC workforce 
consisted of a large pool of managers in Europe supporting expatriates on ‘the 
Coast’, with subordinate posts filled by local staff.  At the top of the staff pyramid sat 
an Executive Committee of three managing directors that replicated Unilever’s 
Special Committee.  Thomas defended the top heaviness of UAC workforce thus: 
UAC head office was proportionally larger than that of Unilever because of the 
different nature of its business requiring buyers of goods from all over the 
globe, arranging insurance and shipment, and supervising ‘the Coast’ 
companies.110 
 
However, that number and grade of staff in head office was only sustainable if trade 
on ‘the Coast’ held up.  Even at this early stage, trade dependency in West Africa 
and particularly Nigeria was a cause for concern.  Revenue generated by trading in 
commodities was always subject to the ebb and flow of global market prices.  
Furthermore, the demand for consumer goods in West Africa was itself reliant on 
local affluence.  These two factors were interconnected as the wealth of the Nigerian 
economy and thereby its people were still largely dependent on revenue generated 
by commodity exports.  If the commodity trade suffered, then so did the people, 
which in turn produced repercussions for that top-heavy UAC workforce in Europe.  
A measure of business diversification or redeployment out of West Africa may well 
have been prudent at this time, but booming trade on ‘the Coast’ perhaps coloured 
those decisions at home.  It does, however, pose some questions about the 
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proficiency of higher management at that time.  These issues came back to haunt 
UAC in later years.  In the meantime though, with trade on ‘the Coast’ buoyant, there 
appeared little to worry about.  The first big challenge to company strategy, though, 
was to arrive in relation to the all-important commodity trade. 
 
So it was that, to the utter dismay of the UAC directors, the newly elected 
Labour government in May 1945 decided to retain the marketing boards as a means 
to aid Britain’s economic recovery.  It was a clear indication that the post-war British 
economy would take precedence over all other considerations.  The business 
interests of UAC and those of other firms overseas were therefore subordinate to 
British domestic economic policy.  Furthermore, the British government justified 
retention of the boards as a way to protect the West African farmer from ‘the ills of 
middlemen in an unregulated market’.111  It is highly debatable whether this was a 
sound argument as board officials had no direct contact with the farmers they 
professed to protect.  What is true is that the boards continued to manipulate the 
market and purchase price rarely, if ever, reflected real value.  That effectively 
reduced the amount of cash filtering down to local Nigerians and elsewhere in West 
Africa.  Board officials further argued that profits from onward sales would be banked 
and used exclusively to ensure market stabilisation.  The vast profits were, in effect, 
an insurance pot for West African farmers.  That made sense, as commodity prices 
were historically volatile.  Despite the commendable intentions of the boards, 
however, those banked profits were used only once to compensate Nigerian farmers 
during the 1953/54 dry season.  Then palm oil producers received a share of £6.9 
million from a pot that remarkably then stood at £35 million.112  There were no further 
recorded incidences of those funds being returned to Nigerian agriculture.113 
 
 Board officials also justified this apparent frugality by claiming that a lack of 
goods markets in rural locations meant that the Nigerian farmer would become cash 
saturated and then place them more vulnerable to the much maligned local 
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intermediaries (although officials did not indicate why or how this would happen).  
The officials, it would appear, thought that surplus cash would be hoarded under the 
floorboards of peasants’ huts.114  Funds were therefore withheld which retarded rural 
development and precluded real investment in agriculture.  The marketing board 
system also contradicted the advertised goal to ensure that farmers received a fair 
price for produce.  The historian Williams, who researched the accounts of the 
Cocoa Marketing Board, came to the damning conclusion that: ‘Since their 
inceptions in 1940, Nigerian marketing boards have been used to serve various 
interests and purposes, hardly any of which have benefitted the producers’.115 
 
UAC archival records reveal that company directors frequently lobbied board 
officials in London.  One constant criticism was the practice of fixing commodity 
prices on an annual basis.  UAC argued it was inconsistent with conditions on the 
ground as production fluctuated considerably in yield over the course of a year.116  
The board responded that fixed annual prices were needed to protect the farmer 
from dips in the market.  Again, that was certainly true as a result of price volatility, 
but the marketing board always paid less than market price in any case for all 
purchases.  It would appear that, despite the protestations of UAC management, the 
civil servants were simply unwilling to deviate from the official line.  Papers in UAC 
archives also reveal that marketing board officials were extremely concerned that 
‘subversive elements in Nigeria would dearly love to get ammunition of this kind’ 
should boards be viewed as ‘imperialist exploitation’.  One can only therefore 
conclude that the boards were retained, first and foremost, to support domestic 
economic policy in Britain.  The claim that the boards ‘protect[ed] the interests of 
colonial primary producers’ is unconvincing.117  What is true is that as long as the 
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marketing boards were retained, UAC and other companies were unlikely to make 
any significant investment in the commodity trade on ‘the Coast’. 
 
It would appear that a number of colonial officials were unhappy with the 
dominant trading presence that UAC held on ‘the Coast’, and therefore the decision 
to retain marketing boards was perhaps welcomed in some official circles.  
Fieldhouse quoted a Ministry of Food official who claimed that the introduction of 
marketing boards would mean that the company’s ‘power for evil is limited’.118  That 
view dispels any notion that British authorities and company executives were in 
cahoots overseas.  Clearly, the ‘old school tie’ pact was a thing of the past.  Indeed, 
relations between the colonial office and business leaders were not as strong as 
Cain and Hopkins implied in their ‘Gentlemanly Capitalism’ thesis,119  and certainly 
not after the Second World War.  Moreover, the historian Maria Misra observed that 
‘the [British] civil service [overseas] didn’t hobnob with the British businessman’.120  
The feeling was perhaps mutual as William Louis spoke of the ‘open contempt for 
civil servants’ held by business leaders during decolonisation.121   It is therefore 
unsurprising that UAC grievances fell on deaf ears.  For the company itself, however, 
the loss of downstream commodity trade weighed heavily in terms of revenue and 
was a major determining factor in future business strategy. 
 
 As previously mentioned, all British trading firms on ‘the Coast’ were 
contracted to the Ministry of Food and remunerated for produce collected.  The 
commodity trade set-up run by UAC was vast and comprised of outstations, bulk oil 
storage facilities and the estates themselves.  By the 1940s, the company operated 
five administrative centres in Lagos, Ibadan, Port Harcourt, Warri and Calabar.  
Those centres supported 34 trading hubs and storage facilities for 200 outstations 
across the colony.122  The outstations traded directly with the local intermediaries.  
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Given that scale of buying infrastructure, UAC was allocated a palm oil quota 
commensurate to the company’s assets, as the figures in Table 2.3 clearly show. 
 
Table 2.3: Nigerian Palm Quotas for Selected European Firms 1943/4123 
Company Palm Oil 
% 
Palm Kernels 
% 
CFAO 4.01 6.54 
J Holt 5.04 11.56 
Paterson Zochonis 4.45 7.37 
SCOA 7.37 4.47 
UAC (+ GBO) 73.48 62.89 
 
As an LBA to the marketing board, UAC was allotted almost three quarters of the 
total British quota for palm oil in the region.  Profits generated by onward commodity 
sales carried out by marketing boards continued to climb as revealed in Table 2.4. 
 
Table 2.4: Nigerian Marketing Board Bank Reserves 1947- 54124 
Commodity Capital Reserves 
£000 
Cocoa 46,043.3 
Palm Oil 35,014.8 
Groundnuts 30,535.3 
Cotton 8,321.3 
Total Capital 119,914.7 
 
The table shows that the profit from downstream sales of Nigerian produce was 
huge.  If we apply the UAC quota in Table 2.3 of 73.48% to figures in Table 2.4, then 
the company lost roughly £24.73 million in profits over that period.  That was a 
significant loss of revenue.  It is therefore understandable why UAC directors 
consistently lobbied for an end to the boards.  It was to no avail and subsequently 
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private investment in Nigerian commodity production stagnated or indeed, dried up.  
The chapter now turns to the few estates that UAC did own in West Africa. 
 
UAC Estate Production 
Despite the policy of Trusteeship, UAC continued to manage estates in Nigeria 
including those in the Congo where a ten-year investment programme secured 
56,000 acres of estate land.125  In contrast, in West Africa, total estate land was just 
7,000 acres.126  That consisted of four rubber estates in Nigeria (Jameson, Sapele, 
Qua Eboe and Ikotmbo) and one in the British Cameroons (Bai).  There were four oil 
palm estates, two in Nigeria (Cowan and Calabar), and one each in the British 
Cameroons (N’dian) and Ghana (Sese).  A further two banana estates were in the 
Cameroons (Bwinga and Lobe) however the Lobe estate was replanted in 1956 with 
oil palm and Bwinga with rubber in 1959.  As indicated earlier, the financial 
contribution of those estates was not huge however, as Table 2.5 shows, one crop 
did show real potential. 
 
Table 2.5:  UAC West African Estates 1941–1949 Pre-tax profit/(loss)127 
Year Ending Bananas 
£ 
Oil Palm 
£ 
Rubber 
£ 
Total 
£ 
1941 (1,100) 13,100 37,200 48,200 
1942 Unknown 22,900 68,700 49,200 
1943 Unknown 22,300 78,400 101,000 
1944 (4,600) 49,100 84,800 129,300 
1945 (1,400) 38,300 87,200 124,100 
1946 11,900 72,700 80,600 155,100 
1947 27,300 179,200 92,900 299,400 
1948 64,100 360,100 43,700 447,600 
1949 64,100 462,700 6,800 533,600 
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The figures reveal that at the start of the decade, rubber generated the biggest 
profits.  However, once the oil palm had reached maturity at the end of the 1940’s, 
profits from those estates easily surpassed that of rubber.128  In fact, the profits 
posted for palm oil in 1949 surpassed that of all other commodities combined, and 
that was despite being forced to sell through the marketing boards.  Returns from the 
banana estates also improved, however the estate at Lobe was eventually wiped out 
by the Sikatoga disease in the late 1950s.129 
 
 Overall, estate profits were rising, particularly those growing oil palm.  
Therefore in 1953, UAC made another pitch for land and warned authorities that 
Nigerian palm oil production would soon fall behind the estates in South East Asia.130  
In fact, one official colonial report seemed to support UAC’s proposals: 
British policy in Nigeria has held tenaciously to the principle of non-alienation of 
the land, on both moral and economic grounds, resisting the repeated efforts of 
large scale concerns to establish plantations.  The competition of plantation 
production elsewhere is now too serious to be ignored.131 
 
Despite the compelling economic argument, just as before, the land request was 
turned down on grounds of trusteeship policy.  Reflecting on that decision, it is now 
clear that dogged resistance to foreign land ownership had little to do with 
economics or indeed much-needed rural development.  Instead, policy was politically 
motivated by colonial officials who were wary about stirring up nationalist protest.  
That guarded approach was confirmed in a letter by the chairman of the Nigerian 
Produce Marketing Company in 1950 that warned UAC to be discreet about the vast 
revenue being generated in London by downstream commodity sales: ‘I am, 
however, frankly uneasy, on political and other grounds…if any information got into 
the wrong hands’.132  That said, it is equally fair to argue that UAC dominance on ‘the 
Coast’ probably had a bearing on land requests.  That condemnation of UAC in 
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official circles surfaced elsewhere.  This was a response by a colonial official 
addressing a UAC land request in the British Solomon Islands: 
UAC would be as sound a firm to deal with as any in a matter of this kind.  They 
are, of course, exceedingly well-known in West Africa.  There is also, I think, a 
rather wider question to be considered, viz, whether we really want to let UAC, 
which had for some time almost a strangle-hold (and may still have for all I 
know) in West Africa, get the Western Pacific within its tentacles.133 
 
The tone of the language used is revealing.  In a number of colonies, politics always 
took precedence, and the colonial position undoubtedly coloured decisions on 
commercial investments.  The colonial authorities in Nigeria thus clung on to the 
argument that allowing foreign access to land would open a political ‘can of worms’. 
 
This belief had a long history and lasted from the early 20th century into the 
1950s, as the following objections to an estate culture in Nigeria collated during this 
research from various colonial and Fabian Society papers indicate: 
1. If an estate became uneconomical then a European firm would simply 
abandon the land, leaving large numbers of unemployed locals behind. 
2. Leading on from that point, authorities were concerned that subsidies and 
other types of assistance would then be required to keep the estates running. 
3. Authorities conceded that, although an estate culture was more efficient, 
traditional production was more robust when commodity prices slumped. 
4. Finally, by the 1950s, the British government was aware of demands for 
colonial development.  Nationalism was on the rise and therefore privately 
owned estates in West Africa had the potential to cause further unrest among 
indigenous people and thereby bolster support for anti-British politicians. 134 
 
Arguably, those same objections to private estates applied to Malaya, especially at a 
time when the Communist insurgency was threatening all western interests. Yet, 
there, the British-owned plantation industry continued to flourish with the blessing of 
authorities.  In contrast, the colonial authorities’ blocking of UAC ambitions in 
commodity production seems likely to have deprived Nigerian agriculture of 
investment and the technological advances that were taking place on British-run 
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estates around the world.  That included, most notably, what took place in the nearby 
estate development in the Belgian Congo.  However, as final arbiters of policy, the 
colonial authorities were not prepared to abandon this position.  In that respect, the 
policy of trusteeship, alongside the marketing board system, were the two key 
underlying factors for a perceptible tail-off in Nigerian commodity exports after the 
Second World War.  Both of these policies were, of course, of British design.  A third 
factor contributing to the decline in exports was of a different type, and arrived in 
1956 with the discovery of oil in the Nigerian Delta Region, a development returned 
to later in this thesis.135 
 
In any case, after the final rejection in 1953, UAC management seemed to lose 
interest in the estates and instead directed their effort towards specialised trading 
and agency work.  Tony Thomas justified management strategy thus: 
Unilever originally got into plantations as a defensive measure, certainly in 
West Africa because Lever felt vulnerable to extortion by the existing raw 
material exporters.  That is why he bought UAC.  As far as UAC was concerned 
plantations were always a separate business; it was different from trading.136 
 
The argument made by Thomas here that UAC got into plantations as a defensive 
strategy is historically well made, however it is worth speculating about what would 
have happened had the company managed to secure Nigerian land.  The profit 
figures in Table 2.5 above indicate that estate work could have become more than 
just the side-line business Thomas implied.  In 1947, for instance, Unilever 
purchased an estate in Johor, Malaya, to grow oil palm.  That purchase enabled the 
transfer of oil palm technology, personnel and growing practices out of Africa.  The 
fact that UAC was not involved in this new venture, despite the company’s proven 
estate management capability, is remarkable.  It was perhaps an indication of what 
was to come within Unilever.  A subsequent reorganisation of all overseas holdings 
by management in 1955 saw the estates placed into a single executive.  The 
creation of a Plantations Group ended any UAC involvement in commodity 
production.  Unilever’s estate reorganisation, more importantly, closed off a potential 
diversification option for UAC when trading conditions began to deteriorate. 
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 Despite the ban on foreign land acquisitions in West Africa and the company’s 
move out of estate management, UAC trade on ‘the Coast’ was still buoyant in the 
post-war era because of that well-diversified business portfolio.  UAC was still very 
much the ‘Business Octopus of Africa’. In 1951, for example, the company posted an 
annual turnover of £56 million from merchandising alone, which produced a profit of 
£9 million.  Those figures represented a quadrupling of returns in just five years. 137  
The question is why was UAC so successful?  Thomas outlined UAC strengths thus: 
1. We had money when local capital was scarce (someone reckoned the 
  national income per head in Nigeria was about twenty quid) [1950/60s]. 
2. We also had long and practical experience of trade in the region. 
3. We were careful to recruit personnel able to work independently. 
4. We had a big network of trading posts. 
5. We had economies not only of scale.  People would come in to sell  
  their produce and [leave] having bought our merchandise. 
6. Our size enabled us to obtain agencies from international firms  
  (Heineken, Caterpillar etc.).138 
 
UAC was therefore a well-staffed, highly diversified enterprise with capital to spend 
on its established trading infrastructure in West Africa.  The company was an 
obvious ‘go to’ agent for western manufacturers seeking entry into the region.  
Moreover, that availability of capital saw management outspend and/or buy out 
competitors in the region.  For those reasons alone, any company contemplating a 
challenge on UAC’s dominant business position on ‘the Coast’ had its work cut out. 
 
 For the parent company, UAC in the post-war years was a major financial 
asset. Indeed, its position was described thus by one former employee:  ‘[the 
subsidiary was] the brightest feature in Unilever’s crown’.139  However, the future of 
UAC was already under scrutiny in some quarters.  A Unilever report completed in 
1955 raised a number of concerns about the future of trade in West Africa.  The 
report may have been motivated by looming independence in the Gold Coast 
(Ghana) as it is clear that some senior staff were questioning the sustainability of 
business on ‘the Coast’.  Another concern, however, lay with UAC’s continued 
involvement in the commodity trade, the conditions of which were in steep decline. 
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 Indeed, the commodity trade was a precarious business for a number of 
reasons, and particularly due that reliance on local intermediaries to collect the 
produce from farmers.  In 1949, for example, an article in UAC’s Statistical & 
Economic Review revealed that roughly a quarter of palm oil bought by the company 
in Southern Nigeria was purchased by means of interest-free loans or goods on 
credit.140  The transactions were conducted on trust and facilitated through cash 
advances to local intermediaries.  In a region where cash was king, David Griffin, a 
former UAC manager, was heavily involved in this trade, and he highlighted the 
weakness, which Thomas confirmed, that the company was at the end of a long 
buying chain and totally reliant on local intermediaries with no allegiance, other than 
financial, to UAC.  Thomas recalled trade first hand with those intermediaries: 
The first time I ever went to Nigeria, I went into the Produce Managers office in 
Kano.  This villainous looking gentleman came in, seized large bags of coin, put 
a thumb print on a piece of paper and left.  I said to the manager “how do you 
know you are going to get groundnuts back?”  He said “why do you think I have 
a Gastric Ulcer?”  But what happened was that the Nigerian man who was a 
wholesaler, he would go out and give some of money to a sub-wholesaler who 
gave some of the money to another and it would go right the way down to the 
farmer because even small amounts of the money were valuable in those 
days.141 
 
Most transactions with indigenous buyers on ‘the Coast’ were conducted in this 
informal manner.  By today’s standards, it was, to put it mildly, rather risky, and 
indeed UAC was certainly at the end of the buying chain.  Despite this, Thomas 
argued that the system operated efficiently because if a buyer did not return then he 
was not employed again.142  It was an ad hoc arrangement that suited all parties as 
long as UAC continued to offer a better or at least similar price as competitors.  But 
in the end, the company had little choice, as Griffin argued: ‘Nigerian individual 
produce buyers accounted for 90 per cent of local purchases.’143  The outstations 
also acted as unofficial banks and allowed local buyers to deposit funds for 
safekeeping.  This provided financial liquidity and further sales opportunities, a point 
expanded on by Griffin: 
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When I first went out there I was buying palm oil, palm kernels, copra and we 
used to hold the traders’ money when they brought produce in, they built up an 
account.  In fact we paid them 1 per cent commission but then we did, forgive 
me for saying, conditional sales.  We said, ‘look you have got all this money, I 
have got this load of corrugated iron sheets, I’m overstocked, I’ve got to get rid 
of them so listen you buy the sheets of Iron and I will just deduct it from your 
credit’.  He could go off and sell it in the market anyway.144 
 
However, as the bank balances of those local intermediaries swelled, they became 
relatively wealthy and could choose to bypass UAC and sell directly to a regional 
marketing board (after 1954 when the boards were transferred from London).  This 
added further financial strain to UAC’s precarious position in the trade as profit 
margins were still being dictated by the price paid to LBAs by the marketing boards. 
 
 In 1954, London relinquished control of the boards, and they were transferred 
with substantial bank balances to West Africa.  The much-maligned marketing board 
system was then retained by Nigerian regional authorities, and profit from onward 
commodity sales continued to mount.  The difference now was that any form of 
financial accountability and restraint was gone, a point picked up on by Thomas: 
Undoubtedly too little of the marketing board surpluses were ploughed back 
into agriculture.  I think that is best explained by the politically motivated 
siphoning off of surpluses, especially to finance economic development 
plans.145 
 
Many Nigerian politicians came to view profits from the commodity trade as revenue 
to be used as they wished and, as such, a number of dubious local development 
projects were funded.  When the Nigerian Federal government took power at 
independence in 1960, officials also viewed the trade as a means to generate much 
needed capital.  The marketing board system therefore was a legacy of British rule 
that was retained by a nationalist regime despite the costs to agriculture.  In practice, 
the boards in fact imposed a levy on agriculture, which, when added to federal taxes, 
represented a loss of over 29 per cent of income for palm kernel producers alone at 
one point.146  This was a disincentive to producers, many of whom switched to 
alternative crops like gari (cassava meal) which could be sold locally to avoid export 
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taxes.  British firms also took radical measures to avoid the financial imposition of the 
boards, and Davidson recalled a major replanting exercise undertaken by the 
Plantations Group:  ‘[To remain profitable] we replanted the Calabar oil palm estate 
with rubber because there was no marketing board [for rubber].  This is now a 
successful rubber estate.’147  It is all the more remarkable considering that this crop 
conversion took place at time when estate owners, including Unilever, in Malaysia 
were doing the exact opposite and replacing rubber with oil palm. 
 
 Ultimately, the retention of the marketing boards weakened the Nigerian palm 
oil industry at a time when the commodity was experiencing an upsurge in global 
demand.  The boards themselves survived until 1977 when, some 37 year after 
inception, they were finally dissolved.  During those years, Nigerian agriculture was 
milked of capital and profits from the commodity trade went into questionable pet 
projects of leading Nigerian politicians in the name of development.148  Perhaps 
more damningly, the nation became a net importer of food.  That included palm oil, a 
commodity Nigeria once produced and exported more than any other nation.  
Absences of any real investment in agriculture saw rural employment stagnate, 
which thereafter accelerated urban migration.  This in turn generated deeper and 
more fundamental social issues in cities, which were themselves compounded by 
Nigeria's limited manufacturing capability at this time.149  That latter point was again 
a legacy of British rule when almost all finished goods were imported into the colony.  
However, for UAC, the marketing boards were not the sole reason for the final 
business exit from commodities.  In truth, conditions of trade in the commodity trade 
for the foreign company had been in decline for quite some time. 
 
 When boards were transferred to the Nigerian regions, the authorities were 
more inclined to allocate LBA status indiscriminately to indigenous traders rather 
than foreign firms.  In that respect, Thomas believed that continuing in the trade 
would have eventually resulted in UAC being muscled out by local intermediaries: 
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The Nigerian government wanted to see the produce trade as a wholly 
indigenous enterprise and [achieved this through] the marketing boards by 
restricting our ability to function as an LBA.  Reduced profitability partly due to 
the increased competition from indigenous LBAs [persuaded] UAC to reckon 
accurately that this situation was likely to worsen further.150 
 
That lack of official oversight allowed many indigenous LBAs to take matters into 
their own hands and deal directly with marketing boards rather than UAC.  Moreover, 
many indigenous buyers resorted to dubious practices. For example, a UAC report in 
1957 found: 
In the east [of Nigeria] competition in palm oil is disturbing. This is due to small 
licensed buying agents with lower overheads and operating in places as near to 
bulk oil plants as possible, who wrangle their FFA [Free Fatty Acid] content and 
bribe the inspection and laboratory staff in the bulk oil plants.151 
 
When Nigerian buyers branched out on their own, they were lost to UAC forever. 
Thomas confirmed that ‘we [UAC] didn’t go out and buy the produce ourselves, so if 
they [Nigerian intermediaries] left us we couldn’t operate.’  There were also times 
when some competing firms offered inflated prices.  A company report in 1958 stated 
that CFAO, Holts and SCOA were overpaying local buyers and that had contributed 
to a 62 per cent drop in palm oil purchased by UAC in the Onitsha district of 
Nigeria.152  Clearly there was no loyalty or cross-company cooperation in the trade.  
Although UAC revenue from the trade had been stable if not spectacular, in 1957, a 
loss of £44,000 on palm products was reported.  The next year, the company broke 
even and, in 1959, reported a small profit of £350,000.  That profit, however, 
represented a return of just 1.1% of a total turnover figure of £33 million.153  At the 
end of the 1950s, UAC operated 350 buying outlets in West Africa, employing 
around 2,500 personnel in Nigeria alone.154  The company also had a further 2,700 
local intermediaries under contract to facilitate trade.155  The financial commitment to 
a commodity buying infrastructure constructed over a number of years therefore was 
huge.  Eventually, however, the hand of the UAC board was forced when rumours 
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circulated that the eastern and western boards in Nigeria proposed reducing the 
price paid to LBAs.  With the Plantations Group now managing Unilever estates in 
West Africa and elsewhere, the UAC board announced withdrawal from the Nigerian 
commodity trade in 1960.156  The directors now based survival of the company on 
specialist trade and, moreover, the Nigerian domestic market. 
 
 The exit from commodities drew a line under a core trade that stretched back 
to before the company’s formation in 1929 if the activities of UAC’s predecessor 
companies are taken into account.  For Nigeria, the consequences of UAC 
withdrawal from any form of involvement in the commodity trade impacted negatively 
on agricultural production.  There were a number of reasons for this however 
perhaps the removal of British company regulation and accountability within the 
trade saw farmers subjected to less equitable conditions of trade.  What is also true 
is that palm oil production stagnated and declined relative to other nations thereafter. 
 
UAC and Specialist Trade 
Lost revenue was not confined to the commodity trade as the out-stations also 
conducted supplementary sales of merchandise.  Historically speaking, foreign firms 
on ‘the Coast’ had pursued a dynamic and flexible approach to business in relatively 
unregulated markets.  However, even though demand for western goods continued 
apace, there was now a need for a more sophisticated and specialist approach to 
that business.  UAC certainly had a fair number of specialists in its ranks, particularly 
at home, but now London head office insisted on more modern management 
structures and practices on ‘the Coast’.  Hence, the company structure was 
streamlined and compartmentalised to reflect and accommodate specialist agency 
work on ‘the Coast’.  The motors department became UAC Motors; hardware was 
now UNACIL; and there was also a Breweries Division and a department overseeing 
and operating Kingsway Supermarkets etc. rather than the somewhat haphazard 
approach previously employed.  The aim of the new setup was to present UAC in a 
more professional light to western manufacturers. 157   To appease nationalist 
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concerns, the board also decided to register a number of divisions locally as 
separate business entities.  Moreover, it was thought that local registration would 
mitigate risk on ‘the Coast’ and thereby attract more multinational clients.  UAC 
Motors was the first of many to be locally registered in Nigeria.  It provided some 
comfort to London that the company remained wholly owned by UAC and staffed at 
board level and in higher management by expatriates. 
 
This new business setup may not have been trade diversification in the true 
meaning of the term.  It was, though, a fundamental shift away from general trade 
and commodities.  There is a question whether management perhaps should have 
embarked upon this restructuring programme at an earlier stage as the reasons for 
the company’s exit had been evident for a number of years.  A better time to embark 
on the diversification strategy would have been immediately after it became known 
the marketing boards would be relocated to Nigeria under local authority control in 
1953.  Did the board still contemplate a future in the commodity trade even when the 
request for estate land was turned down also in 1953?  If this was the case, why 
then did management not pursue those estate ambitions outside of West Africa?  An 
obvious choice was Malaya where Unilever already had an oil palm estate.  As it 
turned out, the parent company created another division in 1955, the Plantations 
Group, and tasked it to look after all Unilever estates both in Africa and elsewhere.  
In that move, the Unilever Special Committee most probably brought to an end any 
commodity production ambitions entertained by UAC management.  That said, UAC 
was still heavily involved in the downstream trade in West Africa.  To that end, and, 
despite deteriorating financial returns, it still took the UAC board seven years to 
move out of the commodity trade in West Africa completely, and, in that respect, 
perhaps parent company oversight should have been more rigorous.  This was an 
occasion when Unilever’s preferred hands-off approach to managing subsidiaries 
can be faulted.  It is thus worthwhile taking a closer look at the subsidiary/parent 
company relationship that existed at that time. 
 
Unilever and UAC 
As noted, the Unilever philosophy on managing subsidiaries was to afford autonomy 
wherever possible.  It was a management strategy that had served the company well 
during imperialism.  The question was, though: was that same approach practicable 
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in an independent state?  The management ethos was, however, reaffirmed in a 
1959 paper, ‘An International Business’, which stated ‘It has long been our principle 
that operating companies know their own business, and should be left to get on with 
it in their own way’.158  Of course, Unilever core business was manufacturing; UAC 
trade on ‘the Coast’ was a completely different beast altogether.  Until the 1950s, 
that was never really an issue as subsidiary profits continued to flow and, at times, 
kept the wider Unilever business afloat.  Wilson calculated that, after the war, UAC 
was ‘providing between one-third and one-half of group profits’.159  Therefore, UAC 
business practices were rarely questioned by Unilever’s Special Committee.160  In 
the 1959 paper, the authors did, however, make recommendations that certainly 
applied to UAC.  These included: ‘trade should always be transferrable to other 
regions or nations’, in the first place, to enable expansion, and second, to facilitate 
the relocation of trade if conditions deteriorated in a particular region.  Furthermore, 
the paper gave guidance on staff numbers, warning that ‘large headquarters have 
their dangers’.161  It seemed as if the authors were making direct reference to the top 
heavy management of UAC, alongside the growing dependency on ‘the Coast’ trade.  
Despite these warnings, it would appear that the UAC board was still focussed on 
business expansion on ‘the Coast’ and included giving the company a more African 
appearance.  One recalls Decker’s point that British firms in West Africa attempted to 
build up goodwill by aligning business strategy to that of a host nation’s local 
development policy.  It was a very tricky route to go down, however. 
 
Africanising UAC 
In 1951, UAC recruited a career civil servant to run the company.  The new 
Managing Director, Frederick Pedler, came with 20 years’ service in the African 
Colonial Office and very little experience of the world of business.  Undoubtedly 
Pedler understood the institutional workings of the region (under British rule that is); 
however, the transition to African self-rule must have seemed extremely chaotic at 
times even to this former civil servant.  In 1953, the Federation of Nigeria was 
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formed, consisting of four self-governing regions.  The regions were later reduced to 
three and divided along tribal lines; the Hausa in the north, Igbo in the east and 
Yoruba in the west, as the image below shows.   
 
Image 2.1: Map of Nigeria showing main Tribes and land borders162 
 
Allowing the regions to self-govern was an error in judgement as divisions were not 
just tribal, but also religious, and ethnicity, religion and politics rarely mix well.  What 
is more, from a UAC business perspective, as the nation approached independence, 
a permanent seat on the Nigerian Legislative Council was lost in 1955.  Tony 
Thomas explained the importance of that municipal body to UAC business: 
In colonial days there was a Legislative Council and our chairman was the 
commercial representative on Legco. It was a business-like arrangement 
because Legco wanted to make sure it didn’t kill the businesses which provided 
employment and taxes and we wanted to make sure that if any legislation was 
coming, we didn’t have a veto but, we could express an opinion.163  
 
Moreover, a few radical politicians were already questioning the dominance of 
foreign companies in the private sector and arguing for change.  In 1956, a National 
Economic Council was established to replace the previous (British business-
sponsored) Legislative Council.  The powers of the new public body were enhanced 
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by a Joint Planning Committee formed in 1959.  UAC had no representation on 
either of these new powerful public bodies.  Any ability to influence local business 
policy was quickly ebbing away and the rise of nationalism was emerging as an 
obvious threat to UAC trade interests in Nigeria. 
 
 To assuage growing discord among Nigerian politicians, Pedler proposed and 
then pushed through resolutions to register several more parts of the business 
locally.  He later justified the strategy arguing that: 
Seeing that the country would soon be independent, UAC decided to give its 
business the form of a Nigerian company so that it might be better able to co-
operate with an independent Nigerian government.164 
 
Pedler, the diplomat, was determined to combat local criticism levelled at UAC and 
avoid the company being viewed as an unwelcome reminder of British exploitation.  
Therefore, in 1957, UAC of Nigeria Ltd (UAC [N]) was locally registered with a start-
up capital of £5m, alongside the companies, UAC (Gold Coast) and UAC (Sierra 
Leone).165  Pedler claimed that the move was needed ‘to give the company a local 
character and to enable it to become a citizen of the state when it became 
independent’. 166   It was a move that paved the way to serious challenges for 
management in later years.  Although not fully appreciated at the time, by placing 
parts of the company outside of the corporate protection offered by London, Pedler 
had made UAC vulnerable to hostile legislation overseas.  Moreover, at that time, for 
the British investor, a company’s corporate residence was extremely important.  That 
was confirmed by David Hopkinson, former fund manager for Municipal & General 
Investments (M&G).167  In Pedler’s defence, UAC had just the one shareholder, 
Unilever and, no shares in the new associate companies were made available to 
African nationals.  The underlying and perhaps unforeseen issue was that, despite 
Pedler’s crusade to give the company more of a Nigerian look by local registration, it 
was always perceived by politicians as British and from a populist standing, an 
unwelcome reminder of colonialism.  Therefore, UAC and, those locally registered 
constituent companies, were lumped together and treated similar to all other resident 
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foreign firms accused by Nigerian politicians of exploiting the nation and its people.  
In fact Pedler’s strategy can criticised further as local registration opened a door to 
more direct legislative challenges in the future, a subject covered in later chapters. 
 
 In some areas, Pedler’s take on the Nigerian political economy was laudable 
for his time.  UAC was in need of a more African appearance that could perhaps 
fashion a workable relationship with incoming Nigerian politicians.  The question is: 
could that have been done without local registration?  Nothing in the UAC archives 
indicates that management were pressured into local registration and therefore, if it 
was voluntary, then it was an own goal and symptomatic of a board that was 
accustomed to acting autonomously.  Thomas defended the move  thus: 
I think that with any sort of appraisal it is very useful to put yourself in the other 
person’s shoes.  To say that all of us have an instinct for self-preservation 
helps to explain the attitude of UAC.168 
 
That statement also alluded to an apparent unwillingness on the part of the UAC 
board to consult Unilever, a consultation which may have undermined that 
autonomous position.  In fact, Pedler’s strategy was no different to a number of 
British overseas firms that were pursuing similar strategies elsewhere in the former 
empire.  Still hard questions remain unanswered about UAC’s decision to locally 
register important parts of the business, regardless of Thomas’s defence above 
 
On that subject, the business historian Stephanie Decker claimed that British 
firms in West Africa ‘gained social capital through corporate policy that was linked to 
official development programmes, facilitated by good publicity and extensive political 
networking’.169  That statement fits with Pedler’s goals in Nigeria.  Moreover, those 
interviewed claimed that the name of UAC held respect among local Nigerians (there 
is, though, no direct evidence to confirm those claims).170  One could counter that 
those who took office in the newly independent government did not share that 
respect, and that, in the end, it was they who mattered most.  Moreover, a number of 
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politicians were businessmen in their own right.  They most probably coveted parts 
of UAC trade but lacked capital to compete on a level playing field.  For that reason 
alone, it is more likely that UAC had only working relationships with local politicians.  
Indeed, a vast number of reports written by visiting London staff speak only of 
courtesy calls to local politicians in Nigeria.171  Some UAC employees argued it was 
not company policy to 'cosy up’ to Nigerian politician due to underlying tribal and 
religious tensions. 172   It was more the case therefore that, although UAC did 
Africanise parts of the business, management did not pursue the ‘extensive political 
networking’ that Decker suggested.  There was, of course, the possibility it may have 
gone on behind the scenes.  However, if it did, it was in violation of Unilever’s 
declared ethical business stance overseas.  That in itself raises questions about how 
much the UAC board told Unilever about business operations on ‘the Coast’. 
 
 Unsurprisingly, it was only a matter of time before Nigerian politicians 
introduced a policy aimed at reducing the presence and business share of foreign 
companies.  As early as May 1958, the board of UAC was informed that the Federal 
government intended to introduce a tax on company profits if it did not subscribe to a 
new and unsecured Nigerian state loan.  Since 1955, Nigeria’s sterling assets had 
been declining and had fallen by £17 million in just five years.  Moreover, the 
balance of payments deficit was, by 1960, about £18 million.173   Those sterling 
assets were obviously being used to fill the balance of payments deficit.  In response 
to the loan request, the UAC board took a hard line and informed authorities that ‘in 
a political climate of this sort, the time had come [for the company] to begin to 
disinvest’.174  The response was indicative of a Unilever policy that cautioned that a 
company should never invest in something in which it was not directly involved; it 
was not, after all, a merchant bank.  That said, the Special Committee later 
conceded that ‘in UAC’s position a degree of flexibility may be applied to meet heavy 
                                                 
171 UAC 1/9/4/1/5, UAC Corporate Planning Department: Nigeria – Visit Reports, 1957 to 1981. There are a 
number of visit reports referring to different areas of trade. Some reports talk of calls made to Nigerian 
officials out of courtesy as opposed to discussing matters of business in depth. 
172 Interview with David Griffin and Tony Thomas, 6 December 2012.  Both claimed that many Nigerian 
businessmen were also active in politics and the self-interests of certain individuals surfaced in lobbying for 
the Nigerianisation of trade to reduce the commercial strength of British companies like UAC. 
173 ‘Nigeria’s first year: Anniversary of Independence’, the Round Table, Commonwealth Journal of 
International Affairs, 52 (1961), p. 55. 
174 UAC 1/1/5/21, Board Minute 9566, 5 May 1958. 
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political pressure.’175  As events played out the tax threat was hollow.  The episode 
did, however, post a warning that business conditions in Nigeria were subject to 
change and certainly now unpredictable. 
 
 In the meantime, UAC revenue on ‘the Coast’ was buoyant despite the 
company’s restructuring programme.  Company accounts for 1960 would have made 
good reading in Unilever House, as Table 2.6 shows. 
 
Table 2.6: UAC(I) Profit and Valuation Figures at 30 September 1960176 
Gross Profit 
£ 
Dividend 
% 
Company Valuation 
£ 
Cash Reserves 
£ 
1,922,800 8 47,000,000 30,000,000 
 
The table shows that profit, despite the exit from the commodity trade, was almost £2 
million and therefore a dividend of 8% was provided to the parent company.  The 
figures further indicated that perhaps specialised trade could compensate for the 
loss of the commodity trade.  The results also highlighted the strength of capital 
reserves.  In 1960, London staff moved across the Thames into a new headquarters, 
UAC House.  Although the move was caused by overcrowding in Unilever House, 
nevertheless, it underscored the autonomous status of UAC.177  That was a high 
water mark in UAC history when staff looked forward to a new, if uncertain, trading 
future on ‘the Coast’.  It did not last long, however: one year later, UAC posted a 
£1.1 million loss on its Nigerian trading operations.178 
 
 Before moving on it is worth reflecting on the company structure that emerged 
in Nigeria under British rule.  On ‘the Coast’, and particularly within the Nigerian 
private sector, that structure was rather straightforward.  There was really only UAC 
and all of its various constituent business parts.  Many of the companies that were 
active before UAC arrived were bought out and added to the ‘Business Octopus of 
                                                 
175 UAC 1/1/522, Board Minute 199, 29 June 1959. 
176 UAC 1/1/1/6/32, figures extracted from UAC provisional profit and loss Accounts, 1960:  Director’s Report 
dated 3 January 1961. 
177 In 1959 UAC staff vacated Unilever House and moved across Blackfriars Bridge in London into new purpose 
built Headquarters. This was caused by a lack of space in Unilever House. 
178 UAC 1/1/1/6/23, figures extracted from UAC provisional profit and loss Accounts, 1961. 
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Africa’ by the end of British rule.  At independence, any remaining competitors had 
neither the capital nor the trade reach to threaten UAC.  Therefore, it is no surprise 
that UAC became an obvious target to Nigerian politicians and particularly those with 
business interests.  As such, the position of UAC in the Nigerian private sector was 
more fragile than under British rule.  Some of that weakness lay with a lack of local 
competition.  By extension, there was no collective strength through local business 
representation.  A lack of support in political circles (colonial and national) did have 
an impact on UAC trade and management strategy at different times.  When Nigeria 
achieved independence in 1960, the future of UAC was anything but certain.  
However, the company had now pinned its hopes for business survival on 
specialised trade and agency work, with a measure of Africanisation to appease bad 
press locally on ‘the Coast’.  In truth, Pedler had burnt most of UAC’s bridges, 
particularly when UAC exited the commodity trade.  The subsequent and mounting 
challenges to UAC business are examined in later chapters. 
 
 Before we come to that, though, the thesis turns to Malaysia and looks at 
trade development and company formation in that former colony, the early British 
commercial role in agriculture and the all-important commodity trade prior to 
independence. 
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Chapter 3: Malaysia pre-1942 – the rise of the Agency House 
Introduction 
This chapter now turns to look at a number of British companies that were active in 
Malaysia before and after independence.  The companies are: Thomas Barlow and 
Brother (Barlows), the Guthrie Corporation (Guthries) and Harrisons & Crosfield 
(Harrisons).  All three were examples of the Agency House business model and all 
specialised in commodities as well as the provision of professional services to local 
FSCs.  Each started life as family-owned merchants, however, by the first decade of 
the 20th century, both Guthries and Harrisons were listed on the London Stock 
Exchange.  Barlows, though, remained family-owned throughout.  The corporate 
status, trading strategy and growing commercial interests in Malaya of each of these 
firms offers a further opportunity for comparative company analysis.  Moreover, 
corporate status and separate equity portfolios would have a direct bearing on the 
business longevity of each Agency House in Malaysia.   
 
The chapter begins by reviewing early British trade in Malaya and focusses on 
the huge investments that were made to develop a European-style estate industry to 
grow rubber.  Unlike the case of Nigeria, the colonial authorities in Malaya were 
more welcoming of British (and other foreign) land ownership.  That endorsement at 
government level would lay the ground for the business ascent of the Agency House 
in Malaya.  The research therefore dwells on a number of key aspects of British rule, 
the political economy of Malaya and the trade that enabled those Agency Houses to 
build up controlling positions in the estates.  Under de facto Agency House direction, 
those estates would become an ‘economic pillar’ for the nation, as it remains so to 
this day.179  We start with a brief look at what marked out the Agency House in the 
early years of British trade in Malaya. 
 
The Agency House Business Model 
A common feature of each of these firms was a flexible and diversified approach to 
business by the end of the 19th century.  In this regard, the directors of Harrisons 
exhibited a particular knack of positioning the company in the right type of business 
                                                 
179 The term, ‘Economic Pillar’ was used by Malaysian leaders when discussing the rubber, tin and palm oil 
industries. It was also used by the Raja Alias on the contribution of palm oil, 6 November 2014. 
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at the right time.  That may have been due to an early lesson in the danger of 
pursuing a single avenue of trade.  This topic is developed further later, but the point 
to make just now is that the Harrisons’ board always resisted outright estate 
acquisitions, as did Guthries for a time.  By the start of the 20th century, all three 
Agency Houses were among a small band of ‘go to’ companies for the local FSC 
operating in Malaya.  Professional services offered by these Agency Houses 
included accounting, banking, legal support, export logistics and estate 
management, to name a few.  The last of those provided keys to the development of 
both the Malayan estates and the Agency Houses:  Agency Houses consistently 
invested in client estate operators and reaped significant dividends especially when 
demand for rubber soared.  A share of those dividends was ploughed back into client 
firms, and soon the Agency House became a major shareholder in a growing 
industry.  In simple terms, these companies used the profits generated by others to 
grow their own business through a programme of measured investment.  That 
position overseas was bolstered by an office presence in London and links to the 
City.  Those links to the financial world generated secretarial work paid on 
commission for client estate operators seeking capital to expand.  This was a 
lucrative business that further enhanced the equity holdings of the Agency House in 
Malaya.  Therefore, the evolution of the Agency House as a firm can say much about 
British business overseas, including that of the estate industry in Malaya.  First 
though, the chapter looks at the early years of British trade in Malaya. 
 
The Origins of British Trade in Malaya 
Throughout the 18th century, the numbers of British merchantmen arriving off the 
Malay coast steadily increased, and a permanent trading settlement was established 
at Penang.  Thereafter, the island of Singapore was claimed by Thomas Stamford 
Raffles in 1819, and the British took control of Malacca after the Anglo Dutch Treaty 
of 1824.  From all three strategically positioned ports, the British could project 
military power and trade across the region of South East Asia under the auspices of 
the East India Company.180  That trade attracted all manner of commercial enterprise 
to the peninsula.  Among the first to arrive in Singapore was the Scottish merchant, 
                                                 
180 D J M Tate, The RGA History of the Plantation Industry in the Malay Peninsula, (Kuala Lumpur: OUP, 1996), 
pp. 15-17. 
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Alexander Guthrie, founder of one the most celebrated British Agency Houses in 
Malaya’s history.  Guthries specialised in the provision of logistical support to a vast 
number of FSCs operating locally.  Guthries also had offices in London, albeit not a 
headquarters.  However, that London presence provided a means for British 
investors to speculate overseas, most prominently in this case in the Malayan 
estates.  Guthries were not alone in that regard as a number of Agency Houses 
offered the same financial conduit.  Capital flowed east, and the Malay interior was 
steadily opened up to British commercial interests.  By the end of the 19th century, 
the region, to all intents and purposes, was under indirect British rule and home to a 
vast number of FSCs engaged in a variety of ventures, many of which were 
resource-extraction industries. 
 
 British FSCs located in Malaya as elsewhere were largely reliant on local 
lenders, like the Agency House, for cash liquidity.  Thereafter, if more capital was 
required, then it usually came from the financial houses of London (in early years, 
that included industrial, commercial and financial strongholds in the north such as 
Glasgow and Manchester).  As the British financial market matured and was 
centralised in London, access to capital was achieved by floating on the stock 
exchange.  Therefore, by the end of the 19th century, a substantial amount of British 
investment was being targeted at a new and extremely profitable estate industry in 
Malaya.  An inducement to investors was the favourable conditions of trade available 
to FSCs in Malaya.  That included a leasehold system of land tenure that was 
usually granted for up to 999 years with no specified fee increase under the principle 
of ‘permanent settlement’.  Sir Frank Swettenham, first British Resident General to 
the Federated Malay States (and later chairman of Barlows’ Highlands and Lowlands 
Para Rubber Company) justified the scheme on grounds that security of tenure and 
cheap rent were needed to attract British investment.181 Comparatively speaking, 
these favourable business terms were not available to FSCs in all colonies and not, 
for the purposes of this thesis, in Nigeria. 
 
                                                 
181 For further details on the land lease terms see Lim Teck Ghee, Origins of a Colonial Economy, (Penerbit 
Universiti Sains Malaysia, Penang, 1976), p. 13. The Federated Malay States of Selangor, Perak, Negeri Senbilan 
and Pahang were administered from Kuala Lumpur by Swettenham from 1986 to 1901, after which he became 
the British High Commissioner. 
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 The land-lease scheme was unveiled in 1897 under special regulations for the 
Federated Malay States with rent set at 25 cents per hectare for the first ten years.182  
That paved the way for extensive rural development, as estates were cut out of the 
jungle to grow rubber.  A decade after the first estate was planted at Malacca in 
1896, rubber production in the colony had surpassed the total output of Latin 
America.183  That trend continued apace, and Malaya, as it came to be known, 
became the world’s largest exporter of rubber.  The pace of rural development was 
breath-taking, and, by 1921, some 1,470 European, mainly British, estates covered 
half a million hectares in Malaya.  Rubber production there was now four times that 
produced by Africa and Latin America combined. 184   To achieve that scale of 
development required vast inputs of capital, people and research.  In 1913, 
investment stood at M$351 million (£41 million) with most coming from British 
industrial wealth.185  It was not just money, as huge numbers of managers were 
despatched overseas, while most estate workers were transported from Southern 
India.  The ability to draw on such a vast human resource pool in various parts of the 
Empire was an obvious advantage for British business interests globally.  That said 
commercial success for the FSC was far from certain.  That success relied on the 
abilities of London-based directors to manage from afar.  In that respect, the 
directors of the Agency Houses played a key role, and it is to those companies that 
are listed above that the chapter now turns.   
 
The Early Years of the Agency Houses 
Each of the Agency Houses evolved somewhat differently by geography, ownership 
and trade.  Some of those differences remained and surfaced more prominently in 
later years, which is a subject covered more fully in the subsequent chapters of this 
thesis.  What was clear, though, was that all three were destined to become highly 
profitable firms largely due to their commercial interests in the Malayan estate 
                                                 
182 Barlow, Natural Rubber Industry, p.28. 
183 Barlow, Natural Rubber Industry, pp. 25-30. 
184 Barlow, Natural Rubber Industry, p. 53. Also see Table 2.2, p. 26 and p. 35 for planted area and estate 
numbers respectively. Natural History Museum, Seeds of Trade, see <http://www.nhm.ac.uk/nature-
online/life/plants-fungi/seeds-of-trade/page.dsml?section=regions&region_ID=1&page=spread&ref=rubber>, 
(accessed, 25 August 2015). 
185 Barlow, Natural Rubber Industry, p. 36. Here Rubber is ranked ninth in terms of main recipient industries of 
UK overseas investments, after Railways, Mines, Banks and Government Loans etc. 
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industry.  One of those was Harrisons, a company that first started trading from a 
warehouse close to Liverpool’s Albert docks. 
 
 On New Year’s Day 1844, the brothers Daniel and Smith Harrison went into 
business with Joseph Crosfield in a warehouse a few streets back from the docks.  
With a start-up capital of £4,000, the new company began importing tea and coffee 
from China, Costa Rica, Jamaica and Brazil.  Tea drinking was sweeping across 
Britain at that time and helped deliver profits of £3,000, £5,000 and £6,400 
respectively in the first three years of trading.  At that time, tea sales provided 80 per 
cent of revenue.186  Market entry was well timed as British companies were soon 
supplying the world with half of its tea.187  However, it was clear that opportunities to 
grow the business were limited by geography and the disposable income of 
Liverpudlians.  In July 1854, the partners gambled and relocated business south to 3 
Great Tower Street in London.  After a recorded loss on the first year of £1,162, the 
company posted a remarkable profit of £25,000 in 1857.  Over the next decade, 
business grew steadily and Harrisons became the third largest tea trader in Britain, 
with annual sales of 2.5 to 2.75 million lbs (roughly 2.5 per cent of all UK tea 
sales).188  Soon though, a number of British firms decided to move upstream in the 
trade.  As such, tea production in, most notably, Ceylon (Sri Lanka) rocketed under 
British direction.  Moreover, advances in shipping gave easier access to the 
overseas estates, and it was not long before the tea trade became a crowded 
marketplace.  Increasing competition in Britain combined with greater numbers of 
ships docking with tea saw Harrisons’ profits reduce as profit margins were 
squeezed.  The figures in Table 3.1 reveal this trend in company profits from the tea 
trade in the last third of the 19th century. 
 
 
                                                 
186 London Metropolitan Archives, Harrisons & Crosfield (H&C), GB 0074 CLC/B/MS112-001, early trading 
ledgers for Harrisons & Crosfield, 1840-1890, (Hereafter H&C MS Series), see also Elementis plc History, see 
<http://www.fundinguniverse.com/company-histories/elementis-plc-history/>, (accessed, 25 August 2015). 
187 C Fox, ‘Statistics of Tea Consumption’, Royal Statistical Society, 57 (1894), p. 716. In 1892, of a global figure 
of 442,862,485lbs of tea consumed, 193,000,000 lbs was British grown. 
188 The Grocer published league tables of the leading firms of tea dealers based on the amount of duty paid 
between the years 1863 and 1867. Harrisons were placed third after Moffatt & Co. and Peek Brothers. Also see 
LMA GB0074 CLC/B/177, Peek Brothers and Winch Limited Archives. 
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Table 3.1: Harrisons Selected Figures taken from Balance Sheets 1863-94189 
Year Profit/(Loss) 
£ 
Tea Sales Turnover 
£ 
Total Turnover 
£ 
1863 8,784 32,021 34,430 
1872 8,758 32,610 37,065 
1879 6,836 37,458 37,507 
1894 (3,526) 22,553 22,553 
 
The table shows that, from 1863, despite increased turnover, profits declined until 
1894, when a loss was reported.  Tea sales peaked at 109,679 chests in 1879, but, 
by 1893, sales had fallen to just 67,852 chests.  Moreover, market prices for the 
commodity slumped due to those rising imports.  One can hazard a guess that a 
rapid rise in production in India (46.4 million tonnes to 188.6 million tonnes) and 
Ceylon (345,157 tonnes to 150 million tonnes) meant the market was well and truly 
saturated by the end of the century.  A company report noted that the price yield 
from Indian tea imports (using average prices at London auction), had dropped from 
a high of one shilling and seven pennies in the 1860s (19d in old money) to just 
7.35d in 1902, a fall of over 60 per cent.190  The family owners had contrived to put 
all of its eggs in one basket in specialising in the tea trade as in 1879, coffee had 
disappeared from the accounts.191  It was an error that Harrisons did not repeat.  The 
company was now being managed by the sons of the founding partners, but they 
were devoid of ideas and consequently, business stagnated.  At the end of the 19th 
century, the company was in trouble, and the family was forced to look for a solution 
or go out of business.  That solution came from outside of the family. 
 
 The last of the original partners passed away in 1883 leaving the company in 
the hands of four surviving sons.  However by 1890, reserve capital stood at just 
                                                 
189 H&C MS37097, sales figures from company balance sheets for the years 1863, 72, 79 and 94. 
190 H&C MS37097, reports accompanying Harrisons annual accounts up to 1902. In old English money one 
shilling was equal to 12d (pennies). 
191 In interview, Henry Barlow explained that the European coffee crop for in west Malaya was destroyed by a 
combination of fungus (Himalaya Versatrix) and the larva of the Hawk Moth (Sephonodias Hylas). Interview 
with Henry Barlow, 6 August 2013. 
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£60,000 with trade in steep decline.192  Finally, in 1894, new blood arrived in the form 
of Harrisons’ first salaried partners, Charles Heath Clark and Charles Arthur 
Lampard.  It was a first step on the road to business recovery, which occurred in part 
because of the separation of ownership from management functions.  The first of the 
new partners, Clark, was a shrewd operator, and he took over the domestic end of 
the business.  The more entrepreneurial Lampard was tasked with looking for new 
business overseas.  In tea production, Ceylon had already surpassed China as world 
leader, and therefore in 1895, Harrisons opened a first overseas office in Colombo.  
Four years later, Lampard secured an interest in the Hopton tea estate in Passara, 
then owned by Finlays, a British FSC.193  That allowed staff in London to brand 
Harrisons’ own tea at a new warehousing facility on the Thames, aptly named 
Ceylon Wharf.  More importantly, Harrisons now had a presence overseas and could 
buy direct from the estates.  The Colombo offices doubled up as merchant sales 
outlets for British goods and other services required by local FSCs.  The agency 
business spread company risk and enhanced the appeal of Harrisons to capital 
markets in London.  The management thereafter took up the overseas Agency 
House mantle with vigour. 
 
 Agency work overseas proved to be very lucrative, and it was something in 
which several British companies became engaged, which leads on to the saga of the 
second Agency House selected by this thesis.  Predating Harrisons overseas was 
Guthries, a merchant firm based in Singapore.   Alexander Guthrie, in partnership 
with James Scott Clark, became the local agent for Coutts banking in 1830, London 
Fire Insurance in 1853 and London & Provincial Marine Insurance in 1961.  Guthrie 
continued to steer the firm in that direction, and, by 1896, the company was the 
Singapore agent for six banks, five insurance companies and two shipping firms.  
Moreover, Guthries traded sugar, flour, cement, coffee, machinery, whiskies, beers, 
wines and spirits.  The company also branched out into management services and 
looked after five coffee estates, three tobacco estates and twenty-three tin and gold 
                                                 
192 H&C MS112-001, figure extracted from early trading ledgers for Harrisons & Crosfield, 1890. 
193H&C MS112-003/1, papers on purchase of part ownership share in the Finlays Hopton Tea Estate, Passara, 
Ceylon. The estate operates today as part of the Passara Group within Finlays. See 
<http://finlaysteaestates.lk/estates/passara/hopton-estate/>, (accessed, 25 August 2015). 
79 
mines.194  At the end of the 19th century, Guthries was already an established, well 
diversified Agency House and better placed than Harrisons given the latter’s, as yet, 
mainly London-based setup.  In terms of corporate governance, the company had 
already separated ownership from management functions at the end of the 19th 
century, and, on 18 February 1903, Guthrie & Company Ltd was registered in the 
Singapore Straits Settlement with an opening balance of M$2,875,498.42 
(£335,475).  Later that same year, the firm opened offices at 52/54 Gracechurch 
Street, London, in conjunction with a merger with Scott & Company.   Sir John 
Anderson, who first arrived in Singapore with his Scottish parents back in 1847, was 
installed as Governing Director.195 
 
 The final Agency House chosen for this thesis is the family-owned concern 
Thomas Barlow & Brother (Barlows).  Much like Harrisons, which focused on the tea 
trade, Barlows was focussed on imports of a single commodity to Britain, in this case 
cotton.  The founder of the company, Thomas Barlow, came from a family of yeoman 
farmers and first went into business with John Bolton in 1857 as Bolton & Barlow.  
Henry Barlow, the great grandson of Thomas, gave a concise account of the family 
story from that point forward: 
Then he [Thomas] struck out on his own just about the time that the American 
Civil War broke out and he succeeded together with other Manchester 
merchants in smuggling large quantities of cotton out from the blockade of the 
Southern States. It was trans-shipped in Bermuda where there was no banking 
system at that time and exactly what the mechanics were and how it was all 
arranged and paid for is an aspect of the American Civil War activities which 
appears to have received very little attention.196 
 
Even before the outbreak of the US Civil War, though, there was a pattern to the 
cotton trade.  After unloading at ports in North West England, the raw cotton was 
delivered to nearby factories and woven into textiles for export to Far Eastern 
markets like Calcutta, Shanghai, Singapore and Manila.  The company posted 
excellent profits and, in 1859, Thomas Barlow assumed outright ownership of the 
company.  He opened overseas offices in Calcutta to handle Barlow goods overseas 
                                                 
194 Extract from web description for Guthrie Corporation Archives, School of Oriental and African Studies, 
London.  See <http://archives.soas.ac.uk/CalmView/Record.aspx?src=CalmView.Catalog&id=GC&pos=1>, 
(accessed, 17 December 2015). 
195 Extract from Guthrie Corporation Archive cover page, SOAS, London. 
196 Interview with Henry Barlow, 6 August 2013. 
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and shipped tea back to Britain.  It was then that Thomas Barlow hit upon the idea of 
using receipts for goods as security to buy consignments of tea and other 
commodities in overseas currency.  It was a risky practice that nevertheless also 
brought substantial rewards, as Henry Barlow revealed:  ‘My great grandfather must 
have been up [liable] for about £7 million at a time when he can’t have been worth 
more than about £500’.  Barlow added that the business practice saw his great 
grandfather ‘make his fortune but lost his health in the process’. 197  In 1876, the 
company opened offices in London primarily to manage tea sales and to look after 
the family’s financial affairs.  Thereafter in 1883, other offices were opened in 
Shanghai in the name of Barlow & Co.  Unlike Harrisons and Guthries, Thomas 
Barlow bought a number of estates outright, a strategy that continued apace 
throughout the 19th century, as table 3.2 shows. 
 
Table 3.2: Tea Estate Acquisitions by Thomas Barlow & Company198 
Year Tea Estates 
1880 Castleton in Darjeeling, India 
1890 Brae Group of Estates in Madulkelle, Ceylon 
1898 Cooliekooksie in Assam, India 
1898 Loongsoong in Assam, India 
1898 Chingoor in Assam, India 
Prior to 1899 Balijoorie in Upper Assam, India 
Prior to 1899 Kopira in Assam, India 
Prior to 1899 Dilli in Assam, India 
 
From the table it is clear that Thomas Barlow bought tea estates as a means to 
supply downstream trade.  Moreover, he acquired the Monastery Bonded Tea 
Warehouse in East London in 1889 to process imports and sell direct to the local 
markets.  Again, as with Harrisons, it was a sizeable commitment, with the added 
issue that risk was placed on just one commodity. 
                                                 
197 Interview with Henry Barlow, 6 August 2013. 
198 Barlow Archives, Box 4/1-2, Foreign Correspondence and other papers relating to tea plantations overseas. 
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 In 1890, as Thomas’s health deteriorated further, his son John took over the 
reins.  John further expanded the company’s interests in tea estates, as the table 
above shows.  Perhaps heeding counsel on the dangers of limited business 
diversification, in 1891, Barlows bought a struggling Singapore merchant Scott & 
Company and, thereafter, forged ahead with agency work.  From there, Barlow 
continued the practice of using receipts for goods as security to finance commodity 
purchases.  Soon that included rubber.  At around that time, Barlow was persuaded 
by a Singapore manager, J M Allinson, to extend credit to a number of struggling 
estates and traders locally.  It was an inspired gamble as when global demand for 
rubber went through the roof, the company profited immensely.  From its London 
offices, the company was well placed to undertake the job of listing client FSCs on 
the LSE.  In 1906, furthermore, Barlows cobbled together a number of Malayan 
estates to form the Highlands & Lowlands Para Rubber Company.199  As the listing 
agent, the family secured an interest of 16 per cent in the new company.  The timing 
was extremely fortuitous as that listing came just prior to the great rubber boom of 
1910.200  Thereafter, like Guthries and Harrisons before, the business reputation of 
Barlows grew both in the FSC community overseas and in the City in London.  
However, unlike the other Agency Houses, the family retained control of the 
company by means of a secretariat in London.  It was a corporate structure that 
survived over many years as Barlows emerged to be one of the most prominent 
Agency Houses to operate in Malaya. 
 
The Private-Sector Ascent of the Agency House in Malaya 
A major commercial strength in the Agency House business model could be found in 
an office presence both overseas and in London.  That dual presence was attractive 
to the standalone FSC operating overseas as it provided local contact and more 
crucially, access to the City.  For an FSC seeking to expand, access to capital was 
usually achieved by floating on the LSE as a limited company.  Traditionally, that 
service was only provided by the issuing houses of London which dated back to the 
17th century coffee houses.  However, at the start 20th century, the Agency House 
                                                 
199 Barlow Archives, Box 1/1-2, Home and Foreign Correspondence 1904-8.  Company papers related to the 
purchase of Scott & Co and the formation of the Highlands and Lowlands Para Rubber Company. 
200 Interview with Henry Barlow, 6 August 2013. 
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could also offer those services.  The fundamental difference and trump card in many 
ways was that the Agency House had a staff presence overseas, and therefore FSC 
management there could discuss matters directly and locally.  At the same time, an 
Agency House could assess FSCs at the coal face prior to signing contracts.  For the 
most part, that capability was outside the reach of London brokers.  Moreover, when 
an Agency House undertook a listing on the LSE, a business relationship with client 
firms was formed which often led to other trade and merchandising contracts.  This 
was another edge over London-bound issuing houses.  When Harrisons opened its 
Colombo offices, the board moved fast to exploit those opportunities.  On 14 June 
1901, Harrisons was appointed as secretary for the listing of the Atlas Assurance 
Company on the LSE.  Atlas was an established insurance broker specialising in the 
provision of policies overseas.  Harrisons was also a sales agent for Atlas policies in 
South East Asia, a detail that highlights the commercial advantage of conducting 
business in the local setting.201  For each company listing, the Agency House was 
allocated a percentage of shares at a favourable price.  That was a particularly 
lucrative option if, as often happened, those client firms subsequently flourished as 
limited companies. 
 
 The Agency House corporate and business setup in its various forms 
continued to thrive overseas, so much so that, in 1910, it was estimated that the top 
third of British firms operating overseas (£4 million plus capitalisation) were engaged 
in agency work.202  Moreover, when western economies toiled, it was the Agency 
House that stepped in to cover investment shortfalls in colonies like Malaya.  In 
1914, at the outbreak of the First World War, 85.8 per cent of all new investment in 
Malayan rubber was facilitated or provided directly by Agency Houses. In 1922, 
moreover, in the depths of the US post-war economic depression, the figure was 
75.7 per cent.  Even during the great rubber boom of 1910, when an unprecedented 
£8 million flowed to the Malayan estates, Agency Houses were still responsible for 
36 per cent.203  Agency Houses were thus consistent investors overseas despite 
                                                 
201 H&C MS112-004, companies Harrisons acted as secretary and agent, paper dated November 1903. 
202 Chapman, Merchant Enterprise in Britain, pp. 252-4. 
203 Richard T Stillson, ‘The Financing of Malayan Rubber, 1905-1923’, Economic History Review, 24 (1971), p. 
594, the figures in Table 2 have been challenged by some however the basic argument that Agency Houses 
helped fund estate companies in Malaya is undeniable. 
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challenging economic downturns.  They were key players, materially and financially, 
in the steady expansion of an estate industry overseas in colonies such as Malaya. 
 
 The board of Harrisons decided to specialise in the Malayan estates at an 
early stage.  The company’s first recorded public listing of an estate operator was in 
1899, the Lenuva (Ceylon) Rubber and Produce Company.  Equity options exercised 
by Harrisons often brought representation at board level.  With each new listing, 
Harrisons’ influence spread throughout a rapidly expanding, British-owned Malayan 
estate industry.  Table 3.3 reveals the estate operating FSCs for whom Harrisons 
acted as secretary. 
 
Table 3.3: Plantation Companies listed on the LSE by Harrisons 1903-37204 
1900s 1910s 1920-30s 
Pataling Syndicate (1903) 
Anglo Malaya Co (1905) 
Golden Hope (1905) 
Kuala Selangor (1905) 
Malaysia (1905) 
Castlefield (1906) 
Shelford (1906) 
Sungkhai Chumor (1906) 
Lanadron (1907) 
Nordanal (1907) 
Cluny Rubber (1910) 
Djasinga Rubber (1910) 
Kenneth Kajang (1910) 
Killinghall (1910) 
Kinta Kellas (1910) 
North Labis Rubber (1910) 
Holyrood (1912) 
Hong Kong (1912) 
Kuala Krau Rubber (1918) 
Perak Coconut (1919) 
Prang Besar (1921) 
Hoscote (1925) 
Sogomana (1926) 
Edensor (1927) 
Kemasul (1927) 
Doranakande (1931) 
Ledbury (1937) 
 
The table spans a 35-year period, revealing the scope of Harrisons’ work in company 
flotations.  All estates were located in South East Asia, and most were in Malaya.  
The estates listed above are clear evidence of the Harrisons’ stake in the Malayan 
estate industry.  Unfortunately there are no corresponding records for Guthries, 
however, the company was doubtless just as active.  A minute book produced by the 
Singapore offices provides indirect evidence of this, stating that ‘the company has 
been able to secure the appointment as Secretaries and Agents for a number of 
these in return for assistance rendered in their flotation’.205  The Barlows stake also 
grew rapidly in the first decade of the century, as Table 3.4 clearly shows: 
                                                 
204 H&C MS 37007A, Agreements with secretarial and other companies, 1903-37. Also, the Golden Hope Story, 
1844-2007, (Kuala Lumpur: Golden Hope Plantations Berhad, 2007), p. 18. 
205 Guthries G/MIN/1: Minute book of Guthrie & Company Ltd. Company agency and secretarial work, p. 27. 
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Table 3.4: Barlows’ Principal Estate Companies by Year of Listing on LSE206 
Year Estate Company Name 
1903 Sapong Rubber Estate Ltd 
1904 Sungie Krian Rubber Estate Ltd 
1904 Krian Rubber Estates Co Ltd 
1904 Sagga Rubber Co Ltd 
1906 Manchester North Borneo Rubber Ltd 
1908 Sekong Rubber Co Ltd 
1909 Ayer Kuning (FMS) Rubber Co Ltd 
1909 Bradwell (FMS) Rubber Estates Ltd 
1909 Chersonese (FMS) Estates Ltd 
1909 Kablang Rubber Co Ltd 
1909 Muar River Rubber Co Ltd 
1910 Majedie (Johore) Rubber Estates Ltd 
1910 Permas Rubber Ltd 
 
The list above does not include the Highlands & Lowlands Para Rubber Company, 
which, at 60,000 acres, was by far the family’s biggest asset.  By 1917, five British 
Agency Houses held sway over two-fifths of all estate land in Malaya.  Of that five, 
Guthries and Harrisons were the most prominent, with Barlows not far behind.207  
These Agency Houses thereafter, became key players in the global rubber market, 
not least through their role in the estates that grew the commodity in Malaya.  Their 
role was central in making Malaya home to a vast rubber industry. 
 
The Malayan Rubber Industry 
It is thought that rubber was first planted in Malaya in late 1876 with seeds (Hevea 
brasiliensis) transported from Brazilian tropical forests via Kew Gardens in London to 
Ceylon and finally on to the Botanic Gardens at Singapore.208  A decade passed 
before commercial planting took place in Malaya and during that time supplies 
                                                 
206 Barlows Box 2/1-2: Home Correspondence and letters relating to company estates in Malaya. 
207 Tate, RGA History, p. 251. The other two companies were Boustead Bros and Edward Boustead’s. Of the 
five, Harrisons, Guthries and Barlows held the lion’s share of estate interests at this time in Malaya. 
208 Bauer, the Rubber Industry. 
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mainly came from trees growing wild in the Amazon. 209   However, supply was 
limited, there being no estate culture in South America.  By 1899, an estimated one 
million trees had been planted on British-owned rubber estates in Malaya.210  The 
timing was ideal as demand for rubber soared on the back of a new US automobile 
industry.  In 1902, total rubber producing land in Malaya was just 2,400 hectares.  A 
decade later the figure was 239,200 hectares, an almost a 100-fold increase.211  
Most of that growth was driven by European (mainly British) FSCs, as Graph 3.1 
confirms. 
 
Graph 3.1: Land Area of Estate-Grown Rubber in Malaya, 1898-1912212 
 
 
The graph shows that the development of estates to grow rubber in Malaya, which 
also heralded a meteoric spate of land clearance.  By 1920, land cleared had 
doubled again and the Malayan estates now produced around 400,000 tonnes of 
rubber.  That figure dwarfed the South American total of 28,000 tonnes.  It was a 
production lead that the Malayan industry never surrendered, and, even today, the 
wider region of South East Asia supplies around 92 per cent of the world’s natural 
                                                 
209 Barlow, Natural Rubber Industry, p. 16. In 1900, world production of rubber stood at 45,000 tonnes, of 
which some 28,000 tonnes came from South America and 16,000 tonnes from Africa. 
210 Barlow, Natural Rubber Industry, p. 22. 
211 H&C MS37152, planted acreage in Malaya: 1905-12.  Also, David Figart, ‘the Plantation Rubber Industry in 
the Middle East’, Crude Rubber Survey, (Washington: US Department of Commerce, 1925), p. 277. 
212 Barlow, Natural Rubber Industry, p. 26. Figures extracted show that in 1920, Total planted rubber stood at 
882,700 hectares of which 478,400 hectares were European-owned estates and 404,300 hectares, Asian. 
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rubber.213  The chapter now takes a more detailed look at Harrisons, which played a 
particularly important role in Malayan estate developments. 
 
Harrisons and the Malayan Estates 
Harrisons’ first recorded foray into the Malayan rubber industry took place in 1902 
and coincided with the appointment of Herbert Wilford Brett to the board of directors.  
Brett had recently purchased 2,000 acres of estate land at Pataling near Kuala 
Lumpur and planned to grow coconut, not rubber.  Spiralling demand for the latter 
commodity persuaded Brett to amend his plans, and, on 24 March 1903, the Pataling 
Rubber Estates Syndicate was floated on the LSE.  As secretary for that listing, 
Harrisons exercised an option to purchase £1,000 in shares.214  The director who 
oversaw the contract was one Eric Miller.  It was Miller who would rise through the 
ranks to become chairman of Harrisons, and he retained his association with 
Pataling until he passed away in 1958 (he was still chairman).  In 1905, rubber 
reached a new high of 6 Shillings per pound, double the price five years earlier.215  
Encouraged by unrelenting US demand, Harrisons parcelled together a number of 
small estates in 1905 and floated them as the Anglo-Malayan Rubber Company Ltd.  
That listing was followed by the Golden Hope Rubber Estate Ltd, also in Malaya.  
Golden Hope is worthy of note here as it was an independent company until 2008, 
when finally subsumed into the vast estate holdings of the Malaysian conglomerate, 
Sime Darby.216 
 
 The Harrisons’ board was now committed to development of business in 
Malaya and especially the trade in rubber.  In 1907, offices were opened at 70 Jalan 
Ampang, Kuala Lumpur, to handle increasing trade in the name of Crosfield, 
Lampard & Company.217  That was a shrewd investment as the price of rubber kept 
on climbing.  In 1908, Harrisons itself was listed on the LSE, and James Blackhouse 
                                                 
213 Natural History Museum, Seeds of Trade: Rubber, see < http://www.nhm.ac.uk/nature-online/life/plants-
fungi/seeds-of-trade/page.dsml?section=regions&region_ID=1&page=spread&ref=rubber>, (accessed, 25 May 
2012). 
214 Funding Universe, Elementis plc History, see <http://www.fundinguniverse.com/company-
histories/elementis-plc-history/>, (accessed, 12 March 2015). Pataling Rubber Estates Syndicate was floated 
on 24 March 1903 with a nominal capital of £30,000. 
215 J C Kunhardt, An Analysis of the Statistical Position of Rubber, (London: W H Rickinson & Son, 1921, p. 41. 
216 Interview with Henry Barlow, 1 July 2015. Barlow was responding to a first draft of thesis by author. 
217 Golden Hope Story, p. 15. 
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Crosfield, grandson of the original partner, was installed as chairman.  The transition 
from family-owned firm to joint-stock company was now complete.  The value of 
share capital issued was just £150,000, a figure well short of true company value: 
when realisable assets and other share interests were accounted for, the true 
financial worth of Harrisons was very much higher.218  Unsurprisingly, no third party 
underwriting of capital was needed for the listing.  The flotation took place in the 
same year when the wild Amazon trees were hit by leaf blight and rubber output in 
Brazil stagnated. 219  The British and Dutch estates in South East Asia seized on the 
chance to expand and, in doing so, achieved near monopoly market conditions of 
trade thereafter.  The launch of the Model T Ford in October 1908 saw demand for 
rubber soar further, and prices went through the roof.  This was the boom era for 
rubber during which estate operators in Malaya realised enormous profits. 
 
 In 1908, shareholders in the Pataling Company were awarded a dividend of 
45 per cent, followed a year later by an incredible 125 per cent.  Those awards paled 
in comparison when London prices remarkably reached a new high of 10 shillings 
per pound in 1910, which was around 150% higher than comparable prices for the 
commodity in 1908.  In that same year, the Pataling board sanctioned an astonishing 
325 per cent dividend to shareholders.220   As significant holders of equity in a 
number of estate companies, Harrisons benefited immensely.  Moreover, it became 
standard practice for client companies to take out exclusive merchandise contracts 
with Harrisons.  Other divisions of business in Malaya also saw profits rise, most 
notably land conveyancing, book keeping, agency work and legal and insurance 
services.  It was a win/win arrangement for the Agency House as contracts for one 
professional service often led to many others.  In financial terms, the job of listing 
those companies on the LSE delivered commissions of between 2.5 and 5 per 
cent.221  Harrisons converted much of that into equity.  That long-term investment 
                                                 
218 See Geoffrey Jones and Judith Wale, ‘Diversification Strategies of British Trading Companies: Harrison & 
Crosfield, c. 1900-c.1980’, Business History, 41 (2006), p. 72. Here the authors try to put a figure on the ‘real’ 
net assets of Guthries and Harrisons by taking account of those companies largely controlled by the Agency 
Houses. For Harrisons the figure was around £10.8 million in 1922 while for Guthries it was £5.1 million. 
219 Amazon rubber production was devastated by a tree disease (South American Leaf Blight) which destroyed 
the crop in many areas. Seeds taken to Kew (and onto South East Asia) did not contain the blight. 
220 Kunhardt, Statistical Position of Rubber, p. 41. Malayan total area planted was 207 thousand acres in 1910 
(eight thousand in 1904).  Rubber prices were at this point $3.06, around five times that of ten years earlier. 
221 Tate, RGA History, p. 251. 
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strategy in rubber estates was beginning to pay off.  A list of estates and the decade 
in which Harrisons first secured equity in them is shown in Table 3.5. 
 
Table 3.5: Harrisons First Recorded Share Purchases in Selected Estates*222 
1900s 1910s 1920/30s 1950s 1960s 
Ayer Molek 
Bagan Datoh 
Begerpang 
Braemar 
Cluny 
Diamond Jubilee 
Dusun Durian 
Golden Hope 
Klang River 
Linsum 
Pataling 
(Victoria 1865) 
Plang Simpang 
Semenyih 
Shelford 
Sungei-Mahang 
Sungei Wangi 
Prang Besar 
Rambong 
Sialang 
Rompin 
Selaba 
Sialang 
St Helier 
Sungai Samak 
Tamock 
Tangkah 
Balgownie 
Batang Benar 
Bilham 
Bukit Pilah 
Edensor 
Elphil 
Kelpin 
Kemasul 
Lanchang 
Mentakab 
Pernambang 
Selaba 
Sepang Selangor 
Sogomana 
Sungei Sebaling 
Tangkah 
Ulu Ayer Tawar 
Welch 
Anglo Malay 
Bikam 
Klanang 
Bahru Lumut 
New 
Crocodile 
Strathisla 
Tai Tak 
Bukit Kajang 
Jugra Land & 
Carey 
 Lanadron 
Nordanal 
Oriental 
Prang Besar 
Straits 
* The estates are listed by the decade in which Harrisons first purchased shares. 
 
All of the estates listed in the table were located in South East Asia and the majority 
in Malaya and Sumatra.  Moreover, all but two, Rambong Sialang and Sungai 
Samak, grew rubber (the two named estates grew oil palm).  One historian claimed 
that, in 1914, Harrisons held a large number of shares in 40 estates which included 
representation at board level.223  Unfortunately, there are no records to reveal the full 
extent of Guthries’ holdings, however a sheet produced later by the Singapore 
offices listed interests in 31 estate companies in South East Asia.224  For Barlows, 
the Highlands Group was made up of 21 estates with another 13 smaller estates 
                                                 
222 See Golden Hope Story and Harrisons archives, MS 37017 series and MS37389, historical notes.  There may 
be some duplication or indeed, missing data from the list above as there are no conclusive papers on estate 
holdings in the archives, however the annual accounts do list estates by name and amount of equity held 
therein. The list above is therefore constructed using data from both the book and AGM papers. 
223 Rajeswary A Brown, Capital and Entrepreneurship in South-East Asia, (London: Palgrave MacMillan, 1994), 
pp. 57-8. 
224 Guthries G/MIN/2: Loose paper included in final accounts for company estate holdings produced by 
Singapore offices for FY 1961. 
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listed separately.225  The business reach of all three Agency Houses across Malaya’s 
estate industry was obvious through these extensive equity holdings.  The strategy 
of the Harrisons’ board was to accumulate significant though minority shareholdings 
in estates rather than outright acquisition.  That strategy lowered risk and allowed for 
investments to be made elsewhere.  Tate contended that this flexible approach to 
business was the ‘real secret of the success and ascendency of overseas merchants 
as agency houses for the new rubber plantations.’226  As the pre-eminent Agency 
Houses in Malaya, Barlows, Guthries and Harrisons confirmed Tate’s claim.  The 
management of each Agency House was now well placed to exert control and 
influence over the future direction of the Malayan rubber industry. 
 
 To better manage equity holdings, in 1906, the Golden Hope Rubber Estate 
Ltd was formed as a holding company for shares held in estates located in Selangor, 
Malaya.  A year later, London Asiatic Rubber and Produce Company Ltd was listed 
to manage interests in Malacca, Perak and outliers in Ceylon, India and elsewhere.  
A third company, Pataling Rubber Estates Ltd, was formed in 1920 to hold shares for 
estates on the Klang River near Kuala Lumpur.  Those holding companies, Golden 
Hope, London Asiatic and Pataling, thereafter became known as the ‘Three Sisters’.  
On the corporate side, the last family members did not last long into the 20th century.  
In 1911, James Crosfield, the company chairman, retired.  He was followed into 
retirement by Charles Harrison in 1915.  Finally, Hugh Theodore Crosfield, the last 
direct descendent of the original partners, left to join Twinings in 1916 and took with 
him the packaged and wholesale tea business (although the company’s 
shareholding in Ceylon and India remained with Pataling).227  Harrisons had now 
severed all links to the original partners, and the firm’s future was in the hands of a 
salaried board of directors and answerable to shareholders.  The board was 
convinced that the company’s future lay overseas, which was perhaps why the tea 
trade in Britain was allowed to go out of the door with Hugh Crosfield.  That focus 
                                                 
225 Barlows Box 2/1-2: Home Correspondence and letters relating to company estates in Malaya. 
226 Tate, RGA History, p. 251. 
227 H&C MS37394, also MS112-054, 103 and 124, papers dated 1899 – 1960.  These boxes contain historical 
papers on company transactions and business interests examined to complete the early business history of 
Harrisons. For a reasonably concise history of Harrisons see, <http://www.fundinguniverse.com/company-
histories/elementis-plc-history/>, (accessed, 25 August 2015). 
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overseas was vindicated by consistent annual profits over the course of the next 
decade, as Table 3.6 reveals. 
 
Table 3.6: Harrisons Annual Report of Company Profits 1909-24228 
Year Profit 
£ 
Year Profit 
£ 
1909 47,969 1917 151,839 
1910 129,155 1918 156,530 
1911 176,372 1919 115,701 
1912 186,063 1920 97,070 
1913 148,217 1921 164,466 
1914 158,148 1922 149,138 
1915 187,833 1923 192,710 
1916* 196,596 1924 309,001 
           *85% of the London staff was released by the company to join HM Forces 
 
Annual profits posted by Harrisons reveal that, despite losing so many employees to 
the armed forces during the First World War, financial returns were, relatively 
speaking, unaffected.  By 1924, company profits were still rising and far above 
previous years.  Business was financially sound and managed by a board of 
directors with a proven track record.  Harrisons was a well-positioned Agency House 
both at home and overseas, with the people and financial means to tackle the 
challenges that lay ahead in Malaya. 
 
 Turning to Guthries, the company posted a loss in 1908, but returned to profit 
in subsequent years.  Of course, Guthries was still headquartered in Singapore 
where business was perhaps not subject to the same rigours as companies listed on 
the LSE.  In 1911, the Singapore offices reported that the independent auditor of 
accounts had raised serious concerns about the transparency of company share 
transactions.229  The report went on to censure Guthries for share deals during the 
great rubber boom of 1910.  That lack of regulation overseas may explain why 
                                                 
228 H&C MS370201, figures extracted from Report on Annual Accounts, 1909-24. 
229Guthries G/MIN/1. The figures are extracted from Guthrie & Company Ltd, Singapore minute books 
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Guthries’ management chose to register in Singapore rather than London.  In any 
case, a profit of £185,966 reported in 1916 generated a bonus for staff.  The gesture 
was repeated a year later when a profit of £275,349 was reported.  Over the next two 
years, 1918-19, Singapore posted further profits of £279,722 and £265,177.  Despite 
war in Europe, business was booming in Malaya.  However, even at this early stage, 
it was obvious that Guthries was highly reliant on Malaya for business and revenue.  
Harrisons, in contrast, had one eye on business opportunities elsewhere in order to 
balance a worrying over-reliance on the Malayan estate industry. 
 
 In 1920, Harrisons held a significant number of shares in twenty-three estate 
FSCs on the Malay Peninsula.  The company had also secured a controlling interest 
in a smaller Agency House, the Singapore-based Barker & Company.  That 
company held equity in forty two local estates and a further thirty four in Penang.  All 
estates were operated as standalone companies or FSCs and, many were listed on 
the LSE.  Company papers reveal that Harrisons also provided day-to-day estate 
management, logistical support and secretarial services to almost all of them.230  
There were estate interests elsewhere, notably twelve in Sumatra, ten in Ceylon, five 
in Java and two in Borneo, but there was clearly an emerging geographical 
imbalance in the business.  To try and address that growing dependency on the 
Malayan rubber industry, the board acquired a majority holding in the China Borneo 
Company in 1920.  This brought with it exclusive logging rights to the jungles of 
Borneo (then part of the British and Dutch Empires).  It also offered an opportunity to 
explore the downstream trade in timber.  Management also sold off some minor 
interests in tobacco plantations to Dutch firms in 1921, claiming that the company 
lacked sufficient expertise in the crop.  Thereafter, the board diversified into coconut 
palm in the Philippines and Ceylon, where production reached one million tonnes in 
a decade due to rising demand for margarine as a result of butter shortages in the 
west.  The board geographically diversified further afield in 1922, when it opened 
offices in Canada, primarily to handle sales of imported rubber from the estates.  
That North American market entry would, in later years, provide the company with a 
foothold from which to pursue business in new industries.  In something of a 
                                                 
230Golden Hope Story, pp. 3-5, and H&C MS37378/002, paper on company holdings titled, ‘Sphere of 
Influence’, hand-written on back, 1927. 
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departure from that celebrated cautious approach to asset ownership, Harrisons 
bought the Wilkinson Process Rubber Company in 1926.  That secured exclusive 
patent rights to Linatex, a vulcanized rubber compound still used today in the 
manufacture of robust and pliable piping for the mining industry.231 
 
 A company report from the time was entitled ‘Sphere of Operations’ and set 
out the geographical scope of Harrisons’ business overseas.  London Headquarters 
oversaw branches in Calcutta, Colombo, Kobe, Medan (Sumatra), Kuala Lumpur, 
Montreal, New York, Quilon (India), Sandakan (Borneo) and Vancouver.232  There is 
little doubt that the majority of business still gravitated toward Malaya and its rubber 
estates.  However, it is worthy of note here that the directors of Harrisons appeared 
to be well aware of the dangers inherent in focussing on a single line of business and 
were therefore investing in other sectors to spread risk.  That broad approach to 
commercial strategy to ensure business survival was not so obvious in the behaviour 
of the directors of other Agency Houses. 
 
Estate Monoculture vs. Crop Diversification 
In the Malayan estates, rubber remained the crop of choice despite the commodity’s 
volatility in demand and, therefore, price.  In that respect, it was surprising to find in 
the archival records that both Harrisons and Guthries had early opportunities to 
pursue crop diversity on those estates, and that they took them.  In the 1920s, two 
estates in the Harrisons’ stable grew oil palm, Rambong Sialang in Sumatra and 
Sungai Samak in Malaya.  Around that time, Guthries also acquired two oil palm 
estates in Malaya, the Elaeis and Liniggi Plantations.  Although production on all four 
estates was consistent, however, neither company appeared willing to plant oil palm 
elsewhere.  Perhaps at this time, management was not fully appreciative of the 
potential in palm oil, or perhaps of its suitability to the Malayan environment.  Of 
course, it could have been that each board thought demand was insufficient to justify 
                                                 
231 H&C MS112-165, Wilkinson’s was registered in 1926 in Kuala Lumpur to produce Linatex and other crepe 
rubber at a factory at the Batu Caves, Selangor in Malaya. It was partly owned by Harrisons and Crosfield 
Limited (MS112-001-016). Harrisons and Crosfield (Malaya) Limited (CLC/B/112-071) acted as secretaries for 
the company and, from 1930, were sole concessionaires in Europe of products. In 1966 the company name 
was changed to Wilkinson Process Rubber Company Berhad, and in 1990 to Linatex Process Rubber Berhad. In 
1989 Harrisons and Crosfield became the majority shareholder. 
232 H&C MS37378/01, Overseas Property Holdings: Sphere of Operations, 1929. 
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replanting rubber with oil palm.  Marcus Gent, the last British chairman of Guthries, 
was asked about that: 
Only the Danes [United Plantations] and one other group [Harrisons] had oil 
palm estates pre-war [including Guthries].  They were fairly unprofitable and it 
was thought that oil palms would only grow on wet, coastal, clay soils.233 
 
The ‘fairly unprofitable’ remark made by Gent is questionable as Harrisons and 
Guthries papers reveal that those oil palm estates were certainly profitable. 234  
Moreover, given the constant price volatility of rubber, it raises the question: why did 
neither Agency House consider further experimentation in oil palm?  In defence of 
Harrisons, the board did not hold controlling positions in client estate operators.  That 
said they did hold considerable influence at boardroom level.  The same defence 
cannot apply, however, to Guthries or indeed Barlows as those companies owned a 
number of estates outright.  Perhaps the argument was that oil palm was a West 
African native where, at the time, Nigerian production satisfied market demand.  As 
such, there is no mention in the Harrisons’ papers about crop diversification at that 
time.235  In the case of Guthries, in 1929, the chairman responded to a letter from 
Lady Anderson (widow of Sir John Anderson and majority shareholder), on the very 
subject of planting oil palm.  Part of John Hay’s response read as follows: 
As regards Palm Oil, we cannot afford to lock up our own capital in that 
direction, as one unit alone necessitates the provision of a very large sum.  
Through our associated companies we are, however, practically the pioneers in 
Malaya of the cultivation of this product on a large scale.236 
 
Hay seemed to allude to the fact that estate operators were actually nervous about 
committing capital at a time when the price of rubber was extremely unpredictable.  
Hay did acknowledge Lady Anderson’s point on the dangers of relying on one 
commodity though it did not persuade him to plant more oil palm.  As a result, the 
Malayan estates continued to focus on rubber and sought efficiency savings to give 
                                                 
233 Marcus Gent, email dated 1 November 2013.  Responses to questions sent by author. 
234 H&C MS37946, Annual Reports and Accounts for Allied Sumatra Plantations Ltd. Guthries G/OPM/10, Oil 
Palm Malaya Accounts. 
235 H&C MS37587-627, Harrisons: Secretarial, Agency and other Agreements. These papers were produced by 
offices in Kuala Lumpur and Singapore and cover interests in Malaya from 1909 until 1945. There is nothing in 
the papers to indicate that management were considering a level of diversification into palm oil at that time. 
236 Guthries G/MIS/9, personal letter from Sir John Hay, chairman to Lady Anderson, widow of Sir John 
Anderson, former Governor Director of Guthrie & Co Ltd, (the Anderson family held 80% of Guthrie share 
capital), 8 June 1928. 
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each an edge over rivals.  That had limited success as, despite extensive research, 
the market price of rubber remained the dominating factor throughout.  Even at the 
height of the rubber boom in 1910, price volatility had wreaked havoc on the finances 
of many estate operators.  That lesson most probably weighed heavily on the minds 
of those holding the purse strings, hence the extremely conservative approach to 
new crops.  In many ways, the episode ran contrary to the spirit of those early trail-
blazing British FSCs that gambled all on business ventures overseas.  The issue 
surrounding rubber prices continued to dominate the industry for a number of years. 
 
 In an attempt to harness the collective strength of estate operators globally, 
the Rubber Growers' Association (RGA) was formed in June 1907.  Some 250 
companies, including the Agency Houses studied here, signed up, and thereafter the 
RGA became the central and London-based voice of the industry.  In July 1912, the 
RGA was incorporated as a limited company and thereafter reported directly to 
government; a testimony of the importance of rubber to the British economy.237  
Over-supply and price volatility were the two main, though connected, issues facing 
the industry.  Therefore, at the end of the First World War, the Agency Houses used 
the RGA as a means to lobby government directly.  It was Harrisons' Eric Miller who 
came up with a plan to manipulate rubber prices by regulating supply.  That plan is 
examined in more detail later in the chapter.  In any case, working through the RGA, 
Agency Houses successfully positioned the estates at the centre of British 
government policy as a means to achieve wider economic and political goals. 
 
 In the inter-war years, British economic policy was, like that of much of the 
world, greatly influenced by consumer demand in the USA.  The US was, by far, the 
rubber industry’s main customer.  In a two month period in 1922, the US consumed 
47,640 tonnes of rubber while Britain and Germany, the next two big importers, 
consumed 15,000 tonnes apiece.238  The price of rubber, although ostensibly set by 
the Singapore market, was guided by prices on the Rubber Exchange of New York, 
where the majority of transactions took place.  The separate London commodity 
market merely mirrored New York prices in sterling.  Most US imports of rubber were 
                                                 
237Rubber Growers’ Association Archives: LMA CLC/B/194/MS24863/001, Council Minute Book, 1907-13. 
238 H&C MS37152, company paper dated 17 July 1922. 
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destined for the automobile industry, which, in 1910, passed the one million car sales 
mark in North America alone.239  Encouraged by buoyant demand, more British firms 
entered the industry and established rubber estates in Malaya.  A Harrisons report in 
1910 estimated that in the Federated Malay States, rubber covered 362,853 acres; 
and, of that figure, the 435 British-owned estates accounted for 245,774 acres.240  By 
1917, world production was 270,988 tonnes; and, of that total, South and Central 
America and Africa accounted for just 56,588 tonnes.  Malaya alone produced 
134,778 tonnes.241  US demand did not abate, which encouraged further British 
investment in Malaya as more land was cleared for estates.  Barlow estimated that of 
the $359 million invested in the Malayan rubber industry in 1913, 85 per cent came 
from Britain.242  A subsequent and somewhat inevitable global economic depression 
following the First World War caused wild swings in prices, as Graph 3.2 shows. 
 
Graph 3.2: Annual Plantation Rubber Prices (High and Low) 1914-33243 
 
 
The graph shows that the price of rubber swung back and forth wildly from a high of 
$1.02 to a low of 11.5 cents per pound between 1914 and 1922.  At that time, British 
                                                 
239 Colin Barlow, Sisira Jayasuriya and Tan C. Suan, The World Rubber Industry, (London, Routledge, 1994), p. 7. 
240 H&C MS37152, Statistical Report Table 1: Agricultural Acreages in the Federated Malay States 1910. 
241 Tate, RGA History, p. 349. 
242 Barlow, Natural Rubber Industry, p. 35. 
243 Frank A Howard, Buna Rubber - The Birth of an Industry, (New York: D. van Nostrand Company, Inc., 1947). 
Figures from U.S. Tariff Commission Report No. 6, September, 1944. Also, see line graph in Barlow, Natural 
Rubber Industry, p. 10. 
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estates in Malaya produced around half of global supplies.244  The graph also shows 
the start of a more sustained move downwards in price despite a short-lived rally in 
1924-5.  At the end of the Great War, a report written by Eric Miller of Harrisons went 
a long way to convincing the British government that higher rubber prices were good 
for the economy and could help offset outstanding debt with the US.  Subsequent 
overproduction in Malaya and the Dutch East Indies, however, again saturated the 
market in the early 1920s, which was exacerbated by a global economic crisis.  As a 
result, all of the estates within Harrisons’ London Asiatic group cut their workforce by 
a fifth, an action that was widely duplicated across the industry as a whole.245 
 
 Guthries’ Singapore offices reported a huge loss of M$5,253,200 (£583,689) 
in 1920 and a negligible profit of just M$5,229 (£581) in 1921, followed by a further 
unrecorded loss in 1922.246  Under pressure from members, the RGA stepped up 
lobbying to persuade government to intervene.  On 1 November 1922, an export tax 
and voucher scheme was introduced to restricted estate output.247  That scheme 
was known as the ‘Stevenson Plan’ and would run from 1923 to 1928.  The plan’s 
main architect was, again, Eric Miller of Harrisons.248  All British estate operators 
signed up to the plan and production was cut by an average of 40 per cent in 
Malaya.  Moreover, as rubber supplies were processed through London, any 
subsequent release of stock to the market was strictly regulated by the RGA.  The 
price of rubber climbed as a result, and, in response, US firms sought alternative 
means of supply.  The tyre manufacturer, Firestone, invested in estates in Liberia, 
however production was not consistent and sourcing land was an issue which harks 
back to colonial policy in Nigeria.  US investment in South American estates, 
                                                 
244 Barlow, Natural Rubber Industry, natural rubber production on Peninsular Malaysia in 1920 was 177,000 
tonnes against a global production figure of 358,000 tonnes. Figures have been extracted from Table 2.3 on p. 
34 and Appendix Table 3.1, p. 442. 
245 See The Straits Times, 26 July 1921. This untitled article reports that Harrisons were forced to dispense with 
the services of 157 estate assistants in Sumatra due to the slump in demand for rubber. 
246 Guthries G/MIN/1, Minute Book of Guthrie & Company Ltd, approximately £1 = M$9. 
247 Barlow, Natural Rubber Industry, pp. 42-3. 
248 Funding Universe, Elementis plc History, see <http://www.fundinguniverse.com/company-
histories/elementis-plc-history/>, (accessed 25 August 2015). Eric Miller, previous chairman of Harrisons, was 
a main architect of the Stevenson Report, which proposed regulating the release of rubber stocks to the 
market at the end of World War I. Miller, with close links to bank executives in the City, was a born diplomat 
who convinced Churchill that sales of rubber to the US would help pay off Britain’s war debt. The plan was to 
restrict production in Malaya, India, Ceylon and the Dutch East Indies and thereby drive up world prices, p. 4. 
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moreover, saw most trees destroyed by the region’s Leaf Blight.249  The underlying 
difficulty for US firms was that all of those alternative supply ventures were small 
scale when compared to the estates in Malaya.  Therefore, regardless of that 
significant investment overseas, the US factories remained very much dependent on 
rubber from South East Asia. 
 
The Stevenson Plan was beginning to look like a master stroke by Miller, until 
the Dutch estates in Indonesia and Borneo refused to sign up.  Rubber was then 
smuggled from Malaya to the East Indies and exported alongside Dutch supplies.  
As a result, prices remained volatile, reaching an all-time high of $1.12 lb in 1925 
only to bottom out at $0.165 lb three years later.250  The Stevenson Plan finally 
collapsed after the US ramped up pressure on the British government.  Thereafter 
the industry returned to free market supply, before prices crashed again in 1929.  
Many estate operators in Malaya went out of business and the best were bought out 
by larger, more financially robust companies.  Those buyers included the Agency 
Houses. 
 
Estate Consolidation and the Agency Houses 
What followed was another round of consolidation in the Malayan estates during 
which all three Agency Houses were active.251  Both Guthries and Harrisons propped 
up a number of estates through large share purchases.  Furthermore, in the financial 
markets, Harrisons was not averse to speculating on shares held in the estates.  A 
department dedicated to that activity published a weekly report for senior 
management in London.  Some selected figures from those reports are reproduced 
in Table 3.7. 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
249 Barlow, Natural Rubber Industry, p. 105. 
250 Barlow, Natural Rubber Industry, p. 10. This table reveals the violent price swings in natural rubber, most 
specifically during the time-period 1900-40. 
251 The Straits Times, ‘Rubber Companies to Amalgamate’, paper article dated 8 December 1933. This article 
reports that Harrisons intend to merge three rubber companies in Malaya, Bikam, Sungkai and North Labis. 
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Table 3.7: Harrisons Profits from Share Transactions Extract 1924252 
Week Ending Profit (£) 
29 February 16,064 
30 May 17,520 
25 July 30,412 
31 October 10,425 
28 November 17,945 
24 December 30,986 
 
The table reveals that 1924 was a particularly good year to speculate on the markets 
and, according to the figures above, it was a lucrative side-line business for 
Harrisons.  Papers accompanying these returns also disclosed the extent of 
Harrisons’ stake in the estates.  A 1924 report written by company stockbrokers, 
Branston & Gothard, listed prices of shares held by Harrisons in 80 different estate 
companies.253  All of those shares were allocated to individual directors and held in 
trustee accounts. 
 
Turning again to Guthries, in 1925, trade had improved which is reflected in 
the profits posted and reproduced in Table 3.8. 
 
Table 3.8: Guthries (Singapore) – Annual Accounts and Dividends 1925-27254 
Year Ending Profit 
£* 
Dividend Award 
% 
1925 72,376 15 
1926 75,786 17.5 
1927 71,031 20 
*Figures converted to sterling using an exchange rate of £1 = M$9 
 
                                                 
252 H&C MS37021/8, selected weekly entries for Harrisons share dealings in 1924. 
253 H&C MS37021/8, letter from Branston & Gothard attached to end of year report for equity holdings of 
Harrisons, dated 19 December 1924. 
254 Guthries G/MIN/1, figures extracted from Minute Book of Guthrie & Company Ltd. 
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As the table shows, business operations in Malaya were going well during the mid-
1920s and allowed the board to award generous dividends to shareholders.  Overall, 
Guthries was in good shape and, despite recent challenges, displayed the resilience 
and business qualities that set the Agency House apart from other types of firms.  
Barlows also survived intact, although the family business was on a more risky 
footing than others as estates in the Highlands and Lowlands Group were owned 
outright.255  However, consistent profits from other areas of business shored up the 
estates during difficult times, which, in many ways, vindicated the diversified 
approach to trade championed by the Agency House.  Unlike that of Guthries and 
Harrisons though, Barlows’ commercial future was not so assured, and indeed Henry 
Barlow often remarked in interview about the strain his father endured while fighting 
to keep the family business afloat. 256   Of the three Agency Houses, Harrisons 
continued to stand out and reported very impressive and consistent profits over the 
next decade, as shown in Table 3.9. 
 
Table 3.9: Harrisons Annual Report of Company Profits 1925-38257 
Year Profit 
£ 
Year Profit 
£ 
1925 347,608 1932 282,361 
1926 414,848 1933 323,317 
1927 447,555 1934 390,854 
1928 432,112 1935 402,839 
1929 485,521 1936 412,649 
1930 456,475 1937 474,029 
1931 343,432 1938 489,841 
 
The table shows that despite the onset of a global economic depression, Harrisons’ 
directors ran a tight ship.  The consolidated figures above, however, hide the fact the 
Malayan estates posted three consecutive losses for the years 1930 to 1932.  During 
                                                 
255 Barlows Box 58/1-2, papers on Highlands & Lowlands Estates. Financial statements for individual estates. 
256 Interview with Henry Barlow, 6 August 2013. 
257 H&C MS37020/1, figures extracted from Report on Annual Accounts, 1925-38. 
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that time, the company was regularly forced to extend credit and loans to struggling 
estates to ‘tide them over’.258  That aside, profits reported were still impressive and 
proved that overall, business was resilient and capable of absorbing global economic 
downturns and price volatility in rubber.  There still remained a question mark, 
though, over Agency House reliance on those Malayan estates. 
 
 In the late 1930s, Harrisons’ commercial setup was certainly more diversified 
than the other Agency Houses operating in Malaya, however the majority of business 
was connected, in one way or another, to rubber.  A more detailed breakdown of the 
1938 accounts revealed that 80 per cent of company profits were generated by the 
estates division.259  Of course, Harrisons was not alone in that regard as Guthries 
and Barlows were more entrenched in the Malayan estates.  External threats to the 
estates largely caused by erratic demand for rubber in consumer nations, played 
havoc with prices.  That point was well demonstrated in returns for a Guthries estate 
bought in 1925 for £61,000. 260  The LSE registered United Temiang Rubber Estates 
Ltd., suffered wild revenue swings during the Stevenson Plan, as Table 3.10 shows. 
 
Table 3.10: United Temiang Rubber Estates Annual Profit/(Loss) 1925-40261 
Year Profit/(Loss) 
£ 
Year Profit/(Loss) 
£ 
1925 26,371 1933 258 
1926 54,305 1934 5,569 
1927 34,175 1935 10,101 
1928 8,136 1936 13,720 
1929 16,709 1937 25,581 
1930 1,073 1938 18,386 
1931 (1,455) 1939 8,246 
1932 1,393 1940 35,468 
                                                 
258 Pugh, Great Enterprise, p. 107. 
259 H&C MS37020/1, breakdown of profits reported in 1938 Accounts. 
260 Guthries G/UT/23: United Temiang Rubber Estates Ltd purchased by Guthrie & Company Ltd in 1925 for 
M$366,400 (£1 = M$6). 
261 Guthries G/UT/23: Figures extracted from United Temiang Rubber Estates Ltd Annual Accounts, 1925-40. 
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The returns for this estate reflected rubber price volatility over the period.  Solid 
profits in the mid-1920s were followed by patchy returns year on year and a loss in 
1931.  For the estates, it was a case of feast and famine during this period, and it 
was that unpredictability that drove further consolidation within the industry.  The 
United Temiang estate provided further evidence that the Guthries board was more 
intent on asset ownership if compared to Harrisons.  Despite owning those estates, 
Guthries, like the other Agency Houses, persisted with rubber production.  That 
wider question concerning crop diversification on the estates is worth revisiting 
briefly. 
 
Why did each of the Agency Houses persevere with only rubber at this time?  
Guthries’ offices reported in 1940 that Oil Palm Malay had generated profits of 
£67,271 on revenues of £217,169, a return of almost 31 per cent from just 2,389 
tonnes of palm oil. 262  Despite this, company records reveal that planted area for oil 
palm in Malaya remained around 12,500 acres, compared to the 170,000 acres 
under rubber.263  Why then was oil palm not considered given all of the price issues 
surrounding rubber?  It does seem a little surprising that those Agency Houses did 
not at least experiment further with oil palm. 
 
 It would appear that doubts remained about the suitability of oil palm to 
Malayan soil, as Gent indicated earlier in the chapter.  There was also an 
unwillingness to take on any risk, as revealed in John Hay’s letter to Lady Anderson.  
A further reason lay in the structure of those companies that dominated the Malayan 
estates in the first half of the 20th century.  Malaya played host to a large number of 
British FSCs, and many were estate operators.  Therefore, crop diversification was a 
risky and potentially ruinous proposal at a time when so many firms were often close 
to going out of business.  Moreover, Harrisons did not own estates outright and 
perhaps were not in a position to force through radical change at boardroom level.  A 
further explanation was put forward by Roderick MacKenzie, a former Harrisons’ 
estate manager.  He stated that it was not really in the interests of the Agency 
Houses to force through crop diversification at that time.  Harrisons’ revenue did not 
                                                 
262 Guthries G/OPM/11: Oil Palm Malaya Accounts for 1940, £1 = M$6.61. 
263 Guthries G/LP/28: Oil Palm Malaya, Schedule of Acreage. 
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just come from the estates.  Why then put other revenue streams from 
merchandising, legal services etc., at risk by advocating a radical replanting 
programme that may not pay off?264  Henry Barlow commented that, in the 1930s, 
his father ‘for several years didn’t know from one day to the next if he was bankrupt 
or not’.265  That financial instability explains why Barlow was not in a position to 
introduce the new crop on estates.  In fact Barlow was forced to close down the 
Calcutta operations in 1933 due to declining sales in textiles and falling profits in tea 
agency work.  In 1936, the Shanghai business also closed due to the global financial 
crisis.266  For all three Agency Houses it was therefore financially prudent to sit it out 
and wait for recovery in the industry.  
 
Chapter Conclusion 
The early business activity of the British Agency House in Malaya and, particularly 
their role in estate development, helps to explain the company structure that 
emerged there.  A number of factors paved the way for the Agency House business 
model to succeed in Malaya.  The first was access to Malayan land on generous 
terms that enabled FSCs to exploit the resource wealth of the colony.  That attracted 
significant investment to the region to support those FSCs.  However, these 
standalone firms could not operate independently and needed logistical and 
professional support to survive.  Those services were provided by Barlows, Guthries 
and Harrisons locally through a pool of educated and motivated expatriate staff.  
Despite noticeable management and commercial strategy differences in each of the 
three Agency Houses, however, one common feature was that steady move towards 
Malaya and those industries that generated greatest profits.  For all three Agency 
Houses, that was the rubber industry.  A second component in Agency House 
development was that early and spectacular rise in rubber demand driven by the US 
automobile industry.  When estates wanted to expand production, the Agency House 
could facilitate access to the capital markets.  Subsequent company flotations on the 
LSE then proved to be very lucrative for the Agency House and allowed directors 
access to the boardrooms of other firms.  Finally, the rubber industry had friends in 
                                                 
264 Interview with Rod MacKenzie, 10 July 2015. 
265 Interview with Henry Barlow, 6 August 2013. 
266 Barlows Box 16/1-2: letters concerning Calcutta and Shanghai trading and closure of operations. 
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Westminster and the City as part of a Pax Britannica that largely dominated trade 
overseas including international politics at that time.  The directors of those Agency 
Houses actively cultivated that support via personal and professional contacts in the 
London institutions.  Trade associations like the RGA also weighed in when 
necessary.  With time and those connections, the Agency Houses were able to 
manoeuvre the interests of the Malayan rubber industry towards the centre of the 
British economic policy. 
 
 There were, of course, particular features in the Harrisons’ business that 
marked it out from peers.  The board always gave the appearance of being readily 
predisposed to new business ventures both at home and abroad.  A further example 
of this was the launch in Britain and Canada of a chain of builders’ merchants in 
1935 under the Harcros name.  That investment provided economies of scope to 
complement logging concessions in Borneo. 267   Harrisons’ management also 
consistently and frequently invested in client estate firms while resisting the greater 
financial commitment and risk that came with outright acquisition. 
 
  More generally, in 1937, Malaya produced half a million tonnes of rubber, 
about half of global supplies.  The Malayan rubber estates then covered 1,330,000 
hectares of land.  Of that total, the British owned 817,500 hectares or 61 per cent.268  
It was the Agency House that held the keys to those rubber supplies and, of course, 
stood to profit from escalating global commodity demand at the onset of war.  The 
Japanese invasion in December 1941 brought that trade to a halt and forced the 
evacuation or, worse, the imprisonment of expatriate staff.  It was three long years 
before the British Agency House could return to Malaya and, once more take its seat 
at the head of the estate industry. 
  
                                                 
267 H&C MS37505, papers relating to the Harcros builders’ merchant group, 1935-77. 
268 Barlow, Natural Rubber Industry, pp. 34 and 442-4. 
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Chapter 4: Malaysia Post-war to Independence – Business as usual 
Introduction 
This chapter continues with the analysis of Malaya and business development there 
from the end of the Second World War up to independence in 1957.  The main 
actors are the three Agency Houses we have been dealing with so far and their, at 
times, common approach to a rubber industry that faced daunting challenges after 
the war.  For all returning British companies in Malaya, the task of restarting 
operations was compounded by two new and immediate threats.  First, competition 
in the form of a new synthetic rubber industry base in the United States in the first 
instance and, second, a communist insurrection that wanted to remove capitalist 
interests from the colony once and for all.  The chapter also looks at other British 
firms, particularly the arrival of the multi-national Unilever through its PAMOL 
subsidiary, which was formed to grow oil palm not rubber in Malaya.  This business 
story played out against a backdrop of momentous macro-political events 
precipitated by British colonial withdrawal, which coincided with communism gaining 
a foothold in Asia.  Through all of this, the British Agency Houses continued to plot a 
route for business through a dynamic institutional landscape in Malaya at a time 
when the colony’s political economy was beginning to take centre stage 
 
 In those challenging circumstances, British firms returned to Malaya to reclaim 
assets that had been much neglected and often damaged during the conflict.  One 
Barlows’ report told of an immediate need for a massive replanting programme on 
rubber estates in the Highlands group.269  In the estates’ favour, rubber had again 
become a major overseas dollar generator for a British Treasury that was struggling 
to service US loans.  The practice of pooling dollars in London for commodity exports 
from the colonies while restricting imports of goods from the US became the strategy 
of British government.  In many ways, it was a reincarnation of the Stevenson Plan.  
From a commercial perspective, the Agency Houses made the most of opportunities 
and soon resumed their pre-war position at the head of the rubber industry in 
Malaya.  Initially, that involved giving estates the necessary capital, merchandise and 
people to restart production.  As estate management began to contemplate the 
                                                 
269 Barlows Box 21/5, report dated 30 September 1947 and additional correspondence on replanting scheme 
following war damage to the Inchong Estate in Kedah, Malaya. 
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future of the rubber industry in light of its long history of volatility and the incursion 
into the market by synthetic rubber, oil palm began to emerge as possibly an 
alternative crop.  In time, palm oil became an economic saviour, not just for the 
estates but also for the financing of economic and rural development in Malaya.270  
The question was, how much longer could Agency Houses remain at the head of the 
industry? 
 
Post-war Recovery and the Communist Threat 
On 12 September 1945, the Union Jack flew again over Malaya.  However, the 
colony emerged from war, like most, beset by high unemployment, spiralling 
inflation, especially in relation to food prices, and plummeting wages.271  Three years 
of occupation had crippled the economy and production on the estates had all but 
ground to a halt.  An Allied shipping blockade had ensured that only 168,000 tonnes 
of rubber was shipped out of Malaya during Japanese occupation compared to over 
half a million tonnes in 1941 alone.272  Three years of inactivity meant estates were 
overgrown, and the supporting infrastructure stripped of metal and largely 
abandoned.  Occupying troops had also felled rubber trees, mainly on the British 
estates close to population centres, in order to boost food production.  Around 
53,000 hectares of estate land had been cleared, which equated to about ten per 
cent of all British holdings in 1941.273  What is more, the majority of workers, along 
with their European managers, had fled the estates while many had been sent to 
work on railway construction in Burma and Thailand.  Unsurprisingly, some did not 
return.  Therefore, the task of rehabilitating the estates, just like that of the Malayan 
economy, would be a costly and drawn out affair for all involved. 
 
 An interim military administration was hastily convened in Kuala Lumpur in 
late 1945 and tasked to restore law and order prior to the return of colonial officials in 
                                                 
270 Term coined by Raja Alias, former chairman of FELDA, when assessing the contribution of palm oil to the 
Malayan economy, 4 November 2013, Email response to author. 
271 For a more in depth analysis on the state of British colonies after the Second World War see John Darwin, 
Britain and Decolonisation: the Retreat from Empire in the Post-war World, (Palgrave MacMillan, 1989), pp. 1-
232 and Nicholas J White, Decolonisation: The British Experience since 1945, (Routledge, 1999), pp. 1-168.  The 
authors indicate that after the Japanese surrender, returning British authorities were faced with many serious 
challenges in South East Asia, one of which was high unemployment and low wages for locals. 
272 International Rubber Research Group, Rubber Statistical Bulletins, 26 (1946). 
273 Barlow, Natural Rubber Industry, p. 75. Most British estates were located close to the cities and towns. 
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1946.274  In re-establishing British rule, authorities were now confronted with a much-
changed political landscape not just in Malaya but across the breadth of the empire.  
Already in 1942, the fall of Singapore, ‘the Gibraltar of the East’, had dispelled the 
aura of invincibility exhibited under previous British rule.  The end of the Second 
World War was then simultaneously the beginning of the end for British imperialism.  
In July 1945, the Labour Party swept to power under a reformist Keynesian 
manifesto that included the orderly reduction of overseas commitments—with an 
emphasis on orderly.  What in fact transpired was an irregular erosion and abdication 
of British rule in colony after colony.  In just three years Burma, Ceylon, India and 
Pakistan had achieved independence.  Encouraged by events elsewhere, many 
British colonies, including Malaya, lined up to demand home-rule. 
 
 Many people in Malaya were undoubtedly acutely aware that economic crisis 
in Britain was driving decolonisation.  However, the status of Malaya as a colony was 
played upon, too, by an encroaching Communist ideology.  Many ethnic Chinese, for 
instance, rallied to the call of Chairman Mao, and military units that had been trained 
to resist Japanese occupation took up arms once more.275  The Malayan National 
Liberation Army (MNLA) was formed with the aim of removing capitalist influence in 
Malaya.  The organisation quickly identified the economically vital yet isolated 
estates as soft targets.  On the morning of 16 June 1948, armed insurgents entered 
offices of the Golden Hope Elphil estate and shot dead the manager, a British 
national.  Two more British planters lost their lives that day whereupon authorities 
immediately declared a state of emergency across much of the colony.  The Malayan 
Emergency, as it became known, would run for 12 years.  During that period, British 
estates bore the brunt of attacks carried out by the MNLA.276  It was a war of attrition 
that was fought out in the jungles.  It was also a war that the Agency Houses could 
well have done without. 
 
                                                 
274A military administration governed from 12 September 1945 until 1 April 1946 during which time the short 
lived Malayan Union and Crown Colony of Singapore were formed. 
275 The 1947 Census indicated that residents of Chinese extraction accounted for 38.6% of a Malayan 
Federation population of 4.9 million. C A Vlieland, ‘1947 Census of Malaya’, Pacific Affairs, 22 (1949), p. 59. 
276 The Malayan Emergency was announced on 16 June 1948 and ended 12 July 1960. It was fought between 
Commonwealth Forces and the Malayan National Liberation Army (military wing of the Malayan Communist 
Party).  The conflict was termed an ‘Emergency’ as the companies that ran the rubber estates and tin mines 
would not otherwise have been covered for losses by Lloyd’s Insurers if the term ‘war’ was used. 
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British National Interests and the Colonies 
At the end of the war, the British Treasury found itself once again mired in debt.  US 
loans to keep the economy afloat came at a price.  That included a staged reduction 
in the nation’s colonial footprint.  Notwithstanding US pressure, the British 
government recognised that reconstruction and development in some of the more 
strategically placed colonies, like Malaya, might well subdue any hostility to British 
overseas business, allow firms to invest and, ultimately, blunt the appeal of 
Communism.  Rebuilding the private sector in Malaya would therefore restore 
commercial dominance in crucial, dollar-earning sectors like the estates.  A major 
obstacle to carrying out that plan was finding the capital to enact it.  Once again 
colonial authorities turned to British firms and created the conditions necessary to 
encourage investment to flow into the colony.277  For Malaya, the resurrection of the 
economically crucial rubber industry was a major part of that strategy.  The challenge 
on the ground was that many returning estates did not have the capital required to 
recommence operations, and that is where the Agency House stepped in. 
 
 Post-war reconstruction in Malaya meant that demand for all imported goods 
was extremely high.  Building materials and other manufactured goods were needed 
to repair damage caused by the Japanese and subsequent allied bombing 
campaign, and much of the manufactured goods traditionally came from Britain.  To 
meet this demand overseas for manufactures, British factories in turn needed a 
constant supply of raw materials.  Rubber was one of the most important of these 
raw materials, and therefore, for the Agency Houses in Malaya, these were good 
times for trade.  Initially, revenue from merchandising soared and helped to cover 
any financial shortfall on the recovering estates.  Professional services provided by 
the Agency House were also in demand, but business was not without frustrations.  
The bulk of imported goods arriving at Malayan ports came from Britain, however 
shipments to the colonies were low priority for a degraded merchant fleet.  Moreover, 
British factories struggled to satisfy domestic demand never mind that from 
overseas.  One Barlows’ report submitted by the Singapore offices complained about 
                                                 
277 Nicholas J White, ‘The Frustrations of Development: British Business and the Late Colonial State in Malaya, 
1945-57’, Journal of South East Asian Studies, 28 (1997), pp. 103-19. Here White looks at the emerging role of 
British business in the post-war years (and a rift between business leaders and the Colonial Office). Here 
colonial officials tried to rationalize extractive industries in the colony and promote economic development. 
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a ‘dearth of UK goods to sell’.278  To meet local demand, Agency Houses looked 
elsewhere, including the US.  As a result, imports of cement, iron and steel, 
machinery items, cotton, grains and flour from nations other than Britain increased 
significantly.  Manufactured goods from the US rose from under 6 per cent of imports 
in 1939 to over 21 per cent in 1948.279  This overseas trade, of course, was at odds 
with British Treasury policy to pool US dollars in the colonies and use them to pay 
down debt.  Dollars earned from rubber sales were instead being returned to the US 
as payment for other imported goods.  To stem this trade, British authorities imposed 
an embargo on imports from some nations, in this case those from the US. 
 
 Several local suppliers got round the trade embargo by routing goods through 
Hong Kong and, from there, onto Malaya. 280  It was a trade route most probably 
used by the Agency Houses.  Harrisons owned a subsidiary, Harrisons & Crosfield 
(Hong Kong) Ltd., and, although not officially registered until 1961, documents from 
company archives reveal that trade passing through the crown colony took place 
long before that year.281  The merchandising division of Harrisons must have been 
very profitable at a time when so much investment was being directed towards 
rehabilitating the estates, especially given the annual profits reported in Table 4.1. 
 
Table 4.1: Harrisons Annual Report of Company Profits 1946-50282 
Year Profit (£) 
1946 342,096 
1947 378,808 
1948 255,057 
1949 415,189 
1950 451,667 
                                                 
278 Barlows Box 21/5, report on reopening of Singapore office in April 1946. 
279 Pamela Sodhy, The US-Malaysian Nexus: Themes in Superpower-small State Relations, (Kuala Lumpur: ISIS, 
1991), p. 65. 
280 Shakila Yacob, The United States and the Malaysian Economy, (Oxon: Routledge, 2008), p. 55-6. 
281 H&C MS070113, although Harrisons & Crosfield (Hong Kong) Ltd was registered in 1961, there are various 
papers that refer to trade conducted in the years after the war, most notably with US firms. 
282H&C MS37020/2, figures extracted from Report on Annual Accounts, 1946-53. 
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Even during the war, the company had managed to post a £250,000 pre-tax profit for 
1943, which allowed the chairman, Eric Miller, to grant a centenary bonus to staff.283  
The figures in the table show that, despite the costs incurred to resurrect the estates, 
the Harrisons group posted a healthy profit for each year.  Although there is no 
breakdown of figures, the merchandising division must have contributed substantially 
as the Exports Department in London was expanded in 1946.284  In September 1949, 
the British government allowed sterling to float freely on the markets, which saw the 
currency immediately devalued.  US imported goods through Hong Kong thereafter 
became more expensive, and the trade had reduced to a trickle within a year.285  The 
business environment in Malaya in the post-war years generally reflected a wider 
global political economy as nations struggled to recover while attempting to maintain 
power on the international stage.  Moreover, it was more apparent that the political 
agenda of London would always take precedence over that of the colonies and the 
businesses active in them.  This in itself calls into question claims by some historians 
that there was always collaboration and an element of mutual support between 
British overseas firms and the Colonial office.286  However, despite external factors, 
the Agency Houses were on a strong footing as Harrisons’ profits in Table 4.1 
demonstrate.  Moreover, they were now largely free of bureaucratic constraints due 
to pressing demands for development of any sort in the colonies.  The desired 
business growth in Malaya was helped along the way by the financial difficulty that a 
number of estates now faced.  Many of them, put simply, did not have the necessary 
finances to restart estate production. 
 
The Returning British Companies 
Guthries of Singapore reported to London that ‘heavy expenditure will still be 
required to bring field works up-to-date and to put road and railway systems in good 
                                                 
283 H&C MS37013/3, Chairman Statement at AGM June 1943. 
284 Pugh, Great Enterprise, p. 165. 
285 H&C MS37020/2, Report on Annual Accounts reveal that turnover for trade passing through Harrisons’ 
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and Commonwealth History, 36, pp. 197-220. 
286 Some historians imply that there was collusion between British company directors and public officials in 
Malaya however the author found no evidence of this in the Colonial Records at Kew. There is evidence from 
interview conducted to indicate that an element of collaboration took place in London. 
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order’.287  Not all estate firms had finances to cover that expenditure, however.  In 
fact, a lack of capital forced out the two biggest land owners in British North Borneo.  
In July 1946, the privately owned fiefdom of Sarawak was surrendered by the Brooke 
family (known as the British White Raj).  The family was followed out the door by the 
North Borneo Chartered Company, custodians of Sabah since 1888.  The land 
became a new Crown protectorate, British North Borneo.  It was a land area that was 
almost as big as Great Britain itself.288  North Borneo, had much to offer British firms 
that were seeking to replace lost revenue by exploiting new commercial 
opportunities.  Given existing logging rights in the region, the new Crown land 
interested management in Harrisons as the company had lost a lot of trade.  Only 
the Ceylon and India regional offices had managed to remain open for the entirety of 
the war and, of the ‘Three Sisters’, Pataling had been delisted from the LSE.  On the 
estates themselves, tree loss was heaviest on British estates.  A large-scale 
replanting exercise was needed immediately, but it would still be a number of years 
before those estates were economically viable. 289   Bringing estates back into 
production required time, money and people.  Agency Houses could supply the 
money; providing a workforce was another matter as many had not returned after the 
war.290 
 
 The job of tapping rubber on British estates had been largely carried out by 
Indian migrants.  In 1929, 80 per cent of a total 258,000 estate workforce came from 
Southern India with the remainder drawn mainly from ethnic Chinese.291  Immigrants 
were cheaper than local Malays, and therefore, after the war, it was a test for estate 
management to keep labour costs down.  That was compounded by the fact that 
                                                 
287 Guthries Archives G/LP/28, Directors’ Report and Statement of Accounts for year ended 31 October 1946. 
288 British North Borneo formed 77,000 square miles. Great Britain at 88,500 square miles is 13% larger in area. 
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improvements in immature maintenance were introduced. Interview with Henry Barlow, 6 August 2013. 
290 Around 50% of estate workers perished on the Burma-Siam railway. See speech by Major Sir Basil Neven-
Spence, MP for Orkney and Shetland in Hansard Paper HC Deb 07 March 1947, Vol 420 cc627-36, Malayan 
Rubber Prices (Dollar Exchange), p. 2. 
291 For an in depth study on plantation labour see James Hagan and Andrew Wells, ‘The British and rubber in 
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Malaya and labour disputes that ensued.  See p. 144 for numbers.  
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indigenous Malays were reluctant to work on British estates.292  Notwithstanding 
these and other issues, there were some positives for the British estates.  The 
productive capability of rubber trees, due to that enforced tapping hiatus, was 
generally much better than it had been before the war.  In fact, Barlows noted that, in 
1948, Malaya produced 708,000 tonnes of rubber, a figure 150,000 tonnes above 
the previous height in 1940. 293   Henry Barlow, director of Barlow Bousteads, 
explained the challenges that faced Barlows thus: 
Since it is not necessary to tap rubber every day or every third day the bark 
reserves had to a large extent been preserved and subject to clearing the 
vegetation which had grown up in the inter-rows, and getting the labour forces 
sorted out, the rehabilitation of the rubber properties was not too difficult.294 
 
It was the Agency Houses that had the financial means to restart commercial tapping 
immediately.  Many smaller estate operators went cap in hand to the Agency Houses 
while others put up a ‘for sale’ sign.  For instance, in 1946, Barlows purchased the 
Subang estate in Selangor from the Krian Rubber Plantations due to those financial 
difficulties.  At the same time, the family shed a number of interests in Ceylon and 
India.  In 1946, too, the Chingoor Tea Estate in Darjeeling was sold and so three 
years later was the Brae group of tea estates in Madulkelle, Ceylon.295  No doubt this 
was motivated by impending British colonial withdrawal; however these sales were 
also part of an overseas restructuring exercise that saw the family disengage from 
regions and trade that was deemed risky.  This allowed Barlows to focus on Malaya, 
as Henry Barlow explained: 
Immediately after the war, the offices in places such as Shanghai and India 
were closed down and the firm of Barlow and Company came to rely entirely on 
its one operation which was primarily by then in Kuala Lumpur with a residual 
trading operation in Singapore.296 
 
This restructuring exercise lowered Barlows’ commercial exposure overseas and 
allowed the family to target the rubber industry in Malaya more comprehensively.  It 
also indicated that Barlows, like other Agency Houses, thought Malaya was a safer 
                                                 
292 Some of those interviewed commented that indigenous Malays were not so productive (nor as willing) as 
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293 Barlow, Natural Rubber Industry, p. 76. 
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bet for British business interests than other colonies.  As more estate operators and 
other types of merchants struggled, the Agency Houses benefited, none more so 
than Harrisons. 
 
 In late 1947, The Straits Times reported that Harrisons’ profits for the previous 
two years had allowed dividend awards of 20 per cent to shareholders.297  Despite 
that financial health, though, a number of weaknesses in the overall structure of the 
business remained.  Harrisons still relied too heavily on the Malayan estates for 
revenue.  Therefore, geographical and industrial diversification was needed to 
reduce commercial risk.  Taking this on board, in April 1947, Harrisons formed 
Durham Chemicals (Canada) Ltd. to manufacture and market chemicals and, in 
doing so, launched a new chapter in Harrisons’ business overseas.  It also, again, 
marked the company out from other Agency Houses in Malaya, a subject covered in 
greater detail in chapters six and seven.298 
 
 That strategy aside, resurrecting the estates was a challenge for all involved 
in the rubber industry, and particularly now that there were two major threats to the 
future with which to contend.  The first of those was the rapid growth of a US 
synthetic rubber industry and the other an escalating Communist insurrection.  Let us 
look at each in turn. 
 
The Synthetic Rubber Industry 
The big push into synthetic rubber production in the US happened as the Japanese 
occupied Malaya and much of South East Asia.  As mentioned previously, British 
and Dutch estates in the region were responsible for most supplies of rubber 
between the wars.  Therefore, when the estates were overrun, the supplies were 
choked off at source.  Eric Miller, the Harrisons’ chairman, confirmed that point when 
he wrote that ‘very early in 1942, 90 per cent of the world’s sources of crude rubber 
were closed to the United Nations.’ 299   Between the Japanese attack on Pearl 
Harbour in December 1941 and the fall of Singapore two months later, remaining 
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stocks of rubber were hurriedly shipped to the US.300  As invading Japanese troops 
advanced down Malaya, any stockpiles left behind were burned by the retreating 
British.  With the fall of Singapore, then, US factories were faced with a seemingly 
insurmountable challenge.  Reserve stocks of rubber were dwindling, and the US 
Administration turned to firms in the chemical and oil industries for help, one of which 
was Standard Oil of New Jersey (Esso).  This firm previously held a formal 
agreement with the German company, I G Farben, which operated a synthetic 
research programme in Leverkusen.  In 1929, that firm developed the Buna-S 
synthetic product and found it to be more durable than natural rubber.  
Subsequently, research was shared with Standard Oil including the technology 
required to produce the GR-S (Government Rubber-Styrene) product in the US.301  A 
new industry was born and was set the ambitious target of producing all of the 
nation’s rubber requirements within three years.302  By March 1944, more than 50 
plants had been built and production surpassed targets to reach 66,000 long tonnes 
per month.303  The financial costs involved were immense.  In 1949, in fact, the US 
Congress reported that the Reconstruction Finance Corporation had disbursed some 
$23,034,160 to various public and private agencies to build plants and thereafter to 
support further research and development.304  It is though, an indication of just how 
crucial rubber was to the US industrial war effort.  The development of a synthetic 
rubber industry was a triumph for the US government and its industry in the face of 
adversity. 
 
 At the end of the war, US authorities faced a conundrum: should the 
government-financed synthetic rubber industry (the products of which at the time 
were also more expensive than natural rubber by and large) be retained?  Or, should 
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production be scaled back and the government revert to pre-war International 
Commodity Agreements?305  The maintenance of synthetic production was initially 
justified by the belief output on the Malayan estates would be low.  As it turned out, 
the Malayan estates recovered quickly and, in 1946, produced 410,000 tonnes of 
rubber, rising to 708,000 tonnes by 1948, well in excess of pre-war figures.306  
However, growing western concerns about the spread of Communism formed a 
further factor in US government policy.  Those concerns were heightened by attacks 
on Malayan estates by the MNLA.  As a result, the future of the synthetic industry 
was quickly assured.  The decision was, however, a body blow to the Malayan 
estates and the Agency Houses.  And the bad news did not stop there. 
 
 The US Rubber Act of 1948 granted the President rights to set production 
targets for home-produced synthetic rubber.  Thereafter, government announced 
that it intended to auction off synthetic factories alongside technology and patents.307  
The private companies that expressed interest were the same large petrochemical 
producers and tyre manufacturers then managing the factories.  Ownership of those 
factories and patents offered an opportunity for either backward or forward 
integration for these firms, which would increasingly lead to economies of scale.  It 
would also provide efficiency savings and thereafter, a lower price for the synthetic 
product, which, although more expensive to produce than natural rubber initially, had 
already closed the gap.308 The big problem for the Malayan estates was that those 
same US companies were its biggest customers.  The issue was highlighted in an 
article in the Financial Times which stated ‘the policy of USA Government continues 
to be the dominating factor in the rubber market’.309  That view was cemented when 
US synthetic production reached 510,000 tonnes in 1952, a figure comparable to the 
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levels achieved by the end of the Second World War.310  The post-war scale-up in 
production was, in fact, due to the start of the Korean War, however output on the 
Malayan estates also went up to 600,000 tonnes a year.  Much of the extra orders 
for this increased supply of natural rubber went into rebuilding strategic stockpiles in 
the US.  As a result, the price of natural rubber rose in 1951 to M$5.41 per lb 
(US$1.76), a 400 per cent increase on the previous year.311  It was a short-lived 
boom, however, as when the Korean War ended in 1953, stockpiles were vast and 
caused rubber prices to drop to a quarter of that peak.  Exports to the US fell away, 
and estate operators were again forced to contend with diminishing sales revenue.  It 
was a dilemma that the Agency Houses, with so much capital invested in the 
industry, had to tackle in Malaya. 
 
 Papers in the Harrisons archive reveal that, from 1947, management was 
forced to discount rubber from the Golden Hope estates at US$0.02 per lb, or 10 per 
cent on market prices.  This was primarily caused by growing market competition 
from the synthetic product. 312  Moreover, the downstream sale of rubber was being 
meddled with by the British government, which continued to determine prices in 
London.  A public agency, the Rubber Buying Unit, had been established at the start 
of the war to administer all government purchases of rubber from Malayan estates at 
fixed prices.  That body was still operating in post-war years and had a say, too, in 
the bilateral agreements held with the US.  In 1947, estate operators received 10d 
(US$0.40) per lb of rubber, a price agreed in consultation with Dutch and French 
governments.  This was almost double the market price for rubber set in London and 
New York, and it was the rate at which the US bought from the British government.  
It was clear the London buying unit was manipulating market prices for economic 
and political gain.313  The Rubber Growers Association (RGA) lobbied hard for prices 
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to be set by the markets however the government held firm and, in many ways, it 
proved to be an underlying reason for a drop in exports from Malaya.  In response to 
the deadlock, the Harrisons board moved into synthetics as a means of hedging 
bets.  That move was a further demonstration of management’s capability to adapt to 
circumstances that were, to all intents and purposes, otherwise outside their power 
of influence.  More importantly, it was an indication of the board’s uncertainty at the 
time about the future of the Malayan rubber industry. 
 
Harrisons’ interest in synthetics can actually be traced back to 1931, when the 
US industrial giant DuPont was developing a new chlorinated rubber product, 
neoprene, which was originally manufactured as an oil-resistant product that 
displayed superior properties to natural rubber including heat and cold resistance.  
This made neoprene particularly useful in many industrial applications.  After the 
war, DuPont wanted to expand into Europe and entered discussions with Durham 
Chemicals to manufacture under the company name, the UK Neoprene Agency.  
The British firm was keen on the tie-up, but lacked capital.  Harrisons seized the 
chance to get into the synthetics industry, and, in 1947, formed Durham Raw 
Materials as a joint venture with Durham Chemicals to manage the UK Neoprene 
Agency.  Harrisons put up the capital and the means to market the product outside of 
Britain, while Durham Chemicals handled manufacturing.  Thereafter, Harrisons was 
sole agent for sales of neoprene in Europe and a few other markets that were not 
covered by DuPont.314 
 
 Looking at the synthetics industry from Harrisons’ standpoint, it is clear that 
the board obviously saw it as a major threat to estate interests in Malaya.  However, 
rather than sit tight, the company bought into synthetics, thereby spreading risk.  
This practice of diversifying and redeploying business wherever it was thought 
necessary achieved economies of scope.  In this case, if the Malayan estates 
suffered then the company could invest more capital in synthetics.  Again, the 
company’s position as a minority shareholder in the Malayan estates allowed the 
                                                                                                                                                       
government subsidised the estates to ensure that contracts with the US remained extant. By restricting US 
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314 See The Engineer, Volume 204, No. 5512, 15 November 1957, p. 730.  DuPont opened offices in London in 
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Harrisons board to invest elsewhere and, in this case, even in competing industries.  
The new investment alongside existing interests in the vulcanised rubber compound, 
Linatex, served the company well in later years when the estates and British 
ownership therein came under more explicit pressure.  Despite the move into 
synthetics, however, the company, like other Agency Houses, still relied heavily on 
those Malayan estates for revenue.  It was a vulnerability that had been ruthlessly 
exposed by the Japanese and one now targeted by the Communist MNLA. 
 
The Malayan Emergency and the Plantations 
The second major threat to the Malayan rubber industry in the immediate post-war 
period was the Communist insurgency and an ethnic Chinese MNLA that had 
identified rubber and tin as the economic life-blood of the colony.  In 1950, rubber 
exports accounted for around 75 per cent of Malayan revenues and tin 12-15 per 
cent.315  Most of that revenue was generated by foreign, mainly British, estates and 
mines.  The insurgency plan was straightforward: if production of rubber and tin 
could be halted, it would cripple the Malayan economy, bring about political change 
and rid the nation of western capitalists. 316   As the attacks escalated, rubber 
production slowed as British firms were forced to fund security measures to protect 
estates and workers.  Despite this massive effort to build up security, 99 planters out 
of a complement of 1400 still perished in the Malayan Emergency that ran from June 
1948 to July 1960.  The casualty rate among estates workers was, moreover, 
thought to be much higher.317  Mackenzie, an estate manager for Harrisons during 
the Emergency, recalled that: 
Life for plantation workers was extremely difficult. On the one hand they had 
British Special Constables threatening to throw them in jail if they fed the 
MNLA. At the same time the Communists were threatening to kill them should 
they not cooperate and supply food to insurgents hiding in the jungle. Despite 
the very real dangers which plantation workers were exposed to, there were 
many examples where they showed great loyalty to expatriate management.318 
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It was a perilous time for the industry and all who worked in it, but in MacKenzie’s 
statement one can detect an emerging bond between the British estate operator, the 
workers and local Malay people.  That common ground across the industry would aid 
Agency Houses in later years when they sought land to plant oil palm. 
 
 Attacks carried out by the MNLA mainly took place in three states, Kedah, 
Kelantan and Perak where authorities imposed a blanket curfew from 4pm to 6am.  
Living quarters became fortified strongholds, surrounded by barbed wire and 
patrolled by armed guards.  Those restrictions had an impact on morale.  One 
Guthries report revealed the difficulty in retaining workers. ‘The [estate] development 
programme was adversely affected by the activities of bandits, which resulted in the 
exodus of able-bodied labourers from the district’. 319   Routine tasks became 
hazardous, such as the weekly trip to town to collect wages.  The Communists were 
aware of that journey, which was usually undertaken by the estate manager, and set 
up roadside ambushes, which then forced companies to fly in wages and other 
supplies.  Another Guthries report revealed conditions on the ground: 
The position has steadily deteriorated and recorded incidents and attacks on 
the estates numbered sixty. A senior member of the European staff was 
wounded in and engagement with bandits and in other attacks three Asians 
were killed and six wounded. Three estate buses and eight lorries were burned.  
Two night attacks were made on the Manager’s bungalow and several attacks 
were made on other buildings. The company has provided 12 armoured 
vehicles in an effort to give protection to the staff.320 
 
Despite constant lobbying by the RGA in London, the Malayan Emergency was a 
remote conflict that was slow to catch the attention of a government wearied by war.  
Pleas for military intervention fell on deaf ears, with one Treasury official declaring 
somewhat dismissively that, to defend itself, Malaya ‘should tax herself to the limit of 
her capacity’.321  Barlows correspondence also spoke of extreme security measures 
to protect workforces and a level of disdain held on estates for the lack of response 
by the British government.322  In the early years, the estates had no option but to 
recruit and train local militia.  Eventually in 1951, Commonwealth troops were 
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mobilised, but only after the assassination of the British High Commissioner, Sir 
Henry Gurney, to the north of Kuala Lumpur.  A brutal counter-offensive followed, 
and it was a matter of time before the MNLA was defeated, although a state of 
emergency remained in place for several more years.  In the end, Malaya survived 
the Communist insurgency largely because a majority of local people resisted the 
MNLA and cooperated with Commonwealth troops, and the Malayan Home Guard to 
suppress attacks and penetrate MNLA jungle camps.323  The role of the Agency 
House was also crucial during this time in keeping the estates open and producing.  
The resolute defence of estates and workers also broke down some of the 
prejudices held against British business.  Moreover, it sent a message that British 
firms intended to stay. 
 
 A further motivation for the large-scale deployment of Commonwealth troops 
lay in the financial contribution of rubber and tin to the British economy, especially in 
the form of US dollars.  That contribution was helping to pay down a post-war US 
loan of $3.75 billion.324  In the years 1948-52, Malaya contributed more dollar hard 
currency than any other colony in the Sterling Area, around $1.2 billion, and, as late 
as 1955, added a further US$218 million to that Treasury dollar pool.325  Indeed, 
political stability in Malaya and the security of those estates generated a catch-22 for 
a US government that was deciding on whether to retain the synthetic industry.  On 
the one side stood US security of supply, which might be better guaranteed by 
synthetics than by natural rubber production from Malaya?  On the other hand, in 
geo-political terms, combating the threat posed by Communism was looked upon as 
the duty of the US administration, especially in the context of McCarthyism.  
Furthermore, economically speaking, rubber exports accounted for around a third of 
Malaya’s Gross National Product in the post-war years.326  If trade collapsed, then 
any ensuing economic hardship could open the door to Communism.  The survival of 
                                                 
323 An estimated 40,000 Commonwealth troops were engaged in the hostilities bolstered by 250,000 Malayan 
Home Guard and 37,000 Special Constables. For more detail on the Emergency see Noel Barber, The War of 
Running Dogs: How Malaya Defeated the Communist Guerrillas, 1948-60, (London: Cassell, 1971), pp. 1-336. 
324 Nicholas J. White, Decolonisation: The British Experience since 1945, (Oxon: Routledge, 1999), p. 5. 
325 Sodhy, US-Malaysian Nexus, p. 133 and Robert Wood, ‘From Marshall Plan to Debt Crisis: Foreign Aid and 
Development Choices in the World Economy’, (University of California Press: 1992), p. 54. 
326 Thomas R McHale, ‘the Malayan Economy and Stereo-Regular Rubbers’, Asian Survey, 1 (1961), p. 25. 
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the plantation industry was therefore critical to the colony and a wider western 
crusade against Communism globally. 
 
Of course, the survival of the rubber industry was even more important to the 
Agency Houses.  Throughout this era, the Harrisons board consistently flagged up to 
shareholders that the three threats to business were the US synthetic industry, the 
Malayan Emergency and the company’s geographical trade vulnerability.327  The 
Agency Houses could do little about the first threat, but for the second, Barlows, 
Guthries and Harrisons combated it by investing heavily in estate security.  The third 
threat, business dependency on one region, was an area that Harrisons was 
beginning to address more effectively than other Agency Houses.  We therefore now 
turn to consider the business strategies of each of the Agency Houses in the run up 
to Malayan Independence. 
 
British Agency House and Malayan Independence 
As mentioned before, all three Agency Houses coped reasonably well in the 
immediate post-war era due to that diversified business portfolio.  As estates 
recovered, Harrisons became increasingly attractive to investors in the City due to 
consistent annual profits (shown in Table 4.1).  Those profits generated healthy 
dividends for shareholders, as Table 4.2 shows. 
 
Table 4.2: Harrisons Share Capital and Dividend Awards 1946-1950328 
Year Share Capital  
£m 
Share Dividend  
% 
1946 0.5 20 
1947 0.5 25 
1948 0.5 25 
1949 0.5 25 
1950 0.5 25 
 
                                                 
327 H&C MS37020/2, the threat posed by the synthetic rubber was first outlined in the Chairman’s Statement, 
AGM June 1944 and thereafter, also noted security concerns and an overreliance on Malayan operations. 
328 H&C MS37020/2, figures extracted from Report on Annual Accounts, 1946-50. 
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The Harrisons board awarded a 20 per cent dividend to shareholders in 1946 and 25 
per cent for each of the next four years.  By any measure, these were healthy and 
consistent returns to those with capital to invest.  For Harrisons, the merchandising 
arm of the business had propped up revenue while estates recovered.  As such, in 
1950, company profits were over double those in 1946.  The board was now in a 
financial position to pursue new commercial ventures in Malaya and elsewhere. 
 
 As previously implied, the ‘ordered’ British decolonisation programme 
degenerated into a somewhat haphazard affair, what Darwin referred to as: 
The unpredictable erosion of position after position, foothold after foothold, 
followed on each occasion by further efforts to hold together the remnants of 
world power and influence, by one means or another.329 
 
What is certainly true is that the speed of British withdrawal was largely dictated by 
the British domestic economy.  The health of the British economy also influenced 
development of any sort in those remaining colonies and dependencies.  In the new 
Crown protectorate of British North Borneo, authorities were not enamoured with 
rebuilding settlements and a business infrastructure that had been bombed by the 
Allies during the war.  The former chief executive of Harrisons & Crosfield (Borneo) 
had back in 1946 reported ‘your properties can easily be reported on because there 
is nothing left to report on’. 330   But, because of the state of the British home 
economy, little state aid was forthcoming. Therefore, again, capital up front was 
needed to restart commercial operations in the region, and, again, this was an area 
where the standalone FSC struggled.  For the Agency House, though, North Borneo 
was a region of relatively untapped resource wealth and one where the colonial 
authorities were happy to encourage business investment in order to develop the 
region.  Again, Harrisons stole a march on competitors.  In North Borneo, Harrisons 
already managed docking facilities, shipping and airline offices and were sole agents 
for Atlas Assurance, the same company floated by the Agency House back in 1901.  
In addition, there were exclusive logging concessions in the British Borneo Timber 
Company.  The region was also a suitable host for estate development, and that 
suited Unilever’s ambitions in palm oil. 
                                                 
329 Darwin, ‘British Decolonization since 1945’, p. 206 
330 H&C MS37011/4, Report by McLeod, Harrisons & Crosfield (Borneo), July 1946. 
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 In 1947, Unilever’s PAMOL acquired a rundown tobacco estate in Johor with 
a stated aim to increase ‘production of palm oil in South East Asia’.331  Unilever’s 
estate ambitions in West Africa had been thwarted by the trusteeship policy, 
however the generous land lease terms on offer in Malaya were an obvious 
inducement to invest.  What is more, Unilever had capital to spare after receiving 
substantial compensation from Germany for losses in the Second World War.  
PAMOL was therefore viewed by Unilever as a vehicle to invest these funds 
overseas.  A point worthy of repeating here is that UAC, despite managing Unilever 
estates in Africa, was not involved in the new venture.  UAC was either never invited 
or, more likely, its management were focussed on ‘the Coast’ trade and reticent 
about committing capital and people elsewhere.  It was a missed opportunity.  
Colonial authorities seemed happy with the PAMOL investment as the original estate 
of 4,000 acres was extended in tranches throughout the 1950s to reach 11,500 
acres.332  Clearly palm oil was generating a good profit. The estate also benefitted 
directly from a vast catalogue of crop research amassed by Unilever in Africa.  A few 
years after establishing that first estate, Lever Brothers also built the region’s first 
palm oil refinery at Kuala Lumpur.  That facility operates today within the vast 
business portfolio of Sime Darby.  In effect, the arrival of Unilever to the region was a 
catalyst for radical change right across the Malayan estate industry. 
 
 At the time, the economy of Malaya was heavily dependent on rubber exports, 
which in 1947 generated $120m.  That figure was well ahead of revenues from 
cocoa exports at $50m.  However, rubber revenues were being squeezed all the 
time by the synthetic industry.  In 1949, synthetic rubber accounted for 25 per cent of 
the market.333  A year later, however, there were signs that its share was increasing 
as US imports of natural rubber had fallen to 33 per cent of Malayan production 
compared to 53 per cent in 1947.334  For Malayan authorities and the British Agency 
House alike, change was therefore needed if the estate industry was to have a 
future.  By the early 1950s, British estates were back at full production and crop 
                                                 
331 Leslie Davidson, the Development of the Malaysian Oil Palm Industry: Unilever’s Contribution, (Paper 
presented to the Tropical Growers Association in London, January 2003), p. 1. 
332 Unilever Archives UPG/3/13/1/7/1, appendix 2 to paper on Unipamol Malaysia Sdn Bhd dated 9/10/79. 
333 Lim Chong Yah, South East Asia: the long road ahead, (Singapore: World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd, 
2004), p. 94. In 1950 sales of synthetics accounted for 25% of the global rubber market. 
334 Barlow, Natural Rubber Industry, p 104. These figures were total Malayan rubber exports to the USA. 
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research received a boost in funding from both public and private donors.  Part of 
that research effort was directed at a tree breeding programme at the Rubber 
Research Institute of Malaya in Prang Besar.  Although this was a publicly funded 
project, the Agency Houses were involved while also pursuing their own research 
programmes. 335   In estate husbandry, the industry was operating at optimum 
efficiency so little could be done to improve productivity.  Moreover, it made little 
sense to plant more rubber trees due to uncertainties in demand and the rise of 
synthetics.  Nor could the estates restrict supplies as they had before due to the 
aforementioned management of rubber sales by London’s Rubber Buying Unit.  
Therefore, labour savings were the only option as rubber tapping was a skilled and 
well paid profession which made up a significant part of the commodity’s final price.  
In 1957, rubber tappers were paid a wage commensurate to factory workers and by 
1973 had surpassed them.336  The difficulty estate firms faced was the organised 
strength of a National Union of Plantation Workers that effectively blocked proposed 
wage reductions, as MacKenzie explained: 
Rubber is a more labour intensive crop [than oil palm].  The tapping of rubber is 
a skilled job and [the] tappers were all members of the national union of 
plantation workers.  [It was] a very sensible and well led union but obviously 
their salaries increased so there was the promise of, if you like, higher costs.337 
 
The Agency Houses also argued for a greater say in rubber prices that were set in 
London and accused authorities of penalising the industry (and the wider Malayan 
economy).338  For all parties involved, the issue was, as it is for every business, how 
to achieve a price high enough to reward the producer, yet low enough to satisfy the 
consumer.  At the start of the 1950s, however, the Malayan estates received an 
unexpected if temporary boost to business. 
 
                                                 
335 Interview with Rod MacKenzie, 10 July 2015. Here MacKenzie commented that Harrisons Rubber Breeding 
Programme in Malaysia, run by Ronald Shepherd, produced some of the highest yielding clones that were 
extremely suitable to local growing conditions. 
336 Department of Statistics, Malaysia: Average earnings of estate workers Vs factory workers 1957 and 73. In 
1973 estate workers were paid M$147 a month compared to M$140 for factory workers. 
337 Interview with Rod MacKenzie, 14 November 2012. 
338 It was assessed that labour wages accounted for 65% of the final price of natural rubber, see article by Dr W 
J S Naunton, ‘Synthetic Rubber’s Future’, The New Scientist, 21 March 1957, p. 12. Also see Hansard, Malayan 
Rubber Prices, for a debate in the House of Commons. The MP claimed that a price of 10d per lb for Malayan 
Rubber, deprived producers £13 million a year. Furthermore, US exports at a stipulated two-thirds of Malayan 
rubber through a trade agreement meant a loss of around US$40 million to the UK each year. 
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 The outbreak of the Korean War saw demand for rubber soar alongside 
prices.339  This was the so-called ‘third rubber boom’ for the Malayan estates.340  
Henry Barlow underscored the importance of that war to the whole industry: 
It was the Korean War which really saved the rubber industry because the price 
of rubber soared and the country benefitted from these very high rubber prices 
and thus enabled much further expansion [in plantations] to take place.341 
 
The sudden rise in demand for rubber saw Malaya’s export earnings triple to reach 
$350m in 1952.342  Despite this welcome shot in the arm, the underlying weaknesses 
remained and resurfaced when the Korean War ended and rubber prices 
plummeted.  Further bad news followed: companies in the synthetic rubber industry 
intended to expand into Europe.  In 1955, the British government gave the green 
light to a copolymerization chemical plant at Fort Dunlop in Birmingham.  This new 
factory was forecasted to produce 1,500 tonnes of synthetics for tyre manufacture 
and had the financial backing of the British government.343  It prompted a consortium 
member to predict that ‘by about 1975, the Malayan rubber industry will have been 
born, flourished and permanently declined in 100 years!’344  Although that statement 
proved to be well wide of the mark, the venture would have sent shockwaves 
through Agency House boardrooms.  Also in 1955, US authorities began auctioning 
off the synthetic factories as promised.  If trading conditions were not bad enough for 
the estates, news came through that US authorities also intended to release their 
vast stockpiles of rubber onto the market.  If not before, it was now very much 
obvious that for the Malayan estate industry to survive something needed to be done 
and fast.  The solution came from, perhaps, an unlikely source, although it had been 
right in front of the noses of the Agency House directors for a number of years. 
 
After all, Unilever’s PAMOL estate was, by 1950, established and producing 
palm oil profitably.  It is also worth remembering that Guthries and Harrisons had oil 
palm estates in Malaya that predated the war.  The resolve and claims of those who 
                                                 
339 Hoisington, ‘High Finance in Rubber’, p. 107.  In 1950 the average for natural rubber was $0.41 per lb and in 
1951, $0.59 per lb, a rise of around 300% on the previous ten year average. 
340 Barlows Box 22/2, correspondence with estate managers refers to a ‘Third Rubber Boom’ at this time. 
341 Interview with Henry Barlow, 6 August 2013. 
342Barlow, Natural Rubber Industry, p. 106. 
343 Dr W J S Naunton, ‘Synthetic Rubber’s Future’, pp. 12-14. 
344 Tate, RGA History, p. 555. 
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had voiced doubts about oil palm’s suitability to Malay soils were being sorely tested 
and challenged by rising profits on estates, like those owned by Guthries, as Table 
4.3 shows. On the basis of these profits, the idea of crop diversification on the 
estates began to gain traction among the Agency Houses, albeit very slowly. 
 
Table 4.3: Guthries Oil Palm Malaya Accounts and Acreage 1947-50345 
Year Turnover 
£ 
Profit 
£ 
Square 
Acreage 
1947 410,177 41,786 5,637 
1948 666,757 92.048 7,627 
1949 888,794 200,650 7,627 
1950 907,566 224,771 9,888 
 
Production restarted on the Guthries oil palm estates relatively soon after the war, 
and, by 1950, turnover and profits had more than doubled.  Of course, Guthries 
owned those estates outright.  The issue for Harrisons was persuading clients to turn 
over land to oil palm as systematic diversification was a costly and risky affair.  
However, the slump in rubber prices after the Korean War persuaded some that oil 
palm could offer salvation.  It was in more consistent and less volatile prices for the 
new commodity that the estates began to see real potential, as Graph 4.1 shows. 
 
Graph 4.1: Average Annual Spot Prices: Rubber vs Palm Oil per Tonne346 
 
                                                 
345 Guthries Archives G/OPM/12 and 13: Figures extracted from Oil Palm Malaya Accounts 1947-50. 
346 For Rubber, see Barlow, Natural Rubber Industry, pp. 440-1 and for Palm Oil, see Harcharan Singh Khera, 
the Oil Palm Industry of Malaysia, (Penerbit Universiti Malaya, 1976), p. 305. 
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The chart above shows that not only were palm oil prices consistently higher than 
rubber by the late 1920s, they were also much more stable.  In terms of yield, a 
maximum of three tonnes of latex per hectare was achievable at about year 18 after 
planting, and trees only started producing at around year six.  In the case of palm oil, 
the equivalent yield was around four tonnes per hectare and thus not much higher 
than for rubber; but crucially, fruit could be harvested and pressed 4 years after 
planting.347  Moreover, the price for palm oil was, on average, treble that of rubber.  It 
was hard to argue against the facts and figures.  In the estate industry, the optimal 
time to convert land to oil palm was when existing rubber trees reached the end of 
their productive lives.  If an estate was again replanted with rubber, it could be nine 
years before that estate was profitable once more, as shown in Graph 4.2 below. 
 
Graph 4.2: Basic Annual Yield from Rubber Trees (lbs per Acre)348 
 
The chart reveals that small amounts of latex are produced by trees at around the 
four-year mark, however break even for newly planted estates was only achievable 
at year eight or nine. 349   In the first years after planting, cash flow for estate 
operators markedly slowed.  The oil palm, though, cut non-productive cycles 
                                                 
347 Barlow, Natural Rubber Industry, p. 448. Sime Darby, palm oil: facts and figures. See 
<http://www.simedarby.com/upload/Palm_Oil_Facts_and_Figures.pdf>, (accessed, 1 March 2016). There is 
some dispute about oil palm production as Sime Darby claim that fruit can be harvested and pressed after 30 
months. 
348 H&C MS37512, note with loose paper detailing Summary of Estimated Outputs from Asia of Rubber. 
349 Barlow, Natural Rubber Industry, p. 290. The author calculated that well managed estates will not see profit 
from tapping and rubber sales until around seven years after planting. 
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dramatically (although it should be noted that substantial up-front costs were 
required to replant with oil palm).350  It was again access to capital that hastened a 
further round of consolidation in the estate industry.  Capital availability further 
moved the whole Malayan estate industry into the hands of the Agency House.  
Moreover, changes were afoot in British politics that had potential to benefit estates 
and the overseas investor alike. 
 
In the UK, the election of the Conservative party in 1951 brought back into 
power a government more sympathetic to business interests overseas.  The 
historian Nicholas White drew reference to this when he remarked that ‘there was a 
gradual but perceptible shift from the pre-war hands off policy towards a more 
interventionist approach in the tin and rubber industries’ [of Malaya].’351  A more 
obvious change in Malaya was that colonial authorities became more supportive of 
the British estates.  That was acknowledged by Davidson: 
To be fair, [colonial authorities] were most obstructive in the first half of the 20th 
century.  As countries approached independence, the colonial governors began 
to see the importance of [the] plantations in Malaya.352 
 
Davidson’s view about the changing relationship between local British firms and 
colonial representatives in Malaya was echoed by Henry Barlow: 
My impression for Malaysia was that the business fraternity got on reasonably 
well with the previous Colonial Office and thereafter seemed to get on even 
better with the incoming Malaysian government.353 
 
Agency Houses enjoyed broad appeal not only with authorities, but also with the 
indigenous political elite.  Emboldened by this, each Agency House continued to 
pursue individual acquisition strategies.  Henry Barlow recalled his father’s buying 
spree during the 1950s: 
Unlike many of the proprietors of estate operations who sold out as a result of 
the Emergency and with the onset of Independence, the Barlow family carried 
on...my father went on his expansion spree in the fifties.354 
                                                 
350 An oil palm tree produces fruit at 30 months with a productive life cycle of 23 to 30 years. See, MPOB, see 
<http://www.mpoc.org.my/The_Oil_Palm_Tree.aspx>, (accessed, 11 January 2015). 
351 Nicholas J White, Business, Government and End of Empire: Malaya 1945-57, (New York: OUP, 1997), p. 35. 
352 Interview with Leslie Davidson 4 December 2012. 
353 Interview with Henry Barlow, 6 August 2013. 
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In 1953, Barlows acquired the estates Highlands, Midlands, Rasak and Bukit 
Jelutong to form a subsidiary company, Highlands Malaya Plantations Ltd.355  In 
some ways the company’s buying spree was not surprising. After all, for business, 
Malaya, in the 1950s, was rare in a rapidly shrinking British Empire: a colony that 
was open and commercially attractive to British business and investors alike.  Such 
favourable conditions proved a big draw to large investment funds like Scottish 
Widows and M&G.  In fact, M&G became the world’s leading institutional investor in 
the estate industry during the course of the next thirty years. 356   Where the 
institutions invested, the individual speculator followed.  Share demand thereafter 
rose for Harrisons and its ‘Three Sisters’.357  It was something of a virtuous circle of 
investment within an industry that allowed the Agency House to Influence planting 
strategy on the estates.  MacKenzie expanded on Harrisons’ thinking at that time: 
I think the greatest threat was the introduction of synthetic rubber, this 
influenced the decision, we’ve got to now diversify, it would appear that oil palm 
is ideally suited for most of the Malaysian environment, we should explore this.  
We will not necessarily forget about rubber but let us commit ourselves 
particularly in locations which appear to be ideally suited for oil palm.358 
 
The financial strength and boardroom presence of Harrisons’ men in London helped 
persuade a number of estates to diversify or experiment with oil palm.  Such was the 
success of that move that it was not long before greater effort was being directed at 
planting the new crop on many more estates. 
 
 In the early 1950s, Malaya was still a net importer of palm oil and, like the rest 
of the world, got its supplies from West Africa.  However, change was on its way in 
the Malayan estate, and it was the Agency House at the fore of that crop 
transformation.  Three Harrisons’ rubber estates, Banting, Selaba and Lanadron, 
were replanted with oil palm in 1950.  The date coincided with the achievement of full 
production on Unilever's PAMOL estate, planted in 1947.  Moreover, a new Oil Palm 
                                                                                                                                                       
354 Interview with Henry Barlow 6 August 2013. In the 1950s Harrisons added eight Malay estates to holdings 
and Henry Barlow spoke of his father’s ‘spending spree’ at this time and the addition of several Scottish-owned 
estates to the Highlands Group. 
355Barlows Box 24, list of estate acquisitions by Thomas Barlow in mid-1950s. 
356 Interview with David Hopkinson, 4 July 2014. When asked why M&G continued to invest in the Malayan 
plantations despite the dual risks posed by synthetic rubber and the Communist insurrection, he stated that it 
was simply because the British overseas plantation industry offered consistently high dividends. 
357 H&C MS37017/7, Harrisons share capital trebled from £500,000 in 1951 to £1.5 million in 1956. 
358 Interview with Rod MacKenzie, 14 November 2012. 
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Research Station was opened by Harrisons in 1955 on the Klanang Bahru Estate at 
Banting.  The event was recalled by Brian Gray, the station’s first scientist: 
It was set up by me with my dog in 1955. It expanded from a modest start to be 
the producer of the highest yielding seed in the country and to establish a wide 
range of agronomic and pest and disease trials. And it provided the advice for 
the major expansion of oil palm plantings by H&C [Harrisons].359 
 
Harrisons’ research effort overseas was being ably supported in Britain by the 
Tropical Crop Laboratory at Camberley.  Guthries also invested heavily in palm oil 
research at this time, an effort that was recalled by Marcus Gent: 
Guthries had two research centres, one dealing with rubber in Seremban and 
the other on the OPM Estate in Johor which dealt with palm oil.  We employed 
at each some rather fine experts in their field.  Progress was significant, but 
slow by the nature of agriculture experiment.360 
 
 Former Agency House employees tend to disagree about which company 
deserves credit for spearheading the uptake of oil palm in Malaya, however the 
overriding point here is that the two largest Agency Houses were now on-board.  
Gent did mention that other estate crops were trialled by Guthries, including cocoa 
and coconut.361  That episode was also remembered by Hereward Corley, the former 
Head of Unilever’s Plantation Research: 
There was a brief cocoa ‘boom’, with extensive plantings in both Peninsular 
Malaysia and Sabah.  Yields were good, but the high labour requirement 
together with pest problems eventually put an end to the boom.362 
 
Agency House leaders eventually came to the conclusion that demand for cocoa 
was insufficient to justify large-scale planting.  A few estates in Harrisons Golden 
Hope group experimented with coconut under-planted with cocoa, a method later 
repeated on the Cashwood, Flemington and Bagan Dato estates.363  However, yields 
from coconut were consistently poor and the commodity was soon dropped. 364  
Eventually, the Agency Houses decided on oil palm for the following reasons: 
 There was a compelling economic argument, caused by price unpredictability 
in rubber, to diversify in the plantation industry of Malaya. 
                                                 
359 Interview with Brian Gray, 5 December 2012. 
360 Interview with Marcus Gent, 11 July 2014. 
361 Interview with Marcus Gent, 11 July 2014. 
362 Email response received from Hereward Corley, 23 August 2015. 
363 Interview with Rod MacKenzie, 14 November 2012. 
364 Interview with Rod Mackenzie, 10 July 2015. 
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 Palm oil production was stagnating in Nigeria for reasons covered in this 
thesis and declining in Indonesia due to policies introduced by the new 
regime. 
 The Coastal clay soils of Western Malaya and the volcanic soils of Sumatra 
and Sabah offered a high yield potential for the crop. 
 Finally, an extensive catalogue of oil palm research that had been put 
together by Unilever in Africa was made available to estate operators in 
Malaya. 
 
The final point referring to Unilever’s notable research contribution did accelerate the 
planting of oil palm on Malayan estates.  It is therefore worth looking more closely at 
Unilever’s oil palm research to fully appreciate the crop’s success thereafter. 
 
British Business and Oil Palm Research 
A giant leap forward in oil palm breeding took place in the early 1950s when 
Unilever’s Congo research centre first planted a new seed type on a commercial 
scale.  The thick-shelled Deli Dura palm fruit was hybridised with pollen from the 
Pisifera palm to produce what became known as the DxP hybrid.  The thinner shell 
of the hybrid produced oil yields that were roughly 30 per cent higher than Dura 
palm, and subsequently Pisifera pollen was flown to Malaya to pollinate local Deli 
palms.  Once the ‘Congo theory’ on the inheritance of shell thickness was accepted 
by the industry, the oil palm breeding programme in Malaya switched to Unilever’s 
Pisifera material. 365   Individual companies continued to pursue crop breeding 
programmes, however the estate world of Malaya was a small and incestuous one.  
In an apparent act of altruism, Unilever made available research data to all estates in 
Malaya.  Once the Unilever material was being widely used by most estates, oil 
extraction rates rose.  Davidson reiterated the importance of the DxP hybrid at a time 
when estates were pondering a move away from rubber: 
It is no exaggeration to say that the introduction of DxP palm to Malaysia was a 
major factor in making the oil palm an attractive commercial proposition at a 
time when many rubber estate owners were looking for a more viable crop.366 
 
The new oil palm cross-breeding technique was embraced by the Malayan estate 
industry and today practically all estates in the world use the DxP hybrid variety.  
                                                 
365 Email response received from Hereward Corley, 23 August 2015. The details of this research programme 
were also supplied by Corley. 
366Davidson, Malaysian Oil Palm Industry, p. 2. 
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This is a further occasion when collaboration between British estate operators was 
instrumental in establishing a palm oil industry in Malaya that now leads the world. 
 
 Agency Houses thereafter actively encouraged oil palm planting on a number 
of estates to replace rubber.  Davidson explained the ease with which it took place: 
We had been growing oil palms in Africa for 80 years. Oil palm took off in 
Malaysia because of increasing yields and greater productivity.  It was so much 
more profitable than any other crop.  It is very easy to convert a rubber estate 
to oil palm. You have your plantation already cleared; you have your manager; 
you have labourers, roads and drains.  I have seen them cutting down young 
rubber in Malaysia before it has even matured and planting palms!367 
 
Even the Malayan government acknowledged the favourable returns that oil palm 
could offer the estate industry.  It was here that the political economy of the colony 
again came to the fore.  After winning the 1951 municipal elections, the Alliance 
Party, a coalition of moderate ethnic parties, triumphed at the colony’s first federal 
election in 1955 and shared power with the British until independence in 1957.  The 
indigenous Malay arm of that coalition, the Barisan Nasional, had campaigned on a 
promise to give ethnic Malays, the Bumiputera, an opportunity to own land.368  To 
fulfil that promise, on 1 July 1956, the Federal Land Development Agency (FELDA) 
was created.  The new body offered rural dwellers an opportunity to become 
smallholders on publicly funded estates.  Initially the estates grew rubber, but when 
British firms embraced oil palm, FELDA offered additional grants for smallholders to 
replant.  The advancement of palm oil was another demonstration of shared vision 
for the estate industry between a Malayan government and the British estates. 
 
 For Harrisons in particular, by the mid-1950s, the crop conversion programme 
was well advanced on the estates, and, even at that early stage, it was beginning to 
make a positive impact on group profits, as the figures in Table 4.4 show. 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
367 Interview with Leslie Davidson 4 December 2012. 
368 The term Bumiputera is Sanskrit meaning ‘son of the soil’, and is used for the indigenous Malay people. 
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Table 4.4: Statement of Harrisons Company Accounts 1951-56369 
Year Profit 
£ 
Share Capital 
£m 
Share Dividend 
% 
1951 1,371,802 1 30 
1952 1,716,297 1 30 
1953 1,294,788 1 35 
1954 1,212,912 1 20 
1955 1,338,808 1 20 
1956 1,522,324 1.5 15 
 
The table shows that Harrisons’ year end results not long before independence were 
very healthy.  The short-lived profit boost caused by increased rubber demand 
during the Korean War was reflected in record figures for 1952.  Although company 
profits dropped in the following years, an upward trend was re-established when 
estates began producing palm oil by the mid-1950s.  Consistently high dividend 
awards were undoubtedly a big motivation for M&G and others to invest in the 
Malayan estate industry.  The accounts for Guthries Oil Palm Malay provided a 
clearer picture of the new crop’s impact on the industry, as Table 4.5 shows. 
 
Table 4.5: Guthries Oil Palm Malay Accounts 1951-56370 
Year Turnover  
(£) 
Profit  
(£) 
Acreage 
1951 1,134,095 180,311 9,337 
1952 1,026,146 114,473 7,787 
1953 868,758 86,283 9,627 
1954 841,195 79,901 9,420 
1955 853,442 82,005 9,669 
1956 900,940 89,422 9,303 
 
                                                 
369 H&C MS37017/7, figures extracted from H&C accounts for the years 1951-1956. 
370 Guthries Archives G/OPM/13 and 14: Figures extracted from Oil Palm Malaya Accounts 1951-6. 
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The table shows that profits on Guthries’ oil palm estates did rise initially and then 
dipped somewhat from a high in 1951.  One can speculate that this was most 
probably due to two unconnected factors.  The early rise in profit was due to the 
expiration of statutory British government contracts for palm oil at the end of 1950.  
Previously the estates had been paid M$400 (£46.67) for each tonne of palm oil.  
The price, which was set in London, was well below the open market of between 
M$600-800 (£70-94) per tonne (See Graph 4.1 above).  Those statutory contracts 
expired on 31 December 1950 and profits from palm oil rose accordingly.  A 
subsequent dip in profits in 1953 was a result of the aforementioned costs to convert 
existing trees to Unilever’s DxP palm.  Thereafter, profits rose steadily for Guthries 
Oil Palm Malaya over the remainder of the decade.  One rather surprising fact is that 
Guthries’ oil palm coverage did not increase much during the decade.  Again, one 
must conclude that Harrisons was ahead of Guthries in that estate conversion 
programme.  That said, the Agency Houses were cooperating more openly on some 
of the big issues that faced the industry.  That included seizing control of commodity 
prices from London. 
 
 In 1954, British estates in Malaya came together to form the Malaysian Oil 
Palm Growers’ Council (MOPGC) in Kuala Lumpur.  One of the stated aims of the 
MOPGC was to wrestle price control for palm oil from London and, as such, 
membership was opened to all private estates in Malaya, not just the British.  In fact, 
British firms now owned around half of all estate land in Malaya.371  There were 
notable benefits to membership, including access to research, collective marketing 
and use of bulking facilities at the ports.372  In the spirit of the MOPGC, the two-
volume Mongana Report, compiled by Unilever in the Congo, was handed to the 
organisation.373  This further demonstrated the commitment made by Unilever to 
transfer research out of Africa, and it was one that benefitted the industry as a whole 
in Malaya. Therefore, the MOPGC was able to present a unified business front to 
                                                 
371 Barlow, Natural Rubber Industry:  Malaysia, Table 3.2.  Various estimates have been made about the size of 
British estate holdings. These hover between one and two thirds. However, Barlow’s research produced 
official evidence to support the figures in his book. 
372 Rod MacKenzie, Leslie Davidson and Henry Barlow spoke of the MOPGC, that it was a Malaysian based 
‘club’ for local estate operators (open to all). MOPGC also represented the Malaysian expatriate position on 
the industry to London executives and the RGA. 
373 Interview with Leslie Davidson, 4 December 2012. This was a research report on oil palm compiled by 
Unilever scientists over a number of years on the estates in the Congo. 
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customers and authorities alike from inside Malaya, much like the RGA in London.  
The MOPGC also worked hard to prevent other nations gaining a foothold in the 
Malayan estates.  Most notably, that included the United States Rubber Company.  
The ability of the MOPGC to project collective company strength overseas helped 
attract further investment and accelerated conversion to oil palm further on the 
estates. 
 
 As previously indicated, the consistently healthy dividend awards offered to 
shareholders by Harrisons were a major draw to investors and enabled the board to 
increase share capital to £1.5 million in 1956.374  Furthermore, the firm’s ongoing 
strategy of share accumulation in the estates helped construct an impenetrable 
corporate web of cross-company directorships.  Three Harrisons’ directors held 18, 
12 and 11 additional directorships in estate firms alone.375  In fact, around two dozen 
directors, all Agency House executives, had seats on boards of two hundred rubber 
companies.  The Agency Houses were in a strong position to exert influence across 
the industry by virtue of that board representation.  In 1950, a valuation of Guthrie & 
Company Limited assets was conducted to enable an internal transfer of shares from 
the chairman, Sir John Hay.  Hay’s one-sixth holding was valued at M$21,419,997 
(£3,675.000).  The shares were purchased by the Anderson family, the holders of 
the remaining five-sixths of equity in the company.  At the start of the 1950s, the 
London end of Guthries was in the hands of a few individuals, all of whom were 
members of the Anderson family.  Much like Barlows, Guthries’ business was now 
held in a family secretariat.  However, a letter by the head of the family, Keith 
Anderson, made it clear that it would soon be necessary to make parts of the 
business public by share offer.376  That company valuation above does, however, 
reveal the extent of Guthries’ stake in Malaya at that time.  At interview, Davidson 
remarked that, in the early 1950s, a large number of companies listed on the FTSE 
held investments in Britain’s global estate interests.377  Although that claim is nigh on 
                                                 
374 H&C MS37016/2, figures extracted from ‘1956 Statement of Accounts’. 
375 H&C MS37016/8, paper outlining Harrisons’ secretarial holdings and board directorships in 1956. 
376 Guthries Archives G/MIS/10, letter by K M G Anderson to Sir John Hay dated 6 January 1950. 
377 Interview with Leslie Davidson 4 December 2012. Here Leslie was quoting a friend, Edwin Hadsley, a 
Chaplain in the company M P Evans. He said many FTSE companies, like Shell, ICI etc. produced fertilisers and 
chemicals for the industry while a number of financial firms and trusts were also indirectly invested. It is 
difficult to confirm Davidson’s claim, however on examining the historical records for the Financial Times, 
 
135 
impossible to substantiate, Guthries and Harrisons were certainly well established 
and prominent fixtures on the LSE.378  Despite some uncertainty about what the 
future held in the lead up to independence, the ongoing investment strategy by 
Harrisons and that of other Agency Houses demonstrated that London directors 
believed there was a future for the British Agency House in the Malayan estate 
industry.  Richard Lindesay, former Finance Manager for Harrisons in Kuala Lumpur, 
had this to say about the company’s future in the region: ‘I think you might say that 
we [Harrisons] were in a permanent business.  It wasn’t about short-term profits; it 
was the long term picture [in Malaya] as you might put it.’379 
 
In 1956, Harrisons valued company assets at £6.32 million and yet turnover was ten 
times that figure at £62 million.380  The disparity reveals that Harrisons was still 
operating very much as an Agency House: an industry stakeholder, an investor and 
provider of services to those Malayan estates.  That such a large proportion of group 
turnover came from those client estates in Malaya was an area of the business that 
the board had not tackled fully and is analysed more fully in the final two Malaysian 
chapters.  Those chapters chart the rapid development of a Malayan palm oil 
industry set against a dynamic political economy both overseas and back in Britain.  
First though, the thesis turns once more to UAC in Nigeria after independence. 
  
                                                                                                                                                       
many of the larger companies on the FTSE in 1950 were indeed in the financial services. It is true that many of 
those firms, M&G and Scottish Widows, had investments in the estate industry given the high dividend awards 
by Harrisons and others. Moreover, chemical and oil companies were most certainly invested in one way or 
another, as Hadsley implied. 
378 See Three Decades of the FTSE 100, compiled by de Poel, February 2014. Here Harrisons is one of the first 
firms to feature on the inaugural FTSE 100 top listed companies. 
379 Interview with Richard Lindesay, 5 December 2012. 
380 H&C MS37019/8, figures extracted from ‘1957 Statement of Accounts’.  
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Part II: post-Independence 
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Chapter 5: Nigeria post-Independence 
Introduction 
When independence arrived for Nigeria on 1 October 1960, Unilever subsidiary UAC 
was in as commanding a position on ‘the Coast’ as it had ever been.  In some areas 
of business, that presence was in fact almost monopolistic.  For Nigeria, early 
economic indicators were good, with the OECD declaring it a model African 
economy and an emerging economic powerhouse on the continent.381  The nation 
was self-sufficient in food and had quite recently discovered huge reserves of 
mineral oil in the southern delta region.  Moreover, a vast amount of revenue was 
still being generated by commodity exports, most notably palm oil.  The lingering 
UAC commercial dominance may not have suited ultra-nationalists in Nigeria, but, 
from an economic perspective, it provided business stability and a long-established 
bridge to international markets which, taken together, provided the means to attract 
further foreign investment.  This private sector strength had been instrumental in 
producing annual GDP growth figures that averaged 4.5 per cent prior to 
independence.382  For UAC, the only Agency House of note still operating in West 
Africa, those economic indicators looked good in London head office.  Therefore, 
from its vantage point at the head of the Nigerian private sector, the subsidiary was 
well positioned, both commercially and financially, to pursue further expansion in a 
nation that possessed all the requisite building blocks to become one of the leading 
economies in Africa. 
 
 Despite that early promise, however, after just a few years of independence, 
Nigeria was plunged into tribal violence and political strife, problems that were 
accompanied and exacerbated by rampant corruption among officials.  The Biafra 
Civil War polarised the nation along religious and tribal lines.   Moreover, 
government policy thereafter was heavily prejudiced by that conflict.  When the 
economy did weaken, political leaders deflected criticism by blaming that British 
imperialist legacy, which included most prominently stay-behind companies like 
                                                 
381 W Arthur Lewis, Reflections on Nigeria’s Economic Growth (Paris: OECD Publications, 1967), p. 60. Here 
Lewis champions the Nigerian economy in a report to the OECD in which he claims: ‘Rapid growth, excellent 
fiscal policies, reasonable attitude to foreign enterprise, a first class group of senior civil servants in the eco-
nomic ministries, Nigeria has been one of the fittest candidates.’ 
382 Lewis, Nigeria’s Economic Growth, p. 11. This figure conflicts slightly with a World Bank figure of 4 per cent 
annual GDP growth, 1950-60. 
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UAC.  In Nigeria, an emergent political economy would dictate business conditions 
thereafter and finally determine the business longevity of UAC on ‘the Coast’.   
 
The government narrative of blaming the British while ignoring corrupt practices 
within its own administration became what the Nigerian historian Ogbeidi 
characterised as ‘Nigeria’s political leadership since 1960 and the rhythms of 
corruption’.383  Although this research does not delve too deeply into the subject, it is 
important to acknowledge just how pervasive this was and the damage subsequent 
government policy had on UAC business overall.  To turn to the specific business 
aspects of all of this development, though: the earlier Nigerian chapter underscored 
just how important agriculture and downstream commodity exports were to the 
Nigerian economy before independence.  In 1922, the palm oil trade alone 
accounted for some 57 per cent of Nigeria’s domestic exports.384  It was a trade that 
UAC had been heavily engaged in since inception in 1929.  However, the conditions 
of that trade had been deteriorating for a number of years, and UAC’s final exit did 
much to hasten a steady decline in Nigerian agriculture as a whole.385  Indeed, in 
1961, World Bank statistics revealed that Nigerian agriculture had contracted by 3 
per cent, which coincided with UAC’s move out of commodities a year before.386  On 
that, Thomas laid the blame squarely at the feet of the Nigerian government: 
I don’t think it was a decline in foreign investment that caused the decline [in 
agriculture], but government neglect and mishandling of agriculture (milking the 
marketing boards etc.).387 
 
However, one could respond that it was British colonial policy that caused the 
eventual demise of Nigerian agriculture.  A steadfast refusal to countenance foreign 
land tenure, as well as the introduction and then retention of a marketing board 
system to handle the nation’s most valuable commodities, drained funds and 
deterred any real investment in agriculture.  Certainly, such was the dominance of 
                                                 
383 For a particularly forthright account on Nigerian corruption, see Michael M Ogbeidi, ‘Political Leadership 
and Corruption in Nigeria Since 1960: a Socio-economic Analysis’, Journal of Nigeria Studies, 1 (2012), 
<http://www.unh.edu/nigerianstudies/articles/Issue2/Political_leadership.pdf>, (accessed, 2 May 2016) 
384 Figures extracted from Meredith, ‘Decline of the Nigerian oil-palm Industry’, p. 312. 
385 T Ademola Oyejide, the Effects of Trade and Exchange Rate Policies on Agriculture in Nigeria, (Research 
Report 55: International Food Policy Research Unit, 1986), p. 14. Here the author states that output of export 
crops fell by 17.3 per cent between the years 1970-75. 
386 World Bank statistics quoted in, Iyoha, ‘Economic Growth in African Countries’, p. 187. 
387Further points raised in letter form by Tony Thomas after reviewing draft of thesis, 10 July 2015. 
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UAC in the downstream commodity trade before independence that it is difficult to 
see how the company’s commitment to that point in terms of capital, facilities and 
people could have been replaced after independence.  Government did not have the 
experience, expertise or financial means to fulfil the role vacated by UAC.  Once the 
company exited the commodity trade, agricultural output and subsequent exports 
slowed. Or indeed, in the case of palm oil, stagnated.  For UAC and its vast trading 
setup, there were many more areas of business to focus on, most of which were not 
subject to as many restrictions or government interference as the commodity trade. 
 
 This final chapter on Nigeria is again presented chronologically and mainly 
employs UAC archives and personal testimony alongside official sources to uncover 
the challenges to trade that the Agency House faced after British rule.  As trade 
revenues from Nigeria steadily declined, the UAC board struggled to adapt to testing 
conditions on the ground while, simultaneously, seeking to redeploy business out of 
Africa.  The chapter begins by examining the new UAC setup in West Africa and the 
type of trade that London-based management thought would offer the company a 
commercial future, particularly in Nigeria.  The second half of the chapter examines 
UAC ‘out of Africa’ and the efforts of management to redeploy business.  Over time, 
that effort degenerated into a desperate scramble for commercial survival.  
 
UAC Trade in an Independent Nigeria 
At independence and, after a century of British rule, Nigeria remained dependent on 
an imperialist mode of production built around commodity exports.  However, 
diminishing revenues saw UAC exit the trade in 1959.  The UAC board now 
embraced public relations drive advanced by former civil servant, now company 
chairman, Pedler, which aimed to give the company more of an African feel, a point 
noted by Decker in her thesis on British interests in post-colonial West Africa: 
While the colonial powers had left, imperial business stayed behind and forged 
close links to African political elites in the 1950s and 1960s.  By the 1970s, they 
were challenged, both in Africa and internationally, as being part of a new form 
of colonialism.388 
                                                 
388 Stephanie Decker, ‘Building up Goodwill: British Business, Development and Economic Nationalism in 
Ghana and Nigeria, 1945-1977’, Business History Conference Paper, (2008), p. 602/3. Also, there is no evidence 
in UAC archives to indicate that management had access to Nigerian officials. Indeed, the sale of the 
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UAC management did indeed seek to realign business strategy closer to the 
economic planning of the host nation under Pedler and moved into manufacturing to 
complement the firm’s existing commercial interests. 
 
 As noted earlier, UAC encountered very little competition after a progressive 
and ruthless acquisition strategy that continued right up to independence.  Its 
extensive business portfolio now included a supermarket chain (Kingsway Stores), 
logging concessions (African Timber & Plywood Ltd.), breweries (partnership with 
Guinness and Heineken) and shipping lines (Niger River Transport and Palm Line), 
to name a few.  The UAC brand was everywhere and, according to Griffin and 
Thomas, it was highly respected by ordinary Nigerians and even over government: 
On the whole UAC was regarded utterly straight.  A lot of Nigerians said that 
UAC is the government.  That is what they said.  Forget those... people to put it 
quite crudely, who are running the government. UAC says what happens and 
we like what UAC does.389 
 
Of course, the views expressed by former employees cannot be substantiated 
however, the statement does have some credibility in light of the incidence of 
corruption within the political regime.  It is an inauspicious characteristic that Nigeria 
has not yet shaken off.  For the UAC business overall, though, revenues continued 
to be healthy despite the end to British rule, as the figures in Table 5.1 show. 
 
Table 5.1: UAC Annual Accounts 30 Sep 1960 – 30 Sep 1962390 
Year End Net Profit 
£m 
Dividend 
% 
Reserves 
£m 
30 Sep 1960 1.923 8 30 
30 Sep 1961 1.424 8 30 
30 Sep 1962 1.364 8 31 
 
The figures in the table show that overall group profits on ‘the Coast’ were still solid 
despite a drop in 1961 caused by business restructuring.  Capital reserves were also 
                                                                                                                                                       
company’s Cowan Estate to the state was negotiated through the British Governor. See UPG Acc 1992/67, Box 
47, visit report by Plantations Group staff dated 28 April 1971. 
389 Interview with David Griffin, 6 December 2012. 
390 UAC 1/1/1/6/31-3, UAC Director’s Report and Accounts, 1960-2. 
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very strong and allowed the board to make consistent dividend payments to 
Unilever.  However, the overall figures do conceal a loss for the Nigerian trade in 
particular in 1961. 391   Despite that, UAC’s new specialised approach to trade, 
supported by a vast workforce both at home and abroad, appeared equipped to meet 
the challenges that lay ahead. 
 
 In late 1959, moreover, UAC’s privileged status in the Unilever group was 
augmented by the move out of Unilever House into a new UAC headquarters across 
the Thames.  As before, the subsidiary’s autonomous position was ensured by two 
factors:   the specialised aspects of trade in West Africa compared to Unilever’s core 
manufacturing; and substantial profits.  As long as UAC made money for the parent 
company then the Special Committee was unlikely to interfere in the running of the 
subsidiary.  That said, it would seem that some in the parent company were already 
worried about the long-term future of trading in West Africa’.  A former Deputy 
Director, Richard Greenhalgh, drew reference to this and UAC’s unique status within 
the overall Unilever business fleet: 
[UAC] was an interesting and diverse business.  UAC were entrepreneurial and 
bought and sold businesses when others did not.  However, even a 1960s 
[1959] study revealed that there was a threat to its future.392 
 
Greenhalgh highlighted here that Unilever management was flagging up 
weaknesses in the subsidiary business model.  Moreover, in the paper he refers to, 
‘An International Business’, there is little doubt that many of the findings applied to 
UAC.  Crucially though, the parent company decided not to intervene on UAC 
business for another two decades, and the question is why?  It could be argued that 
the UAC board thought of the subsidiary as a standalone multinational firm with just 
one shareholder, Unilever.  After all, UAC was neither a holding company nor 
dependent on a single trade but a large conglomerate with commercial interests in a 
number of nations.  The board therefore probably thought of UAC as an 
indispensable asset and, at times, practically a commercial equal to Unilever.  Griffin 
implied as much when he spoke of UAC thus.  ‘We supplied members to the board 
                                                 
391 UAC 1/1/1/6/31-3, UAC Director’s Report and Accounts, 1960-2. Breakdown on profit figures, additional 
notes. A loss on trade in Nigeria recorded due to factory build costs. 
392Unilever Archives, GB1752.OH/53, UAC Company staff recorded memoirs, Richard Greenhalgh, 6 July 2010. 
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of Unilever rather than the other way round.’  Company records confirm this, and, 
perhaps tellingly, it was now Unilever directors who crossed the Thames for briefings 
at UAC House rather than the other way round.393  Although the parent company had 
commissioned the 1959 report on trade in an international setting, it would appear 
that UAC management paid little attention to dangers raised, when perhaps they 
should have.  This in itself speaks volumes about the relationship that existed 
between Unilever and UAC.  However, the decision noted above for UAC to leave a 
historically lucrative commodity trade must have raised some eyebrows in Unilever. 
 
 Despite the financial pain incurred by moving away from commodities 
altogether, however, UAC management believed necessary to preserve overall 
business.  Thereafter, UAC immediately sold of the bulk oil installations at 
Abonnema, Burutu, Calabar, Koko, Opobo and Port Harcourt to the Nigerian Central 
Marketing Board.394   The River Niger fleet, responsible for transporting produce 
down river, was largely retired and a feasibility study was commissioned for the 
continued operation of the Palm Line.  Somehow the latter survived.  This all took 
place at a time when Unilever’s PAMOL was opening a second oil palm estate in 
British North Borneo.  Of course, by then, UAC no longer managed estates in Africa 
and therefore took no part in the new venture.  It is, however, worthy of conjecture 
that if management had retained earlier convictions about palm oil production then 
perhaps the exit from the commodity trade would not have been so final or indeed 
deemed necessary to preserve the wider business.  UAC estate management staff 
might well, then, have played a role in Unilever’s oil palm venture in Malaysia and, in 
doing so, redeployed some company assets out of West Africa.  That UAC did not, 
however, and therefore the only question now was: what would replace that 
commodity revenue? 
 
 
                                                 
393 Interview with David Griffin, 6 December 2012. 
394 UAC 2/19/AJ, papers relating to the sale of UAC holding in Bulk Oil Plants of Nigeria Ltd to the Nigerian 
Produce Marketing Company. 
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 UAC’s in-house Strategic & Economic Review of 1963 indicated corporate 
thinking at that time, and laid out what was believed future core business, which can 
be summarised in this way: 
1. Specialised distribution and marketing of a selected -as distinct from a 
comprehensive- range of lines of merchandise on behalf of, or in conjunction 
with, both overseas and local manufacturers. 
2. The setting up and operating of local industries, usually on a wholly 
owned basis and sometimes in collaboration with technical or other partners to 
manufacture and process a widening and progressively sophisticated range of 
goods, many of which hitherto have had to be imported.395 
 
UAC management decided to focus on agency work, to market and sell goods of 
other international companies throughout West Africa.  The business also came with 
the promise of after-sale services and other add-ons.  After all, UAC had always 
been an attractive sales agent to other western firms wishing to sell their goods in 
Nigeria given the company’s well established footprint.396  The trade did, however, 
depend on a Nigerian regime allowing import of finished goods from abroad at a time 
when ‘import substitution industrialisation’ was being hailed by world bodies as a 
means towards economic development.397  As such, any proposal by UAC to invest 
in local manufacturing was generally well received; however permission to bring in 
other western goods often came with strings attached, some of which were costly.  
One such condition applied to Guinness, which had always been a favourite tipple 
for Nigerians.  Government demanded that the stout be brewed locally with a 
percentage of local ingredients.  As a result and somewhat ironically, the company 
was forced into agricultural production and granted farming land in Northern Nigeria 
to grow sorghum.  However, the venture was a disaster as sorghum noticeably 
altered the taste of Guinness.  Nigerian drinkers hated it, and the company was 
forced to abandon the farming venture and incur substantial losses.398 
                                                 
395 UAC 1/11/19/28, ‘Redeployment: an aspect of development in tropical Africa’, Statistical and Economic 
Review, 1963, 28, p. 6. 
396 Email response from Tony Thomas, 7 November 2015 regarding critique of final thesis paper. 
397For a comprehensive analysis of sub-Saharan ISI see Kanayo Ogujiuba et al., ‘Import Substitution 
Industrialization as Learning Process: Sub Saharan African Experience as Distortion of “Good” Business Model’, 
Business and Management Review, 1 (2011), pp. 8-21. 
398 Interview with David Griffin, 6 December 2012. Griffin explained that malt imports were prohibited 
therefore UAC funded a farm in Northern Nigeria to grow Sorghum. However, the Nigerians ‘hated’ the new 
Guinness recipe and the farm was eventually sold with company incurring huge losses (‘millions’). Eventually 
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 In some other industries, partnerships were formed between western firms 
and/or the Nigerian government.  This was not a particularly new strategy ‘per se’: as 
early as 1956, the company had acquired a 20 per cent stake in the Nigerian Pre-
stressed Concrete Company Ltd.  Thereafter, to fill the void space on the outward 
leg to Nigeria, the Palm Line shipped cement from Europe.  The venture was the first 
of a number in that new specialised trade strategy pursued over the next decade.  By 
1965, the company had moved on to develop large stakes in a good number of 
manufacturing enterprises across Africa, as Table 5.2 shows. 
 
Table 5.2: UAC New Manufacturing Business on ‘the Coast’ – 1956-65399 
Market Entry Year Manufacturing Industry (some in partnership) 
1956 Cycle Assembly Plants in Ghana and Nigeria 
1958 Vehicle assembly plant at Apapa in Nigeria 
1958 Heineken Brewery at Kumasi in Ghana 
1959 Vono beds and mattresses at Lagos in Nigeria 
1960 Office furniture factory in Kenya 
1960 Cement paints factory in Nigeria 
1960 Bottling plant for Guinness and a brewing facility in 1962 
1962 Seward toiletries factory at Jamestown in Ghana 
1964 Equity share in personal products firm in Ghana 
1965 Processing plants and textile factory in the Congo 
 
As the table shows, UAC quickly moved into manufacturing while also setting up 
several new agency franchises to handle the goods that authorities were willing to 
allow into Nigeria.  Of course, start-up capital was needed for each new venture, 
most particularly for those that required local manufacture.  That financial 
requirement did though deter competing firms, both foreign and indigenous.  On the 
plus side for UAC, the requisite skills to launch new manufacturing endeavours were 
available in-house.  It is therefore, rather surprising to learn that no documents in the 
archives indicated that those skills were ever requested from Unilever, save for 
                                                                                                                                                       
Guinness found a way round legislation by importing ‘Liffey Water’ which ‘may or may not’ have also 
contained the aforementioned and prohibited malt content. 
399 UAC 1/2/4, UAC Directorate: Divisions and Subsidiary Companies Acquisitions, dated 1 June 1966. 
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running the Lever Brothers soap factory at Aba in Nigeria.400  Again, one can only 
surmise that UAC management remained intent on protecting the subsidiary’s own 
quasi-corporate status and cherished business autonomy.  Nevertheless, this again 
throws light on a unique relationship between parent company and subsidiary.  It 
also reveals a weakness in the overall Unilever setup: the unwillingness, perhaps by 
choice, to draw upon the extensive resources and capability on offer within the 
parent company was apparent throughout the history of UAC. 
 
 The success of some new agency contracts saw costs spiral as a result of 
increasing demand, a situation that was recalled and expanded upon by Thomas: 
Once Nigeria became more important as a market, there emerged a lot of 
commercial pressures.  It is cheap to sell out of a shack but the manufacturers 
came to say, we are not having our stuff sold there, we want a proper 
showroom.  Now showrooms don’t come cheap.  Manufacturers also decided 
that their products required proper marketing and to exert more control over 
this. Add in increased competition and pressure to manufacture some imports 
locally and there were a number of commercial pressures on us on the trading 
side, this coincided with the chopping of our earnings from produce buying.401   
 
In effect, UAC again became a victim of its own success in opening up the Nigerian 
market to western goods.  As sales increased, drawing competition, suppliers began 
demanding more attractive sales outlets and marketing campaigns.  As selling agent 
for these goods, UAC was forced to modernise retail premises which cost money.  
Despite the challenges encountered in this agency work, however, UAC profits had 
picked up again by 1965, as Table 5.3 shows. 
 
Table 5.3: UAC Annual Accounts 30 Sep 1963 – 30 Sep 1966402 
Year End Net Profit 
£m 
Dividend 
% 
Reserves 
£m 
30 Sep 1963 0.556 0 32 
30 Sep 1964 0.666 0 32 
30 Sep 1965 1.508 4.5 33 
30 Sep 1966 1.235 0 34 
                                                 
400 UAC 1/2/2/3/6/1 & 2, UAC/Unilever Liaison: Lever Brothers Nigeria Ltd. Correspondence, April 1982 - April. 
401 Interview with Tony Thomas, 6 December 2012. 
402 UAC 1/1/1/6/34-37, figures extracted from Director’s Report and Accounts 1963-6. 
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The table shows that, immediately after the company’s move into specialised trade 
and manufacturing, profits dipped in the years 1963 and 1964 to less than half the 
previous (see Table 5.1).  Profits did recover somewhat in 1965, but, to ease cash 
flow, the board cancelled dividends to Unilever for three out of the four years.  That 
fall-back option would not be available to the board when Nigerian nationals joined 
the share register of locally listed associate companies, a subject revisited later in 
this chapter.  However, for the time being, the company was committed to 
specialised trade and agency work.  It was a commercial strategy that was thought 
less risky, would enable expansion in Nigeria and offered opportunities to transfer 
business to other nations.  Despite the company’s strength in business, as the most 
prominent British firm in Nigeria, UAC was an obvious target for emerging nationalist 
disquiet.  That evolving relationship with the Nigerian government would soon come 
under strain. 
 
The new Political Economy of Nigeria 
In truth, any influence that UAC could bring to bear on the Nigerian authorities ended 
with the demise of the Legislative Council back in 1956, a body that had been 
chaired by the company.  Thereafter, UAC directors in London anticipated rather 
than shaped subsequent policy directives on trade in Nigeria.  The company did 
press the business case to the government wherever possible, and reports in the 
company archives record official meetings to discuss subjects like trade unions, 
wages and pensions.403  However, as mentioned previously, after independence it 
was risky to get close to politicians of a particular tribe.  Therefore, the unwritten rule 
for UAC was that political affiliations should be avoided.404  For the ordinary Nigerian, 
though, the UAC brand was apparently much liked and reflected well on the 
company, both commercially and even politically, a point Griffin again wanted to 
highlight: ‘Local indigenous Nigerians thought that UAC was the government of 
Nigeria and told the [actual] government what to do.’405  Again, Griffin’s view cannot 
be substantiated; however sentiments of that sort would not have endeared the 
                                                 
403 UAC 1/3/6/2/7, there are several visit reports by visiting London staff that report meetings with Nigerian 
officials. These appear to address specific issues including, Trade Unions, Wages and Pensions. 
404 Interview with Griffin and Thomas, 6 December 2012. Both indicated on different occasions that it was 
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company to the political elite.  Indeed, despite any popularity on the ground, 
company influence within government circles was ebbing away.  Part of the reason 
for this lay with Unilever’s corporate policy of refusing to countenance any form of 
political patronage, a central tenet of the parent company’s policy overseas and one 
confirmed by all interviewed.406  The difficulty with that approach was that it did not fit 
with a Nigerian culture that had actually been influenced and largely shaped by the 
British.  In days gone by, Griffin reflected that: 
When the traders went out to Africa and off the boats they had with them some 
beads, some gin, to go to the local chief there because they wanted to set up 
trade and so they gave them a dash.  And this became part of the culture 
inculcated into Nigerian society that if you go to somebody you automatically 
have an enticement with you.  So it became part of the culture of Nigeria and 
when I went to see my local Chief I would not go without taking him a present, it 
was usually a carton of Guinness.407 
 
And there, in a nutshell, lay the conundrum for the firm when dealing with Nigerian 
officials.  While local company management may well have engaged in the minor 
levels of patronage revealed by Griffin, the practice was never repeated higher up 
the chain of command.  The underlying issue, though, was that patronage and 
similar practices in Nigeria were expected at all levels.  That same point was made 
by the historian Ogfbeidi who stated ‘corruption has attained an unimaginable height 
and is currently assuming pandemic proportion in Nigeria’.408  The fact that UAC 
assumed the moral high ground did not endear the company to a government well 
accustomed to patronage.  Thomas had this to say on that very point: ‘In West Africa 
the possession of a rubber stamp is the pathway to gold.’409  One also recalls the 
previously mentioned stance that UAC took when refusing to subscribe to a Nigerian 
national loan back in 1958.  Of course, back then, Nigeria was still under British rule, 
and it was a very difference scenario for business now.  It was a dilemma that the 
UAC board sat in London never came to terms with despite the fact that local 
management in Nigeria clearly had.  It was no surprise, then, when the Nigerian 
                                                 
406 Interview with David Griffin and Tony Thomas, 6 December 2012. The subject of bribery and graft among 
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407 Interview with David Griffin, 6 December 2012. 
408 Ogbeidi, Political Leadership and Corruption in Nigeria, p. 21. 
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government introduced an early directive that took aim at UAC and other foreign 
firms.  All foreign companies were ordered to replace expatriates with Nigerian 
nationals following the introduction of the same scheme, somewhat haphazardly, in 
the public sector. 
 
In fairness to UAC management, it is clear that the directors in London were 
very good at anticipating legislation before it was enacted in Nigeria, and this, in 
itself, is testament to Pedler’s previous experience in the civil service.  As such, UAC 
had embarked on an in-house local training programme well in advance of the 
Nigerian indigenisation directive.  In fact, employing locals overseas was a major 
part of Unilever’s global vision.  In that aforementioned ‘International Business’ 
paper, the Unilever chairman Lord Heyworth had written: 
We carry responsibility for running the business.  This is a responsibility which 
we are anxious to discharge, as far as possible, through locally recruited 
managers.  Local knowledge is most readily found in local men.410 
 
By 1960, in fact, UAC ran eight technical training schools in Africa, five in Nigeria 
and one each in Ghana, Sierra Leone and Kenya.411  That five schools were in 
Nigeria again underscored the importance of the nation to the firm.  It also indicated 
that perhaps some of Unilever’s warnings in the 1959 paper were starting to be 
heeded overseas even if moves in this direction arose out of economic necessity, in 
particular the fact that expatriates were becoming very expensive.  Indeed, it is worth 
noting that the first UAC School at Burutu on the Niger Delta had opened its doors to 
around one hundred students back in 1934.412   By 1965, the company’s various 
technical schools were turning out somewhere between 500 to 750 students each 
year with one former employee claiming that the largest college at Igbobi in Lagos 
supplied around 40 per cent of all engineering management posts in West Africa.413  
Griffin had this to say on the company’s long-established training strategy and 
obvious compliance with indigenisation policy: ‘We had no trouble [with the 
                                                 
410 Unilever, an International Business, p. 6-7. 
411 UAC 2/19/3/4, UAC of Nigeria Ltd: Training Schemes and Courses. 
412 Wilson, Unilever 1945-1965, p.224. 
413 UAC 1/11/9/28/14, papers relating to UAC training school numbers. Also, UAC 1/3/5/1/15, Visit Report by 
Tueart. Here the author comments on Nigerian Civil Service and UAC staff training, 6-25 August 1978. 
149 
legislation] as we followed our own indigenisation policy.  It was our policy to bring 
on young managers and the graduates who joined us.414 
 
In fact, the main challenge that UAC management faced was holding onto 
those trained staff, a point that Griffin again picked up on: 
If you were a clerk in UAC or a junior manager you had the equivalent of a 
degree as far as government was concerned.  If they wanted someone they 
would poach our people to go and work for them because the training they got 
in UAC was deemed straight down the line, no corruption.415 
 
Despite retention issues, however, the training and employment of local labour were 
economically shrewd policies and improved the company’s profile as a local 
employer.  The practice of piggy-backing indigenous workers onto expatriates was 
used company-wide to enable thorough oversight, a practice that Lewis referred to 
rather disparagingly: 
The role of the foreigner is that of the tutor; a sometimes likeable but usually 
tiresome fellow, from dependence on whom one wishes to escape at the 
earliest possible moment.416 
 
 Lewis’s statement, however, ignores a fundamental problem that all foreign 
firms faced when recruiting locally.  In 1960, the gross rate of enrolment in African 
primary schools was just 36 per cent compared to 67 per cent for Asia.417  These 
privately funded facilities therefore offered Nigerians a means to attain qualifications, 
and as such the piggy-backing practice was a small price to pay.  It was also 
inevitable that UAC students would become coveted by public bodies like the civil 
service and army.  In fact, Griffin told of an encounter with one former UAC 
employee whom he had previously managed.  On leaving the company, the man had 
joined the Nigerian army and had risen to the rank of General.418  In that respect, 
UAC training schools served the wider economy of Nigeria well and produced 
educated and proficient workers.  Of course, not all Nigerians viewed the contribution 
by UAC so positively. 
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 Indeed, many a Nigerian businessman and/or politician could and did argue 
that the lasting business dominance exercised by British companies had rendered 
the economy foreign-dependent and export-orientated.  Quite what the economy 
would have looked like without the British is open to conjecture, however it did not 
stop leading Nigerian politicians from condemning that lingering presence.  Soon 
after independence, a Federal Minister of State complained that ‘the economy of our 
country, strictly speaking, is not in our hands.  Over 70 per cent of our overseas 
trade is controlled by forces over which we have no control.’419  In 1962, a new 
Immigration Law was introduced which excluded foreigners from ‘entering the 
country in a trade or calling, which is already adequately served by Nigerians, or who 
seek individual agricultural settlement...’420  The directive made little impact on UAC 
largely because of that aforementioned local training and employment scheme, 
however it was not long before other parts of the business came under fire. 
 
 Clearly nationalism and, in the case of Nigeria, tribalism were surfacing after 
years of suppression under British rule.  This was most evident in the resource-rich 
east and west of the country, where growing disquiet was being stoked by local 
politicians.  Criticism was directed at an ineffectual Federal administration in Lagos 
that was dominated by northern politicians and who were accused of being products 
of the imperialist education system.  The huge market share of British companies like 
UAC was cited as evidence of subservience to the former power.  To placate critics, 
government introduced a raft of policies designed to increase local participation in 
the private sector.  In 1964, it announced that preferential contracts would only be 
offered to companies with 10 per cent of their shareholding in Nigerian hands.  As it 
turned out, UAC again anticipated the legislation.  In 1960, the UAC board had 
passed a resolution making available 10 per cent of shares in Nigerian Breweries 
Ltd.421  At that time, few companies were listed on the infant Lagos Stock Exchange, 
which had only started trading in 1961.422  The board surmised that an opportunity to 
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buy shares in a UAC-associate company would be popular and, so it proved.  The 
theme of equity transfers to nationals was one the Nigerian authorities would revisit 
more forcefully, however, in later years. 
 
 In 1968, government took another swipe at foreign business interests by 
unveiling a Companies Decree Act in 1968 which stated that: 
Every foreign company shall in respect of its operation in Nigeria be deemed to 
have been incorporated under this decree as a separate entity from the 
company incorporated outside Nigeria in whose name a place of business in 
Nigeria was established, and the company to have been incorporated in Nigeria 
shall have as part of its name (unless already therein) the word ‘Nigeria’.423 
 
Again it would appear that the management of UAC anticipated this type of 
legislation by previously registering parts of the business locally (and elsewhere in 
West Africa).  One can only speculate what the outcome might have been had there 
been a form of collective company action to oppose the legislation.  The Nigerian 
government was fragile, and it did not have sufficient capital reserves to buy out the 
British companies.  Would expropriation of foreign assets resulted, as it did in other 
former colonies?  Of course, the main reason why there was no large trade 
association or business representation in Nigeria was simply due to UAC's 
commanding trade presence, which was, perhaps ironically, also probably a reason 
why UAC was ineffective acting on its own.  The company structure in the Nigeria 
private sector was very different to that of Malaysia in this respect.  Most probably, 
the obvious lack of commercial resistance in Nigeria was also a reflection of UAC 
strategy to appease and cooperate with authorities in order to secure a long-term 
business future after independence.  It was an argument that was supported by 
former employees. 424   As the decade progressed, the fragility of the Nigerian 
government became increasingly evident and finally crumbled along tribal lines, with 
terrible consequences. 
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The Consequences of War for UAC 
The borders of Nigeria, like those of many former colonies, had been arbitrarily 
drawn by British bureaucrats in London at the end of the 19th century.  The borders 
enclosed the lands of the three major tribes in the region, as shown in Image 2.1 on 
page 66 above.  At independence, the historical tribal and religious divisions, 
subdued under British rule, were exposed.  In January 1966, the federal government 
was overthrown in a military coup by Igbo troops from the east.  During the takeover, 
the prime minister, a federal minister, two regional premiers and several top army 
officers, all members of the Northern Hausa tribe, were assassinated.  That coup 
was followed six months later by a pogrom of Igbo people living in the north and a 
further transfer of power.  On 30 May 1967, the eastern region, or Biafra, declared 
secession from the Nigerian Federation, and civil war ensued.  As the former 
imperial power, Britain was under intense pressure to intervene and finally came to 
the aid of the northern and western alliance.  The supply of British arms helped 
defeat the eastern army, and, after three years, hostilities ceased on 15 January 
1970.425 
 
 For UAC, large parts of the business were in the east of the country, and 
therefore, when the expatriate staff had been evacuated, trade there dried up.  It is a 
reflection of the company’s training that many local staff continued to turn up for work 
despite obvious dangers. Griffin himself, spoke highly of UAC staff in the eastern 
region of Nigeria and the loyalty they showed to the company: 
At the close of the Biafra War I moved down to the south to Biafra to discover 
that throughout the war period our local Nigerian managers had continued to 
operate on a limited business; kept full records of transactions, banked all 
receipts of cash and upheld the high standards expected by the company. 426   
 
At the height of the conflict, a number of shortages generated trading opportunities 
for foreign companies to profit.  Thomas, however, maintained that UAC never 
attempted to exploit the trade shortages that war had caused: 
There were periodic shortages particularly during the Civil War and there was a 
lot of profiteering.   Again UAC locally...tried to avoid this.  We were there and 
                                                 
425 There are several publications on the Nigerian Biafra War. However, for an accurate account, see Alfred 
Obiora Uzokwe, Surviving in Biafra: the Story of the Nigerian Civil War, (Lincoln: iUniverse, 2003), pp. 1-248. 
426 Interview with David Griffin, 6 December 2012. 
153 
we knew damn well we could make a short-term fortune but shortages will 
eventually end and compared with some other traders, we were there for the 
long run.427 
 
Regardless of Thomas’s statement, UAC certainly did record some very impressive 
profits during the Biafra War, as the figures in Table 5.4 below reveal. 
 
Table 5.4: UAC Annual Accounts 30 Sep 1967 – 30 Sep 1970428 
Year End Net Profit 
£m 
Dividend 
% 
Reserves 
£m 
Turnover 
£m 
30 Sep 1967 1.284 6.25 15 63 
30 Sep 1968 2.292 10 15 56 
30 Sep 1969 1.316 0 15 64 
30 Sep 1970 1.095 10 15 74.7 
 
The table shows that company profits in 1968 were much higher than the previous 
year.  Moreover, the dividend paid to Unilever also rose to 10 per cent, although 
dividends were cancelled the following year.  Shipments of merchandise arriving 
from Britain increased precipitously towards the end of the decade and accounted for 
half of group turnover.429  Clearly, UAC trade enjoyed a significant upswing during 
the war, a point confirmed by the figures in the table.  This, though, is also a 
testament to the resilience of UAC in the West African region as a whole, despite 
difficult trading conditions in Nigeria.  At the end of the war, a military government 
was installed which ruled for the next three decades, despite a brief return to 
democracy in 1979.  The introduction of military rule was accompanied by an 
upsurge in economic and political nationalism, and the UAC board steeled itself for 
the challenges that lay ahead in a much altered and more challenging political 
economy in Nigeria. 
 
 A Second National Development Plan to cover the years 1970-4 was hastily 
published by the new military regime.  That plan specifically addressed the parts of 
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the private sector that were still dominated by foreign companies.  For the UAC 
board, the tone and thrust of the decree was extremely worrying, as this excerpt from 
the Nigerian Enterprises Promotion Decree Act (NEPD I) reveals: 
It is vital…. for government to acquire and control on behalf of the Nigerian 
society the greater proportion of the productive assets of the country.  To this 
end, the government will seek to acquire, by law if necessary, equity 
participation in a number of strategic industries that will be specified from time 
to time. 430 
 
NEPD I was released in 1972 forcing the UAC board into a major review of 
commercial policy in Nigeria.  The decree directed that different types of business be 
placed into separate schedules and ceilings set on foreign share holdings.  All of the 
existing commercial activities of UAC in Nigeria fell under one or another of these 
headings: 
 
Schedule 1 - Small-scale enterprises, especially retailing, but excluding large 
   department stores and supermarkets 
Schedule 2 - Intermediate scale and technology enterprises, but excluding 
   large industries. 
Schedule 3 - Remaining types of enterprises including banking, insurance, 
   vehicle assembly and mining - all exempt from legislation.431 
 
The companies with business that fell under Schedule 1 were directed to sell all 
assets, including equity, to indigenous buyers or the state.  Those in Schedule 2 
were ordered to set aside 40 per cent of equity for local purchase immediately.  
Fortunately for UAC, most of its Nigerian business escaped Schedule 1 by virtue of 
group size.  The majority fell under Schedule 2 and, as a consequence, equity would 
have to be made available to local Nigerians which would impact on the overall 
ownership of the company.  No longer would the London board enjoy absolute 
control over business assets in Nigeria.  The deadline for compliance was set for 
March 1974.  This time, the board had not anticipated legislation, so there was no 
fall-back defensive option to mitigate the proposed and compulsory transfer of 
equity. 
 
                                                 
430 Nigerian National Archives, NEPD legislation 1971, (visit to Nigerian Embassy, London, 6 July 2013). 
431 Nigerian National Archives, NEPD legislation 1971, (visit to Nigerian Embassy, London, 6 July 2013). 
155 
 A swift decision in London headquarters was therefore necessary, and, in 
May 1972, four options were therefore put before the board.  Each would fulfil the 
demands of the NEP and yet still retain majority control of business assets held in 
Nigeria: 
 
Option 1 - Only offer shares in a select few Nigerian companies. 
Option 2 - A sale of shares in UAC (N) only and hive of Central Services 
   into a separate company registered outside Nigeria. 
Option 3 - Amalgamate all Nigerian companies into UAC (N) and offer  
   40 per cent of shares thereafter. 
Option 4 - Amalgamate all Nigerian business into two companies, GB  
   Ollivant (GBO) and UAC (N) and then make the required offer of 
   shares.432 
 
Crucially, the board took several months before finally coming down in favour of 
Option 4.  There being nothing to indicate otherwise in the archival material, it would 
appear that the board was just slow in making that decision.  However, despite 
claims to the contrary, there is nothing in the archival documents to suggest that 
UAC sought to evade the NEP legislation. 433   It would appear, the board was 
resigned to comply from the start and, on 25 August 1972, formal application was 
made to the Nigerian Enterprises Promotion Board to merge business assets in 
Nigeria into two companies, GBO and UAC (N).  What follows in this chapter applied 
to both companies, however the difficulties encountered by UAC (N) specifically, the 
larger of the two, revealed more about the complexity of the struggle with Nigerian 
authorities that ensued.  For that reason the remainder of the UAC story 
concentrates mainly on that company. 
 
UAC (N) and Nigerian Indigenisation 
UAC (N) was by far the larger of the two companies and, on 5 January 1973, share 
capital was increased from £N5m (£3.125m) to £N11.88m (£7.425m), reflecting the 
addition of a further 14 companies.434  Thereafter, formal notice was communicated 
to the LSE that UAC intended to offer 40 per cent of the equity in UAC (N) to local 
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Nigerians at an opening price of £N0.50 (£0.3125) per share.  That price 
incorporated a generous 10 per cent discount on existing valuations, with the share 
issue expected to generate the company around £N9.6m (£6m), all of which was 
earmarked for repatriation to London.  The Nigerian authorities deliberated over this 
offer for a year with the result that, on 22 March 1974, the Ministry of Finance 
formally objected arguing that the share price should be set independently by the 
Capital Issues Committee (CIC) of Nigeria.  After more delay, a six-month extension 
was granted to conclude the equity sale, but not before the CIC had recommended a 
lower price of £N0.40 (£0.25) per share.  That price was completely unacceptable to 
the UAC board which had reported in the company accounts of 30 September 1973 
that true value for each share had increased to £N0.57 (£0.35).  To compound 
matters, that new figure did not take account of an estimated £N0.29 (£0.18) per 
share after Nigerian property assets were added.435  Unfortunately for the board, 
however, a short time-scale, concerns about the public’s perception and the weight 
of Nigerian officialdom were against them.  In the end, UAC capitulated and 
accepted the lower share price proposed by the CIC. 
 
 When sanctioning the sale, Unilever’s Special Committee stated that it was 
‘better to have 60 per cent of £8m or £9m than 100 per cent of possibly nothing at 
all.’436  The UAC board did, however, forcibly make its displeasure known to the 
Nigerian government.  This though, was probably counterproductive and arguably 
unnecessary, as it had no bearing on the final outcome and doubtless played on the 
minds of officials responsible for subsequent legislation.  Despite concerns in 
London over whether all of the shares would be bought, the issue was in fact eight 
times over-subscribed.437  When the sale was completed, a next setback to company 
plans arrived when the CIC indicated that only half the capital could be repatriated to 
London (approximately £5 million); the rest had to be reinvested in Nigeria.  The 
board made a counter proposal that those funds be used to pay off an outstanding 
Nigerian state debt owed to UAC (International), London headquarters of the 
company.  Unsurprisingly, the Ministry of Finance jumped at the opportunity to write 
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down this debt.438  The remaining £2.5 million was loaned back to UAC (N) in the 
form of second debentures with an interest rate set at 8 per cent per annum and a 
final payment scheduled for on or before 1 January 1980.439 
 
 In the months that followed, some UAC senior management referred to the 
equity transfers as partial expropriation of company assets.440  However, in many 
ways, UAC got off lightly in Nigeria compared to British companies in other African 
nations, where assets were seized with no compensation.  This, though, did not stop 
the UAC board from lobbying British authorities and requesting that the Foreign 
Office lodge an appeal with the Nigerian Federal Commissioner of Finance.  
However, the British High Commissioner to Nigeria intervened to advise that any 
appeal would fail and merely heighten the hostility held towards British interests in 
the country. 441   Again here, politics took precedence over the commercial and 
financial concerns of UAC.  In any event, the issue of equity was not as damaging as 
expected as an oversubscribed and low share price offer appeared to indicate that 
distribution among Nigerians was extremely wide.  London faced no board challenge 
nor, in fact, did the newly formed local UAC (N) board which, in 1974, still numbered 
five British expatriate directors out of a total eight, including a British chairman.  
Moreover, having Nigerians on the share register provided a form of defence against 
further government action.  The historian Thomas Biersteker concluded that events 
demonstrated that ‘the multinational proved more than a match for Nigerian 
nationalist intentions.’442  Although the outcome was not as clear-cut as Biersteker 
implied, the new and streamlined Nigerian business set-up had much to offer.  
Profits rose as trade in Nigeria improved and UAC (I) reaped higher returns from a 
60 per cent holding in an operationally efficient UAC (N) and GBO compared to the 
previous 100 per cent holding in a number of constituent firms.  It is therefore 
important to contextualise the loss of absolute board control over assets in Nigeria 
against the annual returns for the 1970s, shown in Table 5.5. 
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Table 5.5: UAC (I) Annual Accounts 30 Sep 1971 – 30 Sep 1978443 
Year End Net Profit 
£m 
Dividend 
% 
Reserves 
£m 
Turnover 
£m 
30 Sep 1971 2.059 10 15 74.7 
30 Sep 1972 2.161 12.5 14 70 
30 Sep 1973 2.557 12.5 14 76.2 
30 Sep 1974 5.432 20 16 79 
30 Sep 1975 9.314 25 23 143 
30 Sep 1976 16.735 30 9.5 190.5 
30 Sep 1977 19.454 10 19 314 
30 Sep 1978 24.411 17.5 26 330.5 
 
The table shows that in 1978, UAC (I) turnover had quadrupled since the start of the 
decade, and net profit was twelve times that of 1971.  Much of that profit was 
generated by merchandise exports to Nigeria which, in 1978, were valued at £174 
million.  A shareholder in UAC (N) or indeed GBO would have reaped handsome 
dividends from an investment in the company.  Revenues were further boosted by 
what UAC loosely termed ‘service charges’ levied on the associate companies.  
Thomas revealed evidence of these hidden charges at interview:  ‘London had long 
levied a Service Fee, of 2% on turnover (in addition to a buying commission)’.444  
Moreover, UAC profits were again propping up Unilever, this time during the 1973 
global oil crisis.  Jones went so far as to claim that Unilever depended on UAC 
profits so much during the 1970s that the health of the Nigerian economy was as 
important to the parent company as it was to the subsidiary.445  Perhaps at this 
juncture, the London board may, quite understandably, have started to think that a 
corner had been turned in Nigeria.  Those sentiments did not last long, though: in 
1976, news reached London that the Nigerian government was proposing a further 
round of compulsory equity sales for all foreign companies.446 
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 In January 1977, NEPD II was released, the second offensive on foreign 
business assets in just five years.  The new legislation proposed raising the Nigerian 
share of equity for companies in Schedule 2 to 60 per cent.  Moreover, no individual 
would be allowed to buy more than 5 per cent of shares on offer in any single 
company.  The latter clause was included after it emerged that, contrary to views 
within UAC that the share register was now widely dispersed, some well-placed 
Nigerians had subsequently managed to secure huge holdings in the first share 
issue.  In fact, Biersteker estimated that just 20 Nigerian nationals or family groups 
had somehow managed in the aftermath of the share issue to secure the majority of 
shares offered.447  The 5 per cent clause was therefore included to prevent any 
reoccurrence.  A further 24 types of trade were added to Schedule 1, which moved 
UAC assets such as shipping, retail, wholesale trade and manufacturing divisions 
into the first schedule and subject to sale.  The release of NEPD II must have caused 
dismay in London as directors faced the prospect of losing majority control of the two 
Nigerian companies.  The board immediately lobbied the Nigerian government which 
had some success as an exemption clause was inserted in the legislation stating that 
an enterprise or holding company that fell under Schedule 1 but with an annual 
turnover over N25m (£22.8m) and, operating in ten or more states, should remain in 
Schedule 2.448  This concession was so obviously pitched at UAC that it became 
widely known as ‘the UAC article’. 
 
 The next major issue the London board faced was achieving an acceptable 
share price, especially after it was known that the CIC would be involved once more.  
Of course, a complicating factor for UAC was that revenue and profits were up on 
previous years.  Therefore, the fears harboured by the board were quickly realised 
when, on 18 March 1977, the CIC proposed that the offer of 15.8 million in UAC (N) 
equity be priced at N1.25 (£1.14) a share.  In-house UAC calculations found that that 
the CIC price was around half of true value.  The matter was again referred up to 
Unilever’s Special Committee and after some deliberation the response was that ‘the 
price of N1.25 per share [was] outrageous but agreed that it had to be accepted, 
while expressing all proper unhappiness.’  The committee further advised that ‘once 
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Unilever was a minority holder [in UAC (N) and GBO], relations with the 
management [in Nigeria] would have to be changed considerably’.449  This time 
round, the share offer was one and a half times oversubscribed.  In the aftermath, a 
Nigerian national was installed as the first indigenous chairman of UAC (N) to head a 
board of twelve directors that contained a further six Nigerians.  Just as Unilever’s 
Special Committee had predicted, relations between London and Lagos soured 
thereafter.  On one occasion, the London chairman drafted a letter on pension 
liabilities and the adverse financial strain that rising contributions were having on 
private employers.  He instructed the UAC (N) chairman, Abebe, to pass it personally 
to the Nigerian government.  Abebe refused, informing London that ‘he did not think 
that the government would regard this written communication in a friendly way’. 450  
Abebe’s judgement of the situation may well have been sound, but London was 
unhappy with this in-house rebuttal, and, although a minor act of defiance, it 
heralded a reset in relations between London and Lagos.  The episode further 
highlighted that absolute control of business in Nigeria no longer lay with UAC (I) in 
London. 
 
Clearly the Nigerian NEPD II legislation was a blunt, though, effective 
legislative tool to secure a stake in the local assets of resident foreign companies 
and thereby rebalance private sector wealth in favour of the nation.  The government 
therefore claimed that both share issues were necessary steps for achieving 
economic independence from Britain and a way to claim back what was held to be 
Nigerian assets.  The question is: who gained most from the legislation?  Back in 
June 1971, the advertised objectives of the legislation were thus: 
 To create opportunities for Nigerian indigenous businessman. 
 To maximise local retention of profits. 
 To raise the level of intermediate capital and goods production.451 
The answer to the question posed above lies in the first objective, as a large number 
of leading politicians were wealthy businessmen in their own right. 452   It was 
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therefore that group of individuals who had much to gain by removing foreign 
participation in particular business sectors.  Those areas, thereafter, became 
exclusively Nigerian, regardless of the wider cost to the economy.  One can argue 
here that it was therefore these businessmen and associated politicians who should 
shoulder the blame for the subsequent difficulties all business faced in Nigeria.  With 
regard to UAC’s handling of the NEPD II programme: it was evident from an early 
stage that the London directors did not manage the public relations side at all well, 
and, despite eventual compliance with legislation, the company emerged with a 
somewhat tarnished image.  It is, of course, difficult to think what London could have 
done differently, and these events demonstrated just how difficult it was (and can be 
today) to manage commercial operations overseas.  This does not, however, 
absolve the UAC board for the slow response to NEPD I given that the company 
received a copy of the bill well in advance of publication.  If the company’s offer had 
been made sooner, it is entirely plausible that many of the sticking points, including 
those surrounding the share price, could have been avoided.   A further point worth 
making is that the second share issue in UAC (N) and GBO was by means of diluting 
existing share capital.  The provision of a further 20 per cent of shares was certainly 
not achieved through additional investment in Nigeria.  It is a damning indictment of 
the custodians of the Nigerian economy that no foreign enterprise, outside of those 
in the oil industry, was willing to invest in the nation’s private sector.  It is a position 
that has changed little over the years and remains a major challenge to the Nigerian 
government today. 
 
 There is little doubt that UAC, by virtue of size and imperialist legacy, was 
firmly in the sights of those who desired a bigger share of business in Nigeria.  The 
company appeared regularly in the Nigerian press, often in an unfavourable light and 
was frequently accused of reaping vast profits from the nation and exporting them to 
London.453  Of course, the motives for those newspaper articles were questionable.  
The point here is that regardless of any positive contribution that UAC made in 
Nigeria, the imperialist past tended to overshadow everything.  As the historian 
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Ferguson once sweepingly wrote: ‘the difficulty with the achievements of empire is 
that they are much more likely to be taken for granted than the sins of empire’.454  In 
this regard, UAC funded advances in education, professional training, employment 
and trade were largely forgotten in the bid to remove the last remnants of British rule. 
 
 At the release of the NEPD legislation, large scale business redeployment out 
of Nigeria should have been high priority in London, however trade was generating 
the record profits, shown in Table 3.4 above.  A large percentage of those profits, 
though, was due to business rationalisation and efficiency savings arising from the 
legislation (not forgetting proceeds from equity sales).  There was an optimum time, 
financially speaking, to embark on a programme of business redeployment out of 
Nigeria, and yet it appears that management delayed.  London was, by now, well 
aware of the dangers posed to future trade, and therefore one must surmise that the 
board did not or could not act decisively.  Perhaps UAC was simply too big and 
unwieldy to change business course that easily.  The slow pace of change at head 
office alongside ever greater dependency on Nigeria for revenue eventually sealed 
the fate of UAC, however.  In spite of (or because of) that Nigerian equity stake, 
trade and revenue slowly deteriorated in tandem with the nation’s economy, and it is 
here that the story must now turn to when and how ‘Nigeria went bad’.455 
 
Business Diversification and Redeployment Failure  
When Nigeria began to move from an open to closed economy, it dealt a real blow to 
all sectors, other than oil, as revealed in the FDI figures in Table 5.6. 
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Table 5.6: Foreign Direct Investment to Nigeria 1967-75 (Naira million)456 
Year Nonoil Sector Oil Sector 
1967 91 NA 
1968 142.8 NA 
1969 120 NA 
1970 144.6 NA 
1971 148.8 14 
1972 132 195.8 
1973 128 115.5 
1974 95.5 186.2 
 
What the table shows is that it was not the civil war, but instead the release of NEPD 
I in 1971 that derailed the flow of foreign investment into the ‘non-oil sector’.  By 
1974 the level of FDI going into other sectors was back down to the same as 1967.  
As William Lever had astutely remarked many years before ‘[economic development] 
can only be done with capital, but capital will not flow without security. There is no 
rabbit so timid as your capitalist’.457  The Nigerian economy turned in on itself, cut 
back on imports and relied on oil for revenue.  In 1969, oil exports accounted for just 
3 per cent of GDP while agriculture contributed over 50 per cent.458  Once Nigeria 
joined OPEC in 1971, oil took centre stage such that recent figures reveal the 
economy is tethered to that industry which provides over 90 per cent of export 
earnings.459  This reliance on one sector has been compounded by capital flight from 
the country and an accompanying brain drain.  The Nigerian historian Iyoha 
estimated that in 1977 around $2.5 billion disappeared out of the economy followed 
by $2.7 billion and $2.1 billion in the years 1980 and 1981 respectively.460  Those 
                                                 
456 Central Bank of Nigeria, Economic and Financial Review, various years, and Annual Report and Statement of 
Accounts: 1967-74. Papers viewed in Nigerian Embassy, London, 6 July 2013. 
457 Quote by Lord Leverhulme in Meredith, ‘Decline of the Nigerian oil-palm industry’, p. 318. 
458 Gary Moser, Scott Rogers and Reinold van Til, Nigeria: Experience with Structural Adjustment, (Washington: 
IMF, 1997), p. 3. 
459 United Nations, Trade Statistics, see <http://unstats.un.org/unsd/trade/imts/annual%20totals.htm> 
(accessed, 25 August 2015). These statistics are for 2015. 
460 Iyoha, ‘Economic Growth in African Countries’, p. 168. 
164 
factors taken together have dealt a heavy blow to other areas of the economy, 
including agriculture.  Thomas offered his view at interview: 
I think the Economist had an article a year or so back [2013?] which was 
surveying various countries.  It came to the conclusion that particularly for 
underdeveloped countries, finding oil was a disaster and I think that was right 
because oil is too easy as a milch cow.  It leads to corruption and I think that’s 
a very good point because it’s central to the whole of the discussion.461 
 
For Nigeria, a nation blessed with natural resources, the discovery of oil in the 
southern delta has completely unbalanced the economy. 
 
 A further disincentive to investing in agriculture has been that those oil 
reserves are located in the main oil palm and cocoa growing regions in the south and 
east of the country.  The development of an oil industry there has inflated local 
labour costs and food prices which has starved agriculture of investment.  The 
penalties have fallen disproportionally on a disenfranchised and rural populace who, 
with few employment opportunities outside of the oil industry, have joined the 
teeming millions that crowd Nigerian cities today.  Rampant inequality among the 
people and between economic sectors has seen the economy lurch into classic 
‘Dutch Disease’ territory.462  The recent tumbling of global oil prices in 2015 merely 
accentuated the economic difficulties the nation faces.463 
 
 To add insult to injury, in the aftermath of the NEPD II legislation it emerged 
that despite the 5% ceiling on individual equity holdings, yet again, a privileged few 
Nigerians had amassed vast numbers of shares.  In 1977, the Nigerian Business 
Times reported that ‘Nigerians bought their shares and sat back to wait for the 
expatriate managers to make the profit for them’.464  In effect, the Nigerian nationalist 
programme, guided by a dominant and aggressive political and economic agenda, 
has benefited just two groups of people: the local businessmen and the politicians.  
Of course, many politicians are also local businessmen.  The losers were foreign 
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companies, but also those the NEPD programme was meant to benefit, the Nigerian 
people. 
 
 For UAC, the Annual General Meetings for associate companies in Nigeria 
became awkward events, particularly if dividends did not reach the expectations of 
local shareholders.  Griffin recalled one particular AGM for Guinness (Nigeria), then 
in partnership with UAC: 
It was the company’s practice to give each registered shareholder a carton 
containing 24 bottles of Guinness.  It was an expensive exercise so this year it 
was decided to give everyone a calendar instead.  The shareholders revolted 
and made a huge bonfire of the calendars outside the venue and then invaded 
the AGM.  We never gave calendars again.465 
 
Incidences like this became more commonplace and underscored some of the 
ramifications that British companies now faced after going down the local registration 
path and making shares available to Nigerians.  It was a stark contrast to conditions 
on the ground for those overseas firms elsewhere that had managed to stay under 
London control and wedded to the LSE.  Towards the end of the 1970s, the Nigerian 
economy went into tailspin and recalling a much-repeated phrase in interviews 
conducted for the research for this thesis: ‘Nigeria went bad!’466 
 
 In 1978, the Nigerian economy slipped deep into recession as the government 
struggled with a balance of payments crisis.  Meanwhile, for UAC, the repatriation of 
dividends from Nigeria became a drawn out and bureaucratic affair.  Griffin 
commented on the difficulties the UAC board encountered in that respect: 
It was one of the big difficulties we had with dividends, you declare a dividend 
payable on such a date and the Nigerians were paid on that date.  The 
expatriate [dividend] goes to the bank and exchange control, and we say, we 
want to transfer our dividends, two years later we get permission to transfer.467 
 
 Again the point on the consequences of local registration comes to mind here 
and raises the question once more: was Pedler far too hasty in his charge to locally 
register assets?  The drive to give UAC more of an African appearance in the 1950s, 
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in the end, did not really have the desired effect, and it was now one that had come 
back to haunt the company.  Moreover, the delay encountered in repatriating funds 
from Nigeria lengthened as additional restrictions were put in place including the 
amount of capital that could be remitted.  Furthermore, the Central Bank of Nigeria, 
the authority responsible for dividend transfers, was not held in high regard by British 
business and rumours of ‘skulduggery’ frequently circulated.468  Thomas had this to 
say on the repatriation of finances from Nigeria: 
It [the local share issue episode] was a double whammy. You lost part of the 
profitability due to the derisory price at which we were allowed to sell the 
shares.  Secondly you were left queuing for dividends which by the time you 
were allowed to remit them, let alone [lost] interest, were in a depreciated 
currency, [and had therefore lost significant value].469 
Of course when funds did eventually get to London, Unilever could not countenance 
any form of reinvestment in the Nigerian economy thereafter, a point confirmed by 
Griffin: 
Once we got permission to remit the dividends to the UK or wherever, we were 
forced [by Unilever] not to then reinvest it back into Africa.  A lot of it went to 
Brazil and Malaysia which were much more tolerant economic areas.470 
 
This position indicated how far Unilever’s opinion of the Nigerian trade had fallen in 
such a short timescale.  It also revealed that Malaysia was obviously thought to be a 
much safer host for British business and investment.  There was, however, very little 
the directors of either Unilever or UAC could do to influence financial matters in 
distant Nigeria and that accentuated the need for the redeployment of business. 
 
 On the trading side, increased responsibility and autonomy for UAC (N) saw 
the Nigerian majority board shop around rather than buy directly from UAC (I) in 
London.  The long-established Unilever ethos of affording subsidiaries a large 
degree of autonomy can be faulted here.  The board should have put in place 
contracts to ensure that UAC (N) and GBO continued to conduct trade through 
London.  In 1978, the Nigerian economy tumbled further, and with roughly 60 per 
cent of UAC (I) turnover still coming from business operations in that nation, 
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revenues went into steep decline.471  That said, on the surface, company returns for 
the next few years looked spectacular as Table 5.7 shows: 
 
Table 5.7: UAC (I) Annual Accounts 30 Sep 1979 – 30 Sep 1984472 
Year Ending Net Profit 
£m 
Unilever Dividend 
£m 
Reserves 
£m 
30 Sep 1979 5.679 17.5 6.6 
30 Sep 1980 36.588 25 18 
30 Sep 1981 61.984 25 61 
30 Sep 1982 41.52 25 77.5 
30 Sep 1983 20.87 25 73.4 
 
Although not immediately obvious from the figures, however, underlying business 
and profits in Nigerian trade were dropping off alarmingly.  The weaknesses in the 
Nigerian economy saw UAC (I) profits plummet for the trading year 1978/79 to 
around a quarter of the previous year.  They rebounded somewhat in the next year 
as accumulated dividends from Nigerian shareholdings and other withheld payments 
temporarily flowed to London, no doubt as a result of the return to democratically 
elected government in Nigeria.  Profits rose dramatically in the next year, however 
this was down to two separate, though connected, factors.  First, the enforced sale of 
business assets in Nigeria substantially boosted profits and reserves in the short 
term, and, second, the dividends withheld since 1979 were finally released.  That 
allowed the London board to make a substantial 25 per cent dividend payment to 
Unilever for each of the next four years.  One wonders, though, if the accountants in 
the parent company had stepped in to ensure that any surplus capital held by UAC 
(I) did not find its way back to Nigeria.  Perhaps the parent company was starting to 
pull the financial rug away from beneath the subsidiary.  The figures in the table 
above therefore provide an artificially healthy snapshot of a business that was in 
steep decline, and, in 1983, profits dropped off again quite alarmingly after the return 
of military rule to Nigeria. 
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 A crucial point to return to here is that the various European offices of UAC 
housed large numbers of employees, many of whom were at management grade.  
As late as 1982 the company was still employing a staff of 1,200 in British offices 
alone.473  With dwindling revenues coming out of Nigeria, the whole European setup 
was becoming unsustainable.  What is more, concerns voiced in Unilever regarding 
the future viability of the UAC business model were growing louder, a point 
acknowledged at a Directors’ Conference in late 1980 when the UAC (I) chairman 
conceded that: 
The fact that we no longer had management control here [in Nigeria] but could 
only operate in an advisory capacity was beginning to be a considerable 
problem in that it was very difficult to get expenses under control.474 
 
To put thing rather simply, after NEPD II, UAC (I) had become just a major 
shareholder in two Nigerian registered companies, UAC (N) and GBO.  It was a 
fragile foundation on which to base such a large business organisation, and when 
revenues fell again in 1983, the writing was on the wall. 
 
UAC Diversification and Redeployment Effort: A Brief History 
During this challenging era, Thomas was working in the corporate planning 
department of UAC (I) in London and was involved in the search for alternative 
business outside of Africa.  However, as he later explained in interview, the world 
was a much changed place compared to the heady days of operating within the 
British Empire: 
I did some superficial studies on other trading companies when it came to 
deciding what we could do outside Africa.  I came to the conclusion that the 
other trading companies were being subjected to the same pressures that had 
forced UAC into diminishing opportunities etc.  The days of the old fashioned 
trading companies had gone. 
 
Again, the statement underscores the point made earlier that the actions of previous 
UAC directors had contrived to place all of the company’s apples in one basket.  The 
board did not seek to diversify early enough at a time when trade was flourishing 
under British rule; nor did it consider the redeployment of assets outside of Nigeria to 
spread business risk until much too late.  This again harks back to the early decision 
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to exit the commodity trade and surrender custodianship of Unilever’s estate 
holdings in West Africa.  The actions of the company board at that time effectively 
closed down a potential future trading option.  By the late 1970s, it was clear to those 
in London that only comprehensive redeployment of business out of Nigeria could 
save UAC (I).  However, to achieve that would require a substantial capital outlay, 
primarily to purchase suitably sized and established companies.  A pressing question 
was whether Unilever’s Special Committee would now sanction such a move, 
especially given the parent company’s avowed cautious approach to all new 
business.  The conundrum for London was: what could fill the void that an exit from 
Nigeria would leave behind?  Another supplementary, though relevant, question we 
can pose here is: given that the company had been attempting to diversify and 
redeploy for many years, what went wrong?  With these questions at the forefront of 
the analysis, the chapter now turns to UAC ‘out of Nigeria’ and the effort of 
management to find alternative business to ‘the Coast’ trade. 
 
UAC Out of ‘the Coast’ Trade 
Back in 1964, Unilever had commissioned an internal report on overseas business 
which was obviously aimed at UAC trade in West Africa.  One of the findings of the 
paper was that the subsidiary was excessively reliant on Nigerian markets for 
revenue and recommended that management actively pursue alternative commercial 
opportunities elsewhere.475  One precondition was that any new business should be 
transferable and replicable in other parts of the world.  The timing of this report tends 
to indicate that Unilever was now, contrary to its advertised ethos on managing 
subsidiaries, prepared to make a special case of UAC.  No doubt one of the more 
pressing reasons for this was the subsidiary’s frequent and significant financial worth 
to the parent company.  UAC’s first effort to diversify had actually predated the 
report, and, although a minor venture, it reflected much of what took place over the 
next decade. Therefore, in July 1963, UAC took over a small wood veneer firm, Irish 
National Veneer Industries Ltd, located in Donegal, Eire.  This line of business was 
thought, at the time, to offer downstream opportunities that would complement the 
UAC (Timber) Ltd logging concessions held in West Africa.  However, from the start 
the UAC board adopted a ‘hands off’ approach to the business and installed a single 
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manager to oversee operations.  This managerial style, of course, echoed that much 
cited Unilever/UAC relationship and ignored warnings in internal reports regarding 
sufficient oversight.  In any case, the Donegal venture made very little progress in 
the 1960s, not least owing to minimal input from above, and, with losses mounting, 
the company was finally put up for sale in 1971.  Unfortunately, no buyer could be 
found, and therefore the UAC board was forced to write off an original investment of 
£80,000 in share capital and a further £50,000 investment.476  It was hardly a huge 
sum of money to a company as big as UAC, however the Irish venture was an early 
indication of shortfalls in managerial oversight.  It also revealed that the UAC 
leadership was not yet sold on the need to find alternative business outside of West 
Africa. 
 
The next venture of note was launched in July 1964 with a purchase of 42 per 
cent of the equity in Texoprint, a holding company that had been formed to merge 
three established Dutch textile firms.477  The business involved the manufacture of 
wax prints, an adjunct to existing UAC trade in West African textiles.478  The UAC 
board was therefore persuaded to buy a majority stake believing the trade was 
transferable and also had the potential for global expansion.  However, yet again, 
just like the Donegal venture before it, the company did not put in place rigorous 
management oversight or take up board representation, despite being the biggest 
shareholder in Texoprint.  UAC instead restricted participation to the distribution and 
sales side of the business.  As a consequence, pre-existing management structures 
were never streamlined.  Furthermore, one UAC paper appeared to blame the ruling 
coalition government (which included the Labour Party) for sensitivity to foreign 
ownership in national companies at that time.479  However, in truth, it is more likely 
the case that distant and limited management of Texoprint was inadequate to 
develop the business and, as a result, the early promise of expansion never 
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materialised.  The company struggled on with very little investment until 1967 when 
UAC’s involvement in Texoprint was ended by Unilever.  In the aftermath, the shares 
in Texoprint were sold by the parent company in 1971. 
 
 Another failed and, in this instance, nonsensical venture predated each of the 
above in early 1963 when UAC was handed the Unibeam business by the Special 
Committee.480  It is not immediately apparent why UAC was believed suitable to 
manage this venture, however one could hazard a guess that Unilever was 
attempting to guide the subsidiary into safer waters by diversifying the business.  
The Unibeam project was to develop and bring to market office copying machines 
using a recently purchased patent, Imagic.  The alarm bells should have been 
ringing early on in UAC House as this prized patent had already been turned down 
by the acknowledged experts in the field IBM and Rank Xerox.  The question is why 
did Unilever, with no experience in office supplies, believe the project worthy of 
pursuing in the first place and put pressure on UAC to invest?  Company 
correspondence with the patent holder, Abram Games, indicated that management 
in the parent company’s Organisation Division was sold on the idea that a copying 
machine built in-house could save the company money.  Thereafter the machines 
would be released and sold on the market.481 
 
 However, it quickly came to light that the valuable patent was, in fact, some 
way off being a finished product and would require substantial investment up front 
merely to develop a prototype.  Despite this, and at the behest of Unilever, the UAC 
board allocated the funds.  That alone was out of character for a Unilever leadership 
that prided itself in a measured approach to business.  In this case, though, Unibeam 
was an error in judgement on the part of the parent company.  Almost inevitably the 
machine was found to be deficient and, when the patent was put up for sale, no 
buyer could be found.  UAC was forced to write down the loss, estimated to be in the 
region of £500,000.  In fairness to the UAC board, the blame for this debacle lay 
firmly at the door of Unilever.482  The UAC core business, after all, was in marketing 
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and trade overseas.  The company simply did not possess the technological 
capability or manpower to develop what was essentially a forerunner to today’s office 
photocopiers.  The Unibeam venture again exposed a lack of managerial harmony 
between parent company and subsidiary and was another in the long and growing 
list of glaring and inexplicable blunders in the overall UAC business diversification 
effort. 
 
 One further and notable early business redeployment failure came in the form 
of a brewing venture in Burgos, Northern Spain, in partnership with Heineken.  In this 
business, UAC did have the requisite experience gained through agency tie-ups with 
Heineken and Guinness in West Africa.  Therefore, a persuasive case that those 
skills were transferable to the European market existed, and, based on that, the 
company of Compania Hispano Holandesa de Cervezas was launched in 1964 with 
a start-up capital of £500,000.  From the outset, though, the new company 
encountered fierce local competition, which was compounded by a number of 
technical hitches in the day-to-day running of the plant.  These included deficient 
water supplies, low availability of local labour and existing exclusive contracts held 
by regional wholesalers with other breweries.  By July 1968, after further injections of 
capital, the brewery was still running at a loss, largely because the plant was only 
operating at 30 per cent capacity.  Finally, in early 1971, Unilever’s Special 
Committee intervened and put the plant up for sale rather than invest further in a 
business perceived to be failing.  Later that same year, the brewery’s fixtures and 
fittings were bought up relatively cheaply by San Miguel for around £1.8 million.  The 
new owners injected more capital and eventually turned the business around.483 
 
The Spanish brewery debacle delivered a serious blow to the UAC board’s 
credibility and provided clear evidence that, despite the availability of capital, it was 
going to be extremely difficult to break into mature European markets.  In addition, it 
appeared that UAC’s early redeployment effort was undertaken in a somewhat half-
hearted manner and always suffered from insufficient managerial oversight.  For that 
reason alone, it is no surprise that these early ventures failed.  Other diversification 
efforts of note included an electrical goods business and a proposed expansion of 
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Kingsway supermarkets into Britain.  Both foundered and eventually came to nothing 
despite significant investment.  In reality, the focus of UAC management was always 
Nigeria and West Africa, where, of course, the company had an enviable dominant 
presence.  The European markets posed very different challenges and presented 
something the company rarely encountered now in Nigeria, competition.  UAC did 
not have the conviction at managerial level, the manpower or indeed the technical 
expertise to make a decisive entry into a new business that demanded different skill-
sets to those employed in Nigeria.  Nor, it seems, could the company simply buy a 
seat at the table, as the failed Dutch Texoprint venture and others proved.  Despite 
these obvious failures, though, there were some rare successes. 
 
 The UAC board had, by the late 1960s, learned hard lessons from previous 
ventures when attention was drawn to a potential Caterpillar franchise in Britain to 
complement those already held on the African continent.  One of two agencies that 
handled sales for Caterpillar in England was Levertons of Spalding, a privately 
owned company that was keen to list on the LSE.  The sticking point was that 
Caterpillar would not allow a publicly listed firm to hold a franchise as it would place 
the board answerable to another’s shareholders.  The subsidiary status of UAC 
appeared to soothe those concerns, although technically Caterpillar could then have 
been answerable to Unilever shareholders.  Perhaps this was a less risky option, 
and therefore, in 1970, the Special Committee approved the purchase of Levertons 
at what was believed to be the inflated price of £8 million.484   In 1973, the company 
was renamed Westlode Engineering Ltd and, with that, UAC had at last secured a 
major business outside of West Africa.  Thomas talked about the subsequent 
success of Caterpillar sales in England, however he also explained why further 
expansion in the trade was not possible: 
We would have liked to pick up Caterpillar dealerships elsewhere but 
Caterpillar did not want any of their dealers to become too big and turned down 
other requests [by UAC].485 
 
                                                 
484 UAC 2/17/G, Levertons of Spalding and Westlode Engineering: various papers relating to H Leverton and Co. 
and accompanying Caterpillar sales documentation, 1963-88. 
485 Further points raised in a letter by Tony Thomas when reviewing draft thesis, 10 July 2015. 
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The success of the Caterpillar franchise in the UK clearly persuaded the UAC board 
that if comprehensive redeployment out of Africa was going to be possible, then it 
must think big, particularly in the European markets.  Therefore, soon after the 
company’s success with Caterpillar, the board took, what turned out to be, a fateful 
gamble to buy a much larger business in Britain.  It was around this time that 
Unilever’s Buildings Materials Division (Unacil) was scouring Britain for an 
established business of sufficient size to supply building materials to West Africa.  
This offered a chance for UAC to become involved in a new business line that had 
the potential both to expand trade in Nigeria and to open up further redeployment 
opportunities elsewhere. 
 
In early 1974, approval came down from the parent company for UAC to 
make an offer for Kennedys, a publicly listed building merchant with an annual 
turnover of £6 million.   This well-established company had a workforce of around 
one thousand spread across several builders’ yards and gardening centres in 
England and Wales; therefore, the company did not come cheap.  An offer of over 
£11 million was finally accepted for the entire share capital of Kennedys, one of the 
most expensive acquisitions by any part of the Unilever group at that time.  It was 
therefore inexcusable, given what had gone before, that the existing Kennedys 
management structure was never fully assimilated into that of UAC.  Instead the 
business remained under the stewardship of family member and executive chairman, 
J G Kennedy.  To compound matters, the timing of the acquisition could not have 
come at a worse time as the UK economy weakened and house building stalled.  At 
the same time, a downturn in the Nigerian economy heralded stricter criteria and 
cutbacks on imports.  As a direct result, the expected trade in building supplies for 
both West Africa and Britain never got anywhere near initial forecasts.  In 1975, the 
UAC board was informed that Kennedys was losing around £50,000 a month.  
Although the building trade did rebound somewhat in the next few years, the onset of 
a deep recession in 1979 Britain hit the company hard, and the UAC board was 
forced to ask the Special Committee to sanction the sale of the business.  Finally, in 
1985, Kennedys was sold to Travis and Arnold. 486   For a number of reasons, 
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Kennedys proved a serious miscalculation on the part of the UAC board and cost the 
company very dearly.  Of course, many of the factors that led to the business failing 
were outside the board’s powers, however the stubborn adherence to that principle 
of managerial autonomy in subsidiaries was an inexcusable mistake given what had 
gone before.  As the biggest single business purchase by the subsidiary, the 
Kennedys venture was a disaster and perhaps, more than anything that had 
happened before it, bringing forcefully to London’s attention that UAC was not 
equipped or, it seemed, prepared to survive outside of Nigeria and West Africa. 
 
 In the early 1970s, an internal review by the Corporate Planning Department 
at Unilever found that less than 10 per cent of UAC capital was employed in the UK, 
the rest of Europe and the United States combined.  A follow-up review conducted in 
1981 revealed that position had changed very little.  Company accounts exposed 
that, out of total consolidated revenue of £53m, business conducted in UK and 
France generated just £4m.487  Clearly the effort to redeploy business away from 
Nigeria had failed.  The 1981 report went on to state categorically that new business 
could only now succeed if the company was already in possession of the requisite 
and transferable skills.  This obviously differed from the earlier 1964 Unilever paper 
that had openly encouraged the UAC board to explore business opportunities 
outside of core competences.488  One can conclude therefore that the unsuccessful 
ventures mentioned above had gradually altered the views of Unilever management.  
Although the UAC board had a free rein to prosecute trade in West Africa, the same 
was not true in Europe, the business domain of Unilever.  It was in Europe, though, 
that UAC needed to make progress and find new business that would ultimately 
replace the existing setup in Nigeria.  However, again there appeared to be little in 
the way of synergy between parent company and subsidiary at management level 
with the result that UAC’s inexperience and, at times, ineptitude in the European 
market was exposed time and again.  When questioned about all of the business 
acquisitions made by UAC under the diversification and redeployment banner, 
                                                 
487 UAC 1/1/2/2/2/4, Unilever Corporate Planning Department paper, ‘UAC Capital and Trading Status’, 23 
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Thomas thought just three European ventures were successful; Levertons 
(Caterpillar franchise), Ford & Slater (Commercial Vehicles) and Cabus & Raulot 
(Electrical Supplies in France).  It was not a great strike record, particularly for a 
company with so many resources, financial and material, at its disposal. 
 
 There were a few other speculative business forays by UAC which varied in 
size and scope, however by the early 1980s it was obvious to all that a 
comprehensive move away from West Africa and, most certainly Nigeria, was not 
going to happen without considerable financial pain.  The underlying issue for 
management was that in a healthy and performing Nigerian economy, UAC trade 
flourished and the immediate need for business redeployment receded.  However, 
when the Nigerian economy suffered, the fiscal health of the company came under 
intense pressure.  Despite frequent, if  temporary, downturns in ‘the Coast’ trade, 
however, it would seem that UAC directors were always convinced that good times 
were just around the corner.  But it was not to be the case this time around when in 
1981 the Nigerian economy suffered a major blow and contracted by almost 16 per 
cent.  Government was forced to peg the Naira to the US Dollar, which caused a de 
facto devaluation of the currency.489  Moreover, an ongoing balance of payments 
crisis was further exposed by a global oil glut that reduced export revenue 
alarmingly. 490   The resulting economic crisis in Nigeria generated serious 
ramifications for all UAC commercial interests. 
 
 It was admittedly difficult for a firm of the sheer size of UAC and with a trading 
setup so geographically fixed on the Nigerian market to contemplate large-scale 
business diversification or redeployment of assets at any one time.  Moreover, at the 
start of the 1980s, the depressed economic climate that hung over the UK and 
Europe was not conducive to pursuing that strategy.  Again, this supports the 
contention made frequently in this thesis that such endeavours should have been 
started much earlier.  In many ways, the existing and vast UAC setup on ‘the Coast’ 
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was not transferrable to other parts of the world, especially at the end of British rule, 
and most certainly it did not fit well with the European market.  Thomas again offered 
his thoughts on this subject: 
Outside Africa, we did not have the local know-how and experience to be able 
to compete successfully.  Crucially, we could never become the kind of 
international marketer of branded products that would fit Unilever’s overall 
strategy.491 
 
Does this statement also point to a prevailing philosophy held within the corridors of 
UAC House, i.e. that company efforts should be directed exclusively at ‘the Coast’ 
trade?  The point Thomas made about Unilever’s modus operandi is equally salient.  
From a parent company perspective, UAC was always looked on as an outlier, a 
unique though financially significant branch of the company.  Furthermore, Unilever 
had very little insight into the markets in which UAC operated.  Certainly, the 
business portfolio of UAC in Nigeria was wide and varied.  Indeed, in 1980, there 
were still 17 separate and distinct divisions, as Table 5.8 shows. 
 
Table 5.8: UAC (I) Nigerian Divisions - 1980492 
Breweries Medical Timber 
Building Materials Mining Trading 
Consumer Products Motors Traffic 
Engineering Office Supplies UNATRAC (Caterpillar) 
Food & Agriculture Palm Line Ltd Warehousing/Transport 
Hardware Textiles  
 
Those divisions consisted of over 70 associated companies that were shared among 
the two holding companies, GBO and UAC (N), in Nigeria alone.  With so many 
distinct management chains, each competing for finite capital set aside for business 
redeployment, the strategy was almost bound to fail.  In the end, there was little that 
Unilever management could do for the subsidiary other than sanction further a 
capital spend, but this had been tried many times before.  Moreover, the 
aforementioned dismal global economic outlook at the start of the 1980s militated 
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against large investments in new business, particularly in Europe.  Another, more 
radical course of action at this stage would have been to take over direct control of 
UAC with a view to breaking up the company.  However, the ball, as it had been 
since 1929, remained in the subsidiary board’s court for the present time.  Again, 
Thomas commented on the methods that Unilever employed in managing the wider 
business: 
If you look at Unilever over the years it has been pretty good and pretty ruthless 
in defining its strategy and then acting on it.  So it has disposed of a number of 
businesses even if they were still profitable because they were not going to fit 
within long-term objectives.493 
 
Despite what Thomas said here, higher management in fact initially held back from 
radical intervention in UAC. However, the message from the Special Committee was 
clear:  if the board of UAC could not find alternative and significant revenue streams, 
the parent company would be forced to step in.  Why it took so long for the corporate 
axe to then fall on UAC is not clear, although one could hazard a guess that a sense 
of loyalty and perhaps sentimentality for the subsidiary still existed in Unilever’s 
highest offices.  The delayed intervention, though, is all the more remarkable taking 
into account the history of trade redeployment failures that the UAC board had 
overseen. 
 
 The most damning indictment on UAC redeployment effort was in the way 
those ventures were first selected and thereafter managed.  Apart from a very few 
cases, there was rarely any business compatibility with established UAC capabilities, 
particularly for those ventures that required an element of manufacturing.  This was 
compounded by a lack of oversight and direction from a UAC board that strived yet 
failed to emulate Unilever success in handling subsidiaries (UAC aside).  In the early 
1980s, the prognosis for most of the business, particularly that in Nigeria, was more 
or less terminal.  However, even then, there was an air of invincibility among 
management within UAC House led by the conviction that the company was simply 
too big to fail.  This was a point that Thomas alluded to when he said this: 
In the view of individual employees of UAC well I don’t think you even think 
about it, whether your company was going to fail.  They got worried with 
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Africanisation of management, of capital, of shareholding but they still thought 
as far as they were concerned the company will keep going into the future.494 
 
It was a conviction that quickly evaporated, as the company’s profits dropped 
precipitously in the early 1980s. 
 
UAC - the Final Years 
At the start of the 1980s, UAC trade had gone from boom to bust in just a decade 
and mirrored the Nigerian economy on which the company depended so much.  To 
use an analogy, an economic ‘sneezing fit’ in Nigeria infected all UAC trade, and 
revenues thereafter fell away alarmingly.  The company’s capital yield after tax at the 
start of the 1980s made sobering reading, as Figure 5.2 shows. 
 
Graph 5.1: UAC (I) % Yield on Capital Employed after Tax 1975 - 1983495 
 
 
This graph shows that a steep decline in yield on capital ran parallel to the timeline of 
the Nigerian NEPD programme.  When in 1978, the Nigerian Treasury reported a 
trade deficit of £2 billion against a total GDP figure of just £25.6 billion, the President 
called for an immediate cutback on imports announcing that: 
[We] must halt [an] unjustifiable taste for foreign goods of all descriptions. We 
are not rich.  With a population of over 80 million and our present GNP, we 
must be one of the poorest nations in the world.496 
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As exports to Nigeria were cut back dramatically, turnover in the UAC associate 
companies was decimated.  At the time, Thomas wrote a paper on the challenges 
that trade on ‘the Coast’ posed for UAC, much of which still applies to companies 
operating in overseas markets today.  What follows paraphrases what he wrote: 
 
1. Making Profits – this became progressively more difficult for UAC,  partly 
because of a deteriorating economic environment in West Africa and because of: 
a. Increased Competition – increase in Nigerian prosperity led to more 
international interest and competition.  Local traders who had built up 
capital, experience and an organisation – often through working for 
UAC (e.g. as produce-buying agents) – became formidable 
competitors. 
 b. Reservation of specific trading activities for Nigerians – e.g. as in  the 
  successive indigenisation  decrees. 
 c. Management constraints – reduced quotas for expatriate managers 
  and greater difficulty in obtaining work permits. 
 d. Pressure for over-rapid Indigenisation of management. 
 e. Import licensing – applied more severely owing to balance of payments 
  difficulties and locals were favoured in their allocation. 
f. Intervention by Manufacturers – Those, for whom we were agents, 
demanded more expensive premises and marketing facilities for their 
products and/or subsequently wanted to run part or all of their 
business. 
 g. Overheads – Reduced ability to share these with produce buying. 
h. Investment in more specialised activities and in local industry – 
Required more capital than general trading; also required more 
expensive specialist personnel; and business partners (with requisite 
industrial/ technical skills) with whom we were forced to share any 
profits. 
i. Government Pressure – Prohibiting or freezing buying commissions 
and service fees. Reduced income put pressure on covering UK Head 
Office costs. 
2. Keeping profits: 
 a. Isation [compulsory equity transfer to nationals] - Reduced UAC’s  
  share  of equity and hence profits. 
 b. Higher Local Taxes. 
3. Remitting:  Balance of payments difficulties led to exchange controls and 
substantive delays in remittance of proceeds of ‘indigenisation’, dividends, 
service fees, etc.497 
 
                                                                                                                                                       
496 Nigerian National Archives, Nigerian Embassy London. Speech made by Shehu Shagari, Executive President, 
Nigeria, 1979-83, 16 July 2013. 
497 Interview with Tony Thomas, 6 December 2012. This includes subsequent correspondence on the subject 
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 The last point Thomas made about remitting funds back to London was 
particularly crippling for UAC.  The difficulty all foreign companies faced in 
repatriating finances out of Nigeria became ruinous towards the end of the 1970s 
and was caused by the country’s ongoing and deepening trade deficit.  To continue 
operating, UAC was forced back on reserve capital as dividend repatriation from 
UAC (N) and GBO became a drawn out and acrimonious affair dictated by a Bank of 
Nigeria that was discredited in British eyes.  Moreover, the point Thomas made 
about excessive ‘Overheads’ was particularly pertinent to UAC given its high staff 
numbers spread across offices in Europe.  At times, there simply was not enough 
money coming out of Nigeria to support those staff numbers.  The downward fiscal 
spiral was accelerated when the value of the Nigerian Naira plummeted again at the 
start of the 1980s.  Taking into account all of the issues that Thomas raised above, it 
was only a matter of time before reserve capital was exhausted.  With the outlook 
bleak, the chairman of UAC (I) crossed the Thames to make a presentation to the 
Unilever board on 1 December 1983.  He did not pull his punches, stating that ‘the 
sharp decline in our traditional markets…will undoubtedly persist into the foreseeable 
future’.  He further revealed that the Caterpillar business had lost N16.6 million 
(£13.9 million) and the Motor Division N4 million (£3.8 million). The Kingsway Stores 
business was also in the red.  Some of the divisions, including Textiles and Property, 
were profitable, however this was not enough to offset substantial losses incurred in 
other parts of the business.498  With no alternative business on the horizon to offer 
salvation, Unilever stepped in. 
 
 In early 1984, the Special Committee enlisted the services of the consultancy 
firm McKinsey to conduct a comprehensive review of UAC business.  The final report 
in August of that year proved painful reading and posed searching though 
fundamental questions about the subsidiary and trade overseas.  These included, 
first of all, what was core business, and what parts of the existing trade could enable 
the company to continue operating? And secondly, what was then the firm’s future 
strategy?499 
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 In addressing the first question in the report: the core business was still in 
Nigeria, where the economy was in deep recession, and government had again 
reverted to military rule in 1983.  UAC revenue was therefore dependent on Nigerian 
economic performance, but with no upturn in sight.  The question about future 
strategy, of course, was completely reliant on finding a satisfactory solution to this 
state of affairs.  Reduced revenues from Nigeria meant there was not enough capital 
to pursue alternative business strategies elsewhere.  After the McKinsey report was 
released, a two-day conference was convened at Unilever House in February 1984 
to address its findings and thereafter come up with a proposed recovery plan to 
guide UAC out of crisis.  The follow-up meetings that took place a few months later 
in May and July surprisingly involved only UAC directors.  Lengthy discussions 
produced a report entitled the ‘Review of Strategic Direction’, which was presented 
to Unilever’s Special Committee.500  The paper proposed the disposal of nine core 
UAC divisions to leave just five lead units.  Furthermore, staff numbers in the UK and 
France were to be cut by around 40 per cent, although the bulk of higher 
management would be retained.  The paper also made a more obvious verdict that 
the business redeployment programme had failed for a variety of reasons.  Of 
course, this chapter has already outlined some of those reasons which were of UAC 
making and could well have been avoided with better management oversight.  The 
UAC directors did, however, argue that trade in West Africa did offer promising 
returns in the future.  The final point was perhaps more a case of self-preservation, 
or indeed, more probably, self-delusion.  The parent company was thereafter 
presented with two proposals: 
 Unilever without UAC (I) by integrating current assets into other divisions; 
or, 
 Accept the rescue plan put forward by the UAC board to shrink the 
business to the proposed five leading units alongside deep staff cuts. 
 
Basically, the options were: break-up UAC or retain the company in a much 
slimmed-down form.  It was therefore astonishing, given that UAC management had 
been largely discredited by the McKinsey report that the Special Committee came 
down in favour of the latter rescue plan.  Thomas did offer his own personal view on 
the decision (while stressing that this was conjecture on his part): 
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I wondered whether the decision not to wield the axe on UAC was connected 
with the personal friendship between the respective chairmen of UAC and its 
parent, Unilever.501 
 
 This view tends to indicate that there was still an element of sentimental 
loyalty held by higher management for UAC, however that would also contradict the 
earlier points and statements made by Thomas about Unilever’s ruthless approach 
to those parts of the business that did not perform.  Perhaps some of those Unilever 
directors, as Griffin indicated earlier, were in fact former UAC men.  Or yet again, 
there being no real synergy between the two boards of directors, the Special 
Committee took UAC management at its word, believing that business salvation was 
achievable despite the critical tone of the report produced by the auditors.  Events 
though, laid bare the serious flaws that had persisted down through the years in the 
decision-making process at director level and the oft repeated weaknesses in the 
provision of too much autonomy to subsidiaries.  The final acceptance of the UAC 
proposal was, however, made with certain qualifications, some of which indicated 
that the Unilever Special Committee was not comfortable with its decision.  A 
separate paper produced shortly after pointed to the final disposal of UAC.  One 
extract was this: ‘there are several companies that are both large enough and have 
some sort of similar businesses who could be interested in the purchase of all or 
parts of UAC (I).’502  The overriding message here was that the commercial survival 
of the subsidiary would now only be considered within the context of broader 
Unilever strategy.  Perhaps that should have been the case all along.  Given the dire 
economic outlook in Nigeria, it is still however, quite remarkable that the company 
survived at all.503 
 
 Thomas, though, stated he always suspected that the restructuring exercise 
that was sanctioned by Unilever was simply a step towards the final disposal of UAC: 
There was a high-level conference [at Liphook in July 1984] which 
recommended severe retrenching and reducing to core businesses.  But they 
were going to eliminate or cut everything else, so UAC was being prepared for 
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502 UAC 1/1/6/3/6, Unilever Memo dated 15 August 1984. 
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disposal although that was never stated. Most participants there believed this 
would be UAC’s salvation rather than one step on the way to its demise.504 
 
On implementation of the rescue plan, the UAC board was reduced to six directors 
(from ten), reflecting a slimmed-down business that was broken down by territory, 
Anglophone and Francophone.  Thereafter, trading divisions were subdivided into 
consumer goods and industrial products.  The five core trading divisions that 
survived the cull were Levertons (Caterpillar and other vehicles), CEIM and Cabus 
ET Raulot (electrical wholesale), Qualitair (refrigeration), various Brewery companies 
(agency contracts with Guinness and Heineken) and finally a truck dealership based 
in Coventry, Ford & Slater.505  These divisions were all categorised as specialised 
trade and agency work which offered, with the exception of breweries, additional 
after-sales business.  They were also transferable to other countries and did not 
involve too much manufacturing on the part of UAC.  Gone were the timber 
concessions, the cement business, the Kingsway supermarkets and the foam 
mattress factories, most of which had been located in Nigeria.  The slimmed-down 
business stumbled on, although it was not long before cracks began to appear in the 
plan, which made Unilever’s next move that much more straightforward. 
 
 Just 18 months after implementation of the new business plan, two of the 
remaining UAC divisions, Qualitair and Ford & Slater, were assessed as 
incompatible with Unilever business and packaged up for sale.506  Quite why it took 
so long to arrive at that verdict is unclear, however, one could hazard the guess that 
it may again have been a case of self-preservation on the part of a UAC board trying 
to salvage what business it could.  UAC was left with three divisions: Breweries, 
Electrics and the Caterpillar franchise held under Levertons.  To compound matters, 
in 1985 the Nigerian government officially devalued the Naira, and thereafter the 
sterling value of dividends and other investments dropped dramatically.  As a result, 
repatriated receipts from UAC (N), expected to be somewhere in the region of £22 
million, dropped to just £6 million.507  This greatly reduced figure was reflected in 
                                                 
504 Interview with Tony Thomas, 6 July 2014. 
505 UAC 1/1/6/1/7, Board Meeting Minutes at Liphook, 10-12 December 1984. 
506 UAC 1/2/4/7/9, BEAM McKinsey Recovery papers 1983-4. 
507 UAC 1/1/5/4/17, Unilever Directors Conference Minute 170, 4 September 1986. 
185 
lower dividends paid to Unilever for the years 1985 and 1986, as Table 5.9 below 
shows. 
 
Table 5.9: UAC (I) Annual Accounts 30 Sep 1984 – 30 Sep 1987508 
Year End Net Profit 
£m 
Dividend 
£m 
Reserves 
£m 
30 Sep 1984 4.167 25 52.5 
30 Sep 1985 9.32 10 51.9 
30 Sep 1986 14.9 10 56.8 
30 Sep 1987 18.7 75.5 0 
 
The net profit for 1984 was around a fifth of the figure for the previous year (see 
Table 5.7), and even that and the subsequent figures in this table must be viewed as 
artificial in that they were bolstered by the ongoing sales of business assets in 
Nigeria.  Two years after approving the rescue package, the Special Committee had 
no alternative but to wield the axe once more.  Consultants McKinseys were 
recalled, and this time the brief was much more straightforward: which parts of the 
UAC business, if any, could be saved?  The final break-up of UAC began in January 
1987, and the few parts of the business considered worth retaining were 
incorporated into Unilever’s Overseas Division and the Africa and Middle East Group 
(AMEG).  With that, UAC lost its long and cherished autonomous status. 
 
 Even at that very late stage there was a misplaced conviction within the 
subsidiary’s management that the UAC name could live on as a semi-autonomous 
division within AMEG.  However, although staff in London continued to front up at 
UAC House, numbers dwindled as the painful process of downsizing got underway.  
Within a year, staff numbers had dropped a further 40 per cent.  The shipping offices 
in Liverpool were shut down and in Manchester the GBO offices also closed.  The 
Hamburg and Brussels branch offices ceased trading, and in Paris the Francophone 
territory workforce was slashed from 400 to 100.509  Despite these cuts, head office 
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costs still hovered stubbornly around the 2 per cent mark of total turnover, a figure 
that compared poorly with head office costs for the Overseas Committee that were 
just 1 per cent of group turnover.  Even right at the end, then, UAC was far too top 
heavy.  Finally, and symbolically, the lease to UAC House was surrendered to the 
landlords, Norwich Union, in 1987.  Early surrender of the lease attracted a sizeable 
credit payment of £10 million to UAC due to spiralling demand for office space in 
London at that time.  The Human Resources manager who oversaw the transaction 
later commented that: 
The 1958 lease signed on UAC House was for 45 years. Unilever were only 
paying a fixed rent of £1.50 annually therefore they negotiated a substantial 
sum to leave 14 years early which was more than the total profits for Nigeria 
that year!510 
 
In early 1988, the doors to UAC House finally closed for good. 
 
Reviewing UAC (and Unilever) Strategy 
It is always a much easier task to identify why a company failed in retrospective than 
it is to predict failure in the first place, but the retrospective view does provide a 
valuable lesson nonetheless.  The UAC business in Nigeria spanned an era of 
British imperialism and thereafter independence.  Trading conditions after 
decolonisation were fluid and frequently more challenging for British companies 
operating in new and independent nations.  As a present reminder of British rule, 
UAC was clearly never going to be a favourite among Nigerian politicians, who were 
never predisposed towards the company and the huge commercial market share it 
retained.  Nor did UAC subscribe to buying favour with politicians as some other 
foreign companies allegedly did.511  In that respect, the board of UAC was always 
fighting a losing battle with the authorities and, by implication, in the all-important 
public relations game.  That said, it is clear that at crucial times glaring errors of 
judgement were made by the UAC board which had become accustomed to near 
monopolistic trading conditions during British rule.  Specific areas of the trade were 
shut down when they perhaps should have remained open.  Some others, pursued 
under the flawed diversification and redeployment programme, should never have 
                                                 
510 Unilever Archives, GB1752.OH/53, Interview, Richard Greenhalgh, HR Management, 6 October 2010. 
511 Interview with David Griffin and Tony Thomas, 6 December 2012. Both accused other foreign firms 
(Lebanese and others) of paying bribes to Nigerian politicians to gain their favour. 
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been opened in the first place.  The prevailing political economy of Nigeria was 
always the main determining factor for UAC business success or failure overseas.  
Therefore, ‘the Coast’ trade was always profitable under British rule and, indeed, 
very much so when the Nigerian economy was stable and open.  However, by the 
1970s the fervour of economic nationalism and compulsory local participation 
gripped the nation and was pursued forcefully through a raft of indigenisation 
legislation under the NEPD programme.  The result was that foreign investment 
dried up in all but the oil sector.  Somewhat inevitably, the Nigerian economy started 
to collapse in the 1980s as a result of a steadily deteriorating price of crude oil.  The 
final years of UAC trade in Nigeria can be viewed metaphorically as being that of a 
slow moving tanker heading inexorably towards grounding.  In the face of declining 
revenues, Unilever intervened too late in the day and could only salvage those parts 
of the subsidiary still worth saving.  It is not surprising therefore that very little of the 
business was saved in Nigeria. 
 
 But in a more general sense, UAC was more than just one of many Agency 
Houses that fell on hard times after British rule.  UAC epitomised trade in Nigeria and 
was a major player in the spread of British commerce across Africa that spanned 
back into the 19th century.  In that respect, UAC at its height was a shining example 
of British overseas commercial strength and, subsequently, after independence 
reflected a volatile relationship between former power and colony.  As all African 
nations sought self-determination more forcefully through economic nationalism, the 
role of the traditional British overseas trading enterprise or, Agency House, passed 
into history on the continent. 
 
 In 1994, Unilever disposed of a remaining 40 per cent holding in UAC (N) and 
with that went the last business link to Nigeria.  The company, UAC (N), still operates 
today as a Nigerian-owned business, although very little remains of this once vast 
and powerful trading multinational.  In the final years of UAC, London directors 
expended an inordinate amount of time and effort combating the many challenges 
posed to foreign business in Nigeria.  As legislation became more divisive, all foreign 
companies came under fire from what was ultimately a populist and self-serving 
nationalist-driven agenda.  One can certainly question the motives and ultimate aims 
of the authors of that legislation, but what is now clear is that they were the architects 
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of an economic strategy that saw the nation’s finances slip deeper into the red just a 
decade after a glowing appraisal by the OECD.  The inevitability of the Nigerian 
recession that resulted was accelerated by the NEPD programme and a populist 
assault on resident foreign business that was sponsored by an unstable regime.  
These weaknesses in Nigerian politics, combined with a struggling economy, 
conspired to decimate UAC trade.  Once it was clear that the diversification and 
redeployment effort had foundered, the fate of the business was sealed.  Thereafter 
it was merely a question of when rather than if the company would exit Nigeria. 
 
 Looking at the UAC business from a distance, it appears that the company 
was frequently a victim of its own success: it was far too dominant and focussed on 
Nigeria and therefore unable to change course easily.  The bigger the company 
became in West Africa, the more isolated and fragile it was.  There were few 
business alliances, no commercial talking shops and no collective company lobbying 
of authorities at the end of British rule.  This does not take away from the fact that, as 
the leading trading enterprise in West Africa, there were times that UAC did profit 
enormously.  Perhaps for that reason, the London board was too distant to fully 
appreciate the unstable political and business environment of Nigeria.  Directors 
were slow to act and innovate, reassured by a conviction that, despite dips in profit, 
the good times would come again.  After Nigerian independence in 1960, Unilever 
identified critical flaws in the UAC business model and openly queried the 
subsidiary’s commercial future.  In that respect, it could be argued that UAC 
management ignored the danger signs for too long and should have acted sooner, 
as the parent company should have as well.  By the 1970s, though, it was too late 
and the subsequent effort to redeploy out of Nigeria became more desperate as a 
number of ventures foundered.  Indeed, Griffin confided that management were so 
frantic by the late 1970s that they were close to making offers for the established 
multinationals Rolls Royce and Guinness. 512   There were, of course, other 
opportunities that were not fully explored over the years..  One of those was the 
commodity trade and estate management, a role that the company board had 
discarded by 1960. 
                                                 
512 Interview with David Griffin and Tony Thomas, 6 December 2012. Both remarked that the board of UAC was 
actively attempting to purchase established UK firms, among them Rolls Royce and Guinness. 
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 The challenges faced in the Nigerian commodity trade and, particularly the 
palm oil industry, are symptomatic of the deficient effort directed at economic 
development by authorities after the Second World War.  Nationalist authorities, 
including those colonial representatives before them, simply failed to grasp the 
benefits to be gained by allowing private companies to invest in agricultural 
production.  Any form of foreign company participation in crop production was 
consistently blocked in Nigeria, and therefore the necessary investment to 
modernise the sector was never there.  Wider rural development suffered as a result 
with a consequent human price paid by those that populated the sprawling and 
crime-ridden urban centres.  After UAC had exited the produce trade, Nigerian 
exports in particular commodities such as palm oil fell far behind that of competing 
nations like Malaysia.  It is contended here that the palm oil industry could have 
provided a redeployment route for UAC that was never explored.  Although former 
employees have firmly argued that estate work was never core business, there was 
scope to invest significantly in the industry, especially in Malaysia (and elsewhere) 
where Unilever already had a presence.  As previously noted, UAC possessed bulk 
shipping capability, estate management experience, research facilities and, most 
importantly, capital.  Of course, trading offices in Europe would have needed to be 
rationalised, no doubt with some pain and redundancies.  However, investment in 
the estates of Malaysia could have been pursued by management and would 
certainly have been more profitable than most of the failed ventures that proliferated 
under the subsidiary’s redeployment strategy.  It was obviously a missed opportunity 
and one that UAC was desperately in need of when trade collapsed in Nigeria. 
Thereafter, the main revenue generator for the former ‘Business Octopus of Africa’ 
was gone. 
 
 The final chapters now turn back to Malaysia and the British Agency Houses 
there, which continued to command much of the estate industry after independence.  
Here, the government also introduced new policies in the pursuit of economic 
nationalism from the former power.  That also involved breaking down the residual 
and dominant commercial strengths of the British Agency House and their business 
stake in the estate industry.  In Malaysia, though, the methods employed to achieve 
those aims were very different, as were the subsequent outcomes for resident British 
business and the Malaysian economy as a whole.  
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Chapter 6: Malaysia - 1957 (Independence) – 1969 (Race Riots) 
Introduction 
Hari Merkeda or Independence Day for Malaysia arrived on 31 August 1957, and the 
nation was free from British rule.  However, while the people of Malaysia could rightly 
claim to be politically liberated, it would be many more years before the nation could 
declare itself entirely free in an economic sense.  Like Nigeria, the nation’s economy 
was wedded to an imperialist mode of production constructed around a commodity 
trade that continued to be run by British Agency Houses like Barlows, Guthries and 
Harrisons.  At independence, moreover, the estates were in the midst of change 
caused by the large-scale take up of oil palm as a new and substitute crop to rubber.  
Therefore, this chapter continues to chart the commercial strategy of the Agency 
House in Malaysia to understand the business development that took place within an 
estate industry driven by British investment.  How those British Agency Houses 
shaped their business and corporate structures in response to new legislation 
introduced by successive Malaysian regimes forms much of the analysis in these 
chapters.  Company governance also explains why one particular Agency House, 
Harrisons, fared that much better than others.  Proficiency at board level and an 
ability to adapt to changing circumstances overseas became an important corporate 
feature that would eventually determine whether an Agency Houses survived or 
perished.  This first of two chapters on Malaysia in the post-independence era runs 
from the coming of independence itself until the Sino/Malay riots in 1969.  The 
outbreak of violence between the two most populous ethnic groups in the country 
heralded a changing of the guard in government and a reset in the way the private 
sector and those all-powerful Agency Houses were handled thereafter.  It also set in 
motion a steady erosion of the business conditions that had served the Agency 
House so well down through the years in the former British colony of Malaysia.   
 
Malaysia and ‘pseudo-Independence’ 
Malaysia’s transition to nation state was one of seamless political succession during 
an otherwise chaotic period that encompassed British withdrawal from Empire.  After 
achieving independence in 1957, the economic record of Malaysia has, for the most 
part, been exceptional when compared to that of most other former British 
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colonies.513  Some of the fundamental reasons for that economic success are worth 
touching on prior to moving on to examine the business and company aspect of the 
story. 
 
 A major factor behind that impressive economic development record for 
Malaysia was political stability.  In Malaya, the free elections of 1955 had delivered 
rule by an Alliance Party consisting of moderate representatives from all three major 
ethnic groups.  Thus, at independence, the broad appeal of the government ensured 
that the nation avoided the tribal, religious and/or racial strife that plagued so many 
former British colonies.  A second factor lay with a British commitment to defend 
Malaysia’s democratic status.  Although the country was embroiled in a Communist 
insurgency, the Commonwealth troops that were fighting alongside a Malayan home 
guard had effectively besieged the MNLA in the jungles of three states, Kedah, 
Kelantan and Perak.514  Indeed, the Malaysian Emergency became something of a 
unifying struggle that brought together different factions in the country.  Although 
British estates bore the brunt of the conflict, the commodity trade was as crucial to 
the Malaysian regime for employment and revenue as it was to the Agency Houses 
that exercised ‘de facto’ control.  A third factor lay with a Malaysian economy that 
remained, in many respects, tied to the British Treasury and the capital markets in 
London.  The Malaysian Ringgit currency was pegged to Sterling and therefore relied 
on comprehensive economic recovery in the former power.  As the British economy 
began to recover, Malaysia reaped the benefits from an export-orientated trade in 
commodities.  All of these factors taken together laid a foundation for steady 
economic development and a business status quo within a fundamentally agrarian 
and export-orientated private sector.  In that favourable commercial environment, the 
Agency House continued to reap vast profits, much of which were ploughed back 
into the estates. 
                                                 
513 Malaysian economic growth averaged 5.7% annually in the years 1957-70 and 6.9% 1971-80. See Jaya 
Gopal, the Development of Malaysia’s Palm Oil Refining Industry: Obstacles, Policy and Performance, Thesis, 
University of London, January 2001, p. 104. Also Zainal Aznam Yusof and Deepak Bhattasali, Economic Growth 
and Development in Malaysia: Policy Making and Leadership, Working Paper No. 27, Commission on Growth 
and Development, (IRBD/World Bank, 2008). 
514 For a detailed account of the Malaysian Emergency and map of the ‘the Battlefield’ see Noel Barber, the 
War of the Running Dogs: How Malaya defeated the Communist Guerrillas 1948-60, (London: Cassell, 1971), p. 
13. Also interviews Henry Barlow, 6 August 2013 and Rod MacKenzie, 14 November 2012. 
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 In many ways, the extant economic ties to Britain were most apparent in an 
estate industry that was dominated by British firms.  However, it was not all one-
sided, given that investment continued to flow into Malaysia on the back of that 
British estate presence.  That investment was instrumental in allowing government to 
put in place long-term development plans.  As a result, the first Malaysian regime 
was something of a facilitator for inward investment and displayed an attitude that, to 
all intents and purposes, appeared at ease with the significant British business 
interests in country.  In response, the London boards of the Agency Houses 
sanctioned further investment in the estates while publicly voicing approval of the 
new Malaysian regime.  In 1958, for example, the Straits Times published an 
interview with the Harrisons’ chairman, Sir Leonard Paton, who remarked ‘the 
Federation is to be congratulated upon a remarkably successful and happy first year 
of independence’. 515   Moreover, a number of British companies contributed 
financially to the Alliance Party that was headed by an anglophile Tunku Adbul 
Rahman.516  That patronage went some way to maintaining the business status quo.  
It also spawned claims of business-sponsored neo-colonialism aided and abetted by 
the Malaysian ruling class. 517   Regardless of this, there is little doubt that the 
Malaysian laissez-faire approach to foreign business and capital assets placed the 
Agency Houses in a very strong position and able to extend commercial ambitions 
further.  That business strength brought influence in a number of sectors, most 
notably in the estates.  As a consequence, one final factor behind Malaysia’s 
economic development lay in the willingness of the Agency Houses to put in place 
long-term investment strategy and most obviously in the estate industry.  On the 
estates, British firms were producing 60 per cent of a Malaysian rubber by 1960.518  
As major stakeholders in the estates, moreover, the Agency Houses now began 
directing investment towards an alternative oil palm crop that offered great 
                                                 
515 H&C MS7019/8: ‘Harrisons and Crosfield Ltd’, cutting from the Straits Times, dated 18 November 1958. 
516 See Nicholas J White, British Business in Post-colonial Malaysia, pp. 58-62.  White revealed evidence of 
British business funding to the Alliance Party through the Tunku Abdul Rahman National Fund. Unilever never 
participated in the practice. Tunku Rahman (and others) was viewed ‘anglophile’ due to being educated in 
England and an apparent predisposition to British interests (for Rahman that included horse racing). 
517White, British Business in Post-Colonial Malaysia, p. 1-4.  White addressed claims of neo-colonialism, 
referring to Malaysian independence as ‘pseudo-independence’ due to the ‘strong position’ of British firms at 
that time and a dependency on the British ‘metropolitan bourgeoisie’. This applied to the estates where 180 
British companies owned 800,000 acres, 59% of total Malaysian rubber coverage in the mid-1960s. 
518 Nicholas J White, ‘British Business Groups’, p. 155.  White states that in 1960 over 60% (of 1.75 million 
acres) of Malaysian rubber acreage was under de facto control of the British investment groups. 
193 
potential.519  It is therefore worth underscoring here some of the economic ties that 
bound Malaysia to Britain after independence and the trade impact and benefit that 
the Agency House was able to accrue as a result. 
 
The Malaysian Economy and Politics 
In order to set the scene, it is worth repeating an obvious though important point; an 
export-orientated economy cannot operate in a commercial vacuum as external 
factors will always intrude and influence that trade.  That was certainly true of 
resource-rich Malaysia and, by extension, the British firms that directed so much of 
the nation’s commodity trade.  At independence, the rubber and tin industries 
together accounted for 80 per cent of gross Malaysian exports within an economy 
that was averaging 5.7 per cent growth annually. 520   Malaysia though, had a 
negligible industrial capability, largely due to that aforementioned imperialist mode of 
production that was a common feature of British rule.  As such, the nation imported 
finished goods mainly from Britain.  The Malaysian commodity trade had rewarded 
the British Treasury very well down through the years, most obviously as it tried to 
navigate fragile Sterling through treacherous financial markets.  However, the dollar 
debt for some colonies was huge and, in that respect, Malaysia’s sat at the top of the 
pyramid. 
 
 A measure of the British stake in Malaysia was revealed in 1963 by the UK 
Trade Commissioner in Kuala Lumpur, who advised Prime Minister MacMillan that 
an estimated £400-500 million of capital was tied up in the Federation.  The figure 
then was greater than that of the whole of India.521   It gives some idea of the 
economic interdependency that existed between former power and colony.  
Consequently, some relationships with former colonies proved to be more durable 
than others by virtue of economic necessity.  Moreover, Malaysia was a strategically 
located democratic state in a troubled part of the world.  Indeed, the emerging Cold 
War in Europe had softened the US administration’s anti-imperialist rhetoric as the 
                                                 
519 From 1965, the Malaysian palm oil industry experienced an annual growth rate of around 17 per cent. 
Department of Statistics, Malaysia, Export figures for 1973, Palm and Kernel oils Annual Growth 1965-73. 
520 Rokiah Alavi, Industrialisation in Malaysia: Import Substitution and Infant Industry Performance, (London: 
Routledge, 1996), pp. 28-29. 
521 White, British Business in Post-Colonial Malaysia, p. 3. 
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former British colonies in the east now became bastions of capitalism in the struggle 
against the Communist ideology.  Prior to Malaysian independence, British 
authorities had recognised that to avoid Communism gaining a foothold in the 
colony, the economic status and welfare of the people must be improved.  This is 
where the British company came in, as any amount of business investment in 
Malaysia was of twofold benefit.  First, capital aimed at the estate industry helped 
raise the social status of a largely rural indigenous people by providing employment 
as well as infrastructure and welfare improvements.  Second, and perhaps more 
importantly, any new commercial venture in the estates would increase the dollar-
earning capability of Malaysia, allowing it thereafter to become a beacon to other 
international investors.  It was therefore, perfectly rational that the Malaysian regime 
would seek to maintain that amenable stance to resident British firms.  In fact, the 
Malaysian Minister of Commerce and Industry went to great lengths to assure 
foreign investors that their stakes were safe and that no restrictions would be placed 
on the free movement of capital or the remittance of profits.522  This of course, not 
only complemented wider British ambitions on the international stage but paved the 
way for the Agency House to advance interests in the estates relatively free from 
public interference. 
 
Agency House Investment and Profit 
In the immediate aftermath of independence, relations between British firms and 
local authorities were rarely confrontational, a point confirmed by those 
interviewed.523  This was a major boon for the Agency House and a contributory 
factor in producing annual accounts that continued to impress.  Harrisons’ profits 
were especially buoyant which allowed the board to increase share capital while 
maintaining impressively high dividend awards, as Table 6.1 indicates. 
 
 
                                                 
522 The Straits Times, 1 January 1958.  Cited in White, British Business in Post-Colonial Malaysia, p. 58. 
523 All of those interviewed maintain that relations with Malaysian officials were always privately cordial and 
conducted on a business footing. At times politicians did denounce the British presence although it was viewed 
political rhetoric. MacKenzie recalled a rally he attended at Kunak in Sabah which was expected to be anti-
British in tone. However, just as the Chief Minister of Sabah, Tun Mustapha rose to speak, the heavens opened 
to monsoon rains. The audience scattered leaving MacKenzie and another British manager from a 
neighbouring estate. The Minister looked down to the British planters and said, ‘Rather pointless don’t you 
think’ and, ‘good, where can we have a coffee’. Interview with MacKenzie, 14 November 2012. 
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Table 6.1: Harrisons Figures Extracted from Annual Accounts 1958 – 63524 
Year Profit 
£m 
Share Capital 
£m 
Share Dividend 
% 
1958 1.196 1.5 15 
1959 1.258 1.5 15 
1960 1.656 2.5 12 
1961 1.618 2.5 15 
1962 1.566 2.5 16 
1963 1.621 2.5 18 
 
The table shows that consistently high profits spawned generous dividends, which 
were above those of most FTSE companies.  Crucially, share capital also increased 
to £2.5 million, and, in 1963, the board reported that assets were now valued at £20 
million, three times the corresponding figure in 1958.525  It was hardly surprising 
therefore, that those Agency House returns attracted further investment to Malaysia.  
In 1957, Harrison’s long-serving chairman, Sir Eric Miller, passed on the reins to 
Leonard Paton.  Thereafter, Paton kick-started a further burst of business 
diversification which included expansion in the builders’ merchant division in Britain 
under the Harcros name.  Paton also had an eye on new technology and, in the late 
1950s, the company began manufacturing a new type of cyclised rubber for use in 
printing inks and paints.  Those new products were brought to market and sold 
through existing branches of Durham Raw Materials.  For the other Agency Houses, 
financial returns were just as impressive. 
 
Large profits were being posted by all British Agency Houses at this time.  
Barlows saw profits treble in the decade following independence, while dividends to 
family members more than doubled by 1968.526  In Singapore, Guthries also posted 
impressive profits helped along by an extensive oil palm planting programme that 
was now maturing.  By 1963, the company owned over 26,000 acres of oil palm 
                                                 
524 H&C MS37017/7-9, figures extracted from Harrisons Annual Reports to Shareholders, 1958-63. 
525 H&C MS37017/9, figures extracted from Harrisons 1966 Annual Report to Shareholders. 
526 Barlow Box 66, Annual Accounts 1967, reported a profit of M$339,352 (£46,034) and Dividends were 
M$208722 (£28,313). 1968 figures were M$1,114,040 (£152,616) and M$439,343 (£60,187) respectfully.  
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across five estates.  The palm oil produced generated a profit of £563,334, a six-fold 
increase on the corresponding figure for 1956.527  Clearly the significant research 
effort directed at oil palm was beginning to produce results, with yields increasing on 
all British estates.  Most profits from the estates were, of course, repatriated to 
London, and, in 1967, it was reported that an estimated M$300 million (£35.1 million) 
of dividend and interest payments flowed out of Malaysia each year.528  In the palm 
oil industry itself, Malaysia had no refinery capability apart from the Lever Brothers 
factory at Kuala Lumpur.  Therefore, crude palm oil (CPO) was exported to refineries 
in the UK and the Netherlands.  It was those western refineries therefore that 
realised downstream product value-added in the commodity.  At one point, CPO sold 
at £70 a tonne to western refineries was in turn sold as vanaspati (vegetable 
shortening) on the Indian sub-continent at around £140 a tonne.529  This perhaps 
poses an obvious question: why was there no discernible nationalist backlash to the 
lingering British commercial dominance in an estate industry generating vast profits? 
 
 A 1967 speech by the Malaysian Minister of Finance revealed much about 
government policy at that time.  He said that ‘the surest way to trigger off a flight of 
capital is to impose restrictions on capital outflow’. 530   Therefore, with the 
government’s endorsement, British investment kept on flowing into the estates.  A 
demonstration of that investment in action took place when Unilever’s PAMOL 
arrived at Labuk Valley on Sabah in 1960.  In just two years, the company was 
providing work for 2,500 workers and families on a new estate and had built a palm 
oil mill which was also made available to local smallholders.  Workers’ housing was 
built, as well as an airstrip, hospital, dental surgery, secondary school and a road 
that was carved through the jungle to the nearest major settlement at Sandakan.531  
Of course, this type of financial commitment was not an act of altruism: the PAMOL 
                                                 
527 Guthries G/LP/28 for oil palm acreage figures and G/OPM/17 for Oil Palm Malaya Accounts.  A profit of 
£89,442 was posted for palm oil in 1956 on 12,000 acres of estate land. 
528 White, British Business in Post-Colonial Malaysia, p. 59, for exchange rates throughout see 
<http://fxtop.com/en/currency-converter-past.php>, (accessed, 25 August 2015). 
529 Gopal, Malaysia’s Palm Oil Refining Industry, p. 148. 
530 National Archives, Kew, Foreign and Commonwealth Office, FCO 24/162, Economic Section, Kuala Lumpur 
to Commonwealth Office, 26 May 1967, summary of speech by Tan Siew Sin, the Malaysian Minister of 
Finance. 
531 Leslie Davidson, ‘a Green Charter’, paper presented at the International Planters Conference, June 2003 
dated 15 December 1989, p. 19. 
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estate generated handsome profits for Unilever.  However, it is appropriate to 
emphasise at this juncture that investments of this size were not an option for the 
Malaysian authorities and/or indigenous firms.  However, the government agency, 
the Federal Land Development Authority (FELDA), was well placed to piggyback 
onto those new British estate ventures, and this would subsequently help provide 
employment for a vast number of disenfranchised rural Malays.  It is therefore 
worthwhile digressing from the focus on British Estate Houses to look at FELDA and 
the agency’s role in the diversification that took place on the Malaysian estates.  
 
FELDA and the Estates 
One of the main architects of FELDA was Tun Abdul Razak, who later became 
Malaysia’s second Prime Minister.  Abdul Razak championed the cause of the 
indigenous Bumiputera under a banner, ‘land for the landless’ and ‘jobs for the 
jobless’.532  The scheme was relatively simple in design and promoted as a means to 
eradicate rural poverty.  Davidson listed the benefits of a plantation culture thus: 
The most serious problems facing Less Developed nations at this time were: 
lack of food, lack of employment and rural to urban drift.  Plantation ventures 
can probably play a more direct role in each of these three problems than any 
other form of investment.533 
 
FELDA participants were allotted 10-14 acres of land to grow rubber (later oil palm), 
with some land set aside for food production.  Each family received a start-up loan to 
buy the land, which was then repaid in monthly instalments over 15 years.  Housing 
was also provided, and settlers lived communally in planned villages.  Each plot of 
land formed part of a larger estate to allow for the provision of various ancillary 
support services including milling factories.  Only rubber was grown on those estates 
when FELDA first launched, however a replanting programme on British estates was 
soon adopted by FELDA and in 1962 the agency began offering a grant of M$1,860 
(£224) per hectare to encourage participants to convert to oil palm.534 
 
 Raja Alias, a former chairman of FELDA, acknowledged that a ‘major 
consideration [for replacing rubber with oil palm] was high returns from investment 
                                                 
532 Raja Alias, unpublished Paper presented at FELDA International Conference 2006, 8 July 2006, p. 1. 
533 Leslie Davidson, ‘Agricultural, Globalisation and the impact on Malaysia’s Oil Palm Industry’. 
534 Pletcher, ‘Regulation and Growth’, pp. 626-7. 
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in oil palm cultivation’. 535   In a decade, around 200,000 acres of rubber was 
replanted and such was the pace that, by 1970, FELDA accounted for 30 per cent 
of Malaysia’s oil palm land.536  Clearly, FELDA followed the lead of the British into 
oil palm, but it did not come cheaply.  By 1983, FELDA had disbursed M$3.926 
billion (£981.5 million) of loans, with 90 per cent provided by the public purse and 
the rest by the World Bank.  That was an average of M$47,420 (£11,855) per family 
settled, and, by then, 47,906 families were working oil palm estates.  That was 57 
per cent of all scheme participants. 537   Overall FELDA’s record as a rural 
development scheme was spectacular and, over the years, provided much more 
than mere employment to Malaysians, a point Mackenzie was quick to highlight: 
Malaysia could easily have imploded; it was saved by FELDA and Land 
Development.  FELDA has gone a long way towards stabilising or closing the 
gap between the people with absolutely nothing and the people who have at 
least got their working wage.538 
 
Indeed, the World Bank lauded FELDA as ‘one of the most successful land 
organisations in the world’. 539   FELDA has continued to expand even out-with 
Malaysian borders and now operates 56 thousand hectares of oil palm in Indonesia.  
A total land bank of 450 thousand hectares now means that FELDA is the third 
largest estate operator in the world.540 
 
 The undoubted success of FELDA underscores an earlier claim made here 
regarding the emergence of a shared vision between British estate and Malaysian 
regime.  In the period 1956-70, agriculture and wider rural development accounted 
for 22.3 percent of government spending  in Malaysia, compared to just 2.4 percent 
on industrial development. 541   FELDA was therefore an intrinsic part of the 
government’s economic strategy which, at independence, still relied heavily on the 
                                                 
535 Raja Alias, 6 November 2013. Email response to question by author. 
536 Gopal, Malaysia’s Palm Oil Refining Industry, p. 167 and Barlow, Natural Rubber Industry, pp. 444-5. 
537 Malaysia, Federal Land Development Authority (FELDA), Annual Report, 1983, (Kuala Lumpur: FELDA, 1983), 
p. 15 (1983 exchange rate). See <simedarbyplantation.com>, (accessed, 1 November 2014). 
538 Interview with Rod Mackenzie, 14 November 2012. 
539 ‘World Bank gives Felda high rating’, New Straits Times, 2 March 1988. 
540 Figures extracted from FELDA Global Ventures, see < http://www.feldaglobal.com/our-
company/milestones/>, (accessed, 25 August 2015). 
541Anoma Abhayaratne, ‘Poverty Reduction Strategies in Malaysia 1970-2000: Some Lessons’, 
<https://www.um.edu.my/docs/librariesprovider7/working-papers/fea-wp-2004-014.pdf?sfvrsn=2>, 
(accessed, 3 June 2016). 
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contributions made by those British estate operators.  Among those contributions 
were the many advances made on British estates, all of which FELDA and the wider 
commodity trade directly benefitted from.  Indeed, Harrisons and Unilever even 
funded training courses for FELDA scheme participants.542  That holistic approach to 
agriculture marked Malaysia out from other nations, most notably Nigeria, where 
minimal investment reached the sector after the end to British rule.  The Malaysian 
government was, in those early years, a rare breed that viewed agriculture as a route 
to achieving economic development.  It was no accident then that, in a foreign 
dominated yet business-friendly estate industry, the Agency House was therefore 
able to go from strength to strength. 
 
Palm Oil and the Malaysian Economy 
Although a number of Agency Houses operating in other former British colonies 
could claim similar levels of commercial dominance after independence, their 
position was not always as assured as those in Malaysia.  In Malaysia, the targeting 
of resident British firms legislatively was not government policy immediately after 
independence, hence the continued flow of British capital and personnel into 
Malaysia.  A survey of 144 foreign companies conducted by the Malaysian Chamber 
of Commerce found that investment, measured by growth of fixed assets, increased 
by over 38.5 per cent for the years 1969-72.543  That foreign investment does, in 
many ways, correlate with the rapid expansion that took place in the estate industry.  
Therefore, it is fair to argue here that rising company profits in the palm oil trade 
allowed them to make a major contribution to the economic growth of Malaysia.  That 
claim provides some context and a foundation for the further evolution of the Agency 
House in the estates and a decisive move into oil palm. 
 
 At independence, Malaysia was the world’s largest exporter of natural rubber, 
and the global market prices obtained for that commodity largely dictated 
                                                 
542 Interview with Leslie Davidson, 10 July 2015. Davidson made the point about the British company provision 
of company training courses to FELDA settlers during the 1960s.  Also, interview with Brian Gray, 5 December 
2012. Harrisons also provided training to FELDA staff and management. 
543 Barlow Box 85, Letter by Malaysian International Chamber of Commerce dated 10 January 1974, p. 3.  The 
letter revealed that the collective fixed assets for 144 foreign companies in Malaysia totalled M$1392 million 
(£210 million), and a Treasury Economic Report for 1973 reported that the long term capital inflow in 1973 
from these companies stood at M$207 million (£31.2 million). 
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government spending. 544   British estates that produced much of that rubber 
experienced unpredictable returns due to constant market volatility.  The Agency 
Houses attempted to mitigate erratic revenues by merging estates to achieve 
efficiencies of scale.  The Highlands & Lowlands Para Rubber Company, managed 
by Thomas Barlow, for instance, bought out a number of estates and added them 
family holdings.  In 1958, Barlows then acquired Vallambrossa, Selangor, Sungei 
Way, Changkat Salak and Heathwood rubber estates.  In the next five years, 
Barlows added a further eleven estates in Malaysia and by 1964, holdings were as 
indicated in Table 6.2. 
 
Table 6.2: Rubber Estates in Highlands & Lowlands Group 1964545 
Anak Kulim Elmina Midlands Sungei Rengam 
Bukit Cheraka Emerald Rasak Sungei Tekel 
Bukit Jelutong Heathwood Riverside Sungei Way 
Bukit Selarong Highlands Selangor Tampin Lingii 
Byram Jin Seng Sembilan Torkington 
Changkat Salak Kalumpong Strathairlie Vallambrossa 
Edinburgh Kapar Bahru Sungei Rawang  
 
The table lists the consolidated estates that made up the Highlands & Lowlands 
Group in 1964.  It does not include twelve other estates held separately within the 
Barlows Secretariat.  All estates were in Malaysia, which again serves to 
demonstrate the family’s geographic focus and consolidated business approach to 
business management.  Indeed, the estate holdings became core business when the 
merchandising arm, Barlow & Company (Singapore), was sold to Bousteads in 
1959.546  Henry Barlow recalled his father’s acquisition strategy and the motivation 
for expanding the Highlands & Lowlands Group: 
The reason that my father went on the takeover trail in the late 50s and early 
60s was that the then [Advisor to the] Governor of the Bank of England, 
                                                 
544 Barlow, Natural Rubber Industry, pp. 443-445. According to the Barlow production figures, the Malaysian 
Peninsula produced just over a third of total world production of rubber, 1933 tonnes, at independence. 
545 Barlow Box 12/2, various business correspondences relating to rubber estates in the Highlands & Lowlands 
Group, 1958-66. 
546 Barlow Box 25/2, correspondence with Boustead Ltd on takeover of Barlow & Co (Singapore), 1959-60. 
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Thompson-McCausland, an acquaintance of my father’s, said the small rubber 
companies must amalgamate.  Unless they became larger units, the 
institutional investors would not be prepared to invest in them.547 
 
Henry Barlow also revealed evidence of connections in high places and added that 
his father and Thompson-McCausland were close friends.  Moreover, the other 
brother at the head of the business was Sir John Barlow who served as a 
Conservative Member of Parliament from 1952 to 1966.  The advice offered by 
McCausland regarding estate consolidation appeared sound and was endorsed by 
David Hopkinson of M&G, who stated the Malaysian estates were one of his 
company’s biggest investment targets.548  Henry Barlow elaborated on that alleged 
access to privileged information and investment patterns thereafter: 
The Governor presumably passed a similar message to Guthries and 
Harrisons.  All in all though, the fact that these companies were willing to invest 
heavily in a newly independent Malaya and investors at home were happy to 
buy their shares indicates the confidence that existed in the new Malayan 
government headed by Tunku Abdul Rahman.549 
 
In that vein, Gent of Guthries revealed that his fellow directors were also on good 
terms with Bank of England officials.  Indeed the Guthries board enlisted the services 
of the governor himself, George Baring, in 1963 to preside over the delicate matter of 
succession at chairman when the incumbent, Sir John Hay, refused to stand 
down.550  That disclosure alongside Henry Barlow’s statement was illuminating in 
several respects.  First, it indicated that the management of the Agency Houses had 
access to privileged counsel, perhaps privately, from some of the most powerful 
figures in the City.  Secondly, the Bank of England was predicting a bright future for 
the Malaysian estate industry despite the challenges faced by British companies in 
                                                 
547 Interview with Henry Barlow, 6 August 2013. The majority of Barlow estate land was in the Highlands & 
Lowlands Group. Tom Barlow, father of Henry, was chairman of that part of the family business. 
548 Interview with David Hopkinson, 4 July 2014. M&G was the largest investor in plantations. Hopkinson 
managed many of these investments and was on personal terms with a number of Agency House directors. 
549 Interview with Henry Barlow, 6 August 2013. 
550 Interview with Marcus Gent, 11 July 2014.  In the early 1960s the board of Guthries split into two factions; 
one half backed the incumbent chairman, Sir John Hay (now 80 years old and by nature an ‘obdurate’ 
Scotsman). The other half wanted Hay to stand down. George Baring, Governor of the Bank of England, was 
‘brought in to organise a settlement’. Also of interest, Gent’s father was Sir Edward Gent, first British High 
Commissioner to the Federation of Malaya. Edward Gent died in office when a plane he was in crashed near 
Northwood, North London on 4 July 1948. 
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many former colonies not to mention the threat posed by synthetic rubber.551  That 
institutional backing generated confidence in the City and encouraged large 
investment funds, like M&G and Scottish Widows, to invest in Malaysia.  In effect, 
estate consolidation was considered desirable because size mitigated risk.  A further 
point worth making here is that the estate consolidation carried out by Agency 
Houses at this time would benefit Malaysian authorities in later years.  This is a 
subject addressed in the final chapter.  Meanwhile, as British investment flowed into 
the estates, the position of the Agency House at the head of the industry was further 
augmented.  Collectively, all of these factors taken together laid the ground for the 
large-scale crop diversification that took place on the estates. 
 
 As mentioned previously, Malaysia was relatively open to foreign capital and 
business, and, as such by 1960 sixty per cent of all estate land was owned by British 
firms.  That consisted of 492 estates covering 1,170,831 acres compared to 1,762 
smaller Asian-owned estates covering 771,341 acres total.  At the head of that 
British estate total were the Agency Houses.  Table 6.3 gives a snapshot of the 
dominant position occupied by the Agency Houses within the estates just after 
independence. 
 
Table 6.3: Breakdown of Malaysian Plantation Acreage as at 1962552 
Agency House Estates Acreage Total Malaysian Estate 
Acreage as a % 
Barlow & Brother 77* 164,486 8.47 
Guthrie Corporation 97** 185,465 9.55 
Harrisons & Crosfield 114*** 178,948 9.21 
Total of all three 288 528,899 27.23 
Malaysian Totals 2,254 1,942,172 100 
*    Of those 77 estates, the Barlow secretariat owned 39 outright. 
**  Of those 97 estates, Guthries, through various companies, owned 25 outright. 
*** Harrisons owned none of the estates outright. 
 
                                                 
551 Barlow, Natural Rubber Industry, p. 92. In 1962 production of synthetic rubbers surpassed that of natural 
rubber for the first time. As a result, the price of natural rubber declined markedly during the 1960s. 
552 These figures extracted from Barlow Box 60/4archives, H&C 37017/14 and, approximate acreage for 
Guthries and Sime Darby, in Sjovald Cunyngham-Brown, the Traders, (London: Newman Neame Ltd, 1971). 
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The success of the estate consolidation programme is very obvious from these 
figures.  Of a total 492 European-owned estates, three Agency Houses either owned 
outright or had significant equity in 288 which made up over 27% of estate land in 
Malaysia.  Commercial dominance at such levels generated power and influence 
across the whole industry.  Ultimately, too, it was those three Agency Houses that 
spearheaded the large-scale replanting programme that was to follow. 
 
 The shorter maturation of the oil palm at 3-4 years alongside stable prices 
persuaded a large number of estates to replant in the early 1960s.  MacKenzie 
witnessed the transformation take place first hand, often in a quite dramatic fashion. 
‘I have seen newly planted rubber plantations being ripped up before maturation and 
replanted with oil palm crops.’ 553  MacKenzie’s recollections are borne out in figures 
for the industry as rubber coverage decreased from 814 thousand hectares in 1957 
to 706.7 thousand hectares by 1967.  The downward trend continued apace such 
that, by 1973, the figure was 589.4 thousand hectares, representing a 30 per cent 
reduction in sixteen years.554  However, during that period, advances in seed culture, 
growing techniques and pollination were introduced on all of the remaining British 
rubber estates.  As such, despite that reduction in land coverage, rubber production 
more than doubled in the fifteen years that followed independence.555  Here Corley 
identified a key advance for the industry due to research carried out by Guthries: 
An important contribution from Guthries was the development of Integrated 
Pest Management by Dr Brian Wood, from the 1960s onwards.  Indiscriminate 
use of insecticides had led to some intractable problems, but by studying pest 
ecology and adapting management methods, natural biological control could be 
re-established.  Today, insecticide use by the industry is negligible.556 
 
Again, research findings by British firms were made available to all Malaysian 
estates through trade associations like the aforementioned Malaysian Oil Palm 
Growers Council (MOPGC).  Thereafter, a virtuous cycle of growth, profits and 
investment became common in the industry.  This virtuous cycle was in turn enabled 
in large part by a decisive move into oil palm, which we consider next. 
                                                 
553 Interview with Rod MacKenzie, 14 November 2012. 
554 Barlow, Natural Rubber Industry, p. 444. 
555 Barlow, Natural Rubber Industry, p. 444. Production of rubber per estate hectare was 580 kgs. In 1973, the 
figure had risen to 1,327 kgs. 
556 Email response received from Hereward Corley, 23 August 2015. 
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The Agency House and Oil Palm 
Following independence, it was mostly business as usual for the Agency House in 
Malaysia.  Indeed, in many respects, the conditions of trade had improved as palm 
oil now produced the price stability that estates had never found in rubber.557  For 
Guthries Oil Palm Malaya, profits were rising steadily on the estates, as shown in 
Table 6.4. 
 
Table 6.4: Guthries Oil Palm Malaya Accounts 1957-67558 
Year Revenue 
£ 
Profit 
£ 
Estate 
Acreage 
Dividend 
% 
1957 937,349 150,839 9,046 20 
1958 1,087,782 126,609 12,742 15 
1959 1,199,137 238,162 12,549 20 
1960 1,260,338 286,848 14,150 25 
1961 1,229,350 248,006 14,232 20 
1962 1,241,514 229,502 15,324 20 
1963 1,681,682 563,334 21,289 35 
1964 1,872,292 655,155 21,186 35 
1965 2,328,715 690,214 24,204 45 
1966 2,295,884 655,589 26,044 40 
1967 2,711,907 576,989 33,818 32 
 
The figures reveal that, in a decade, Guthries more than trebled oil palm acreage, 
and profits grew four-fold.  These returns saw the board award high dividends and 
undertake a programme of expansion.  However, rubber was still the most widely 
grown commodity in Malaysia, and in 1960 the nation produced 35 per cent of global 
output.559  Much of that came from the estates under the de facto control of British 
                                                 
557 Refer back to Figure 5.1 to provide the evidence in support of this point. 
558 Guthrie G/OPM/16-18, figures extracted from Oil Palm Malaya (Singapore) Accounts, 1957-67. 
559 Jean-Jacques van Helten and Geoffrey Jones, ‘British Business in Malaysia and Singapore since the 1970s’, in 
R Davenport-Hines and G Jones (eds.), British Business in Asia since 1860, (Cambridge: CUP, 1989), p. 179. 
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investment groups and the Agency Houses.560   Indeed, much as before, British 
investment in Malaysia dwarfed that of other former colonies and prompted the 
Commonwealth Relations Office to warn in 1962 that: ’the very size of our stake in 
this country could well be a source of embarrassment and it seems desirable to 
avoid stressing it in public, in Malaya at any rate.’561Much of that stake was held in 
the estates, and, as global demand for commodities recovered, British companies 
were encouraged to secure more land for oil palm.  This suited a Malaysian regime 
quick to realise that its rural people benefitted greatly from British investment in the 
estate industry. 
 
 A cost-benefit analysis of estates in West Malaysia was conducted under the 
auspices of the OECD between the years 1955 and 1968 and found that the rate of 
return for growing oil palm was 50% higher than rubber. 562    This result was 
supported by Barlow, who claimed estate grown rubber generated a gross value 
output of M$1,987 per hectare.  The corresponding figure for oil palm was 
M$3,204.563  Encouraged by better returns, British estates began planting oil palm on 
a large scale.  It quickly produced results.  In 1953, Nigerian palm oil accounted for 
53 per cent of global exports.564  By 1965, Malaysia had overtaken Nigeria.  In that 
year, Malaysia’s palm oil export total of 141.5 thousand tonnes eclipsed a Nigerian 
total of 110 thousand tonnes. 565   Generally confirming this production shift, a 
Harrisons’ report in 1965 revealed that Nigerian shipments of palm oil to Malaysia 
had now ceased. 566   To carry out regular inspections of estates, the company 
selected a number of proficient employees to perform the duties of Visiting Agents 
(VA) and Visiting Engineers (VE).  The inspectorate was thereafter tasked with 
maintaining standards across all Harrisons’-managed estates.  Mackenzie, a former 
VA himself, spoke about the job and the company's exclusive milling policy: 
                                                 
560 Jones, ‘British Agency Houses’, p. 155 
561 DO 189/219: Confidential note on the nominal value of British Capital in Malaya, c. July 1962.   
562 I M D Little and D G Tipping: A Social Cost Benefit Analysis of the Kulai Oil Palm Estate, (Paris: OECD, 1972), 
pp. 87-93. 
563 Barlow, Natural Rubber Industry, p. 398. 
564 E. Charles Leonard, Edward G Perkins and Arno Cahn (eds.), Proceedings of the World Conference on Palm 
and coconut Oils for the 21st Century, (AOCS Press, 1998), p, 20. 
565 Malaysian Department of Statistics, Oil Palm, Cocoa, Coconut and Tea Statistics Handbook, 1984, (Kuala 
Lumpur: Department of Statistics, 1984), figure extracted from tables. 
566 H&C MS37019/9, annual report to shareholders, 1969. 
206 
The position of the Visiting Agent (and Visiting Engineer) demanded total 
integrity.  Oil mills were built for Harrisons produce only. Quality is reflected in 
agricultural standards plus the quality of harvesting and handling of the crop.  If 
you open your gates to everybody your own extraction rates go down.  It is not 
the amount of fruit you have; it is oil extraction rates that are important.567 
 
The point MacKenzie emphasised here was that estate grown oil palm fruit, to all 
intents and purposes, may look the same as fruit grown elsewhere, however oil yield 
can vary dramatically.  Fruit grown on an estate, under optimum conditions and, with 
inputs like fertiliser, will always yield more oil than those grown on smallholdings.  
The images below show MacKenzie’s point about efficient estate production. 
 
Images 6.1 and 6.2: European Style Oil Palm Estates in Malaysia568 
 
 
The first image from above is an oil palm estate and reveals regularly spaced, well 
managed rows of trees.  The second image is of the fruit bunches being harvested 
on those estates.  Efficient planting and harvesting standards ensured maximum oil 
yield from fruit grown on British estates.  The Harrisons inspectorate was 
acknowledged as an unrivalled success and had a positive knock-on effect for oil 
production on all estates.  While the Harrisons’ inspectorate system was viewed as 
the benchmark of excellence by the industry, the company’s exclusive milling policy 
was not duplicated.  Unilever’s PAMOL believed it was economically, politically and 
socially prudent to accept palm fruit from neighbouring estates and smallholders.  
Moreover, milling was an area in which PAMOL could call upon the extensive 
research carried out by Unilever in Africa, as Corley recalled: 
                                                 
567 Interview with Rod Mackenzie, 14 November 2012. 
568 Images taken from Google showing Oil Palm Estate from above and of harvesting of fruit on the ground. 
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Another important Unilever contribution was in palm oil extraction.  They had 
done extensive research on palm oil extraction in the Congo, and the basic mill 
design and operation today is little changed from that developed by Unilever 
more than half a century ago.569 
 
Davidson confirmed that companies had different strengths when he stated that 
’Harrisons had the edge as regards husbandry; we [Unilever] were leaders in the 
1950s, when it came to milling because of our experience in the Belgian 
Congo.’570The Malaysian estates always cooperated on a range of matters, and, in 
1964, the Oil Palm Genetics Laboratory was formed to coordinate research efforts.  
Results were thereafter dispersed across the industry through the MOPGC.  While 
the estate industry appeared to be going from strength to strength, however, in other 
business sectors, Harrisons stood apart from the other Malaysian Agency Houses.  It 
is therefore again useful to examine Harrisons’ business strategy to flesh out some 
of those crucial differences. 
 
 Despite the company’s lengthy and colourful history in the estate industry of 
South East Asia, Harrisons retained cherished shareholder status longer than most.  
Directed from London, the ‘Three Sister’ companies progressed with expansion 
plans in the estates.  In 1959, Pataling added a further 28,000 acres of land by 
purchasing the Carey Island rubber estate of Jugra, Land & Carey.  About 10,000 
acres was immediately cleared and replanted with oil palm.  Golden Hope also 
expanded and in 1962, the Straits Plantation Ltd was bought which added another 
6,000 acres of oil palm to holdings.  An existing 15,500 acres of coconut was also 
replanted with oil palm.  Furthermore, in 1961, the London Sumatra group with 
130,000 acres of rubber had embarked on a programme of rapid conversion to oil 
palm. 571   The expansion in ‘Three Sisters’ holdings not only demonstrated the 
ambitions of Harrisons in Malaysia, but revealed a clear move into oil palm.  
Furthermore, shareholder status allowed the board to promote and profit from a suite 
of estate services.  Evidence of this appeared in minutes of a board meeting in 1962, 
when it was announced that a new management and agency contract had been 
                                                 
569 Email response received from Hereward Corley, 23 August 2015. 
570 Interview with Leslie Davidson, 4 December 2012. 
571 H&C MS37795: notes on the Purchase of Jugra Land & Carey Ltd, 1959/60 and MS37723, Golden Hope 
Plantations Ltd, Prang Besar Rubber Estate Ltd, MS37021, London Sumatra Company Ltd, estate holdings. 
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secured with the Glengowie Rubber Company Ltd. 572   For managing estates, 
Harrisons received generous commissions which were frequently ploughed back into 
those clients through share purchases.  As such, the company was still using the 
money of others to grow business.  The strategy brought great influence, the extent 
of which was revealed in 1959 when it was reported that a director, F W Harper, sat 
on the board of ten secretariat companies and was chairman of seven of them.573  
Moreover, in 1960, three other Harrisons’ directors held 18, 12 and 11 additional 
directorships in estate firms respectively.574  Harrisons’ men were spread far and 
wide in boardrooms across London which helped to construct an intricate web of 
corporate power.  Those cross-holdings prompted one employee to remark ironically 
that ‘it is so complicated that even we do not fully understand what we are doing.’575  
From that position of power, though, Harrisons’ management, alongside the leaders 
of other Agency Houses, were able to largely direct the Malaysian estate industry. 
 
 In 1960, the Indian economist, lawyer and founding member of the Peoples’ 
Action Party in Singapore, James Puthucheary, posed a question: ‘Who controls the 
Malaysian private sector?’  The author’s own response was, that British Agency 
Houses ‘control not only the commanding heights of the Malayan economy, but also 
much of the plains’.  He argued that just eleven Agency Houses managed over 300 
of the European-owned estates in Malaysia.576  Referring back to the figures in Table 
6.3, it would seem that Puthucheary was a little conservative as, according to 
company archives, the three featured Agency Houses exercised de facto control 
over 288 of the European estates at that time.  That British business strength was 
instrumental in attracting significant investment.  Between 1955 and 1964, the post-
tax returns for investments in Malaysia averaged 19.8 per cent.  That placed the 
nation second only to West Germany as the most profitable destination for British 
                                                 
572 H&C MS37021, Minutes of Board Meeting, 12 April 1962 
573 H&C MS37020, Minutes of Meeting of the Estates Committee, 2 March 1959. 
574 Jones, ‘British Agency Houses’, p. 311. 
575 Quote extracted from Financial Times, 24 January 1978. 
576 James Joseph Puthucheary, Ownership and Control in the Malayan Economy: A study of the structure of 
ownership and control, and its effects on the development of secondary industries and economic growth in 
Malaya and Singapore, (Singapore: Donald Moore, 1960), p. xiv & p. 46.  The author wrote this book when 
detained by British authorities in Changi Prison (he was accused of assisting the MNLA to carry out attacks on 
authorities). In the book he posed a question, ‘Who owns the productive wealth of the country?’ p. 46. 
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capital.577  As a direct result, Harrisons and Guthries were established fixtures on the 
FTSE.  Certainly, in terms of overall Agency House assets, the only real difference 
lay in Harrisons’ reluctance to acquire estates outright.  The Barlow family business 
was in a similarly strong position to Harrisons overall and was managed by a London 
secretariat.  Guthries, likewise, was now owned by the Anderson family through the 
Guthrie & Co secretariat.  Harrisons though remained a salaried, director-run 
company with a dispersed and public share register.  These corporate governance 
arrangements would help Harrisons survive in later years. 
 
Business Mergers and the Agency House 
The Barlow business was, as noted earlier, headed by two brothers, Thomas and 
John Barlow.  The secretariat, Thomas Barlow & Brother, also provided 
management services to a number of estate operators quoted on the LSE.  Like 
Harrisons, the estates Barlow managed fell under ever greater Barlow shareholder 
control, supported by a financial web of cross-holdings.  Furthermore, the Highlands 
& Lowlands group of estates was greatly enlarged.  Henry Barlow explained how 
business was split between the brothers: 
My father [Thomas Barlow] and uncle [Sir John Barlow] could not agree to 
expand the smaller companies as my father wished.  Shareholdings between 
the two [brothers] was such that my uncle had no effective veto over my father 
as far as [the] Highlands Group was concerned.  Moreover, the Highlands 
Group owned huge areas of land with development potential in the Klang 
Valley [land around Kuala Lumpur].578 
 
Clearly, differences existed between the brothers about business direction, and, as a 
result, the corporate status of the independently listed estates remained unchanged.  
However, Thomas Barlow held sway in the Highlands & Lowlands group and 
appeared to be the more dynamic of the two brothers.  This was an interesting 
aspect within the family that would re-emerge in later years.  For the time being, the 
brothers agreed to merge the remaining merchandising business with Boustead 
Holdings Berhad in 1963.  Boustead, another British Agency House, was dual listed 
on the Kuala Lumpur and Singapore stock exchanges, but not in London.  The 
business tie-up was revisited in 1965, when estate management was also merged to 
                                                 
577 White, British Business in Post-Colonial Malaysia, p. 7. 
578 Interview with Henry Barlow, 6 August 2013, and email response to first draft of thesis, dated 18 June 2015. 
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create a holding to rival the big two Agency Houses.  Barlow Boustead Estates 
Agency Sendirian Berhad (Barbeal) pulled together 120,000 acres of rubber and oil 
palm under one company roof, although actual ownership remained with the 
family.579  The mergers were something of a marriage of convenience as, Boustead, 
proficient in trading, complemented Barlow’s proven track record in estate 
management.  Moreover, the family appeared happy with a controlling 75 per cent 
stake in Barbeal.  Little did the brothers suspect then that by merging the estates to a 
Malaysian (and Singapore) listed firm, would render the whole business vulnerable.  
This development is covered in Chapter 7. 
 
 Guthries was also forging ahead with a Boustead merger in the mid-1960s.  In 
1964, the Guthries board approved merging shipping and travel assets in Malaysia 
to those of Boustead under the company name, Guthrie-Boustead Shipping 
Agencies Berhad.  Thereafter, the board sought to rationalise existing share 
holdings, as explained by Gent: 
In the 1960s under the new Chairman Sir Eric Griffith-Jones by a complicated 
Scheme of Agreement merged all the companies within the Guthrie Agency 
Group so that the old shareholders all became shareholders in the Guthrie 
Corporation Ltd. From its inception it held a place in the FT 100 Index, around 
the 60th place.  We did attract many UK investors.580 
 
This was the share scheme that Keith Anderson had alluded to in the early 1950s. 
 
 The objective of these mergers was to protect the estates and other parts of 
the business from takeover. Henry Barlow confirmed that the goal was to create a 
‘financially impregnable spider’s web’ of company holdings, one which would place 
assets out of reach of Malaysian authorities.’581  All Agency Houses participated in 
these sorts of corporate tie-ups, with the exception of Harrisons who went it alone in 
Malaysia.  In 1962, Finlay Gilchrist succeeded Paton as the chairman of Harrisons.  
Gilchrist had previously worked in Malaysia and was well versed in political matters 
there.  He immediately embarked on strengthening the corporate integrity of the firm 
by pulling together the subsidiaries and associate companies.  The aim again was to 
                                                 
579 Barlow Archives, Box 73/1, letter to shareholders dated 29 June 1967. 
580 Interview with Marcus Gent, 11 July 2014. 
581 Interview with Henry Barlow, 6 August 2013. 
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make it difficult for predatory firms to swoop on any part of the business.  Moreover, 
Paton still held fast to the shareholder status the company had developed over time 
and thereby avoided any form of boardroom challenge.  For all Agency Houses, the 
timing of these asset rationalisation exercises were probably prompted by events in 
neighbouring Indonesia where Dutch assets had been confiscated with no 
compensation.582 
 
Indonesian Expropriation vs Malaysian Indigenisation 
In 1964, when the Batavia (Jakarta) offices of Harrisons applied to renew the leases 
for the estates in London Sumatra Plantations, the company was forced to surrender 
a third of its land to the Indonesian government.583  Davidson argued that legislation 
which amounted to expropriation of foreign assets was responsible for destroying a 
once revered Indonesian plantation industry: 
Immediately prior to World War II, Indonesia had the most highly developed 
plantation industry in existence.  By 1963… things had changed strikingly for 
the worse.  Not only was there a very sharp drop in production per acre but 
also the acreage under nearly every plantation crop had declined - Palm 
Oil/Kernels from 1938, 275,000 tonnes to 1963, 181,000 tonnes.584 
 
Business conditions thereafter plummeted when the British government attached 
Sabah and Sarawak to the Malaysian Federation in 1963.  Soekarno, who claimed 
North Borneo for his nation, was outraged, and in the ensuing conflict all Harrisons’ 
assets in Indonesia were seized. 585   Those actions contrasted with that of a 
Malaysian regime that saw foreign-owned oil palm estate land increase from 100,000 
to 438,000 acres in the 1960s.  Moreover, indigenous smallholders, many of whom 
were FELDA participants, also increased land holdings from 19,000 to 160,000 acres 
by 1969. 586   British company dominance in the estates was very obvious and 
growing, however a first tentative step by government was taken to reduce expatriate 
management numbers. 
 
                                                 
582 In 1961, the Indonesian government, Under Soekarno, passed the Basic Agrarian Law which strictly 
regulated foreign, i.e. Dutch, business asset tenure in the estates.   
583 H&C MS37271, Batavia (Jakarta) Branch, various papers from head office in London regarding secretarial 
and agency companies in Indonesia – details on government seizure of estate assets, 1961-6. 
584 Leslie Davidson, ‘Changing Trends in the Plantation Industry’, pp. 5/6. 
585 H&C MS37017/8: Chairman’s Report on assets in Indonesia, extracted from 1964 accounts. 
586 Khera, Oil Palm Industry, p. 126. 
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 In 1962, the Malaysian government proposed the gradual replacement of 
British estate managers with Malays.  This may have been motivated by the events 
that White chose to highlight: ‘[British] planting companies had behaved with 
exceptional stupidity between 1960 and 1962’.587  What White was referring to was 
the influx of British planters (estate managers) after Malaysian independence at a 
time when estates were diversifying into oil palm.  As it turned out, the government’s 
indigenisation policy was not particularly resisted by British firms as expatriates (and 
their accompanying families) were becoming very expensive.  In fact, Agency 
Houses were proactive in this regard and had already set up training courses for 
local Malays.  Evidence of this was revealed in minutes from Harrisons Estates 
Committee on 25 April 1960 when the board approved the funding of a further two 
agricultural scholarships at the University of Malaysia.588  In fact, formal enforcement 
of the policy was not required.  MacKenzie noted that ‘there was no need for 
immigration targets to be set by authorities as the indigenisation programme was 
capably managed by the Rubber Growers Association.’589  Progress was monitored 
by the RGA in Kuala Lumpur, and personally by Claude Fenner, the last British Chief 
of Police in Malaysia. Fenner was a highly respected individual and was decorated 
by government for his part in the Indonesian Confrontation. 590   There were 
exceptions to this general rule of acceptance of government policy as some directors 
in London viewed indigenisation a flagrant intrusion on their business.  However, 
Fenner proved more than a match for any boardroom resistance.591  The former 
Harrisons and Sime Darby estate manager, Douglas Gold recalled Fenner’s overall 
contribution: 
                                                 
587 White, British Business in Post-Colonial Malaya, p. 75. 
588 H&C MS37021, Minutes of Estates Committee meeting at Great Tower Street in London on 25 April 1960, p. 
4 and interview with Brian Gray, 5 December 2012. Gray told of Harrisons sponsored training courses for 
Malay employees in estate management and research. 
589 Interview with Rod MacKenzie, 10 July 2015. Comment made by MacKenzie in follow-up interview in 
response to first draft of thesis by author. 
590 Tan Sri Sir Claude Fenner, the last British Chief of Police in Malaysia, was awarded the title by the Malaysian 
government in recognition of services to the nation during the Indonesian crisis. It was the Malaysian 
government that insisted on Fenner’s appointment as the RGA’s official representative in-country. 
591 Interview with Brian Gray, Douglas Gold and Richard Lindesay, 5 December 2012. These former Harrisons 
men recalled a social gathering in Kuala Lumpur where Fenner took one of the British Sime Darby directors to 
task, loudly accusing him of lying about his company’s expatriate staff numbers. 
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He [Fenner] negotiated with the government that planters retiring or leaving the 
industry [were replaced by Malaysians] at a pace which suited the government. 
It wasn’t necessary to have a specific Malaysianisation programme.592 
 
Those interviewed claimed that it was 1962 that the last British planter arrived to take 
up post in Malaysia.  Thereafter, between 1966 and 1971, the number of expatriate 
estate managers fell from 791 to 339.593  The indigenisation programme proceeded 
smoothly largely because it was endorsed by all parties.  However, the wider subject 
of indigenisation did not go away and resurfaced more forcefully in the 1970s. 
 
Over the remainder of the 1960s, the Malaysian regime seemed relatively 
content with a controlling British presence in the estates.  On the international stage 
however, the strategic importance of the nation was weakening.  In September 1963, 
the British Commissioner-General to South East Asia advised the British Prime 
Minister that ‘our interest [in Malaysia] is not so much in the extent of our economic 
investments and trade as in our vested interest in world peace’.594  The MNLA and 
Communism had been defeated, and therefore the State of Emergency ended in 
July 1960.  In Britain, a general election in 1964 brought the Labour Party back to 
power.  Thereafter, Treasury officials became more critical of overseas companies, 
arguing that investments abroad deprived home industry.  Historian Sarah Stockwell 
has argued that the ‘economic rationale for Malaysia was always ancillary to local 
and British politico-strategic considerations’.595  This seems to have been the case 
here: thereafter, new British investment in Malaysia, although still substantial, did 
reduce somewhat.  When a parliamentary secretary to the Board of Trade visited 
Kuala Lumpur in 1966, he was informed that British investment for the previous year, 
at M$28 million (£4.7 million), was less than a US figure of M$38 million (£6.3 
million).596  That said, investment in the estates and oil palm continued unabated 
despite a gloomy geopolitical backdrop. 
 
                                                 
592 Interview with Douglas Gold, 5 December 2012. 
593 Malay Mail, 17 October 1971. Quoted in White, British Business in Post-Colonial Malaya, p. 77. 
594 CO 1030/1710, copy of letter to Macmillan, 3 September 1963. Cited in White, British Business in Post-
Colonial Malaysia, p. 209. 
595 Stockwell, ‘Trade, Empire, and the Fiscal Context’, p. 146. 
596 White, British Business in Post-Colonial Malaysia, p. 184. Here White highlights a slump in British 
investment in Malaysia as opposed to the US and emergent Japanese investments. 
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 It was in the early 1960s that British firms turned their attention to North 
Borneo.  That interest was kick-started in 1960 when Unilever approved a new oil 
palm venture in what was then British North Borneo.  A new subsidiary company, 
PAMOL (North Borneo) Ltd, was formed to buy an abandoned tobacco estate of 
around 10,300 acres in Sabah.  The estate was thereafter cleared and planted with 
oil palm.597  A further 10,000 acres of land was bought from the Sabah Development 
Company in 1964 and also planted with oil palm.  In 1967, a mill was built, bringing 
the overall cost of the venture to £8 million.  Only the Agency Houses could afford 
such a financial undertaking. 598   Of course, Harrisons already held logging 
concessions in Sabah alongside interests in a number of other commercial 
operations.  Therefore, in 1965, Harrisons established a new oil palm estate of 4,000 
acres with a milling factory. 599   For Harrisons, investment in Sabah offered 
economies of scope away from the Malaysian Peninsula most obviously in this case, 
in a downstream timber and building supply trade largely based in the UK.  By the 
end of the decade, Harrisons managed 175 estates across Malaysia, Sumatra and 
North Borneo.600  Those management contracts contributed greatly to healthy and 
rising group profits in the 1960s, as the figures in Table 6.5 clearly demonstrate. 
 
Table 6.5: Harrisons Figures Extracted from Annual Accounts 1964 – 69601 
Year Profit 
£m 
Share Capital 
£m 
Share Dividend 
% 
1964 1.736 4.87 12.5 
1965 2.011 4.87 16 
1966 2.014 4.87 16 
1967 2.219 4.87 18 
1968 2.952 4.87 18.5 
1969 3.104 4.87 19.5 
 
                                                 
597 This is the PAMOL estate in Labuk Valley mentioned earlier. 
598 Leslie Davidson, Changing Trends in the Plantation Industry: the Unilever FDC Study Group, July 1976, 
Appendix 1, p. 2. 
599 H&C MS37017/0, Chairman’s Statement: Annual Report to Shareholders, 1966. 
600 H&C MS37071, Harrisons Report on estates: agency and management services, 4 March 1969. 
601 H&C MS37017/9-10, figures extracted from Harrisons Annual Reports to Shareholders, 1964-69. 
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The figures in Table 6.5 reveal that the board once again managed to raise share 
capital to £4.87 million by 1964, up from £2.5 million in 1963, while at the same time 
maintaining high dividend awards to shareholders.  An investment in Harrisons 
would have generated returns to capital in the region of 150 per cent in just six years 
before taxes, an astonishing performance.602  The company was now one of the 
most prominent and successful Agency Houses in the world, with consistently high 
profits that had placed Harrisons a favourite in the City.  In terms of business 
diversification, at the end of the decade, the Asian operations accounted for 38% of 
group profits, which compared favourably to the other Agency Houses in Malaysia.  
Barlows also recorded impressive profits in the family’s various estate interests.  
Furthermore, at the end of the decade, BARBEAL, the estate management 
company, added a profit of £218,761 to the secretariat for the year.603  Guthries was 
also doing well and the oil palm estates alone posted a profit of £5 million over the 
course of the decade.604  The first signs of government uneasiness regarding the 
scale of those British profits surfaced in 1969, however, when Harrisons was notified 
by that its logging concessions in Sabah would not be renewed.  It was, though, a 
rather muted censure as the contracts were not due for renewal until 1982.  That in 
itself revealed that government was still treading carefully where foreign investment 
was concerned and was also perhaps an indication that the British Agency House 
still held great influence within Malaysian political circles.  The government’s 
tentative approach to a perceived business-sponsored neo-colonialism was not at all 
well received by, most obviously, the indigenous Bumiputera. 
 
Ethnic Inequality and the Riots 
A First Malaysian Plan for the years 1966-70 was essentially an economic 
development roadmap that revealed government still expected a number of 
programmes to be funded by foreign donors.  Around M$1,100 million (£179 million) 
of a total investment figure of M$6,610 million (£1,075 million) was expected to come 
from overseas, mainly from British sources.605  The plan confirmed that Malaysian 
leaders still believed future growth was heavily reliant on investments made by 
                                                 
602 £100 invested in 1963 would have been worth roughly £252 by 1969 without taking into account taxes. 
603 Barlows Box 66/1, BARBEAL statement of accounts 1966-69. 
604 Guthries G/OPM/16-19, cumulative total of profits in 1960s, Oil Palm Malaysia. 
605 First Malaysia Plan, 1966-1970, Kuala Lumpur: Government Printer, 1965. 
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resident British business.  Again, this underscores an earlier point that, although the 
Malaysian government was politically liberated at independence, for the time being, 
real economic power and influence resided in distant London boardrooms.  This was 
the London connection that the Malaysian historian Hua Wu Yin labelled the 
‘Metropolitan Bourgeoisie’. 606   Throughout the 1960s though, the Malaysian 
population grew while the poverty rate among indigenous and rural Malays remained 
stubbornly high at around 50 per cent.607  What appeared to be the uninterrupted 
export of the nation’s wealth to London merely exacerbated feelings of injustice 
among the poorer parts of Malaysian society.  For the young and disenfranchised 
ethnic Bumiputera majority, the government’s piecemeal effort to stem British 
business exploitation was a weakness.  Matters were about to come to a head, 
although surprisingly the British firms were not in the firing line. 
 
 In terms of political development after independence, ‘Greater Malaysia’ could 
hardly be thought of as unified following the cobbling together of Peninsula Malaysia, 
Singapore, Sarawak and Sabah in 1963.  Despite consistent economic growth, the 
trickle-down of wealth was not fast enough for the majority.  Moreover, in politics, 
Lee Kuan Yew of Singapore, was viewed too dynamic and dangerous for politicians 
in Kuala Lumpur who believed economic power was being drained south. 608  
Therefore, in 1965, the Malaysian parliament voted to expel Singapore from the 
Federation.  By the end of the decade, in what remained of the country, ethnic 
Chinese in Malaysia made up 25 per cent of the population while the Bumiputera 
numbered more than 65 per cent.609  Simmering tension was stoked by the fact that 
a Chinese minority owned 37 per cent of the nation’s wealth.  In stark contrast, the 
                                                 
606 Hua Wu Yin, Class and Communalism in Malaysia: Politics in a dependent Capitalist State, (Zed Books, 
1984), cited in White, ‘British Business Groups’, p. 155. 
607 The population of Malaysia rose from 8.1 million in 1960 to reach 106 million in 1969, see 
<https://populationpyramid.net/malaysia>, (accessed, 2 May 2016). After independence, almost 90 per cent 
of indigenous Malays lived rurally and, despite rapid economic growth in the next decade, poverty among rural 
Bumiputera remained at over 50 per cent. See A H Roslan Harahap, ‘Income Inequality, Poverty and 
Development Policy in Malaysia’, paper presented at the UNESCO International Seminar on Poverty and 
Sustainable Development, 22-3 November 2001, pp. 3-6. 
608 For a comprehensive account see W G Huff, The Economic Growth of Singapore: Trade and Development in 
the Twentieth Century, (Cambridge: CUP, 1994) and, interview with Rod MacKenzie, 10 July 2015. 
609 Swee-Hock Saw, the Population of Malaysia, (Singapore: Photoplates Pte Ltd, 2007), p. 15.  There were also 
around 7% indigenous Indians and the remainder made up of various tribes in North Borneo. 
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Bumiputera accounted for just two per cent.610  One leading political economist made 
reference to this when he coined the phrase ‘politics for the Malays, the economy for 
the Chinese’.  The larger British stake of 60 per cent was, perhaps surprisingly, 
ignored as most of the anger became directed at ineffectual politicians.  When public 
protest failed to change anything, the ethnic Chinese minority provided a more 
obvious and accessible target.611 
 
 Rioting broke out in Penang and Kuala Lumpur immediately following the 
national elections in May 1969 after the Chinese opposition parties had made 
significant gains.  On 13 May, supporters of the Chinese Democratic Action Party 
and the Parti Gerakan took to the streets to celebrate, however clashes with 
opposing rallies saw events rapidly degenerate into violence.  Subsequently, the 
Chinese community bore the brunt of attacks as properties and businesses were 
looted and/or burned with significant loss of life.  Within days, the Malaysian 
parliament was suspended and a State of Emergency declared.  When the 
emergency was finally lifted in February 1971, the government of Prime Minister 
Tunku Abdul Rahman had been replaced by a more nationalist-leaning regime.  
Thereafter, a Second Malaysian Plan accompanied by a New Economic Policy 
(NEP) was unveiled to address the concerns and rights of the Bumiputera majority.  
This time around, though, the British Agency House was in the firing line. 
 
 This chapter examined the immediate years that followed Malaysian 
independence and the impact that the new nationalist political agenda had on the 
resident British Agency House.  Despite what was a charged global political arena, 
very little altered for British firms operating in Malaysia as the country’s government 
strived to ensure that foreign investment continued to flow and particularly the estate 
industry on which the economy heavily relied.  As a result, the Agency House 
business model continued to thrive and develop within a relatively open private 
sector.  British commercial strength and influence was most apparent in the estate 
industry where, despite persistent market challenges to rubber, Agency Houses were 
                                                 
610 J W Henderson et al., Area Handbook for Malaysia, (Washington: Foreign Area Studies, 1977), p. 323. 
611 Jomo Kwame Sundaram, a Question of Class: Capital, the State and Uneven Development in Malaya, 
(Singapore: OUP, 1986), pp. 246-7. 
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able to expand their holdings, largely owing to the introduction of oil palm as a 
substitute crop for rubber.  As owners and major shareholders in those estates, the 
Agency Houses reaped huge financial rewards throughout the 1960s.  However, that 
comfortable relationship with Malaysian authorities deteriorated towards the end of 
the decade due to the export of wealth based on repatriation of rising company 
profits for foreign-owned firms and a persistent and rampant inequality across 
ethnicities.  The resentment of a majority indigenous Bumiputera finally surfaced in 
race riots after the national elections of May 1969.  Those terrible events ushered in 
a new economic policy designed to address inequality among the people, which in 
turn targeted the commercial stake of the Agency House.  The next and final 
Malaysian chapter focuses on those deteriorating relations between national leaders 
and Agency House executives, and is set against the backdrop of the British 
government’s receding interest in the former colony. 
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Chapter 7: Malaysia 1970 – 1989 (Economic Independence) 
Introduction 
This final chapter covers events in the years 1970 to 1989, a period unlike all those 
that had gone before as relations soured between the Malaysian authorities and the 
Agency House directors sat in London.  The tone was set by the launch of the New 
Economic Policy (NEP) in 1971, which announced a radical shift in the government 
position to one that was intent on seizing control of the private sector and the all-
important estate industry.  Achieving that goal would ultimately involve removing the 
dominant commercial presence of the British Agency House in Malaysia.  The 
chapter therefore opens with a look at the launch of the NEP, which was framed by 
the racial violence of 1969.  How each British company adapted to that policy forms 
the basis of much of the content of this chapter, which focuses on comparing 
business strategy and final outcomes.  The research seeks in particular to explain 
why one company, Harrisons, survived when others perished.  Again, the thesis 
employs primary resources from company archives alongside public records, 
interspersed with the testimony of those who lived and worked both in Malaysia and 
London at that time.  First, though, we need to examine the political fallout after the 
race riots in 1969, which forced the Malaysian government into radical policy reform. 
 
 To avoid a repeat of the recent violence, the new regime tackled what it 
viewed as the root cause by immediately addressing the rights of the indigenous 
Malay majority.  In 1970, half of the Malaysian people lived in poverty, and the 
majority of those were Bumiputera.  Furthermore, poverty rates in the rural regions, 
where most Bumiputera lived, were very much higher than in the cities.612  Thus, 
when parliament reconvened in 1971, after a 2 year hiatus, the constitution was 
amended to recognise the special status of the Bumiputera.  A Second Malaysia 
Plan, entitled ‘A New Development Strategy’, was unveiled, the first lines of which 
read ‘…greater emphasis must be placed on social integration and more equitable 
                                                 
612Abhayaratne, ‘Poverty Reduction Strategies’. In 1970, 66 per cent of Bumiputera were poor; the figures for 
the Chinese and Indians were 27 per cent and 35 percent respectively. Incidence of poverty in rural areas was 
much higher. In 1970, 59 per cent of the rural population fell below the poverty line compared to 21 per cent 
in urban areas. As 80 per cent of Bumiputera lived rurally, the bulk of the poor were indigenous Malays. 
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distribution of income and opportunities for national unity and progress’.613  Much of 
the new policy involved positive discrimination in favour of the Bumiputera majority.  
The plan was accompanied by the NEP, the contents of which announced 
government plans to redistribute the nation’s wealth.  An integral part of that strategy 
was the staged reduction in foreign ownership of the estates, which in turn would be 
achieved by restructuring the share capital of the Agency Houses.  Basically, the 
government demanded a share of equity in Malaysian assets owned or controlled by 
the Agency Houses.  That in itself was a major challenge as it involved taking on the 
boardrooms of London, not to mention the financial might of the City.  However, 
much of the motivation behind this crusade lay in figures that revealed that, of a total 
M$4,678 million (£641 million) of equity holdings, 62.1 per cent was held by the 
British, 22.8 per cent by the Chinese and just 1.5 per cent by indigenous Malays.614  
The British were thus finally recognised as being Malaysia’s biggest equity owner. 
Rebalancing that corporate wealth therefore required a major reduction, not only in 
existing British, but also in Chinese stakes.  For a new regime that was under 
intense pressure from its people to deliver, the persistence of British company 
ownership of Malaysian assets in particular was clearly unsustainable. 
 
 The NEP directive, among other things, instructed foreign-owned firms to 
submit plans to transfer equity to Malay nationals and public agencies.  Shareholding 
ceilings were set at 30 per cent Malay ownership, 40 per cent for other Malay 
nationals and just 30 per cent for overseas investors.  Furthermore, companies were 
given a deadline of 1990 to comply.615  An important footnote added to the directive 
was that share transfers be achieved through investment and business growth, not 
dilution of existing capital.  One recalls the corresponding Nigerian NEPD which also 
demanded the transfer of equity to nationals but only succeeded in diluting existing 
UAC share capital.  Nor, for that matter, was UAC afforded as much time to comply 
in Nigeria.  In contrast, a measured approach to the British firms that dominated the 
private sector marked Malaysia out among peer former colonies even in the NEP, at 
                                                 
613 The Second Malaysia Plan, (Kuala Lumpur: Government Printer, 1971), p. 1. See 
http://www.pmo.gov.my/dokumenattached/RMK/RMK2.pdf>, (accessed, 3 March 2016). 
614 Figures extracted from Second Malaysia Plan, p. 40. Exchange rate of £1 = M$7.3. 
615 Figures extracted from Second Malaysia Plan, p. 41. 
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least to begin with.  Still, although the Malaysian NEP was promoted as advisory, 
that was certainly not how the Agency Houses saw it, as Henry Barlow recalled: 
The whole system was entirely advisory, there was no statutory legislation but 
the standing of Tun Ismail in the committee at large was such that nobody 
would ever have dreamed of bucking the trend and saying ‘well we are going to 
do it anyway whether you like or not’.616 
 
That is an interesting comment by Barlow as, in fact, Harrisons resisted the 
requirements of the NEP for very much longer than any of the other Agency Houses.  
Of course, the ultimate goal for government was to wrestle control of national assets 
away from British investors and curtail the commercial power exercised by London 
boardrooms.  As such, the NEP can be thought of as the first step down a road 
towards eventual economic independence for Malaysia. 
 
 Gent of Guthries recalled what he claimed then was a widely held view among 
Agency House executives:  ‘I cannot believe that any of us UK quoted companies 
were very willing participants.  It was a very political issue and nothing much to do 
with oil palms!’ 617   Gent’s take appeared reasonably accurate, as economic 
independence was certainly the political objective for Malaysian leaders.  However, 
despite this, the government was also keen to avoid derailing the transformation 
taking place in the estate industry.  Therefore, the challenge faced by authorities was 
to accomplish a transfer of corporate wealth without panicking foreign investors.  To 
ensure the task was managed efficiently and sensitively, two new public agencies 
were formed.  The first was the Foreign Investment Committee (FIC) and the second 
the Capital Issues Committee (CIC).  It was the latter that wielded greatest power as 
it was fronted by a formidable individual, Tun Ismail Mohammad Ali, second 
Governor of Bank Negara and brother-in-law to the future Malaysian Prime 
Minister.618  From 1971, any foreign investment proposal exceeding M$1 million 
(£137,000) had to be approved by both agencies.  Furthermore, applications were to 
                                                 
616 Interview with Henry Barlow, 6 August 2013. 
617Interview with Marcus Gent, 11 July 2014. 
618 Some of the respondents described Tun Ismail as a skilful though unreasonable man. (Gent, Hopkinson 
etc.). Contrary to that, MacKenzie said he found him very fair and added Tun Ismail had tried to retain his 
services in the plantation industry in later years. If anything, MacKenzie argued, Tun Ismail was harder on 
subordinate Malays whom he thought did not come up to the mark. Interview with Rod MacKenzie, 10 July 
2015. Dr Mahathir Bin Mohamad became Deputy Prime Minister in 1976 and in 1981 was elected as the 
nation’s fourth Prime Minister, a post he held the post for the next 22 years. 
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be accompanied by a schedule for equity transfers.  In response, Fenner and the 
RGA were again called upon to negotiate on behalf of the British estates.  Support 
for the RGA in London was still strong, which gave Fenner the mandate to inform the 
Malaysian authorities that British firms would comply and implement equity transfers 
to Bumiputera or public bodies as demanded.  Rather conspicuously, the RGA was 
not so forthcoming about the provision of 40 per cent equity to other Malay ethnic 
groups. 619   Despite obvious apprehension and some resistance, most Agency 
Houses signed up to the plan and made progress towards compliance. 
 
Agency House Response 
The Agency House boards recognised that a way to achieve the required equity 
transfers and generate goodwill with government was to list company assets on the 
KLSE.  Forming a new Malaysian registered company meant that new capital could 
be issued to avoid dilution of overall asset value.  Crucially, this would also allow the 
boards to ring fence assets outside of Malaysia and could then safely pursue 
business ventures elsewhere.  It further ensured that British shareholders were not 
financially disadvantaged or exposed to any undue risks posed by Malaysian 
legislation.  The strategy particularly suited Harrisons given the company’s more 
globally dispersed business portfolio.  It was a portfolio that continued to generate 
excellent returns, as revealed in Table 7.1. 
 
Table 7.1: Harrisons Figures Extracted from Annual Accounts 1970-72620 
Year Profit 
£m 
Share Capital 
£m 
Share Dividend 
% 
1970 3.526 4.87 20 
1971 5.619 4.87 22.5 
1972 5.912 4.87 27.5 
 
The table shows that profits and dividends at the start of the 1970s were still rising.  
Those annual returns saw the reputation of Harrisons continue to strengthen in the 
                                                 
619 Interview with Marcus Gent, 11 July 2014 and Tate, RGA History, p. 495. 
620 H&C MS37017/11-13, figures extracted from Harrisons Annual Reports to Shareholders, 1970-72. 
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City.  More worrying, though, by 1972, half of group profits was produced by the 
Malaysian estates despite retention of that minority shareholder status. 
 
In contrast, Guthries at the start of the 1970s owned a large number of 
estates in Malaysia.  As previously indicated, those estates produced the lion’s share 
of company revenues, there being little else business elsewhere in the world.  
Therefore, the company board introduced a plan to merge all land holdings and other 
assets in a number of new KLSE listed companies.  This would enable the board to 
retain overall control in London yet still fulfil the requirements of the NEP.  Of course, 
the Guthries estate interests in Malaysia were rivalled only by Barlows and 
Harrisons.  The last papers produced by the Singapore offices, prior to Guthrie’s 
corporate rationalisation exercise, revealed the extent of that consolidated estate 
holding, which is summarised in Table 7.2. 
Table 7.2: Guthries Malaysian Estate Holdings and other Assets at 1970621 
Rubber Estates Rangoon Para Palm Oil Agency 
Beaufort Borneor Sablas North Borneo Twitchin 
Cheviotr Sendayan United Sua Betong* 
Kamuning Simpang Sumatra  
Karmen United Sua Betong  
KMS (Malay) United Temaing Other Assets 
Kombok  Guthrie Estates Agency 
Labu  Guthrie Industries 
Lambak Oil Palm Estates Guthrie Latex 
Ledan Bahru Bukit Badak Guthrie Processing 
Linggi Elaeis Kamuning Tin Company 
Loendoet Hay Renong Dredging 
Malacca Linggi* Renong Mines 
Port Dickson Lukut Malacca*  
Rambau Jelei Pahang  
* Rubber estates with adjoining land given over to oil palm production 
 
The table reveals the breadth of the Guthries estate footprint in Malaysia in 1970.  To 
rationalise holdings, furthermore, the board proposed to sub-divide the estates into 
six separate companies and list each on the KLSE.  In addition, overall control would 
be retained through an LSE holding company, Guthrie Ropel (an acronym of Rubber, 
Oil Palm Estates Limited).  Gent recalled that ‘each of them [the proposed Malaysian 
                                                 
621 Guthrie G/MIN/1: paper listing Guthries Malaysian Assets, 1970. 
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companies] was sufficiently big, it was thought, to fend off the Malaysians.’622  Gent 
went on to outline the steps that were proposed by the board: 
Guthries in an agreement with the Malaysian government formulated a scheme 
to float its land interests in Malaysia in six equal instalments.  The companies 
which owned these instalments were incorporated in Malaysia and the first of 
them was floated on the local market in the 1970s.  The flotation only just 
succeeded.623 
 
As it transpired, in the run up to the first KLSE listing, Guthries was the subject of 
bad press and rumours spread that the estates selected were the worst-performing.  
Some of those interviewed (none of whom worked for Guthries) speculated that this 
singled Guthries out for special treatment by government in later years.624  Whether 
or not the rumours circulating about the estates were accurate, their existence might 
explain the subsequent lukewarm appetite for Guthrie shares shown by the 
Malaysians.  The whole exercise did not endear Guthries to the Malaysian 
authorities and certainly not Tun Ismail of the CIC.  Gent countered that he thought 
criticism levelled at Guthries was unjust and revealed what he believed was the real 
objective of Tun Ismail and other Malaysian officials: 
Even though he [Tun Ismail] was in cahoots with Mahathir [the Malaysian 
Deputy Prime Minister], we spoke to him and we obviously knew they were 
determined to take over the plantation companies, the British ones.  They had 
done the tin companies already.625 
 
Gent did not, though, comment on whether the first estates selected were indeed the 
worst performing.  A point worth highlighting here, though, is that the directors of 
Guthries were meeting Tun Ismail on a regular basis for bilateral meetings.  They 
were therefore not always working in tandem with the other Agency Houses or 
through the RGA.  At the other end of the scale, and disregarding any form of 
cooperation with the CIC, was the chairman of Harrisons, who simply refused to 
meet Tun Ismail.626 
 
                                                 
622 Interview with Marcus Gent, 11 July 2014. 
623 Interview with Marcus Gent, 11 July 2014. 
624 Interviews with Henry Barlow, 6 August 2013 and Lesley Davidson, 4 December 2012. Both believed that 
the first estates selected by Guthries were the worst performing in the company portfolio. 
625 Interview with Marcus Gent, 11 July 2014. 
626 The claim was made by Gent and Barlow about the management of Harrisons (both were involved in 
negotiations with authorities throughout the 1970s).  Indeed the Harrisons archives reveal that the board did 
not enter into formal discussions with Tun Ismail until the early 1980s. 
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 That unwillingness to engage with Malaysian authorities was reflective of the 
business ethos held by successive chairmen of Harrisons, Sir Finlay Gilchrist and 
then Tom Prentice, who took over the reins in 1973.  Prentice, also a Scotsman, had 
like Gilchrist spent much of his working life in Malaysia.  He therefore possessed a 
thorough understanding of Malaysian culture.  However, the new and more forceful 
approach by authorities was still rather unexpected given what had gone before.  In 
response, the board of Harrisons accelerated plans to redeploy business elsewhere 
and protect commercial assets both inside and outside of Malaysia.  It is in this area 
that the directors of Harrisons, yet again, displayed foresight and an undoubted 
corporate proficiency when compared to those similarly affected Agency Houses. 
 
 As noted previously, Harrisons already had an interest in the chemical 
industry that included most prominently the partnership with Durham Chemicals.  
Further investment in that industry was logical, especially now that the Malaysian 
estates were under threat.  In 1973, Harrisons therefore acquired the chromium 
business of Albright & Wilson for £7.5 million and renamed it British Chrome & 
Chemicals.  The board injected £750,000 of capital in R&D and quickly brought to 
market chromic oxide, a component used in the manufacture of jet engines.  In short 
time, the company had secured 90 per cent of the global market for the compound, 
at which stage Harrisons expanded into North America by acquiring another 
chromium firm in Corpus Christi, Texas.627  On 31 December 1975, Harrisons also 
acquired the entire shareholding of Neodex Ltd and added its assets to the Durham 
Chemical Group.  In that year, British Chrome and Chemicals recorded a profit of 
£1.03 million, while the figure for Durham Chemicals was £1.04 million.  The board 
was still investing in plantations, and the annual report in 1975 announced a £20 
million investment in a new oil palm estate in Papua New Guinea.  In that same 
report, the board also announced record profits for Sabah Timber of £4.2 million.628  
It was the commitment to business diversification globally, though, that marked 
Harrisons out from other Agency Houses and moved the company away from 
complete reliance on the Malaysian estates.  In that respect, Harrisons was always 
                                                 
627 H&C MS37189.  Board papers relating to the purchase of Albright & Wilson Ltd., and renaming of the 
company British Chrome and Chemicals dated May to November 1973. See also MS37393 for details on 
Harrisons Canada and USA offices, dated December 1961. 
628 H&C MS37100/2, Annual Report, notes on Group Profits Statement, 1975. 
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one step ahead of the other Agency Houses.  When Tun Ismail turned up the 
pressure on the Agency Houses, Harrisons was in a strong commercial position. 
 
 In time, directors from each of the Agency Houses were regularly summoned 
to meetings with Tun Ismail and asked to provide updates on progress towards 
equity transfers.  All companies consented, apart from Harrisons, who simply refused 
to play ball.  Gent, then chairman of Guthries in Malaysia, recalled the actions of the 
Harrisons leadership: 
The man who was running Harrisons was called Sir Finlay Gilchrist. But the 
Governor of Bank Negara [Tun Ismail] could not stand Harrisons because 
Harrisons would not talk to him.  He [Gilchrist] would not talk to Ismail at the 
bank.  Ismail did not like that.629 
 
That stubborn refusal to engage in discussion clearly infuriated Tun Ismail of the 
CIC, however it was very effective and bought the Harrisons’ chairman time to 
consider options.  It was a lesson in brinkmanship of the highest order at a time 
when Gent and Sir Eric Griffiths-Jones, the London chairman of Guthries, were 
following a more gentlemanly approach.  The Barlows family was in a similar position 
and also decided that it would be preferable to engage with authorities to ensure a 
business future in Malaysia.  To represent the family at the negotiating table, Henry 
Barlow, son of Thomas, was despatched to Kuala Lumpur. 
 
 Henry Barlow arrived in country in 1970 and was immediately pitched into 
discussions with Tun Ismail.  For Henry, the main difficulty was persuading his 
elderly father and uncle to surrender part of the family stake in the company.  Henry 
Barlow offered his take on events at that time: 
When I arrived in country at the beginning of the 1970s, the Malaysians no 
doubt thought we will place pressure on this young whippersnapper and 
thereafter I spent many years trying to persuade my elderly father and uncle 
that they must sell.630 
 
Barlow estate land in Malaysia was now 230,000 acres and was split between the 
Highlands and Lowlands Company and a group of smaller LSE-listed firms.  All 
                                                 
629 Interview with Marcus Gent, 11 July 2014. Gent made this point several times during interview and 
indicated that at the time he and others were somewhat surprised about Harrisons’ refusal to engage with the 
Malaysians. He was heavily involved in discussions with the authorities on behalf of Guthries. 
630 Interview with Henry Barlow, 6 August 2013. 
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estates were located on mainland Malaysia.631  After some initial resistance, the 
family did make concessions.  In 1972, the Edinburgh Rubber Estates Ltd was sold 
to the Malaysian company Sharikat Permodalan Kebangsaan Berhad for M$1 million 
(£147,000).  The accounts for 1972 also revealed that Sungei Siput Rubber 
Plantations Ltd was listed on the KLSE and shares made available to Malaysians.632  
Table 7.3 shows the extent of Barlow Boustead acreage and crops grown in 1971 
compared to figures a decade later. 
 
Table 7.3: Barlow Boustead Acreage and Crops, 1971 and 1981633 
Year Rubber Oil Palm Coconut Cocoa Cattle Total Acreage 
1971 116,528 55,916 8,428 1,637 0 182,930 
1981 54,674 101,118 4,077 3,251 1,000 164,216 
 
The table shows that although the company did sell land in the Highlands group, 
overall this did not represent a major loss.  One additional and important point to 
highlight from these figures was an ongoing replanting programme.  During the years 
1971-1981, oil palm swapped places with rubber as the main crop grown on Barlow 
estates.  This provides further evidence of an industry-wide move into oil palm.  
Thus, despite government pressure, Barlow, like other Agency Houses, was still 
investing heavily in estates.  In fact, some of those investments were made in 
partnership with authorities, as Henry Barlow explained: 
We [Barlows] were regarded as honest and competent, so much so that the 
Federal government insisted, as a condition for helping state governments 
open up land for oil palm, that Barbeal be appointed agents to do the initial 
planning and planting.  We managed several schemes in Kelantan, Trengganu 
and Johor, as well as one for Tabung Haji in Penang.  The other Agency 
Houses had minimal business of this nature.634 
 
It would appear that Barlows' compliance with the NEP requirements was looked 
upon favourably by Malaysian authorities.  It did not, however, pay off in the end, as 
we shall see later in this chapter, not least because Henry Barlow revealed in 
interview that he always suspected the Malaysians were resorting to somewhat 
                                                 
631 Barlows Box 68, papers showing breakdown of estate acreage in family holdings in 1971. 
632 Barlows Box 73/1, the archive papers use an exchange rate of M$6.80 = £1. 
633 Barlows Box 68.  Figures extracted from company holding reports. 
634 Interview with Henry Barlow, 6 August 2013. 
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nefarious practices that included phone tapping to listen into his conversations with 
senior family members in the UK.635  Before looking more closely at the Barlows 
business, however, it is worth touching on the fate of two smaller British Agency 
Houses in Malaysia to demonstrate the extent that authorities were now prepared to 
go to in order to seize control of the estates.  It also provides some context for the 
subsequent demise of the British Agency House in Malaysia. 
 
 The first of these smaller Agency Houses was Sime Darby.  Dennis Pinder 
became chairman of the company in 1967 and, in seven years, managed to multiply 
group profits ten-fold. 636   Henry Barlow recalled Sime Darby and the business 
philosophy of Pinder himself:  ‘Sime Darby in the late 60s and early 70s was headed 
by a man called Pinder who was a very aggressive and basically very successful 
businessman.’637  By the early 1970s, Pinder had the Highlands & Lowlands estates 
in his sights.  However, an offer never materialised.  Henry Barlow explained why: 
He [Pinder] was clearly preparing to make a bid for Highlands and Lowlands in 
the early 70s, and I reckon was within 2 weeks of launching his bid when he 
was arrested on grounds of having his fingers in the pension fund. When 
removed from his position as chairman this provided an opportunity for the 
Malaysians to come in and come in they did. They used their, by then, very 
substantial shareholding to block re-election of certain key expatriate executive 
directors. Immediately after that Tun Tan Sui Sin was nominated by the 
Malaysian government as the first Chairman. That was, equal with Guthries 
Dawn Raid [covered later in this chapter], the most obvious example of 
aggressive and in this case, opportunistic behaviour by the Malaysian 
government to establish control over a key Malaysian plantation operation.638 
 
The personal failings of Pinder proved to be the company’s undoing as it moved 
matters directly into the hands of Tun Ismail.  The subsequent takeover of Sime 
Darby presented the Malaysians with their first formerly British Agency House.  In 
1975, Boustead Holdings Berhad, a company listed on the KLSE, split Malaysian 
assets from those elsewhere and within a year became the next Agency House to 
fall to Tun Ismail.  Of course, Boustead was a business partner of Barlows in Barbeal 
and now 25 per cent of those shares were in Malaysian hands.  Tun Ismail was 
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OUP, 1981), p. 98. 
637Interview with Henry Barlow, 6 August 2013. 
638 Interview with Henry Barlow, 6 August 2013. 
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closing in on Barlows.  While all of this was going on in Malaysia, Finlay Gilchrist of 
Harrisons was devising a plan in London to protect the company’s overall integrity. 
 
Harrisons - from Shareholder to Estate Owner 
The fundamental difficulty faced by Harrisons was similar of all LSE-listed companies 
with assets in Malaysia at that time: that of securing the integrity of the wider 
business while fulfilling the demands of the NEP.  In 1973, the Harrisons board 
successfully fought off a hostile takeover bid by the Rothschild Investment Trust.  To 
protect against subsequent bids, Prentice devised a plan to protect assets outside of 
Malaysia and ring-fence the Malaysian estates: he proposed merging all of them into 
the ‘Three Sisters’ groups.  Thereafter, a new company would be formed and listed 
on the KLSE to enable those NEP equity transfers.  Company regulations required 
that at least 75 per cent of the share register in each of the ‘Three Sisters’ 
companies must vote with the board.  It was here that the limitations of Harrisons’ 
minority shareholder status became apparent. 
 
 Over 75 per cent of shareholders in Pataling and London Asiatic voted with 
the board, however only 73 per cent did so at the Golden Hope EGM in January 
1977.  Genting Highlands Hotel Berhad, a Malaysian company that held 22.4 per 
cent of Golden Hope shares, voted against the resolution arguing that the ‘scheme 
did not go far enough in its measures for Malaysianisation of the companies’.639  As it 
turned out, Prentice had anticipated this and had a back-up plan.  A new motion 
required that just 50 per cent of share equity across all three companies vote with 
the board.  Thus the ‘Three Sisters’ became Harrisons Malaysian Estates Ltd (HME), 
a new UK registered company.640  It was a crowning success for Prentice who firmly 
believed that merging the Malaysian estates would serve best the interests of a 
predominantly British share register.641  On completion, the chairman presented an 
ivory chess set to its bankers, Baring Brothers, stating that ‘what we needed was a 
                                                 
639 The Straits Times, ‘Genting Board to discuss next move to block Merger’, dated 9 February 1977. 
640 Information extracted from various papers in H&C Archives and Eng Kee Goh, ‘Three Sisters in new Merger 
Plan’, Business Times, 13 January 1977. 
641 H&C MS37394, Tom Prentice letter dated November 1977, part of a papers collated by Guy Nickalls for 
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chess player and a street fighter – I was the street fighter’.642  Harrisons was now 
able to secure a majority holding in HME rather than the minority holdings in each of 
the ‘Three Sisters’ companies.  Thus, in 1977, a century after the company first 
invested in the Malaysian estates, Harrisons finally took on the mantle of ownership.  
Furthermore, all other global assets were now out of reach of the Malaysians.  It was 
a corporate goal that the boards of Guthries and Barlows were unable to achieve. 
 
 Unfortunately for Prentice, however, the story did not end there.  His next 
move to transfer the entire share capital of HME to a new KLSE holding company, 
Harrisons Malaysian Estates (holdings) Ltd., was blocked by the Malaysian 
government.  Authorities argued that the transfer of so many estate assets to a 
single company listed on the KLSE would only serve to consolidate the foreign stake 
in the industry.  The Malaysians were justified in this claim as the Harrisons board 
proposed making available just ten per cent of equity in the new company to 
Malaysian investors.643  With no fall-back plan this time, Harrisons was finally forced 
to the negotiating table and a waiting Tun Ismail.  Unsurprisingly, initial discussions 
did not go well, and matters degenerated into a fractious discourse that lasted five 
long years.  The delay again, though, suited Harrisons more as it provided the board 
with time to pursue further redeployment and diversification plans.  Looking back at 
events, in many ways one is forced to admire the guile of successive Harrisons’ 
chairmen, particularly when it was clear that Tun Ismail was bent on seizing control 
of its estates.  The actions taken by each of the Harrisons chairmen, though, most 
probably ensured the company’s survival in later years. 
 
Despite corporate challenges, it is again important to highlight that the Agency 
Houses were still investing in oil palm planting and research and in the wider estate 
industry in Malaysia.  Indeed, rubber enjoyed a global resurgence in the 1970s due 
to the superior properties of latex in the manufacture of medical products like 
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collapsed and some board minutes in Harrisons archives (see H&C MS37697) do indicate that 10 per cent was 
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‘Three Sisters’ companies. 
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condoms and surgery gloves.644  Indeed, rubber production rose in Malaysia, despite 
an overall reduction in acreage due to the introduction of oil palm.645  Global prices 
for rubber also improved. Indeed, in 1973, the commodity was fetching double that of 
the previous year.646  With significant interests in both rubber and palm oil, Agency 
House profits continued to climb.  Some profits went into research which delivered 
major advances on the estates, some of them transformational.  One of the most 
important was delivered by that British-sponsored research in palm oil. 
 
The Million Dollar Bug 
Throughout the 1970s, British estate operators made a number of breakthroughs 
which significantly boosted yields of palm oil.  One particular innovation in relation to 
pollination did more than any other to advance the industry and, again, the value of 
Unilever research in Africa was at the fore.  All estate operators in Malaysia to that 
point had been wrestling with a fruit pollination problem, a task carried out by hand 
every three days.  Davidson provided some detail on what was then an onerous and 
labour-intensive task: 
Previously workers walked along rows every day with rubber puffers to blow 
pollen to the receptive female flowers.  Workers went out to collect more pollen, 
stored them in a freezer, and laboratory workers checked samples through a 
microscope for viability.  They mixed pollen with talcum.  It meant a higher yield 
if the bunches were formed properly achieving a better fruit set.647 
 
In fact, the PAMOL estate in Sabah employed a vast number of workers to carry out 
that single task.648  It was a job that became more difficult as trees grew taller.  
Industry figures revealed that, at 1980 prices, labour costs were on average M$150 
(£40) per hectare just to pollinate oil palm manually.649  This was a massive outlay 
and a sub-industry that swelled overall production costs considerably. 
                                                 
644 Interview with Leslie Davidson, 4 December 2012. Here Davidson argued that natural rubber industry was 
largely saved by global demand for these products. 
645 Barlow, Natural Rubber Industry, p.444: Although estate grown rubber acreage had fallen from over 800 
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 In the early 1970s, Davidson proposed a solution; perhaps an insect could 
pollinate palm fruit.  His idea was based on personal observations at the N'dian oil 
palm estate in the Cameroons where Davidson witnessed flies swarming around oil 
palm inflorescences.  He later recounted: 
I spoke to Dr Greathead, the head of the CIBC [Commonwealth Institute for 
Biological Control], in London.  With his backing I got Unilever to again fund the 
necessary research.  CIBC despatched their scientist, Dr Rahman Syed, to 
Unilever’s plantations in West Africa.  He very swiftly confirmed that the oil 
palm in its natural habitat was insect pollinated.650 
 
After initial resistance, research was eventually commissioned on Unilever estates in 
West Africa.651  Although all estate operators stood to benefit from Unilever research 
once more, this time around, the industry had very little choice as events unfolded.  
In tests, entomologist Dr Syed identified a particular type of weevil as a potential 
pollinator and, in 1980, the insect was transferred to the Royal Botanical Gardens in 
Kew to undergo trials.652  In March the following year, Elaeidobius Kamerunicus was 
introduced to Unilever’s Malaysian estates whereupon the insect spread like wildfire.  
Within a year, every oil palm tree in Malaysia was infested.  MacKenzie, who was 
then a Visiting Agent for Harrisons, claimed it was riskier than some claimed as he 
believed the weevil was released in Malaysia earlier than advertised.653  This was 
refuted by Davidson and indeed, the source of MacKenzie’s claim may lie in an early 
release of the insect in Kuala Lumpur, the details of which were revealed in a book 
on the history of the RGA: 
Incidentally, a premature release in 1981 of weevils into the Lake Gardens of 
Kuala Lumpur caused dismay in the Lake Club and aroused a small outcry 
amongst the local experts at the time.654 
 
The weevils were released by the Malaysian Agriculture Department in Lake 
Gardens under purportedly strict conditions.  The site selected was in the centre of 
Kuala Lumpur, and, there being no other oil palms for miles around, it was believed 
                                                 
650 Interview with Leslie Davidson, 10 July 2015. Davidson addressed this point directly in letter in response to 
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that the insect could not spread.  Davidson did argue that ‘rumours spread among 
some of the planting fraternity who knew very little of what was going on, [and of the 
conditions] that they had been prematurely released.’655  
 
 In any event, the release of the weevil was a major success as subsequent oil 
yields were remarkable.  Palm oil production increased by 12 per cent in the first 
year and continued to rise in subsequent years.656  In 2001, the Malaysian Minister 
of Primary Industries recognised the weevil’s contribution when stating that: 
The effect of the introduction of the weevil had been to increase Malaysia’s 
output of palm oil in 1989 by approximately 400 million tonnes of palm oil and 
300,000 tonnes of palm kernel oil per annum.657 
 
Labour savings on the estates were immediate and Kang Siew Ming, a Malaysian 
scientist involved in the scheme, commented that: 
The combined industry savings ran to hundreds of millions [of Malaysian 
Ringgit] each year, through the dispensation of hand pollination and the gain 
from increase in yield as the result of more compact fruit bunch formation’.658 
 
The RGA estimated that removing the requirement of around 25,000 workers to 
carry out manual pollination saved the industry something like M$15 million (£3.1 
million).659  The weevil thereafter was feted as the ‘Million Dollar Bug’.  In 1990, 
Leslie Davidson and Dr. Syed were awarded the title of Datuk (akin to a British 
knighthood), and, in 2008, Davidson was presented with the Merkeda Award for 
services to the palm oil industry, one of the highest honours in Malaysian society.660  
As of 2016, Davidson was one of only three Europeans to have received that award. 
 
 This is just one outstanding example of the many advances made by British 
firms around the world in the field of tropical agriculture.  Of course, while the prime 
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draft of thesis. 
656 Leslie Davidson, Management for Efficient Cost-effective & Productive Oil Palm Plantations, Keynote Speech 
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motivation for research was essentially profit, these findings have since been 
bequeathed to nations that once played host to British companies.  It is therefore 
reasonable to argue that, without that British capital, research and people, the 
Malaysian palm oil industry would not be in the position of strength it is today.  For 
some former British planters, it is a source of disappointment that advances of this 
sort were never adopted in Nigeria, home of the oil palm.  In any event, this chapter 
now turns to rising tensions between Agency Houses and the authorities, and also 
renewed calls for the indigenisation of higher management posts in all resident 
British companies. 
 
The Agency Houses go it alone 
As issues surrounding equity transfers rumbled on, the Harrisons board used the 
time available to address other aspects of business including the indigenisation of 
key posts in Malaysia.  In keeping with the spirit of Fenner and the RGA, by 1975 a 
number of Harrisons estates were headed by Malays as were four oil palm mills.661  
Moreover, in a rare and conciliatory nod to government pressure, the Harrisons 
board promoted the nephew of the nation’s first Prime Minister.  At the company 
AGM in 1978, Tunku Mansoor Yaacob was unveiled as the new chairman in Kuala 
Lumpur.  Harrisons was not alone in pursuing the indigenisation of posts as each 
Agency House looked to appoint Malays to key positions in-country.  Despite that 
effort, a 1975 study found that 67 per cent of directors in Malaysia’s top 100 
companies were non-Malay and 30 per cent were still British. 662   Moreover, in 
London, there were no Malays sat in the Agency House boardrooms.  It was a state 
of affairs that was subject to occasional questions.  At the Harrisons AGM in 1979, 
for instance, the chairman was asked by one shareholder to explain ‘why are there 
no Malaysian nationals on the board of Harrisons?’  Prentice sidestepped the 
question by responding that ‘there is 146 years of experience in South East Asia 
business sat around the table and maybe in time there will be a Malaysian sat as a 
full board member.’663  One wonders if any of those present actually thought that 
could happen as it was not in the company’s interests to have Malay nationals on the 
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board given the global diversification effort taking place at that time.  Therefore, the 
board of Harrisons in London remained resolutely British and indigenisation was 
reserved for positions overseas. 
 
 The question of Malay representation at the highest levels and Prentice’s 
somewhat evasive response did, though, point to a growing rift between London and 
management in Malaysia.  It would appear that the London boards now believed that 
perhaps a business future lay elsewhere given the drive of Malaysian authorities to 
gain control of the estates.  Therefore, in that respect, the Harrisons board’s reading 
of events and subsequent actions was spot on.  Differences in strategy pursued by 
individual Agency Houses was now more obvious as the collective defence of British 
interests in Malaysia began to fragment.  As a result, the mediating prowess of 
Claude Fenner and the RGA was under-utilised.  Fenner himself voiced frustration at 
the slow and inconsistent progress made by British firms in Malaysia.  Henry Barlow 
recalled that Fenner despaired ‘his efforts were being undermined by the failure of 
the British company community to pull together’. 664   In many ways, Fenner’s 
despondency reflected a shifting mind-set in London to that of business survival.  
British commercial strength in Malaysia was always at its most potent when 
companies worked as one through organisations like the RGA and MOPGC.  The 
fact that the Agency Houses now chose to go their own way was symptomatic of a 
disjointed and, at times, dispirited British company presence in Malaysia.  Henry 
Barlow confirmed this point when commenting on a claim that some of the London 
directors were dragging their feet: 
I suppose towards the end of the 1970s they [Malaysian authorities] became 
aware that some companies were moving faster than others and needed a little 
bit of encouragement’.665 
 
Of course, Harrisons was certainly dragging its corporate feet given the board’s 
previous point blank refusal to negotiate with Tun Ismail. 
 
 Looking at events from a Malaysian standpoint, the slow progress on the 
ground by Harrisons, one of the largest Agency Houses, must have been 
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exasperating.  One can therefore understand the irritation of key Malaysian officials, 
none more so than Tun Ismail, the man tasked with ensuring NEP compliance.  That 
task became a little less complicated when Claude Fenner, one of the last 
universally respected British nationals in Kuala Lumpur, died suddenly in 1978 aged 
just 62.  After Fenner’s death, Tun Ismail changed tack and decided to deal with 
each Agency House individually rather than work through the RGA.  However, when 
that happened, Henry Barlow believed the estate industry suffered as a result: 
The [Malaysianisation] policy changed markedly in the 1980s when Tun Ismail 
was effectively in charge.  The expats were strongly encouraged to leave, and 
many moved directly to Indonesia, thus rapidly restoring management skill and 
expertise which set Indonesia up as a major rival to Malaysia.  It has of course 
now well overtaken Malaysia in planted area.666 
 
Furthermore, the sluggish and piecemeal implementation of equity transfers saw 
matters finally come to a head and force the hand of Tun Ismail. 
 
 Back in 1974, Prentice had warned Harrisons’ shareholders that ‘British 
companies are suffering from the deteriorating relationship between the UK and the 
Malaysian government’.667  A year earlier, the British government withdrew from the 
long-standing trade agreements that had bestowed preferential treatment on 
Malaysia.  That move also impacted on existing trade arrangements held with the 
wider European community, which Britain had just joined.  Therefore, attitudes 
towards the former power were beginning to sharpen in Kuala Lumpur.  This was 
aptly illustrated in a New Straits Times article in 1974 which reported that ‘the winds 
of change are now blowing strongly through Malaysia’s primary industries’.  The 
correspondent cautioned British companies that: 
The mid-term review of the Second Malaysia Plan [NEP] leaves little doubt that 
running tin mines and plantations from boardrooms in London and Singapore is 
no longer acceptable’.668 
 
That mounting challenge to British interests was made official in a letter from the 
International Chamber of Commerce, which demanded that companies immediately 
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put forward plans to transfer equity in accordance with the NEP.  Henry Barlow 
discussed the contents of that letter with his family and advised them that: 
I consider it my duty to state unequivocally that in my judgment all signs point 
to the determination of government to have action and that prevarication and 
backsliding will not be tolerated.669 
 
This was an accurate reading of what was a darkening mood in Malaysian 
government circles.  It is worth highlighting that the Harrisons board would have 
received that same letter and yet, unlike the Barlow family, there appeared to be no  
response.  Certainly, though, Harrisons was not as heavily dependent on the 
Malaysian estates as Barlows and Guthries.  Nonetheless, the muted reaction in 
Harrisons’ boardroom was illuminating.  However, at state level, relations were being 
stretched to breaking point. 
 
 As the decade wore on, there was a further loosening of ties between the 
Malaysian government and British firms and government caused by a number of 
incidents.  The resolve of the Malaysians was strengthened somewhat after the 
British election of 1979 when a new Conservative government implemented a radical 
cost-cutting manifesto.  An early thrust in Thatcher’s neo-liberal strategy was the 
withdrawal of subsidies granted to Commonwealth scholars attending British 
universities. 670   The resulting fee hikes fell disproportionately on students from 
nations that had always sent their brightest brains to Britain.  Malaysia was one such 
nation.  A thirty per cent hike in fees for Malay students may have been small 
change to a British Treasury tasked with slashing public spending, however the 
damage to UK interests overseas ran much deeper.  Gent commented on the 
subsequent backlash experienced by British firms in Malaysia: 
Mrs Thatcher and Dr. Mahathir (Malaysian Prime Minister) got involved in this 
awful spat.  [Subsequently] Britain was to come last in any contract that came 
up for offer.  It took a long time till that rift was healed.  I think the Brits [Agency 
Houses] then didn’t stand an awful chance of getting very far with Mahathir or 
his Brother-in-law [Tun Ismail].671 
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Malaysian sentiment towards the former power dipped further when, in March 1981, 
the new British High Commissioner at his first press conference famously declared 
that Britain had expended ‘not only money but lives and blood on Malaysia in 
ensuring that this country enjoys its independence in peace and prosperity’. 672  
William Bentley’s choice of words was not well received and, perhaps unsurprisingly, 
he was replaced in 1983.  Prime Minister Mahathir also complained about the 
decision to fly Concorde through Malaysian air space without first informing his 
government.  He argued that it was a ‘cavalier attitude’ that evoked colonial times 
and a ‘master-servant mentality’.673  Furthermore, the ongoing reorientation of British 
trade towards Europe alongside some other state-level wrangles incentivised the 
Malaysian agencies to go after those remaining Agency Houses. 
 
 Profits posted by the Agency Houses at the end of the decade did not help 
their cause.  Boosted by an upsurge in global palm oil demand, Harrisons recorded a 
profit of £52.3 million in 1978, half of which came from the estates.  By the end of the 
1970s, Harrisons presided over 235,000 acres of rubber estates, 110,000 acres of oil 
palm and a number of other estates growing coconut, cocoa, coffee and tea.674  In 
1979, Harrisons was ranked by The Times at 91st among all British industrial 
companies by turnover and at 65th in terms of pre-tax profit. 675  At the same time, 
Guthries reported profits of £21 million, although it is important to note that more 
than 90 per cent was generated by the estates division.676   Those figures also 
demonstrate just how much more precarious the Guthries position was at that time.  
Certainly, Guthries had not made much headway in business diversification or 
indeed, redeployment out of Malaysia.  For the Barlow family on the other hand, 
profits in the Barbeal estate management company alone had risen five-fold to over 
£1 million by the end of the decade.677  The fact that most of these profits were 
exported to London did not sit well with the Malaysian government.  The scene was 
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therefore set for a final showdown between the surviving British Agency Houses and 
a, perhaps vindicated Malaysian state. 
 
A major hurdle that Tun Ismail faced was gaining access to shares held by 
large UK-based investment trusts.  Several institutions, including Scottish Widows 
and M&G, had accumulated large equity holdings in the Agency Houses such that by 
1981, Gent estimated M&G held 16 per cent of Guthrie share capital.678  David 
Hopkinson of M&G recalled the motivation for investing overseas and those 
Malaysian estates in particular: 
M&G were the largest UK investors in Malaysia and plantations in particular.  
These companies were high-yielding, registered in London on the Stock 
Exchange [with] no tax complications.679 
 
With dividends still high, fund managers were disinclined to sell.  A regular duty of 
the fund manager was to visit and inspect investments overseas.  However in the 
late 1970s, Hopkinson was forced to add a somewhat unwelcome appointment to his 
diary when in Malaysia.  Hopkinson was a guest of Henry Barlow when in Kuala 
Lumpur and he recalled how evenings prior to meetings with Tun Ismail were spent: 
The head of M&G used to come out on a regular basis to discuss matters with 
Tun Ismail and he used to come and stay with me up in the hills the night 
before he went to see Tun Ismail.  After dinner he would stride up and down my 
living room saying ‘what on earth am I going to say to Tun Ismail tomorrow’.680 
 
If Tun Ismail was going to secure control of the estates, he needed Hopkinson and 
others to sell.  The Agency Houses were well aware of the threat and worked hard to 
maintain that share register.  However, fewer former ‘Malaysian estate men’ now sat 
in the boardrooms of London.  Douglas Gold, another former estate manager with 
Harrisons and Sime Darby, made reference to this (as did others): ‘They [the London 
staff] really were very suspicious of the Far East people. I don’t think they 
understood [us] at all.’681  An emerging lack of unity within and between British firms 
finally created opportunities for the Malaysians.  Hence, Tun Ismail assessed his 
options and singled out the most vulnerable British Agency House for takeover. 
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The Guthries Takeover: the ‘Dawn Raid’ 
Despite mounting pressure to divest assets, Guthries had actually increased estate 
holdings from 175,000 acres to 194,000 acres by 1981.682  During the decade 1971-
1981, the board had, moreover, successfully faced down a number of takeover bids.  
Marcus Gent, who succeeded Griffith-Jones as chief executive, recalled details of a 
defining bid in early 1979 when Sime Darby had managed to accumulate just short 
of 30 per cent of share capital.  Stock market rules dictated that once a takeover 
failed, the bidder must sell all equity held.  The Sime Darby shareholding In Guthries 
was therefore bought by the Malaysian government’s largest fund, Permodalan 
Nasional Berhad (PNB).  The fund had been launched in March 1978 to promote 
indigenous share ownership and somewhat predictably, it was also headed by Tun 
Ismail.  In the aftermath of Sime Darby’s bid, Guthries sold off the Malaysian and 
Singapore merchandising divisions (known in company circles as ‘Pots and Pans’) in 
an effort to defend the core estates.  However, the 30 per cent PNB holding was, as 
Gent claimed ‘the albatross around our neck’.683 
 
 On the morning of 7 September 1981, Gent’s fears were spectacularly 
realised.  The ‘Dawn Raid’, as it became famously known, was a lesson in rapid 
share accumulation by PNB and the funds that cooperated closely with it.  In just 4 
hours of trading on the LSE, PNB had managed to seize a majority holding in the 
Guthrie Corporation.  With that, one of Britain’s oldest Agency Houses had fallen into 
Malaysian hands.  The reaction in the City was one of shock.  London’s Financial 
Times unceremoniously dubbed the action ‘back-door nationalisation’. 684   In 
complete contrast, the takeover was reported in Malaysia as a triumph in the 
ongoing struggle to own national assets.  Prime Minister Mahathir hit the nail on the 
head when he stated that ‘ex-colonial powers are very sensitive about their former 
colonies repossessing what is rightly theirs even though they use established 
commercial means to do so.’685  To the impartial observer it would appear that the 
Malaysian authorities had simply played the British at their own game.  Why, though, 
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was Guthries singled out?  Why not Harrisons, a company that had done more to 
antagonise the Malaysian authorities than any other British firm? 
 
 When posed that question, Henry Barlow referred back to the quality of the 
estates selected by the Guthrie board for a first company listing on the KLSE: 
Although Guthries was first to move and comply with the NEP by setting aside 
estates and transferring them to a Malaysian incorporated and quoted 
company, Guthrie Ropel, the government and in particular Tun Ismail realised 
at a fairly early stage that Guthries had transferred the least profitable of their 
estates to the local company.  I believe it was for this reason that Tun Ismail 
decided that he would make an example of Guthries.686 
 
Gent disputed that view, claiming that the company became an easy target largely 
due to his firm's cooperation with the authorities and a conciliatory approach to the 
NEP when others, (again notably Harrisons) were so obviously stonewalling: 
I think that [Guthries] was singled out because [we] had tried to cooperate with 
the Malaysian authorities up to the time of the Dawn Raid and so seemed to 
them to offer a softer target.  There were enormous repercussions for staff.  
The new owners disposed of practically all of the Guthrie business outside 
Malaysia.687 
 
Of course, the shares held by PNB in Guthries did not do the company any favours, 
and Gent himself acknowledged the enormity of that holding.  He added that, just 
prior to the Sime Darby bid, the Guthrie share price rose dramatically which had a 
knock-on effect on the value of the estates.  Many investors were therefore swayed 
to cash in and sell to PNB.  In a desperate effort to redeploy business outside of 
Malaysia, the board had hastily sanctioned a number of acquisitions to make 
Guthries a less attractive target, however Gent surmised that: 
I think because we were successfully doing that [diversifying the business 
outside of Malaysia], and they [the Malaysian government] could see things 
were becoming slightly awkward, was why we had the ‘Dawn Raid’.688 
 
 There is more to this outside of Gent’s understandably loyal, if prejudiced, 
view on the takeover, however.  Guthries’ annual accounts consistently revealed a 
business that was totally dependent on the Malaysian estates for revenue if 
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compared to the corresponding figures for Harrisons.  The estates, by the early 
1980s, were producing over 90 per cent of Guthries' revenue, while the figure for 
Harrisons, while still high, but was around 50 per cent. 689   Furthermore, the 
willingness of Guthries to engage with PNB at an early stage made the company 
vulnerable to direct and perhaps personal pressure, doubtless orchestrated by Tun 
Ismail.  For Harrisons’ part, its directors were certainly the most obdurate of the 
Agency Houses, and they were led by a strong chairman who refused to cooperate 
with the Malaysians.  Prentice was frequently evasive and seemed more of a match 
for Tun Ismail.  The company was also well advanced in plans to pursue business 
outside of Malaysia, while corporate control was protected by large British funds like 
M&G and Scottish Widows.  That corporate defence was backed by an intricate web 
of cross-holdings and directorships.  In the end, perhaps Guthries was just unlucky 
and suffered due to the obvious obduracy displayed by the Harrisons’ board.  
Moreover, it was well known in Malaysia that the Agency Houses were investing 
outside of Malaysia so time was of the essence to Tun Ismail.  For Barlows and 
Guthries, the global investment drive came too late in the day.  Therefore, Guthries 
was the obvious choice for the Malaysian takeover bid.  Once the takeover was 
concluded, Guthries’ assets outside of Malaysia were hived off and sold.  Gent 
recalled that employees in London were then made redundant.690  The company was 
delisted from the LSE and transferred to the KLSE in 1984.  After the ‘Dawn Raid’, 
the management of Barlows and Harrisons were under no illusions about Malaysian 
resolve to finally bring the curtain down on British custodianship in the estates. 
 
 Even big multinationals like Unilever acknowledged that Malaysia was intent 
on seizing control of the estates.  In an internal paper dated 13 January 1982, the 
Plantations Group advised the Special Committee of that Malaysian resolve.  
Davidson, then chairman of the Plantations Group, wrote that: 
Our plantation interests in Malaysia are still 100 per cent Unilever owned.  The 
recent purchases of control majority in Guthries, Barlows and Dunlop by 
Malaysian investors as well as information obtained from unofficial contacts 
with the Foreign Investment Committee (FIC) have confirmed that the 
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Malaysian authorities are now taking a tougher line and that Unilever must be 
seen to move towards substantial local participation as soon as possible.691 
 
Unilever’s Special Committee thereafter authorised a plan to transfer PAMOL shares 
to the Malaysians.  The management of the Plantations Group had already put 
forward the equity transfer schedule shown in Table 7.4. 
 
Table 7.4: Plantations Group Proposed Equity Transfer Schedule692 
 1976 1980 1985 1990 
Malaysian 20 38 50 70 
Unilever 80 62 50 30 
Equity M$ m 78 100 126 207 
 
As the table shows, a staged transfer of equity moved ownership of the PAMOL 
estates into Malaysian hands by 1990.  In recognition of this, the Malaysian 
authorities authorised the sale of a further 4,000 hectares of land on Sabah to 
PAMOL, again to grow oil palm.693  The retention of a Unilever presence in the 
plantation industry was clearly favoured by the Malaysians, which may well have 
been due to that ongoing and successful research programme referred to earlier.  In 
any case, as a subsidiary with just two estates, PAMOL was never a threat to Tun 
Ismail’s plans when compared to Agency House holdings. 
 
 For Barlows, the method of takeover pursued by Malaysian authorities was 
very different to Guthries, as here Tun Ismail had only two elderly brothers to 
persuade that it was in their best interests to sell.  On the estates, an oil palm 
conversion programme was well advanced, and, in 1981, acreage was double that of 
rubber (see figures in Table 7.3).  That decisive move into oil palm significantly 
boosted group profits, as shown in Table 7.5. 
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Table 7.5: Thomas Barlow & Brother - Profits and Dividends 1970-1981694 
Year Ending Profit 
£ 
Gross Dividends 
£ 
Directors Emoluments 
£ 
1971 210,522 82,191 45,908 
1972 224,869 82,191 63,313 
1973 369,906 100,000 82,874 
1974 552,848 300,000 106,559 
1975 625,851 100,000 76,011 
1976 602,619 160,000 147,297 
1977 713,219 160,000 175,750 
1978 621,688 214,375 214,375 
1979 851,000 278,667 Unknown 
 
The figures reveal that, in a decade, profits quadrupled and dividends paid to the 
family secretariat trebled.  Emoluments paid to family members were also very much 
higher.  The merger with Boustead to form Barbeal left the family with a 75 per cent 
holding in the estate management business.  That holding was split between the two 
elder brothers, Thomas Barlow and Sir John Barlow, and three offspring, Henry, 
John and Mark (Henry was Thomas’s son; John and Mark were Sir John’s).  The 
Barlow family was perhaps viewed a soft target by Tun Ismail.  As such, Henry 
Barlow based in Kuala Lumpur was subjected to intense pressure to persuade his 
family to sell.  In fact, Henry Barlow summarised his position thus: ‘My job in the 
early 70s was to persuade my reluctant family to agree to comply with the Malaysian 
New Economic Policy’.695  In the late 1970s, agreement was reached for the family to 
sell a 30 per cent holding in Barbeal.  That 30 per cent was then split between the 
government agencies FELDA, Tabong Haji and Tabong Tentera.  Henry Barlow 
explained what happened next: 
We then woke up one morning to find that surreptitiously the Boustead side [the 
other 25 per cent of Barbeal from the earlier merger] had also sold out to 
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roughly the same Malay interests.  Thus Barbeal was Malay controlled and the 
family shareholding reduced to just under 25 per cent.696 
 
With the benefit of hindsight, it would appear that events were being orchestrated by 
Tun Ismail as he had clearly secured the Boustead holding in Barbeal in advance of 
the agreement with Barlows.  If the Barlow family had known that, then it is doubtful 
they would have agreed to the subsequent share transfer.  That said, it is difficult to 
see what the family could have done in the long term as it was obvious that the 
Malaysians were working in concert, and Tun Ismail was pulling all of the strings. 
 
 In the fallout, the Highlands and Lowlands estates were rolled into Guthrie 
Ropel leaving the smaller estate firms bound together by a series of cross holdings 
in London.  Henry Barlow described the disposal of the family estate business thus: 
The smaller companies were amalgamated by a scheme of rearrangement in 
London, eliminating cross holdings, and the estates where then transferred to a 
Malaysian Company in which PNB and the Kuok Group [local Trading 
Company] took a majority interest.’697 
 
The Kuok Group then sold its shares to PNB.  With control of estate management 
gone, the Barlow family had little choice but to sell its remaining shares to Lembaga 
Tabung Angkatan Tentera and FELDA for M$30,810,000 (£5,135,000) on 30 June 
1982.698  That brought down the curtain on 150 years of a family presence in the 
estates of Malaysia.  The final accounts for Barlows are revealed in Table 7.6. 
 
Table 7.6: Thomas Barlow & Brother - Final Accounts 1980-81699 
Year Ending Profit 
£ 
Gross Dividends 
£ 
1980 641,700 2,572,000 (50%) 
1981 620,100 2,572,000 (50%) 
 
The Barlow name was then written out of the Malaysian estate industry altogether as 
part of an agreement that ensured the name would not be used in any aspect of 
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estate management thereafter.700  The Malaysian Business Times headline on 25 
May 1982 announced the ‘End of Era for Barlow Family’.701  Henry Barlow offered an 
appraisal of what was an unceremonious exit from the Malaysian estate industry: 
The fundamental weakness of the Barlow business was that my father and 
uncle failed, until it was too late, to realise that in a developing country, political 
considerations are fundamental and will always prevail over the pure 
economics of creating a financially impregnable spider’s web.  A disastrously 
mismanaged foray into Nigeria in the late 50s made my father and uncle deeply 
reluctant to agree to investment elsewhere.  So unlike H&C [Harrisons], we had 
no alternative business to fall back on.702 
 
 Thus, even Henry Barlow acknowledged the effectiveness in Harrisons’ 
strategy to progressively pursue ‘alternative business’ outside of Malaysia.  The big 
question is why the other Agency Houses did not do the same?  For Barlows, there 
may have been an element of fear or reluctance due to an earlier costly failure in 
Nigeria in the early 1950s.  The investment made in a rubber trading venture at Port 
Harcourt, according to Henry Barlow, was a disaster because the family ‘failed 
entirely to adequately supervise the show’.  He believed that, as a result of the 
‘Nigerian fiasco, my father and uncle were so ashamed that I think they destroyed all 
the [business] records’.  He thinks the losses were somewhere in the region of 
‘£50,000-£120,000 over five or six years’.703  As for Guthries, any papers that may 
have revealed diversification effort have been lost along with the vast majority of the 
company’s archives.  However, Henry Barlow did mention that he was travelling to 
Liberia in his role for Sime Darby to assess rehabilitation work on rubber estates.  It 
transpired that those estates were previously owned by Guthries and had fallen 
inactive during the civil war.  Of course, both ventures were in West Africa where, as 
the Nigerian chapters recounted, attitudes to agriculture were problematic.  Those 
ventures aside, however, neither company made a significant effort to diversify or 
redeploy business away from Malaysia and therefore became evermore dependent 
on the estate industry there for revenue. 
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 In the aftermath, the Barlow family used proceeds from the estate sales to 
form an investment trust, Majedie Investments plc, and Henry Barlow acted as 
chairman from 2000-2010.  Henry Barlow himself continued to work in the estate 
industry in Malaysia as director of Guthrie Ropel and Golden Hope.  He remains a 
resident and citizen of Malaysia and was, in 2008, invited to join the board of Sime 
Darby, a position he still occupies at the time of writing. 
 
 The surrender of the Barlow estates demonstrated the determination of Tun 
Ismail to secure overall control of as many estates as possible.  Only one British 
Agency House remained.  However, Harrisons was a very different proposition as 
this company had friends in high places, particularly in the City where it was revered.  
In December 1980, a London stockbroker stated in the Far Eastern Economic 
Review that ‘Harrisons has a certain mystique’ and, ‘the City would defend it come 
hell or high water’ as a ‘bastion of old fashioned integrity and diligence’.704  That high 
standing in the City was vindicated by year on year returns that revealed steady 
growth funded by consistent and rising profit yield, as shown in Table 7.7. 
 
Table 7.7: Harrisons Annual Turnover and Profit figures 1973-79705 
Year Turnover 
£m 
Profit 
£m 
1973 102.7 19.2 
1974 212.1 9.7 
1975 390 14.5 
1976 528 24.3 
1977 579 54.8 
1978 546 54.3 
1979 639 63 
 
The figures show that turnover rose six-fold and profits trebled in a decade.  Once 
the ‘Three Sisters’ estate companies had been merged to form HME in 1977, profits 
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soared.  At the company’s AGM in 1978, the chairman spoke of ‘record profits 
coming out of Malaysia’ and indeed, while the various operations there produced 63 
per cent of profits, the estates generated 50 per cent alone.706  One can conclude 
that revenue generated by the estates was largely responsible for the spectacular 
rise in company profits at the end of the decade.  Dividend awards also increased, 
and investors reaped a magnificent 22.5 per cent return to capital in 1977 alone.707  
It was obvious that, by the end of the decade, HME was the jewel in the company 
crown. The merger of the ‘Three Sisters’ had made Harrisons the largest private 
estate operator in Malaysia.  In HME, Harrisons held 26.4 per cent of share capital 
and a further 7.4 per cent through a number of subsidiaries.708  However, the board 
was still wary and on 15 May 1978 embarked on a plan to secure the entire share 
capital of HME.  Existing shareholders were offered one Harrisons share for every 
five in HME.  When the deadline passed, the board had secured just shy of 82 per 
cent.  That majority holding was way above the equity ceiling promulgated in the 
NEP.  When a planned change of company domicile and transfer of HME equity was 
effectively blocked in 1978, the board had reached an impasse. 
 
 It was no surprise that Tun Ismail viewed toppling the Harrisons Empire a final 
and crucial step to securing effective control of the nation’s estate industry.  
Fractious negotiations around equity transfer rumbled on and yet, at the end of the 
decade, nothing concrete had been agreed.  In light of the earlier Sime Darby coup, 
the Harrisons board was acutely aware of the threat posed to global business assets 
should they lose control in Malaysia.  It was a ‘house of cards’ scenario that the 
board feared and justified that strenuous effort to ring fence the estates and distance 
business elsewhere.  By 1982, nothing had been resolved despite the Malaysian 
takeover of Barlows and Guthries.  The figures in Table 7.8 underscore the fact that 
losing control of HME and the estates would have been a bitter pill to swallow for 
Harrisons. 
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Table 7.8: Harrisons Results on the Malaysian Plantations 1978 - 1982709 
 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 
Turnover (£m) 72 73 66 82 82 
Profits (£m before Tax) 27.2 29.5 29 25.5 21.4 
 
Detailed Breakdown of Harrisons Group 1982 results 
       Turnover  Profit 
Plantations          82   21.4 
Chemicals and Industrial      334     5.4 
Timber and Building       227     7.8 
General Trading       269     5.9 
Financial          3.9 
Property Disposals       10.1 
Associated Companies        4.6 
 
Turnover and Profit before interest    912   59.1 
 
The breakdown reveals that although the estates accounted for just 9 per cent of 
turnover, they produced 36 per cent of profits.  It was therefore logical that Harrisons 
would fight tooth and nail to retain a significant and, if possible, controlling stake in 
the estates.  The main aim of the board was to delay equity transfers for as long as 
possible thereby keeping profits flowing to London.  However, by the 1980s, events 
were turning in Tun Ismail’s favour as other Agency Houses surrendered by various 
means to the PNB. 
 
 Once Guthries had fallen and it became known that the Barlow family 
intended to sell, Tun Ismail turned to Harrisons, the last major British Agency House 
in Malaysia.  PNB had previously secured the HME shares held by Genting Berhad, 
the company responsible for blocking the first motion to merge the ‘Three Sisters’ in 
1977.  The PNB holding was now just 8 per cent but the Harrisons board was aware 
that Tun Ismail was accumulating shares elsewhere with the backing of the 
Malaysian government.  To open a dialogue with Tun Ismail, Harrisons stationed a 
director, John McLeod, in Kuala Lumpur.  In 1980, the board made an offer to 
transfer 30 per cent of HME shares ahead of the 1990 deadline.  That would be 
accompanied by a gentleman’s agreement to continue investing in the estates.  The 
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Foreign Investment Committee intervened and demanded the equity transfer be 40 
per cent and that it take place immediately.  The Harrisons board acceded to that 
demand, although crucially the company would still retain a controlling 51 per cent of 
shares.  It would have come as no surprise when word reached London that the 
Malaysians had changed tack and wanted majority control as soon as possible.  It 
was back to the negotiating table, and it is worth recalling that these meetings took 
place at a time of increased tension between Britain and Malaysia.  Moreover, a 
more nationalist leaning Prime Minister Mahathir, had launched a ‘Buy British Last’ 
policy in October 1981.710  As the dialogue between the parties grew more fractious, 
Harrisons was instructed to deal directly with PNB and Tun Ismail.  The Harrisons 
director, John McLeod, produced a transcript of, what became the defining meeting 
with Tun Ismail. 
 
 From the start, Tun Ismail was a potent and intimidating adversary for London 
company boards.  Indeed, the meeting with John McLeod in Kuala Lumpur on Friday 
11 February 1982 was symptomatic of the man's approach to dealing with the 
Agency Houses.  On that day, McLeod was kept waiting for over 30 minutes before 
being ushered in to Tun Ismail’s office.  The opening remarks set the tone when Tun 
Ismail interrupted his aide during introductions by shouting ‘I don’t want his 
biography details, is he here to negotiate or not?’  McLeod subsequently reported 
that Tun Ismail was ‘hard faced and aggressive’ throughout the meeting and bluntly 
informed him that a transfer of 40 per cent shares in HME should happen 
immediately.  Furthermore, Tun Ismail advised that his Prime Minister had instructed 
PNB to purchase all of Harrisons’ shares in HME.  It was obvious to McLeod that the 
company’s global assets were now under threat.  McLeod proposed shared 
ownership of HME.  Tun Ismail said ‘he would take to the Prime Minister the concept 
of partnership but Harrisons would get just 30 per cent [of share capital in HME].’  
With that, Tun Ismail demanded his offer be accepted there and then.  When 
McLeod said he did not have that authority to do so, it further enraged Tun Ismail 
who roared to his aide ‘Why talk to him if he has no authority’?  With that, Tun Ismail 
brought proceedings to a close and demanded that an answer from the Harrisons 
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board be on his desk the following Monday.  It was late Friday afternoon and despite 
McLeod’s protests (he was flying to London that evening), Tun Ismail refused to 
budge.  McLeod went directly to his office and wired London.  He wrote that Tun 
Ismail would not accept less than 51 per cent of shares in HME and advised that ‘the 
whole of H&C was at risk’ if the board did not accept the offer.711 
 
 On 1 June 1982, just nine months after the Guthrie ‘Dawn Raid’, a Scheme of 
Agreement was announced where PNB would take a controlling position in HME.  To 
facilitate this, a new Malaysian incorporated company, Harrisons Malaysian 
Plantations Berhad (HMPB), was formed to buy out the entire share capital of HME.  
The motion was finally approved by existing HME shareholders on 20 August 1982.  
Harrisons then sold 50 per cent of its HME shares to another Malaysian agency, 
Permodolan Plantations Berhad.  For that transaction, Harrisons received £150 
million along with shares in HMPB valued at around £100 million.712  On 1 October 
1982, HMPB commenced trading on the KLSE.  A paper in the archives revealed 
that HME was struck off the LSE register two years later.713 
 
 The Harrisons board was left with a minority holding of 30 per cent in the 
estates, just as Tun Ismail had indicated at the meeting with McLeod.  The new 
HMPB board of directors consisted of Tun Ismail (as chairman), four senior 
Malaysians and Harrisons very own John McLeod.  In April 1983, HMPB expanded 
with the purchase of Barlows Plantations Sendirian Berhad from PNB for M$159.1 
million (£46.82 million).  In that single transaction, PNB recouped what it had paid for 
the whole Barlow family business.  Furthermore, in April 1983, HMPB acquired a 70 
per cent holding in Jomalina Sendirian Berhad, the nation’s largest palm oil 
refinery. 714    That acquisition was a step towards securing a domestic refinery 
capability.  Despite losing the estates, Harrisons still reaped generous dividends 
from the shares it retained in the now Malaysian registered company.  Moreover, the 
board now had the funds to further pursue opportunities in the chemical industry. 
                                                 
711H&C MS37608, staff report on meeting between John McLeod, Harrisons Malaysian Estates Ltd., Tun Ismail 
and Khalid Ibrahim, his main aide in PNB, 11 February 1982. 
712 H&C MS373/001, Conditions of Sale, loose paper undated. 
713 H&C MS37678, entry in company accounts to Board, paper dated 19 October 1984. 
714 ‘HMPB commences operations’, Berita Harrisons, Vol. 4, No. 3, p. 1, September 1982, cited in Golden Hope 
Story, p. 27. The refinery is located 30 miles west of Kuala Lumpur. 
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Before moving on, it is worth speculating what might have happened had the 
Harrisons board refused to sell to PNB.  Would Tun Ismail have contemplated 
appropriation of those British estates?  It is an unlikely scenario as it would have sent 
the wrong message out to the international investors that Malaysia was openly 
courting at that time.  Doubtless, the fall of the other British Agency Houses left 
Harrisons isolated and an obvious target for further punitive attacks by authorities.  
Therefore, it was probably the case that the Harrisons board concluded the game 
was up and, rather than risk coming away from Malaysia with nothing, believed it 
was prudent to sell.  In any event, Harrisons came out of the sale rather well 
compared to the other Agency Houses.  The method of takeover was very different 
to the more aggressive methods applied to other Agency Houses.  Those had 
included removal of chairman and board representation (Sime Darby), rapid share 
accumulation (Guthries and Boustead) and direct (and allegedly indirect) pressure 
on individuals (Barlows).  It is therefore curious that other European firms including 
the Danish outfit, United Plantations and SocFin, a French/Belgian company, 
survived the foreign cull in the estates.  One could argue there was a crusade to 
remove the British, however, Unilever’s PAMOL survived as did the refinery in Kuala 
Lumpur.  However, in naming these companies we are not comparing like for like as 
the business assets of each Agency House dwarfed the combined holdings of all 
other European firms operating in Malaysia. 
 
 On that subject, Gent made the rather dismissive remark that ‘one hears 
talking a fearful lot about SocFin and Bek Nielsen [United Plantations].  They were 
trivial things, they counted for nothing’. 715   That said, Bek Nielsen was highly 
regarded in Malaysia and, like Fenner, was the only other westerner named a Tan 
Sri, the second most senior federal title in Malaysia.  What worked in Bek Neilsen’s 
favour was the fact that, as owner of United Plantations, he had made Malaysia his 
home and was looked upon as something of a local businessman.  The remoteness 
and indifference of many directors sat in London stood in stark contrast and 
undoubtedly coloured the views of Malaysian officials, particularly Tun Ismail.  That 
                                                 
715 Interview with Marcus Gent, 11 July 2014. See Susan Martin, the UP Saga, (NIAS Press, 2004), pp. 1-356, for 
a glowing précis on the Danish company, United Plantations.  Whilst all interviewees spoke well of Borge Bek 
Nielsen, all argued that the justification in comparative terms is very weak. United Plantations (and PAMOL, 
SocFin etc.) were small in terms of estate holdings and capitalisation if compared to the British Agency Houses. 
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was true of Harrisons, whose chairman simply refused to speak to the Malaysians.  
For the Malaysian government, the Agency House stake in an industry that the 
economy was completely reliant on was too big a threat to ignore.  Moreover, the 
Agency Houses were engaged in, or contemplating, investing outside of Malaysia by 
using the substantial profits that were being generated on the estates.  It was 
therefore inevitable that Tun Ismail would force through share transfers ahead of that 
1990 deadline.  At the start of the 1980s, the British Agency House had simply worn 
out its welcome in Malaysia. 
 
 Assessing the outcome for each of the British Agency Houses is an 
interesting exercise as all were linked in one way or another.  Boustead was the 
easy target given its local listing on the KLSE and Singapore stock exchange.  The 
early fall of that company gave Malaysian authorities the leverage to go after 
Barlows.  Barlows was perhaps unfortunate to be lumped in with Harrisons, Guthries 
and Sime Darby.  Just about all of the family business was in Malaysia by the 1970s 
and a large slice of profits was actively ploughed back into the estates there.  Sime 
Darby and later Guthries, on the other hand, were slow to react and redeploy or 
diversify business out of Malaysia.  They were, however, viewed as part of a British 
Agency House cabal that exerted majority control over the estate industry both 
before and after independence.  In any case, on the subject of business 
diversification and redeployment, Gent had this to say: 
Whatever we did [elsewhere], the plantation companies became more and 
more rich. Most of the share profits we received came from the plantation 
companies. We obviously knew they [the Malaysians] were determined to take 
over the plantations, the British ones.716 
 
 In assessing the final days of the Agency House in Malaysia, it is obvious that 
the proficiency displayed by Harrisons management down through the years placed 
the company in a strong commercial position elsewhere to survive losing the 
Malaysian estates.  By the early 1970s, all of the Agency Houses were aware that 
their position in the Malaysian estate industry was under threat.  However, Harrisons 
was the only company with a plan to resist and pursue business elsewhere.  Most 
directors of Harrisons had previously worked in Malaysia and were perhaps aware 
                                                 
716 Interview with Marcus Gent, 11 July 2014. 
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that there would be an end date to British ownership in the estates.  On that subject, 
Mackenzie recalled the words uttered by a previous manager who advised him of his 
moral obligations: 
This land is not yours, we have it on a 100 year lease so it will be returned to 
the government and it is our responsibility to make sure that that land is 
returned in as good if not better quality than what it was when started.717 
 
Of course, advice of this sort is all very well on the ground, so to speak; it is a 
completely different ball game when your moral compass is guided by a company 
balance sheet and shareholders who expect dividend awards year on year.  For 
those London boardrooms, retaining the revenues generated on the estates for as 
long as possible became the primary aim.  If the estate industry and the Malaysian 
economy benefitted as a result then that was merely a positive spin-off for the host 
nation.  To hedge against losing the estates, Harrisons ploughed profits into other 
sectors, most notably the chemical industry.  Furthermore, most new ventures were 
in the west and therefore easier to defend at corporate level.  Harrisons held true to 
that multi-faceted and highly diversified Agency House business model that was a 
commercial feature in so many British colonies during the imperialist era.  In an 
interview with the Sunday Telegraph shortly after the equity sales had been agreed 
with PNB, the Harrisons chairman Tom Prentice stated that: 
We are a conglomerate.  We are a group with four clear divisions: plantations, 
chemicals and industry, timber and, building and general trading.  Our intention 
is to acquire and expand where we have a position in existing management 
skills.718 
 
True to the company’s word, Harrisons continued to invest in the estates, and, in the 
annual accounts for 1984, the chairman reported a £20 million investment in a new 
oil palm plantation of 15,000 acres in Papua New Guinea.719  The company always 
appeared to be ahead of competitors and demonstrated a flexible and dynamic 
approach to business that was reflected in the breadth of operations by the 1980s.  
Indeed, despite losing the estates, turnover breached the £1 billion mark in 1983 and 
in the next year it was £1.5 billion.  Those results generated profits of £65.7 million 
                                                 
717 Interview with Rod Mackenzie, 4 November 2012.  MacKenzie is recalling a quote by Ken Stimpson, former 
manager of Harrisons, in conversation. 
718 H&C MS373/001, ‘So where does Harrisons go from here?’, Sunday Telegraph, 6 June 1982. 
719 H&C MS37017/1, Chairman Report to Shareholders at the 1984 AGM. 
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and £97.3 million respectively.720  Clearly the board’s resolve to pursue a thoroughly 
diversified commercial portfolio was vindicated.  It is precisely for that reason that the 
company survives today under the same corporate governance, albeit with a new 
name, Elementis plc.  The only other notable change is that the company 
headquarters are now in Caroline House, High Holborn in London, not Great Tower 
Street where the original partners first launched a tea venture that subsequently led 
to a commercial odyssey overseas.721 
 
 In the aftermath of the HME takeover, Harrisons made further investment in 
the chemical industry and, in 1988, the accounts revealed that that side of the 
business had generated greater profit than the estates, as Table 7.9 shows. 
 
Table 7.9: Harrisons Profit Totals by Division 1982 and 1988 722 
Division 1982 
£m 
1988 
£m 
Plantations 41.6 23.8 
Chemicals and Industry 10.3 34.2 
 
The figures reveal a remarkable transformation in the business in just six years with 
no adverse effect on profits.  Tom Prentice handed over to George Paul in 1984 and 
retired three years later in the post of chairman.  He was replaced by David 
Hopkinson, previously of M&G.  Again, Hopkinson’s appointment demonstrated that 
it was a small and perhaps incestuous world in London boardrooms.  Paul, the new 
chief executive, was not so sentimental about the estates, having come from the 
farm feed sector.  Harrisons’ last link to the Malaysian estates was severed when 
Paul returned from a trip to the Far East in late 1988 (this was his first visit despite 
being chief executive for four years).  In Kuala Lumpur, Paul sought out Henry 
Barlow for advice.  Barlow gave this somewhat amusing account of that encounter: 
Shortly after I left Barlow Boustead I received a telephone call from Paul, who 
was out on pretty much his first visit to Malaysia. He came along to ask my 
advice because the proposals at that stage were that Harrisons in London 
should retain a 30 per cent stake with 70 per cent being owned by Malaysians 
                                                 
720 H&C MS37021-2, figures extracted from Annual Report of Accounts, 1983 and 1984. 
721Corporate Head Office for Elementis plc is now, Caroline House, 55 - 57 High Holborn, London WC1V 6DX. 
722 H&C MS37020-26, figures extracted from Annual Report of Accounts, 1982 and 1988. 
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of various kinds.  I said that I thought that it would not be an easy position but it 
would be an enormously profitable position if they were prepared to stick by 
their 30 per cent stake and hang onto it.  He said ‘thank you very much indeed 
for your advice’, and went straight back to London and sold the lot.723 
 
On 3 March 1989, Harrisons sold its remaining 30 per cent holding in HMPB for £145 
million and, with that final act, brought down the curtain on a business association 
with Malaysia that stretched back to 1865 when Messrs Harrisons and Crosfield first 
bought into the Victoria sugar estate.724  In the intervening years, Harrisons, like the 
numerous other British estate operators, bequeathed an industry and business ethos 
that, to this day continues to provide so much for so many.  On the Elementis 
website, all that remains of that role in the estates of South East Asia is an entry on 
the ‘about us’ page which is reproduced below. 
 
Image 7.1: Elementis plc Company History Extract725 
1844 
Harrisons and Crosfield is formed by two brothers, Daniel and Smith Harrison, 
and Joseph Crosfield to trade in tea and coffee. From here the company soon 
developed into a global trading and tropical plantations company with estates 
producing tea, coffee, timber, oil palm and rubber. 
 
Of all the Agency Houses that dominated the estates of Malaysia, Harrisons survived 
where Barlows, Boustead, Guthries, Sime Darby (as a British company), alongside 
others elsewhere in the world, were consigned to the annals of business history.  A 
British estate presence in Malaysia survived for just a few more years after the 
1980s. 
 
 In December 2002, Unilever sold the last of the company’s PAMOL shares for 
€152 million (£97 million) to the Malaysian company Palmco of Malaysia, a 
subsidiary of the IOI Corporation.726  It was something of a surprise as the company 
was not put under pressure to sell.  However, Davidson surmised that it was a logical 
step: 
                                                 
723 Interview with Henry Barlow, 6 August 2013. 
724 Golden Hope Story, p. 19. 
725 Elementis plc, see <http://www.elementisplc.com/about-us/history/>, (accessed, 25 August 2015). 
726 Unilever website, <https://www.unilever.com/news/press-releases/2002/02-12-02-Unilever-sells-
shareholding-in-Malaysian-palm-oil-estates-to-Palmco.html>, (accessed, 1 August 2016). 
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There is no longer anything which Unilever can contribute to oil palm plantation 
technology, although there may be other ways in which it can contribute. 
Malaysia companies are now recognised as the world's experts in oil palm 
cultivation.727 
 
It was Unilever alongside those Agency Houses that constructed then left behind an 
estate industry and global palm oil trade that leads the world today.  To repeat a 
comment made by Raja Alias ‘the pillars of development [for Malaysia] were built on 
the primary resources of Tin and Rubber.  A third pillar was added in Palm Oil.’728 
 
 When Unilever sold, that appeared to be an end to the British company in the 
estates of South East Asia.  However, at the height of Agency House takeovers, a 
British firm was quietly accumulating shares in oil palm estates in Malaysia and 
Indonesia.  The M P Evans Group, at the time of writing, owns oil palm estates in 
Malaysia and Indonesia alongside a few other assets in Australia.  The company had 
accumulated 51,000 hectares (126,000 acres) of estate land, just over three quarters 
of Barlows Highlands & Lowlands acreage back in 1982.729  The company is listed 
on the LSE Alternative Investments Market with headquarters in Tunbridge Wells.  
Moreover, M P Evans also has a commercial history that stretches back into the 19th 
century and the tea trade, much like that of Harrisons.  Over the intervening years, 
the company has moved into rubber, just as Harrisons did, and, in the early 1900s, 
acted as secretary for the LSE listing of rubber estate firms located in South East 
Asia.  Perhaps therefore, the Agency House business model lives on overseas after 
all.  A postscript to this: on 25 October 2016, the Malaysian company Kuala Lumpur 
Kepong Berhad made an offer for the entire shareholding in M P Evans at £360.5 
million.730  That offer provided existing shareholders with a premium of over 50 per 
cent and further indicated that Malaysian buying activity is not yet finished in respect 
of the estates.  The exit of the British Agency House from the estate industry was 
also not the end of the palm oil success story in Malaysia. 
                                                 
727 Leslie Davidson, paper for the Rubber Growers Association, February 2002. 
728 Raja Alias, 6 November 2013, Email response to question by author. 
729 Extracted from M P Evans, see <http://www.mpevans.co.uk/mpevans/en/home>, (accessed, 25 August 
2015).  Barlow Archives, Box 74/2. Barbeal total estate acreage 241,000 in 1982. 
730 LSE Regulatory News Service, ‘Cash offer for M P Evans Group PLC by Kuala Lumpur Kepong Berhad’, 25 
October 2016. See < http://www.shareprice.co.uk/MPE/M-P-EVANS-GROUP#news/news-rns>, (accessed, 26 
October 2016). 
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Today’s Malaysian Plantation Industry 
In 2013, revenue from palm oil exports provided between five and six per cent of the 
Malaysian Gross Domestic Product (GDP).  That figure was M$80.3 billion (£16 
billion) of a commodity total of M$130 billion (£26 billion), in other words over sixty 
per cent. 731   These figures are all the more remarkable when compared to 
corresponding figures for palm oil in 1973, which were then just M$529 million (£93 
million), just seven per cent of the nation’s take from commodity exports.  The 
emergence of palm oil as a global commodity in the past half century has been 
nothing short of astonishing.  Of the total land coverage for the ten major oilseed 
commodities, oil palm covers just over five per cent, but produces 32 per cent of 
global oil and fats supplies.  In downstream trade, Malaysia no longer exports raw 
palm oil (CPO).  In 1995, Malaysian companies operated 53 refineries producing 8.6 
million tonnes of Processed Palm Oil (PPO) each year. 732   That downstream 
capability has ensured that full commodity product value is now realised in Malaysia.  
In terms of company structures, Sime Darby inherited the bulk of the former British 
estates.  That company now employs over 100,000 people in commercial operations 
spread across the world.  In 2015, the Sime Darby accounts reported a turnover of 
£6.76 billion and a gross profit of £512 million.733  To this day, the company is run, 
more or less, like the British Agency House that preceded it with a thoroughly 
diversified portfolio which includes industrials (agents for Caterpillar), motors (agents 
for a number of brands including Audi, Land Rover and Volkswagen), logistics 
(running ports and waterways) and property (includes hospitality).  A core division 
within the Sime Darby group remains the estates.  With a board of directors 
answerable to shareholders and a corporate structure reminiscent of those 
companies that once commanded the Malaysian private sector, it would appear that 
the Agency House business model is still very much alive. 
 
 This final chapter set out to look at the final days of the British Agency House 
in Malaysia.  Certainly, without the capital, the people and the research commitment 
                                                 
731 MPOB, see <http://www.palmoilworld.org/sustainability.html>, (accessed, 25 August 2015). 
732 Sime Darby, see <http://www.simedarby.com/upload/Palm_Oil_Facts_and_Figures.pdf, figures extracted 
from Oil World 2013, (accessed, 25 August 2015). 
733 Sime Darby, see < http://www.simedarby.com/upload/Sime%20Darby%20Annual%20Report%202015.pdf>, 
(accessed, 1 August 2016). 
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of those companies, Malaysia’s position at the head of the global estate industry 
would not be as it is today.  Much of that success is because of the adoption of oil 
palm by those former British estates, a crop that the Agency Houses introduced in 
the years following Malaysian independence.  That those same British firms were 
able to retain dominant commercial positions for so long and thereby expand estate 
holdings in Malaysia stands in stark contrast to companies like UAC in Nigeria.  The 
subsequent demise of UAC was a consequence of the short-sighted and nationalist 
driven rhetoric that was a feature in many former colonies at the end of British rule.  
That does not ignore the part played by the previous colonial authorities in framing 
policy for the nationalist regimes that followed.  This was plainly evident in an 
agriculture sector on which both nations depended at independence.  For Malaysia 
though, it is palm oil that has supplied the nation with an economic ‘pillar of 
development’.  That prolonged accommodation of British firms allowed the Agency 
House to progress an investment strategy that has seen the nation’s estate industry 
become the world leader it is today.  As Raja Alias plainly stated when asked about 
the legacy of those Agency Houses: 
I have to acknowledge that the British companies made a huge contribution to 
the economic development of the country both prior and post-independence.  
They trained and developed a pool of talented local planters who continued 
with the work of the British companies, for which we are most grateful.734 
 
  
                                                 
734 Raja Muhammad Alias, Director General, FELDA 1969-79, Chairman, FELDA 1979-2001, email response to 
questions dated 6 November 2013. 
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Chapter 8: Conclusion 
Brief Summary 
This thesis set out to compare a number of overseas Agency Houses and their trade 
in the former British colonies of Malaysia and Nigeria.  To achieve this, the research 
placed the firm at the centre of the analysis and examined company formation, 
subsequent corporate structures, specific areas of trade and, finally, evolving 
commercial strategy and outcomes in a changeable business environment in host 
nations.  The thesis argues that such was the commercial prominence of those 
companies overseas, both during and after imperialism, that it is impossible to 
consider the individual economic histories of each nation without including them.  As 
such, the research uncovered a number of factors that were specific to each nation 
in terms of trade and legislation.  As largely agriculturally based and commodity 
export-orientated economies, it was the British company that dominated the private 
sector during imperialism and for a number of years under nationalist rule.  It was 
that British-managed trade in commodities as constructed in Victorian times that 
continued to generate most of each nation’s revenues, public and private, at and in 
the aftermath of independence.  The fact that the trade was still directed by those 
Agency Houses long after British rule became a source of nationalist impatience 
and, thereafter, a major influence in subsequent government policy as both Malaysia 
and Nigeria pursued economic independence from the former colonial power. 
 
 The thesis thereafter considered the policies chosen by the government of 
each nation (including the undeniable legacy of British rule) to identify areas in which 
legislation either facilitated or inhibited Agency House business growth.  The 
legislative approach adopted by host nations also, by extension, determined the 
business longevity and fate of those Agency Houses.  This thesis argues that 
business development in Malaysia, particularly in the estate industry, was 
significantly boosted by the accommodation of those Agency Houses by colonial and 
then independent Malaysian government authorities.  In the case of Nigeria, that 
contributory role for the Agency House was not replicated before, and especially 
after, independence.  Moreover, the Nigerian commodity trade, which had flourished 
under British rule, languished thereafter and was quickly surpassed by the estate 
industry in Malaysia.  It was no coincidence that the Nigerian commodity trade went 
into steep decline after British firms, like UAC, ceased their involvement.  This was 
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most evident in a Nigerian palm oil industry, which had once led the world in terms of 
production and exports. 
 
Nigerian Business and Economic Synopsis 
In Nigeria, British business dominance was as strong as ever at independence and 
was largely exercised by just one company, UAC, known widely as the ‘Business 
Octopus of Africa’.   From company inception in 1929 following mergers of firms that 
had existed since the late 19th century, the management of UAC had pursued an 
exhaustive business acquisition strategy in Nigeria that was designed to seize 
control of large swathes of the private sector.  UAC management was so successful 
in this strategy that, at independence, there was very little in the way of competition 
in a number of business sectors.  However, after independence, the Nigerian 
economy performed badly, which contrasted particularly with the relatively 
successful economic performance experienced in Malaysia.  It is an indictment of 
successive Nigerian regimes that most of those economic woes have been self-
inflicted due to unremitting political strife, endemic corruption and tribal conflict.  
Therefore, a number of factors underpin the nation’s economic weaknesses, and 
some stand out more than others.  One major failing has been an inability of 
government to nation-build and foster unity across religious and tribal divides.  An 
early indication of this can be found in an adopted federalist mode of government 
after British rule.  Central government was fragile from the outset due to the fact that 
leading politicians were allowed to govern from tribal heartlands: the Hausa to the 
north, the Igbo to the east and the Yaruba in the west. Conflict over government 
spending priorities was therefore inevitable and plagued development progress 
thereafter.  Weak regime was replaced by weak regime, and politicians fell back on 
populist rhetoric that was frequently ill-conceived, often retaliatory and, more often 
than not, targeted the business interests of the former power.  For its part, UAC 
management always distanced the company from individual politicians or parties.  
However, that lack of engagement or indeed affiliation with the political elite did not 
sit well in a nation where corruption was endemic and part of an emerging business 
culture.  Thereafter, the lack of patronage saw UAC, the leading foreign commercial 
enterprise in the region, shoulder the brunt of punitive legislation introduced by self-
interested politicians, many of whom were businessmen in their own right. 
 
262 
 Another key factor that fuelled a culture of corruption in high office can be 
found in an early move by government to replace British expatriates and civil 
servants with nationals in 1961.  Subsequently, over-staffing only succeeded in 
creating a bloated civil service where corruption became rife.  One recalls a 
comment made by Thomas that the possession of a rubber stamp in Nigeria 
conferred power on the holder.735  Some of the more shady practices in public office 
certainly found their way into the private sector.  UAC, however, perhaps 
idealistically, kept them at arm’s length despite some indications that other 
competing foreign firms were indulging in them.  Thereafter, an indigenisation 
programme introduced by government rather hastily after the civil war in 1970, failed 
to contemplate the wider consequences for the economy.  An indigenisation policy 
that was designed to rebalance private sector wealth only succeeded in exacerbating 
inequality and destroying the business of UAC. 
 
 As indicated previously, the Nigerian economy at independence was very 
much agriculturally based and built around a commodity trade that, in some 
products, especially palm oil, led the world.  Much of that success was due to the 
role played by British companies like UAC.  A subsequent lack of investment in 
agricultural and constant government interference in the downstream commodity 
trade formed the underlying reasons for UAC’s decision to exit the trade altogether.  
Thereafter, the Nigerian economy was unbalanced by the discovery of oil in the 
Southern Delta region and subsequently by even more questionable financial policy 
and practices.  In short order, Nigeria became almost completely dependent on oil 
exports for revenue.  World Bank figures in 2008 revealed that oil exports accounted 
for over 92 per cent of revenue, while agriculture contributed just two per cent.736  
This was a complete change to the more balanced economy immediately after 
British rule.  Somewhat predictably, plummeting oil prices in 2015 hit the economy 
hard, with The Economist forecasting that Nigerian government finances would 
decline by 40 per cent.  The lack of economic diversification—indeed the growing 
reliance on a single commodity for export earnings—since independence has 
                                                 
735 Interview with Tony Thomas, 6 July 2014. 
736The World Bank, see <http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/FP.CPI.TOTL.ZG/countries?page=5>, (accessed, 
25 August 2015). 
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rendered the nation a net food importer which, at the time of writing, costs the 
government $4.3 billion annually.  The same Economist report also damningly stated 
that ‘a country that should be the region’s bread basket cannot even feed itself’.737 
 
 As far as UAC itself was concerned, though, this thesis has argued that, 
although ensuing government treatment of resident British firms like UAC was largely 
punitive and short-sighted, it did not happen overnight.  Many of the subsequent 
difficulties faced by UAC in Nigeria could have been tempered by early and decisive 
action by management to reduce commercial dependency on one nation.  However, 
the UAC board in London was, at independence, accustomed to operating 
autonomously with very little input from the parent company, Unilever.  It would seem 
that management failed to grasp fully the threat posed to its business as a whole if 
the trade on ‘the Coast’ deteriorated.  A strategy of business diversification and 
redeployment came too late, and most endeavours suffered from inadequate 
managerial oversight.  By the 1980s, revenues from ‘the Coast’ trade had all but 
dried up, and the company could not be saved.  Unilever, the parent company, must 
also shoulder some blame, though, as there was very little in the way of oversight of 
a subsidiary that was once held to be ‘the brightest feature in Unilever’s crown’.738  
Taking into account all of the factors that contributed to the eventual demise of UAC, 
it is little wonder that the Nigerian economy deteriorated so markedly to a point 
where, to this day, business conditions remain challenging to say the least.  That so 
many multinationals will still not invest in that nation is an obvious attestation to the 
business environment that persists today and is an indication of the challenge that 
the Nigerian government still faces. 
 
Malaysian Business and Economic Synopsis 
A strength-in-numbers dynamic that was frequently evident among the Agency 
Houses in Malaysia made for a powerful business lobby both in imperialist times 
and, thereafter, in the independent Malaysian state.  Under British rule, Malaya 
became a major producer and supplier of raw materials to western industries and, 
most obviously, home to an estate industry that rapidly expanded to command the 
                                                 
737 The Economist, ‘Special Report: Nigeria: After Oil’, 30 June 2015. 
738 Unilever GB 1752.OH/5: Phrase from interview with James Keir, Legal Advisor to UAC, 30 March 2004. 
264 
global rubber market.  That industry growth was largely financed by British investors 
and prosecuted by a vast number of FSCs from the beginning of the 20th century.  
During those years, a particular type of firm rose to the top of the industry through a 
strategy of steady accumulation of equity and commercial assets: the Agency 
House.  At the end of British rule in the region, a business-as-usual business 
environment was assured with the election of an amenable and sympathetic coalition 
government.  As in imperialist times, development of the estate industry continued 
apace, funded by that resident British business strength and the resultant influx of 
capital from British investors.  Although the Agency House has long since departed 
the estates of Malaysia, the industry has continued to go from strength to strength as 
part of a wider economy that has surpassed other former British colonies in terms of 
performance.  In 1990, the Malaysian government launched a ‘Vision 2020’ strategy 
to achieve developed nation status within 30 years.  Although that target date may 
well have slipped, there is little doubt that this ambition was built on solid political and 
economic foundations.  For that reason, self-rule in Malaysia can be viewed a rare 
success when compared to other former British colonies such as Nigeria.  
Comparing the business conditions that existed in Malaysia to those in Nigeria, 
allows us to build a compelling case that supports the argument that a large part of 
the post-independence economic performance of former colonies can be explained 
by the historical role played by the Agency Houses that once commanded trade and 
industry across each nation. 
 
 Long-term economic planning has always appeared to be a feature of 
Malaysian governance and one that has seen a relatively stable regime first 
accommodate, then manipulate and finally buy out the business assets of the 
Agency Houses.  Furthermore, this all took place in an era following British rule that 
became increasingly dictated by global events and trade.  Since the start of the 20th 
century, successive regimes in the Malaysian area, colonial and national, have 
successfully attracted significant levels of foreign, mainly British, investment, much of 
which was encouraged by a willingness to free up land for estate development.  This 
consistent ruling policy paved the way for a massive rise in rubber, and 
subsequently, palm oil production.  It is a policy and development strategy that has 
also empowered vast numbers of rural and indigenous people in Malaysia.  The 
growth that took place in the estate industry was also a precursor to business 
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consolidation that saw the Agency House emerge as a compelling commercial 
powerhouse in the region.  However, by the 1970s, that conciliatory approach of 
government was steadily supplanted by an ever more insistent crusade to seize 
control of national assets from distant London boardrooms.  Faced with mounting 
pressure, each of the Agency Houses eventually capitulated to Malaysian agencies 
as the previous strength-in-numbers dynamic began to weaken.  Of all the Agency 
Houses selected for extensive analysis by this study, it was Harrisons that 
demonstrated a particularly adept handling of events, and especially that of 
countering Malaysian government pressure.  It was largely because of that 
boardroom prowess that the company was able to fend off government agencies 
long enough to enable a comprehensive redeployment of business.  For that reason, 
Harrisons continues to operate today under a new company name, Elementis plc. 
 
Contrasting Company Structures in Malaysia and Nigeria 
A major challenge for this study was to make comparisons between the company 
evolution that took place in each nation under imperialism and, thereafter, the trade 
strategy each of the selected firms prosecuted.  In Malaysia, there were a number of 
Agency Houses that emerged to dominate and direct the estate industry in Malaysia.  
In Nigeria, just one company, UAC, emerged to dominate much of the trade across 
the wider region.  That did not include commodity production, which remained the 
remit of indigenes only in that particular country.  The thesis argued that those 
different company structures and trade therein had a direct bearing on host 
government policy which, in turn, determined foreign investment and thereby the 
subsequent development that took place in particular sectors.  For this study, the 
sector highlighted was agriculture. 
 
 For Nigeria, British company and trade representation in the private sector 
was rather straightforward.  UAC controlled so much that it was every bit the true 
‘Business Octopus of Africa’ at independence.  However, that obvious commercial 
prominence was at the same time a clear and painful reminder of British imperialism 
and, as such, UAC became a symbolic target for nationalist resentment.  UAC’s 
status as a subsidiary to Unilever certainly offered management the financial 
strength that was not so readily available to other standalone enterprises in Nigeria.  
That said, the thesis argued that UAC leadership, at times, can be accused of resting 
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on their laurels as they did not exhibit the level of dynamism required to keep such a 
huge business afloat in difficult times.  UAC was perhaps looked upon as too big to 
fail, a view that has frequently preceded the demise of many large companies down 
through the years.  It certainly did not help matters when the board chose to register 
parts of the business locally as early as the 1950s.  Thereafter, any corporate 
protection offered by London was eroded by Nigerian indigenisation of equity and 
business assets.  It was further claimed by the thesis that UAC was slow to respond 
to an emerging nationalist agenda in Nigeria, particularly after the civil war ended in 
1969.  That political agenda steadily eroded trading conditions for all foreign firms, 
and, for most, business redeployment was the only option.  The thesis also 
suggested that the commodity trade could have provided UAC with significant 
revenue outside of Africa. The abdication of management responsibility for Unilever 
estates, quickly followed by the decision to exit the commodity trade altogether, was 
a commercial ruling by head office that would come back to haunt the company in 
later years.  Any form of participation in the commodity trade in Malaysia could well 
have bought the UAC board the time, not to mention the revenue, to enable a level 
of business redeployment away from Nigeria.  As events transpired, Unilever’s 
Plantations Group took over that estate management role and expanded interests in 
palm oil with notable success, although mostly in Malaysia. 
 
 For many reasons, most of them self-induced, the Nigerian private sector was 
never an attractive proposition for foreign investors, outside of the oil industry, after 
British rule.  The emergence of a large oil industry denuded agriculture of 
investment, both domestic and foreign, as the economy went down the route of the 
aforementioned ‘Dutch Disease’ model.  For UAC’s ‘Coast’ trade, the cumulative 
erosion of profits and constant demands for equity transfer undoubtedly took their toll 
and culminated in a situation where the London board was forced to surrender 
control of assets overseas.  Right till the very end, the business of UAC remained 
almost totally dependent on Nigerian trade.  Therefore, when the host nation’s 
economy went into tailspin at the end of the 1970s, UAC’s profits followed suit.  The 
McKinsey audits of 1984 and 1986, in many ways, arrived too late in the day.  By 
then, ‘the Coast’ business was in terminal decline, and the fate of UAC was sealed.  
With no Plan B, the parent company was forced to wield the axe and, as such, little 
remains in Nigeria today to remind of that former British Agency House. 
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 In Malaysia, a larger number of similarly sized and positioned British firms 
frequently demonstrated collective commercial strength through well represented 
and formidable trade bodies like the Malaysian Oil Palm Growers Council and the 
Rubber Growers Association.  That British business strength proved too robust for 
an early nationalist regime to consider moving against.  Instead, the government 
decided to maintain a business status quo which allowed the Agency House to 
steadily increase estate interests.  That business environment and company 
structure also suited British investors and became a crucial enabling factor for the 
former British colony in terms of development strategy.  The historian Sarah 
Stockwell reported that total British capital invested in all of the former colonies 
actually rose between the years 1952 to 1965 from £4,000 million to £11,000 
million.739  In Malaysia, and given what has been highlighted within this thesis740, a 
share of that British overseas investment was targeted at the estate industry which 
embarked upon rapid expansion and crop diversification.  The Agency House was at 
the forefront of these developments, and, by 1978, revenue from palm oil sales alone 
was producing 50 per cent of Harrisons’ group profits.741.  On the back of this 
commercial effort by British companies and investors alike, Malaysian public 
agencies like FELDA benefitted immensely from the subsequent research effort that 
those Agency Houses brought to bear on the industry.  Ultimately, a shared vision 
became evident between British firm and government in the estate industry and 
ensured subsequent rapid growth.  The Malaysian economy benefitted directly from 
this foreign investment as the palm oil industry grew to become a world leader in 
terms of production and exports.  The Agency Houses did not experience this growth 
equally, however. For Harrisons in particular, a progressive and favoured strategy of 
share accumulation rather than outright estate acquisitions, helped to spread risk, 
accelerate trade diversification and allow the board to redeploy business elsewhere, 
most particularly when trading conditions started to deteriorate in Malaysia.  
However, eventually, all of the British Agency Houses bowed to the demands of the 
Malaysian government and either sold majority holdings or were subjected to more 
direct and aggressive forms of takeover.  In many ways, though, the thesis 
                                                 
739 Stockwell, ‘Trade, Empire, and the Fiscal Context’, p. 158. 
740 See FN 521 and 577 above.   
741H&C MS37017/14, ‘Accounts for 1978 - 50% of profits – palm oil plantations’ and MS37020, ‘Consolidated 
results from trading 1973-1990’. 
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highlighted that the business contribution made by the Agency House in post-
colonial Malaysia was as significant and as indispensable as it was during 
imperialism.  Furthermore, it was very different from the role played by UAC in 
Nigeria. 
 
The Commodity Trade and Palm Oil Today 
The thesis selected the commodity trade as a central theme on which to base 
research on the commercial and trade disparities that became evident between 
Malaysia and Nigeria during and after British rule.  Those disparities were largely 
responsible for the different company structures that emerged in each nation.  The 
growth of a Malaysian palm oil industry after the Second World War has been 
particularly remarkable.  The advantage of that commodity over competing crops 
became (and remains) evident in the global market for oils and fats.  Among the ten 
major oilseeds, oil palm accounts for just 5.5 per cent of global land use and yet 
produces 32 per cent of the planet’s oils and fats.742  Furthermore, yields are even 
more impressive for palm oil when compared to other vegetable oils, as the table 
below shows. 
 
Table 8.1: Major Vegetable Oils - Yield per hectare743 
Oil Yield (tonnes) per Hectare 
Palm 3.66 
Soybean 0.36 
Sunflower 0.46 
Rapeseed 0.6 
 
The figures in the table show that yields of oil palm per hectare far exceed all of the 
other major oilseed crops combined, indeed ten times that of the commodity’s 
nearest challenger, soybean oil.  Again, the figures shown in this table are those 
obtained from large and efficiently run estates supported by modern milling facilities. 
                                                 
742See <http://www.simedarby.com/upload/Palm_Oil_Facts_and_Figures.pdf, figures extracted from Oil World 
2013, (accessed, 1 November 2014). 
743 Leslie Davidson, ‘Save the Jungles: Plant Oil Palm’, Global Oils and Fats Business Magazine, 7 (2010), p. 11. 
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 In 2013, exports of palm oil provided the Malaysian economy with around 6 
per cent of the nation’s GDP.  That represented M$80.3 billion (£16 billion) of a total 
commodity export figure of M$130 billion (£26 billion), or roughly 70 per cent of 
commodity exports.744  A major factor behind this contemporary success has been 
the historical contribution made by British firms like the Agency Houses featured in 
this thesis.  British rule was, for the Malaysian estate industry, a largely positive 
experience that facilitated investment and thereby persistent growth.  As the 
historian Sven Beckert highlighted in his study on cotton ‘within this larger story of 
domination and exploitation, however, sits a parallel story of liberation and 
creativity.’ 745   In palm oil, the research undertaken by the Agency Houses and 
Unilever was instrumental in the creative aspect of this equation.  With global 
demand for palm oil forecasted to grow further, the prospects for the industry are 
extremely upbeat.  Ultimately, the economy of Malaysia has benefitted economically 
and socially from agriculture where other former British colonies, like Nigeria, have 
not.  Much of that was largely due to the different approaches taken by government 
to resident British firms after independence.  In the case of Malaysia, the post-
colonial role of the Agency House was therefore significant and crucial for an estate 
industry from which the economy and people continue to profit enormously. 
 
 In Nigeria, the government was not stable, nor was it as predisposed to 
playing host to British firms after independence.  Therefore, the long-standing trade 
dominance of UAC quickly came to be resented by national politicians, many of 
whom were businessmen.  Moreover, the company also became a favoured target 
for punitive legislation.  As a result, foreign investment never reached the levels 
achieved in Malaysia, and agriculture suffered as a result.  The longstanding and 
never-ending ban on foreign land ownership and the retention of the much maligned 
commodity marketing boards long after the Second World War were clear 
disincentives to any real investment in agriculture.  As Lord Leverhulme had warned 
many years ago: 
                                                 
744 MPOB, see <http://www.palmoilworld.org/sustainability.html>, (accessed, 3 July 2013). 
745 Beckert, Empire of Cotton, p. 442. 
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We had no right to collect the fruit or to force the Native to collect it, with the 
result that there was such an irregular supply of fruit that when our £20,000 
capital was exhausted we packed up and went away.746 
 
Nigeria was, therefore, never in a position, commercially or institutionally, to benefit 
from the expertise and technology that British firms like Unilever, through UAC, could 
potentially offer.  As a result, the commodity trade, including the celebrated palm oil 
industry, did not receive the necessary backing to enable it to keep pace with 
developments in Malaysia.  UAC, previously a commercial mainstay in the 
commodity trade, exited at independence and focused instead on more specialised 
agency business including local manufacturing with, it was found, very mixed 
success in Nigeria.  UAC’s parent company Unilever then moved its estate ambitions 
east to Malaysia, where conditions of trade were more welcoming.  The company 
took with it an extensive back catalogue of research amassed in Africa and thus 
followed in the footsteps of Dutch planters who first carried oil palm seeds across the 
seas to South East Asia a century earlier.747 
 
 In conducting this comparative history of British Agency Houses in two former 
colonies, our knowledge and understanding of business growth overseas, 
particularly in agriculture-related industry, has been enhanced.  Moreover, it perhaps 
delivers a valuable lesson on the importance of creating business conditions that are 
attractive to foreign firms to enable economic development in all nations today.  Far 
from being a one-sided story of British commercial exploitation after imperialism, one 
could argue that successive Malaysian regimes effectively manipulated the Agency 
Houses to invest in and grow an estate industry until the government and domestic 
firms were in a position to take over.  From a company perspective, anticipating that 
eventuality was key to business survival.  The business history of Harrisons 
illustrates that final point particularly well. 
 
 
 
                                                 
746 Unilever GB1752.LBC149, Secretary’s Private file, speech by Lord Leverhulme, Liverpool, 9 July 1924. 
747 The first oil palm seeds were delivered to the Botanic Gardens of Buitenzorg in Java from Mauritius and 
Amsterdam in 1848. The first rubber seeds arrived at the Botanic Gardens, Singapore in 1875. See D J M Tate, 
The RGA History of the Plantation Industry in the Malay Peninsula, (Kuala Lumpur: OUP, 1996), p. 451. 
271 
Future Research 
While tackling this wide-ranging comparative study of British Agency Houses in 
Malaysia and Nigeria, it became apparent that some subject areas could not be 
addressed fully.  One such area was the environmental damage caused by 
commodity production, and particularly by oil palm estates in Borneo.  This, of 
course, is a major area of concern for a number of non-governmental organisations 
(NGOs) including the World Wildlife Fund.  To the industry’s credit, the establishment 
of a Roundtable for Sustainable Palm Oil is now making significant headway, and, at 
the time of writing, the supply of environmentally certified palm oil now accounts for 
20 per cent of total production.748  There is some way to go, however there is 
certainly scope to investigate what is today an extremely contentious topic.  One of 
those interviewed by this thesis has spent many years countering the more 
excessive NGO claims levelled at the industry while championing the benefits of an 
estate culture.  In a paper entitled ‘Save the Jungles’, Leslie Davidson fights the 
corner for the industry arguing that ‘oil palm presents us with the only viable way to 
preserve the jungles and the wildlife of Southeast Asia’. 749   Again, this is a 
contentious claim worthy of further investigation. 
 
 A further area not fully covered here was the significant role of FELDA in the 
rapid expansion of Malaysia’s estate industry.  This agency was instrumental in 
providing a means for rural people to develop economically as part of an estate 
industry.  FELDA delivered employment and ownership rights to a vast number of 
previously disenfranchised indigenous people.  The sheer scale of the programme 
since 1956 was such that, in 2012, FELDA was successfully listed on the KLSE.  
Another potential and purely business-focussed research opportunity lies in 
exploring the development of the Harrisons’ business after complete withdrawal from 
Malaysia.  This has the potential to reveal much more on the evolution of the Agency 
House after successful business redeployment and reinvention as a company 
specialising in the chemical industry.  Lastly, and sadly, the whereabouts of the 
Guthries archives still remains a mystery.  Even the last British chairman of the 
                                                 
748 The Economist, ‘a Recipe for Sustainability’, 416, 1 August 2015. The RSPO scheme was launched in 2008 
and now accounts for around 11 million tonnes of palm oil supplies globally. The rise has been largely caused 
by increased environmental awareness and NGO pressure applied to the western markets. 
749 Davidson, ‘Save the Jungle’, p. 9. 
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company, who sadly passed away aged 92 while I was writing this thesis, did not 
know where the material may have ended up.  Tracking down that collection would 
undoubtedly add further insight into the role of British Agency Houses overseas and 
particularly in Malaysia. 
 
 On the Nigerian side of the story, there is scope to investigate what became 
of UAC’s previous business assets on ‘the Coast’.  Again, this may prove to be a 
difficult line of study given that so many of those assets ended up in the hands of 
Nigerian politicians.  Gaining access to papers or obtaining the testimony of key 
individuals, as this researcher discovered, could be tricky.  Perhaps an easier route 
would be to access and review the business papers held at the government 
depository in Calabar.  That said, any prospective researcher should first consider 
the reported condition of these papers (randomly stacked in boxes from floor to 
ceiling).  However, the documents may throw light on some of the more questionable 
development projects that were funded by the commodity marketing boards.  Again, 
though, that could prove problematic given some of the alleged shady deals that took 
place.  One final, though perhaps monumental, research project would be to 
compare British firms that previously operated in West Africa to French firms also 
active there.  A French Agency House mentioned in this thesis, CFAO, still operates 
in West Africa, and obviously survived the foreign commercial cull that forced UAC 
out in the early 1980s.  In 2015, CFAO reported revenues of €3.56 billion, and part of 
that figure came from trade conducted in Nigeria.750  That a French firm survived 
where UAC perished is certainly worthy of investigation and could throw up some 
interesting findings to add to our understanding of business development in West 
Africa after colonial rule. 
 
 One closing potential area for future research is inspired by a comment made 
by the wife of a former Harrisons’ employee.  She said that someone should look into 
the crucial role that was carried out by the British wives who accompanied husbands 
overseas to the estates of Malaysia and, indeed, elsewhere in the former Empire.  
Those women lived through extremely trying times and in living conditions that were 
                                                 
750 CFAO company website, see < http://www.investisseur.cfaogroup.com/phoenix.zhtml?c=232311&p=irol-
regulatoryinfocustom#>, (accessed, 1 August 2016). 
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challenging, to put it mildly.  There, they raised children while husbands headed off 
into the fields.  As Mrs MacKenzie said on one visit to interview her husband: ‘Don’t 
forget the wives, there is a thesis in the making on that subject’.751 
  
                                                 
751 Interview with Rod MacKenzie, 10 July 2015. Rod’s wife made this remark after one interview as an aside. It 
was a valid point to make and one that could open up an avenue for research. 
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Appendix A: Brief Biographies for Key Actors quoted in Thesis 
Raja Tan Sri Dato Seri Utama Muhammad Alias Raja Muhammad Ali:  Joined the 
Malaysian Federal Land Development Authority (FELDA) in 1966 and was Deputy 
Chairman for 35 years until his retirement in 2001. 
 
Henry Sackville Barlow:  Joined the accounts department of Barlow Boustead 
Estates Agency in Kuala Lumpur, was appointed financial director in 1972 and joint 
managing director in 1976. In 1971 he was made a partner in Thomas Barlow & 
Brother and in 1972 joint managing director of Highlands & Lowlands Para Rubber 
Co. Ltd.   The company was sold to Malaysian public agencies in 1982.  Henry is 
currently a Senior Independent non-Executive Director on the board of Sime Darby. 
 
Hereward Corley:  Former Head of Plantations Research for Unilever.  He joined the 
Oil Palm Genetics Laboratory as a plant physiologist in 1967.  Subsequently ran a 
joint venture tissue culture project between Unilever and Harrisons.  Became Head 
of Plantations Research in 1983 where he remained until 1988.  Since then he has 
been an independent consultant and is still working in the oil palm industry.  He is 
co-author of the definitive text book, The Oil Palm (R. H. V. Corley and P. B. Tinker, 
Oxford: Blackwell, 2003, 4th edition.  The 5th edition is in press with Wiley Blackwell, 
Oxford and should be out this year). 
 
Leslie Davidson:  Former Chairman of Unilever’s Plantations Group.  He arrived in 
Malaysia in 1951 to be employed as an Assistant Estate Manager on the UniPamol 
oil palm estate.  In 1956 was posted to West Africa and worked in both the 
Cameroons and Nigeria.  In 1960 was again posted out East to establish a new 
UniPamol estate on Sabah.  Was posted back to London in 1974 and became 
Chairman of the Plantations Group 1983. He retired in 1991. 
 
Marcus Gent:  Former Chairman of Guthries.  Spent ten years in Malaysia running all 
company estate and general trading interests up until the company was taken over in 
1983 by Permodalan Berhad of Malaysia.  He retired from Guthries in 1984. 
 
Brian Gray:  Former Senior Scientist for Harrisons & Crosfield Plantations Division.  
Set up the company Oil Palm Research Station at Banting, Malaysia in 1955 (now 
the Sime Darby Research Station).  Retired from Harrisons in 1970 and joined the 
World Bank. 
 
David Griffin:  Former UAC Employee.  David spent 36 years working in and with 
Nigeria.  He was first posted to West Africa in 1954 as a Trading Assistant at Rivers 
State, in the Delta region of Nigeria.  He was then posted to the Cameroons as 
District Manager.  After some time back in London working for Corporate Planning 
he was again posted out to Nigeria as Corporate Planning and Development Advisor 
for Guinness Nigeria and shortly after joined the board for Guinness in West Africa. 
David spent several years working between London, Nigeria and Ghana as the 
company extended current breweries and build four more in West Africa.  He also 
served on the board for Vono and Vitafoam, both associated companies of UAC.  He 
finally came back to the UK in 1982 as Guinness Liaison Manager in UAC.  He 
retired in 1990. 
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David Hopkinson:  Former Chairman and Head Fund Manager in Municipal 
&General Investments, one of the UK’s largest and longest established investment 
houses, with more than 80 years’ experience.  David specialised in the plantation 
sector of Malaysia and spent many years (1970-88) working in the sector which 
entailed countless visits to the region to scrutinise investments.  In 1988 he became 
Chairman of Harrisons, a post he held until 1992 at which point David retired. 
 
Roderick MacKenzie:  Former Plantation Manager and Director of Visiting Agents for 
Harrisons & Crosfield.  He joined Harrisons in 1959 as an assistant manager and 
over the next 30 years he managed company plantations in Malaya, Sabah and 
Papua New Guinea.  He then joined VA department and eventually became Director 
of VA Services.  In 1989 he was ‘head hunted’ by a large Indonesian company to be 
its Managing Director Plantations with a brief to expand the company’s oil palm 
interests in Sumatra and Kalimantan.  He then became involved in the company’s 
expansion into the pulp and paper industry growing eucalypt and acacia species on 
a large plantation scale.  MacKenzie remains active in the plantation industry today 
in a consultancy capacity for some major firms. 
 
Tony Thomas:  Former UAC Employee.  He began employment with Unilever as a 
Messenger Boy in 1939 before joining the Royal Navy in World War II.  At the end of 
hostilities he re-joined Unilever and served in several posts including editor of the 
UAC Statistical & Economic Review and Corporate Planning and eventually the 
Board Committee Secretariat of UAC.  Tony retired in 1984. 
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Appendix B: Malaysian Titles 
Raja is a title for Malay royalty, as is Tengku as in Tengku Mansur. 
Datuk     = Knight 
Tan Sri    = Lord 
Tun         = possibly Duke 
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